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This study performs a reading of Wittgenstein’s thought that integrates his sometimes 
sidelined remarks on aesthetics and belief, and emphasises consideration of language 
use on the level of practice. It analyses the many ways that Wittgenstein engages with 
the inexpressible or the limits of expression through comparison with poetry as a 
practice. The potential of a Wittgensteinian method of literary analysis concentrating on 
grammatical structures, exemplary forms of expression and quotidian meaning-making 
is shown by viewing several poets’ work in connection with specific forms of the 
inexpressible. 
This thesis consists of three parts. The first chapter surveys previous applications of 
Wittgenstein to aesthetic appreciation and analysis, and considers common 
interpretations of his earlier and later work. Incorporating a wide range of Wittgenstein 
sources allows a new reading to emerge that gives appropriate weight to his hitherto 
under-researched writings. This reading is tested in Chapters 2-5, in each case studying 
a poet or poets alongside a philosophical text or topic. Chapter 2 uses the negative 
theology of Pseudo-Dionysius to probe the ineffable; through Cora Diamond’s resolute 
reading of the Tractatus, Kei Miller’s ‘Church Women’ series and John Burnside’s 
intimate ineffable of ‘Parousia’, a grammatical understanding of inexpressibility 
emerges. Chapter 3 compares John McDowell’s minimal realism in Mind and World 
with Wallace Steven’s Supreme Fiction, demonstrating how Stevens’ – and 
Wittgenstein’s – rich conception of experience can close off a number of philosophical 
lacunae. Chapter 4 concentrates on the poetry of Jorie Graham, whose conception of the 
self is saturated with language. Parallels with Wittgenstein’s methodology are drawn, 
and some reminders issued to curb the excesses of postmodern accounts of subjectivity. 
The focus in Chapter 5 moves to the use of cartographical metaphor in Philosophical 
Investigations and Kei Miller’s poetry. The constraints of specific discourses on our 
thinking are examined, together with poetry’s potential for laying bare or reinvigorating 
the pictures by which we navigate. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses a selection of poetic 
projects completed alongside my research, to extend the reading of Wittgenstein into the 
area of creative practice. 
This thesis demonstrates Wittgenstein’s prolonged engagement with the limits of 
expression and with poetry, as well as the profit of a Wittgensteinian approach to poetry. 
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It thereby questions a number of current responses to Wittgenstein’s work, and displays 
its own original creative outcomes.  
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My fascination with Wittgenstein began with two inspiring teachers at the University of 
Warwick, Professors Michael Luntley and Tim Thornton, who introduced me to the 
philosophy of Wittgenstein, and in particular the astounding, to me, implications of his 
remarks on rule-following and private language in Philosophical Investigations. These 
considerations have remained part of my research and poetic practice ever since, both as 
aspects of my process and as explicit sources of technique and inspiration. I initially 
considered the possibility of devising a grammar of theology that accommodated 
Wittgenstein’s insights, elements of which survive in the discussion of ineffability in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. As my plans for further research developed, I was often struck 
by how rarely and reluctantly analytic philosophy as a discipline engaged with the 
literature and poetry that interested me, despite the obvious applicability of 
Wittgenstein, in particular, to the subject. As I read more of his posthumously revealed 
notes and letters, the importance of poetry for his thinking became ever clearer, though 
it remained a challenge to connect his two seminal texts, the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, to this other material. Eventually, I 
came to see that the points at which language appears to hit its limits – capturing 
aesthetic appreciation, experimentations in poetic form and effect, religious or mystical 
experience, and certain perennial questions of philosophy – were a continuity in 
Wittgenstein’s writing, a challenge to look beyond the apparent necessities of our means 
of expression, the pictures that hold us captive. Instead of attempting to answer 
questions that elude the language in which they are posed, we might try to make clear 
what led us to ask those questions in the first place. Some of these questions are 
stimulated by traditions of language, such as theological terms enshrined in dogma, 
some by the deep metaphors that structure our language, others by the pictures we have 
of how language work, which may be partial or historical. Ultimately, our questions 
arise at the level of practice, since meaning is generated in our repeated use of language 
and by the values we attach to our activities. 
Two intertwined motivations therefore underlie this thesis. I first intend to propose and 
demonstrate a reading of Wittgenstein that makes better sense than available treatments 
of Wittgenstein’s works as a whole, with particular emphasis on aesthetics and the 
notion of practice. These elements of Wittgenstein’s philosophy remain under-
researched, meaning that my reading will contribute to a better understanding of 
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Wittgenstein’s growing cultural importance outside philosophy, as well as what his 
writing still has to offer the Academy. Secondly, because my own interest lies in the 
field of poetry, which also supplies the bulk of the case studies I use to develop this 
reading, I hope that the reminders I assemble here can provide the basis of a method of 
literary analysis. Wittgenstein’s intense attention to the operations of grammar and 
varieties of use can draw our attention to aspects of a poet’s work that might otherwise 
be subsumed under wider theories of their practice. In this thesis I decided it was most 
apposite to focus on poets sharing something of Wittgenstein’s philosophical and 
cultural heritage, though I decided against studying the poetry of a particular period, 
since, as will be discussed, the individual styles and voices of specific poets appealed to 
my sense of what Wittgenstein could offer. The inexpressible provides the linking thread 
between these ambitions, as a shared concern of Wittgenstein and the poets discussed. 
By laying out the logic and language of the inexpressible – its philosophical 
temptations, grounding practices and grammatical techniques – the thesis also 
contributes new possibilities for thinking about the inexpressible and our attitudes 
towards it. 
 
Wittgenstein’s Style  
Interpretations of Wittgenstein’s work are extremely various and hotly debated, not least 
the ‘Tractatus Wars’ and the Theory-Therapy debates over Philosophical Investigations. 
His contributions to several areas of philosophy and beyond are still being measured, 
and – as this thesis contends – there are still further contributions to be made. A large 
part of the difficulty of summarising Wittgenstein’s thought comes from his style of 
writing, as the discussion of competing readings in Chapter 1 makes clear. Austin E. 
Quigley has characterised Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations as ‘a peculiar 
aggregate of loosely related paragraphs which offers no detailed statement of intended 
goals, no sustained elaboration of a narrative thread, and no triumphant summary of 
achieved conclusions’ (‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophizing and Literary Thinking’ 209).  
The extent to which this is experienced as a frustration or an inspiration may vary 
significantly. I generally follow Stanley Cavell in seeing Wittgenstein’s style as integral 
to his thinking – perhaps even constitutive of it (CV 24e) – and alongside Cora Diamond 
and Marjorie Perloff, Cavell functions as a recurring critical ally in my analysis. Like 
Cavell, Wittgenstein can be thought of as comparing many different ways in which we 
approach the limits of expression, to show how and when we can change direction from 
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what looked like an inevitable course (James Loxley and Andrew Taylor ‘Everyday 
Achievements?’ 3). This, of course, stands in contrast to most philosophers, for whom 
‘the ordering of the words is (mere) grammar or syntax’ (Timothy Gold ‘The Literal 
Truth’ 153). 
An important aspect that remains under-researched is the relationship between the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, and the continuing 
publication of Wittgenstein’s collected posthumous remarks in, for example, On 
Certainty, Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough and Culture and Value, as well as 
unedited manuscripts, lecture notes from students, letters and memoirs. Arethese 
materials to influence our understanding of his published philosophical views, or are 
they entirely separable, and of chiefly biographical interest?  
Throughout, I argue that it is possible to steer a middle course. By giving proper weight 
to Wittgenstein’s background and unpublished notes, without giving a merely historical 
account of his writing, the flexibility and complexity of his thought as a coherent whole 
can be discerned – a philosophy of continual effort and activity. This avoids either the 
temptations of speculative philosophising that he explicitly warns against, but also some 
of the limitations and assumptions of dissipative, therapeutic interpretations. The thesis 
as a whole attempts to perform the proposed reading by considering individual case 
studies within the chapters and assembling a series of reminders about our practices. As 
Rupert Read argues in ‘Throwing Away the “Bedrock”’, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is 
best considered as having a non-technical vocabulary (84); as such, the term “practice” 
as I use it operates as a method and a reminder, rather than a solution. Only in our 
activities does our language find meaning, and these practices can be diverse, disguised 
and conflicting; in the patterns of their ebb and flow we glimpse the broader forms of 
our understanding.  
Wittgenstein: Between Romantic and Modern 
As will be discussed in the coming chapters, these glimpses – real or imagined – may 
best capture how the inexpressible intrudes on our everyday speaking and acting. Where 
language is challenged by new pictures, nonsense (hidden or plain), unsettleable 
competing images, or altered attitudes towards objects or persons, the limits of our 
expressions are brought into view. Such a description naturally calls to mind the 
capacities and traditions of poetry, especially Modernist poetry’s questioning and 
revealing of form and estrangement of language, and the transformative language of 
Romanticism. Although this thesis does not depend on either a Modernist or a Romantic 
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reading of Wittgenstein, these are instructive avenues of thought given Wittgenstein’s 
cultural background and aesthetic preferences. At various points in the chapters I 
therefore make use of the Romantic or Modernist concerns of the poets discussed. 
Others have explored Wittgenstein’s formative background in considerably more detail 
than I can here, notably Wittgenstein’s Vienna by Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, 
Marjorie Perloff’s Wittgenstein’s Ladder and ‘Avant-Garde in a Different Key’, and Ray 
Monk’s The Duty of Genius. Yet the importance within that background of arts and 
culture would be difficult to overstate. ‘In hardly any other European city was the urge 
towards culture as passionate as in Vienna’, writes Stefan Zweig, Wittgenstein’s near 
contemporary. ‘You were not truly Viennese without a love for culture, a bent for both 
enjoying and assessing the prodigality of life as something sacred’ (The World of 
Yesterday 42, 51). Romanticism, Modernism and the particular qualities of the Viennese 
avant-garde and Jewish intellectualism had their confluence in the city, producing art of 
a scarcely surpassed sophistication and popular impact. Wittgenstein is thus a figure at 
the crossing of several traditions, thriving and dying. He lived in the late years of 
Romanticism, and often invoked masters of the period as his aesthetic ideals; he also 
lived in the years of High Modernism, and could be variously conceived as aligned with 
aesthetic or critical modernism through his cultural context in Vienna (for further 
discussion of these streams see Janik and Toulmin Wittgenstein’s Vienna and Dimitris 
Gakis Contextual Metaphilosophy). His philosophy shares many of this latter 
movement’s challenges to form and responses to war, as argued in Marjorie Perloff’s 
Wittgenstein’s Ladder and Rupert Read’s ‘Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" 
as a War Book’, while his style has been connected with Romanticism, particularly the 
interlocutor voices discussed further in Chapter 1, as a form of poetic meditation (John 
Koethe The Continuity of Wittgenstein’s Thought). 
 
Poetic Case Studies and Chapter Structure  
The poets I have selected for this thesis stand at similar crossing points between literary 
and cultural movements. Following an overview of current scholarship into 
Wittgenstein, each chapter centres around a poet or poets, and a different aspect of the 
inexpressible discoverable in Wittgenstein’s work. Very brief summaries are given 
below, though since the chapters are designed to function semi-independently, I present 
them here not in the order of their appearance in the thesis, but on the basis of a poetic 
inheritance traced between the poets, beginning with Wallace Stevens. This will, I hope, 
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serve to justify the choices of poets made, as well as illustrate the multiple ways the 
concerns of each chapters hang together.  
Wallace Stevens is most often conceived of as a late-Romantic poet. Simon Critchley in 
Things Merely Are argues for Stevens as following a critical form of romantic idealism, 
driven by the finitude and power of the imagination; Joseph Carroll asserts that for 
Stevens ‘Romanticism was not a remote historical episode. It overlapped with his own 
life, and it formed the immediate historical background to his life’s work as a poet’ 
(‘Stevens and Romanticism’ 87). His modernity, both historically and formally, as a 
reaction against the Enlightenment goals of factual certainty, is well charted, for 
example by Charles Altieri (Wallace Stevens and the Demands of Modernity) or by the 
essays in Wallace Stevens: The Poetics of Modernism. Stevens’ repeated challenges to 
traditional philosophical questions through the powers, failure and nobility of poetry 
make him an ideal interlocutor for academic philosophy, particular of the stream that 
take Wittgensteinian considerations in alternative directions. In Chapter 3, Stevens’ idea 
of the Supreme Fiction is paired with John McDowell’s seminal Mind and World to 
consider the apparent problem of finding meaning in the world, or of grounding what 
we say in our living outside language. Combining McDowell’s ‘re-enchantment’ and 
Stevens’ deflation of mind/world dualism through the capacity and responsiveness of 
the imagination enables a Wittgensteinian picture of continually renewed practice and 
expression to emerge. What had seemed to be the inexpressible beyond our language, or 
the meaningless underlying it becomes an integrated and active part of our practices. 
Chapter 2 addresses the idea of the inexpressible, or ineffable, particularly as it applies 
to the final propositions of the Tractatus. Using the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus as a 
model of negative theology – contemplating and preserving the ineffable through denial 
and deferral of attributions to the divine – this chapter seeks to understand 
Wittgenstein’s conception of the mystical, and shows how neither ineffabilist nor 
resolute readings of the Tractatus account for his respect for, and exclusion of, the 
inexpressible in his writing. By showing the grammatical techniques deployed in 
ineffability talk, a domesticated notion of the inexpressible is proposed, for which the 
Überwindung (surpassing, over-coming, moving beyond) of poetry provides an arena of 
experimentation and expression. The ‘philosophically astonishing’ is shown to inhabit 
rather than exceed language (OC §622). Two poets are harnessed to support this 
investigation: Kei Miller and John Burnside. John Burnside is an acknowledged 
follower of Wallace Stevens, and can be considered to be addressing similar questions 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
13 
 
of world-making, value-making and the writing of the real, though Burnside is more 
politically and ecologically involved (Tom Bristow The Anthropocene Lyric). He can 
therefore be considered as continuing elements of Steven’s late-Romantic, Modernist 
process, tinged with a more Heideggerian than Nietzschean spirit, though maintaining 
an interest in Wittgenstein’s work (‘Words to touch the invisible’). His continual 
uncovering of the ineffable within the ordinary rather than something excluded from it 
provides, nonetheless, a useful illustration of Wittgenstein’s insistence on remaining 
within the realms of ordinary language, without denying it its character, eeriness or 
cupidity. Kei Miller is less obviously connected to Wittgenstein and Stevens’ cultural 
inheritance than the other poets here, though I will show how his different background 
still allows significant and expanded considerations of the same themes. Miller’s poems 
and essays centre on the problems and potential of post-colonial writing, and the 
establishment of a Caribbean literary heritage. His political and environmental concerns, 
particularly in The Cartographer Tries to Map a Way to Zion, invite the reader to 
question forms of language within and beyond poetry. Miller’s writing is most often 
described as musical, honest and moving – and set in contrast to the over-
intellectualisation that besets much contemporary poetry. In this chapter, his series of 
‘Church Women’ poems provide a vivid illustration of the language of mysticism in 
quotidian action, as metaphor and narrative tell stories of faith performed, projected and 
lost. I read in Miller’s accounts of a lost and mourned faith many reflections of 
Wittgenstein’s own life and attitude towards the ineffable.  
Chapter 5 returns to Kei Miller’s work as a means of exploring Wittgenstein’s use of 
metaphor in Philosophical Investigations, in which poetry plays the role of a refresher 
of language and revealer of conflicting modes of discourse. The inexpressible is 
characterised as a philosophical urge and frustration, through an interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘perspicuous representation’ (PI §122) and philosophy as 
poetry (CV 28e), paralleled through Miller’s Cartographer and Rastaman, and their 
misaligning worldviews moderated through poetry, music and shared moments of life; 
thought escapes the confines of the head (Z §605). 
The final poet considered is Jorie Graham, another follower of the path set by Stevens. 
Her work and process are formally challenging, and I identify points of contact with 
Wittgenstein’s techniques of allusion, conversation, allegory and repetition with 
variation, at times with specific reference to the philosopher (e.g.: ‘From Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus’ in Materialism). Yet, Graham also sees herself as living in an age of distrust 
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of our own hearts and bodies, with the ‘still operative inheritance of the desire for 
Romantic fulfilment’ (‘The Glorious Thing’). The unsettleable movement between the 
authoritative ‘I’ of subjectivity and sincerity, and the socially constructed and active ‘I’ 
‘that falls in love, falls out of love, gives birth, loses loved ones, inhales when passing 
by a fragrant rosebush--the "I" that has no choice but mortality’ (‘The Glorious Thing’) 
provides the force of much of her writing. In this fashion it parallels Wittgenstein’s 
moves back and forth between our everyday experience and the caricatures we draw of 
it when we attempt to philosophise. The poem in Graham’s hands, like Peter Gizzi’s 
description of the book, becomes a ‘strange object to discover ourselves. / The flesh-
bound volume is also the reader, and is wounded’ (‘Correspondences of the Book’ 183). 
The idea of an inexpressible within language generated by our own immersion in it is 
interrogated here, including through the use of this image of wounding. Meanwhile, my 
reading of Wittgenstein provides a number of reminders of the pictures we use in talking 
about our inner life, as alternatives to some flights of philosophical fancy.  
Since this thesis concerns both poetry and practice, and moves incrementally from 
traditional philosophical analysis in Chapter 1 towards literary analysis and case studies 
in Chapters 4 and 5, the final chapter resides more firmly int the realm of practice, and 
discusses my own poetry projects that express aspects of this research. Alongside the 
critical work here, I produced collaborative and inter-disciplinary work of various kinds, 
to put into practice (or at least poetry) some of the ideas considered. Chapter 6 
introduces some of these projects and draws connections with specific areas of the 
preceding chapters. The installations, poetry collections and events provided alternative 
ways of testing the themes tackled in the thesis, and aim to operate as further stimulus to 
thinking on the varieties of the inexpressible. Two collections of poems are provided as 
appendices to illustrate my practice.  
 
The Limits of this Study and Suggestions for Further Research 
Through these several strands of enquiry, I have attempted to put forward a refined 
reading of Wittgenstein that is more accommodating to his work as a whole, in 
particular his interest in poetry, aesthetics and ethics. Naturally there are many points on 
which more could be said, but space and expertise are limited; much of the discussion is 
internal to existing Wittgenstein scholarship. I do not, for example, elaborate on the 
many available readings of Pseudo-Dionysius, especially after Derrida, or on the history 
and vitality of Caribbean literature much though such a discussion might enrich the 
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current task. I have used only small selections from the poets’ creations, and could 
equally have used other writers. My reading of Wittgenstein is deliberately not 
definitive or complete, and relies, where not on the established research of others, on the 
interpretations and understandings of a particular kind of mind and background. 
However, given these acknowledged limitations, I have aimed to provide a coherent and 
productive picture that challenges some descriptions of Wittgenstein as more ‘single-
minded or rigid in his work’ than is merited by  his writing as a whole (Eran Guter 
‘Critical Study: An Inadvertent Nemesis’ 299).  
It would be rewarding to pursue this readings in connection with other poets and 
traditions, and the possibilities of reading Wittgenstein’s work in a more literary way. 
Indisputably, though his influence on professional philosophy has fluctuated over time 
and in different fields, his wider cultural reception continues to flourish, inspiring artists 
and attracting critical literary interest (Ben Leubner ‘The Limits of my Language’ 11). 
In the introduction to Wittgenstein’s Ladder Marjorie Perloff provides a considerable list 
of novels, plays and poetry collections that have emerged ‘under the sign of 
Wittgenstein’ (6), to which could be added many more. ‘The Wittgenstein Vector’ 
discussed in Chapter 6 is a further addition to this tradition.  
  




Chapter One: Wittgenstein, Aesthetics 
and Practice 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to give an overview of the variety of  interpretations and 
applications of Wittgenstein’s work, focussed through the themes relevant to this thesis 
– aesthetics and ethics, conceptions of language and practice, the nature of 
Wittgenstein’s texts, and the limits of language and expression. While largely 
concentrating here on Wittgenstein’s writings and the most common accounts and 
critiques thereof, I will indicate connections with the material in later chapters, and 
where the practice-oriented conception of his philosophical project that I ultimately 
favour contributes to the analysis to come.  
There are generally two ways of seeing Wittgenstein’s place in the philosophy of 
aesthetics. On the one hand his influence is felt in many fields and schools of thought, 
with his concepts of family resemblance and language games frequently cited in 
discussions of the nature, judgement and anthropology of art. On the other hand, he 
published nothing and privately wrote very little on the subject, at least in the form of 
books, essays, or direct arguments. In the 2004 anthology Aesthetics and the Philosophy 
of Art, for example, there are no contributions by Wittgenstein, and he is only 
mentioned twelve times in its 571 pages, the great majority of these being confined to 
two articles – ‘The Role of Theory in Aesthetics’, by Morris Weitz (of which see more 
below) and Stephen Davies’ response, ‘Weitz’s Anti-Essentialism’. Wittgenstein’s 
famous concepts, especially ‘family resemblance’, are cherry-picked and often 
misapplied, both in analytic philosophy and in other fields (Guter ‘Critical study: An 
Inadvertent Nemesis’ 296). In this chapter, I give an overview of instances where 
Wittgenstein’s work has been cited or influential in aesthetics, but will argue for the 
necessity of a much more integrated view of his work, both early and late. While 
pointing to key readings of the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations, with 
particular reference to the aesthetic, I also draw attention to the persistent and vital 
search for integrity, clarity and particularity in his work, across multiple fields, 
including religion, culture, philosophy and ethics. The importance of the ethical and the 
mystical, which has long been recognised in Wittgenstein’s earlier writing, but is more 
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difficult to comprehend in his later, is shown to be a continuing presence but modulated 
by developments in his conception of language and his philosophical project. 
Throughout, the close connection between ethics and aesthetics is evident, as is 
Wittgenstein’s sustained interest in the limits and illusions of our language – both 
supposed and structural. The importance of poetry to his thinking, and its potential as a 
philosophical tool, is emphasised. This in part supports the claims made later in this 
chapter that studying Wittgenstein through a Romantic lens can be fruitful, and that the 
practice-oriented reading suggested can address some short-comings in the most 
common current treatments of his work. This chapter thereby lays the groundwork for 
discussions in later chapters, in which particular cases of the inexpressible, or the 
apparent falling short of language, are explored through the juxtaposition of poetic craft 
and philosophical analysis.  
 
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 
Multiple interpretations of Wittgenstein’s work in relation to aesthetics exist, with 
considerable influence on the comparatively late and restructed consideration of 
literature within analytic philosophy. As will be discussed in the sections below, some 
have taken a very strong line on Wittgenstein’s supposed mantra of ‘meaning is use’ (PI 
§43); others have engaged with his holistic notion of the art object and its experience, 
and some have returned to the harmony of ethics, aesthetics and silence in the 
Tractatus. Connections can be drawn between his views on ethics, aesthetics, religion 
and ‘seeing-as’. Some readers have taken Wittgenstein’s work to have a strictly 
propaedeutic role in aesthetics (e.g. Malcolm Turvey in ‘Is scepticism a “natural 
possibility” of language?’), while others, notably Stanley Cavell, have attempted to 
apply a Wittgensteinian view directly to the ‘practice of humanistic inquiry ... namely, 
interpreting art works’ (Turvey 117). These readings have been variously productive, 
but often incompatible and problematic. My own intention over the coming chapters is 
to offer a reading and an application of Wittgenstein that insists on remaining piecemeal 
and incomplete, by staging connections between philosophical problems and poetic 
craft (often responses to these problems, or their formulation) and showing how an 
awareness of different techniques and contexts can provide both protection from 
philosophical pitfalls and an enriched understanding of the poetry to be discussed. 
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Wittgenstein has often been invoked by what one could call the anti-essentialists on the 
nature of Art, most famously William Kennick and Morris Weitz. According to 
Kennick, words reflect our life requirements, so the mystery of the artwork is nothing 
more than our habitual imprecision. The quality of something being ‘Art’ – so often 
connected to its being in some sense inexpressible – is not a genuine connection with 
something higher or beyond, but an experience of coming up against the limitations of 
our own available vocabulary. The artwork is something out of the ordinary, but not 
therefore indescribable or exposing us to something beyond language. Indeed, should 
we genuinely find a use for extending our vocabulary, there is nothing to stop us doing 
so – as we do in areas of specialisation, such as among ‘teatasters and winetasters’ 
(Kennick ‘Art and the Ineffable’ 312-13).
1
 To assume that our vocabulary is of necessity 
inadequate for describing the experience already presumes that we do know what would 
satisfy the description we wish to give – that we know enough about what the 
experience of the artwork is, to be able to say that it is beyond description. So either 
claiming that something is inexpressible is really just an expression of wonder in the 
face of the object (and not real aesthetic appreciation at all), or we should simply make 
greater effort to describe it, and the practical requirements of our society will decide, in 
the long run, whether the words we used are useful enough to keep. Kennick’s approach 
has the appeal of demystification, and a feeling of rigour, applying a Wittgensteinian 
critique to the sacred cows of super-sophisticated criticism or mysterious auras of 
authenticity and creativity. However, while it rightly brings into question whether Art 
might have an essential quality – and an inexpressible one at that – this dismissal of the 
importance of the experience of an artwork seems at odds with Wittgenstein’s own 
sense of the reverence and individuality due to aesthetic appreciation. As will be 
discussed below, although he insisted that art-criticism was a matter of technique and 
knowledge as much as revelation or simple expressions of emotion, expertise is not 
equivalent to possessing a formula for assessment (LC 9). A dismissal of our feelings of 
awe or inexpressibility in the face of artwork may be correct as a critique of some forms 
of philosophy or art-journalism but not as a way of describing or understanding our 
relation to art.  
                                                             
1 Kennick’s choice of example may be an oblique reference to PI §610: ‘Describe the aroma of coffee. – 
Why can’t it be done? Do we lack the words? And for what are words lacking? – But how do we get the 
idea that such a description must after all be possible? Have you ever felt the lack of such a description? 
Have you tried to describe the aroma and not succeeded?’ 
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Morris Weitz argued that the logic of the concept of Art precludes the kind of necessary 
and sufficient definition that traditional theories sought, preferring to see it as a family 
resemblance concept, drawn from Wittgenstein’s analysis of games in Philosophical 
investigations §§65-75. In ‘The Role of Theory in Aesthetics’, Weitz makes the case 
that ‘the inadequacies of the theories are not primarily occasioned by any legitimate 
difficulty such e.g., as the vast complexity of art, which might be corrected by further 
probing and research. Their basic inadequacies reside instead in a fundamental 
misconception of art’ (27), and ‘that if we actually look and see what it is that we call 
“art,” we will also find no common properties – only strands of similarities’ (31).  
Both Weitz and Kennick react against the notion of some ineffable residue to artistic 
experience – either because isuch exceeds our definition, or the possibilities of language 
–  even though such a grasping still commenly finds its expression in writing in this 
field, for example in Rafael De Clercq’s ‘Aesthetic Ineffability’ of 2000: 
 [M]uch of what we find of significance in art, and in aesthetic objects in 
general, cannot be rendered in words (without remainder) and so can never 
become fully our own. This observation, which I take to be in line with 
common sense, could also be phrased as follows: language, at least in its literal 
mode, is not able to capture fully the content of an aesthetic experience; 
aesthetic experience, therefore, may be said to put us in touch with the 
unsayable or ‘ineffable’.  (87) 
Although De Clercq does move on from this opening to make a case for something 
more Wittgensteinian in tone – that the ineffable merits a ‘banal’ sounding solution, in 
the manner of a word repeated over and over again (95; PI p214) – the notion remains 
that art connects with something beyond description; that because we feel that we 
cannot say everything, there must be something that we cannot say, some piece of 
information that by its nature resists informing us. It is this shadow of a conception of 
language as essentially information-giving that creates the apparent conundrum. 
Both Kennick and Weitz take up Wittgenstein’s insistence in Philosophical 
Investigations that language is tailored to a particular purpose such that, what on 
occasion looks like a boundary of expression turns out to be the limits of a particular 
practice rather than something generally inexpressible; the possible precision of our 
expression reflects our interest in making certain distinctions, both in terms of our 
natural history and capacity and the particular game we are playing. Likewise, some 
concepts – of which Art is Weitz’s chief candidate – evade a general definition, because 
the ways in which they can be used or experienced are non-uniform and evolving. 
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Without conflating the works of Weitz and Kennick, it would be fair to label them as 
chiefly interested in an anti-essentialist critique of aesthetics, drawing on Wittgenstein’s 
later insistence on distinct language-games and the ‘countless’ different types of 
sentences that make up our language use (PI §23). In ‘Problems and Prospects of 
Wittgensteinian Aesthetics’, Richard Eldridge has dubbed this approach a ‘classical 
Wittgensteinian Aesthetics’ (252), together with W.B. Gallie’s analysis of theories of 
art as making sense as part of an irresolvable but creative conflict, rather than as 
something for which a definitive solution exists (‘Philosophy and the Historical 
Understanding’ 177).  
Is aesthetics then no longer a discipline that might attain the status of a science, or be 
explained in terms of psychology? Wittgenstein thought the latter idea laughable (LC III 
§7). Some have taken this to be the end of the discussion, that if we must give up on the 
idea of a definition of art, we ought also to give up on the hope of a philosophy of art 
and treat aesthetics as merely a particular discourse with no connections or authority 
outside of itself. But several attempts have been made to preserve the space of a 
philosophical consideration of the aesthetic, without committing to what Daniel 
Kaufman calls a ‘new wave’ of definitional accounts of art (‘Family Resemblances, 
Relationalism and the Meaning of Art’). The most successful approaches involve 
linking the aesthetic with other areas of Wittgenstein’s thought.   
Béla Szabados insists that Wittgenstein’s remarks ‘about music and composers in his 
diaries and notebooks are in themselves interesting’, but that scholarship has largely still 
dismissed them as ‘a curiosity’; rather they ‘deserve to be taken seriously and to be 
related to his philosophical perspective’ (Wittgenstein as Philosophical Tone-Poet 13). 
This point has been made influentially and at length in Wittgenstein’s Vienna (Janik and 
Toulmin). The authors argue, for example, that the philosopher’s cultural background 
made it inevitable that logic, ethics and aesthetics were interrelated, since ‘their 
activities were likewise overlapping’. The ideal of intellectual and creative 
specialization, separating the philosopher from the artist, was a much later invention, 
foreign to pre-1914 Austria (26). The notion of the professional philosopher or 
philosophy as a profession was, after all, something Wittgenstein abhorred, even while 
making his living through appointments at Cambridge. As Cavell has argued (for 
example in ‘Must we mean what we say’) resistance to professionalization or 
systemisation of thinking is a common reaction to modernity in late-Romantic 
philosophy and poetry, to which one can legitimately connect Wittgenstein, as I will 
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argue later in this chapter and informs the discussion in Chapter 3. I attempt to include 
Wittgenstein’s private writings not as equivalent to, but as contributing to our 
understanding of, his philosophical texts, without succumbing to a merely biographical 
account. This more holistic treatment will assist in avoiding some of the more 
superficial elements of an anti-essentialist reading, which can at times seem to offer an 
intellectually unjustified shrug in the face of our common aesthetic experiences. 
Richard Eldridge argues that although the anti-essentialist effort emerges from a 
correctly Wittgensteinian suspicion of theory and definition, it in fact commits a similar 
error by simply helping itself to the concept of Art and then, by showing many different 
and incommensurate examples of what we call art, claiming that they have no one thing 
in common (‘Problems and Prospects’ 256-7). But here Art becomes just an empty 
place-holder philosophical concept of the kind Wittgenstein warned against, that is 
analysed only after it has been assumed, when in fact we should first study the various 
histories, practices and conversations around art, to clarify our thinking. We should not 
presuppose the artistic behaviour or production that we want to see and only test 
examples of art against these criteria – this would beg the question and exclude many 
forms of art, both existing and potential. To be sure, there are some basic human modes 
of behaviour and capacity that join us – what Bob Plant has argued constitutes 
Wittgenstein’s ‘minimal naturalism’ (see Wittgenstein and Levinas, especially chapter 
two) – but Eldridge considers this an incomplete account and seeks a more ‘abstract’ 
viewpoint (‘Problems and Prospects’ 258). He seems to be replacing both essentialism 
and anti-essentialism with a phenomenology of art with a Kantian flavour, 
concentrating on ‘the capacities we exercise in making, responding to, and criticizing 
art’ (257). He suggests that there might well be such a thing as an essence of art, but 
that it exists only within a historically informed study of actual examples, grounded in 
the notion of teachability: ‘If there are practices of the heterogeneous embodiment of a 
distinct artistic value that are teachable and learnable by persons in general, given their 
primitive natural responses, then art as a distinct kind of stuff can find a place in all 
human life’ (252). However, this view has two problems: it risks becoming essentialism 
of grammar, where teachability – which is to say, shared and consistent concepts of art 
–  is the single necessary property, and also risks making that same essence so general 
as to be empty. For the former, Eldridge misreads §271 of Philosophical Investigations 
(‘Essence is expressed by grammar’) by ignoring the italics (251). Where Eldridge 
treats grammar as a mutable, shareable replacement for essence, Wittgenstein is 
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indicating that the word ‘essence’ is being mentioned, not used or defined. That is to 
say, grammar is not how essence is expressed (even historically), but that what essence 
is – what counts as essence – is expressed by the grammar of our use. This can be 
usefully paired with PI §371 – ‘Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is’ – to 
show that grammar is a framework for understanding and need not be essentialist. For 
the latter, although Eldridge is right to insist on the importance of discussing art within 
a historically informed context, the notion of essence that his argument entails is left a 
little empty – it remains either of limited use (except, perhaps, to announce that the 
subject of discussion is art) or is reaching towards a transcendental account of the 
necessary conditions for our talking about art. The latter kind of explanation, despite 
some Kantian echoes in Wittgenstein’s work, as explored by, amongst others, Newton 
Carver in This Complicated Form of Life, is not at all what Wittgenstein is after. To 
quote Ben Tilghman, ‘Wittgenstein is not showing how human understanding, and, a 
fortiriori, art and ethics is possible as if there really were serious difficulties standing in 
the way. He is, rather, clearing away those philosophical theories that if taken seriously 
would lead us to believe that all understanding of human matters – be they ethical, 
artistic or what you will – is impossible’ (Wittgenstein, Ethics and Aesthetics xxi). 
Tilghman argues further that the approach that analytic philosophy has tended to take to 
aesthetics is on a meta-level, seeking theories and essences, rather than engaging with 
‘the point of view of those participating in the activity’ (14). Wittgenstein’s professed 
method rejects such theorising in favour of paying close attention to examples, their 
differences and connections, but it is difficult to marry this with the traditional practice 
of philosophy, especially the analytic kind. Tilghman suggests that exactly 
Wittgenstein’s own station within analytic philosophy provides a clue as to why 
responses to his work have often retained the very approaches he was combating, and he 
himself found it so difficult to say anything at all about aesthetics (p13; CV 26e: ‘In art 
it is hard to say anything, that is as good as: saying nothing’).  
An example of how an analytic approach can overstep this mark is Tilghman’s own 
‘Literature, Human Understanding and Morality’, in which he correctly claims that only 
as humans in action can we understand art (literature in the case of his essay), and that 
much of what we talk about or feel through art can only be understood against the 
background of our language and society. But he relates this solely to the content of 
literature (204), and leaves unaddressed questions of form, performance and practice, 
and so on. Like so much analytic philosophy of aesthetics, some extractable material is 
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posited that counts as the stuff of art, to be given a meaning or purpose through analysis 
(in this case moral examples). A more productive reading might be to think of fiction 
‘or at least certain kinds of fiction, as being already engaged in the kind of grammatical 
investigation with which Wittgenstein was concerned  in his philosophical work’ (David 
Schalkwyk ‘Fiction as “grammatical” investigation: A Wittgensteinian account’ 287). 
With this comes the possibility that one constructs several ‘maps’ from a reading, none 
of which need to correlate or have any one element in common. (For this sort of reading 
in literal action on the Tractatus, see the discussion of ‘The Wittgenstein Vector’, an art 
installation, in Chapter 6). 
An alternative response might be to regard aesthetic discourse as having  not one 
essence but several; interlocking in different ways within specific contexts or artworks. 
In a family resemblance manner, many sets of rules may be in play simultaneously, 
some overlapping, some contradictory. Sonia Sedivy has argued for this kind of model 
in ‘Art from a Wittgensteinian Perspective: Constitutive Norms in Context’. If we are 
able to hold that there really are rules to our aesthetic practices, but that these are not 
reducible to one particular set, we are able to account for how it is that we can offer 
explanations about our aesthetic preferences, yet can never force one another into 
agreement with our view. Likewise, we can account for changes in artistic taste over 
time, as one set of rules gains precedence over another. Such a model ‘explains the 
historically contingent nature of art practices in a way that relational definitions or 
disjunctive explanations do not’ (67), creating space for plurality, disagreement and 
cultural specificity without having to admit a stark relativism between opinions or 
cultures. It remains possible to argue over matters of art, though we had better keep in 
mind that the set of rules we adopt to guide or express our responses to art are 
historically and socially contingent. Wittgenstein’s remark §24 in Philosophical 
investigations thus becomes equally applicable to questions such as ‘What is Art?’:  ‘If 
you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view you will perhaps be 
inclined to ask questions like: “What is a question?”’Only within a particular language 
game can such questions make sense. We can well ask ‘Is this a painting?’, but asking 
‘What is painting?’ seems to assume a context-free essence to such activities, making 
the questions almost senseless, attempting to ‘operate above and beyond a language-
game in which intelligibility is ensured’ (G. L. Hagberg Meaning and Interpretation: 
Wittgenstein, Henry James, and Literary Knowledge 33). 
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Sedivy is certainly right to emphasise that Wittgenstein’s anti-essentialism runs deep, 
and her reading of the family resemblance concept is effective. Often family 
resemblance is taken to mean that all the elements of a set share in some but not all of 
the characteristics that confirm membership of the set, as if there existed some 
underwriting Urphänomen, to use Goethe’s term in the way Wittgenstein applies it in 
Remarks on Colour (III §203) – the ‘primary phenomenon or prototype supposedly 
underlying all instances of a given type’ (Louis A. Sass, ‘Wittgenstein, Freud and the 
Nature of Psychoanalytic Explanation’ 257). But no such object exists, or need not; 
putatively universal explanations are exactly what Wittgenstein’s insight allows us to 
escape. Family resemblance concepts do not ‘reach back’ to a common ancestor, but are 
continually intertwined through use. As Sedivy notes, Wittgenstein combines the family 
resemblance concept with another, that of a rope through which many threads run, none 
of which can be considered the original or the essential one (PI §67; Sedivy 70). This 
has two consequences: we are spared the impoverished essentialism of a single factor 
common to a practice such as aesthetics, and there remains the possibility of the rules 
being applied rightly or wrongly in given cases (a rope can be of better or worse 
production; strands must have sufficient commonality that they can be twisted together). 
However, Sedivy goes on to claim that a genetic model further undermines a historical 
understanding of resemblance, providing an essential but not singular common 
underpinning to family resemblance. Her model relies on an outmoded notion of genes, 
ignoring how their transmissions, interaction and expression are deeply intertwined with 
environment and experience, rather than something pre-determinate.
 2
  It appears to me 
to be an unnecessary step. The argument for a coherent as well as multifaceted notion of 
what constitutes aesthetic discourse – a perspicuous representation of our practice – is 
valuable, but gains nothing from calling these elements essences. Sedivy attempts to tie 
together a great variety of concepts under one way of thinking, whereas multiple but 
complementary ways of thinking best fit Wittgenstein’s rope analogy.  
                                                             
2 In fact, as Stuart Shanker has discussed in ‘A Picture Held Me Captive’ in Wittgenstein at 
Work London Routledge 2004, 246-256, Wittgenstein’s own use of a seed analogy in Remarks 
on the Philosophy of Psychology I (904) to represent human development as a combination of 
potential and growth, has turned out to be more accurate than first thought, as the notion of a 
static, standard human genome is gradually overturned. See, for example Anne Fausto-
Sterling, Sex/Gender: Biology in a Social World. 
 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
25 
 
In Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, 
Wittgenstein is at pains to show that there are very many things going on in aesthetic 
appreciation, including technical knowledge, techniques of judgement, fashion, 
experimentation, comfort and discomfort, cultural sophistication and decline, and ‘an 
extraordinary number of different cases of appreciation’ (LC I §21). The traditional 
terminology of aesthetic philosophy is relegated to only a small part of what such 
appreciation consists of, and Wittgenstein warns against the confusion that supposedly 
crucial categories promote; rather than getting into complex arguments about definitions 
of key terms we should look at how words are learnt and used. The words Good, 
Beautiful and so forth are most often first used as ‘interjections’, and linked to particular 
forms of behaviour, such as appreciating food or responding (socially appropriately) to 
music:  
We are concentrating, not on the words ‘good’ or ‘beautiful’, which are 
entirely uncharacteristic, generally just subject and predicate (‘This is 
beautiful’), but on the occasions on which they are said – on the enormously 
complicated situation in which the aesthetic expression has a place, the 
expression itself has almost a negligible place.  (LC I §5)  
Indeed, he considered it notable that ‘when aesthetic judgements are made, aesthetic 
adjectives such as ‘”beautiful”, ”fine”, etc., play hardly any role at all’ (§8). We would 
consider someone who just kept repeating that a piece of music was beautiful, but could 
offer nothing more, such as some technical analysis, comparison with other pieces, or 
explanation of a personal response, to be a hapless or boring judge, no matter how 
sincerely they insisted on the beauty of the melody (§8, §17). Further, Wittgenstein 
seems to draw a distinction between the mere terminology of aesthetics and lived 
aesthetic experience, where the myriad kinds of objects and behaviours involved are 
studied in their diversity (Terry Diffey ‘Wittgenstein, Anti-essentialism and the 
Definition of Art’ 44). Like religious belief, our aesthetic response shows not so much 
in our agreement with a fact or standard, but in our behaviour – both in individual 
instances and across long spans of time (LC 53-55).  
This is not, however, to resort to a behaviourist view of aesthetic experience, with 
everything we associate therewith reduced to descriptions of codified behaviour. 
Although Wittgenstein sometimes gives voice to a behaviourist perspective – 
sometimes as a tempting but clumsy alternative to his philosophical effort – he refuses 
to reduce one category of experience to another (e.g.: PI §§281, 304, 580). In 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein explicitly confronts behaviourist questions in 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
26 
 
§307: ‘“Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying 
that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?”’ His response is to question the 
foundation on which behaviourism rests, namely that our ‘mental processes and states’ 
are beyond explanation and should rather be reduced to things we can explain, that is, 
physical behaviour (§308). This already assumes that we in some way know what these 
mental states are – that they are something inaccessible going on inside us – so as to 
exclude them from our investigation; meanwhile, to merely ignore mental processes 
would allow only a very poor description of human behaviour. 
Similarly, a description of the behaviour of someone having an aesthetic experience can 
be extremely valuable, and help the philosopher to resist abstracted speculations about 
the true nature of such encounters, without replacing one with the other. In Lectures and 
Conversations, Wittgenstein again mentions behaviourism: ‘Here is the point of 
Behaviourism. It isn’t that they deny there are feelings. But they say our description of 
behaviour is our description of feelings’ (IV §7). Specifically, Wittgenstein is referring 
to logical behaviourism, particularly influential in the inter-war years, in which 
‘statements about the mental are reducible to statements about behaviour and 
dispositions to behave’ (P.M.S. Hacker ‘Wittgenstein and the Autonomy of Humanistic 
Understanding’ 42). This differs from eliminative behaviourism associated with the 
psychology of B.F Skinner and J. B. Watson, in which the mental becomes a folk-
fiction that should be replaced with physical descriptions of process and behaviour 
(Rowland Stout The Inner Life of a Rational Agent). Either approach would, for 
Wittgenstein, without warrant, obscure the differences between two very different 
grammars. To describe behaviour need not be any less rich than the language we have 
available to us; to talk of one’s feelings or thoughts only seems less valid than to talk of 
an action or a gesture if we already presume that one is private and non-physical, the 
other public and measurable. Sometimes, to describe a gesture is the best possible way 
of capturing someone’s feeling; sometimes to explain someone’s feelings is the best 
way to account for their actions, and this can often be captured by perfectly accessible 
details, such as explaining someone’s laughter through the joke they have heard (§7); 
the effect of a painting, or the meaning of an expression, can be explained through 
combinations of context, description, associations and imitation (§§10-12). ‘Remember 
the impression made by good architecture, that it expresses a thought. One would like to 
respond to it too with a gesture’ (CV 26e). 
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The relationship between behaviour and feeling, particularly as between expression and 
the self, is examined in greatesr detail in Chapter 4. Wittgenstein’s conception of the 
self is extremely difficult to define, with interpretations running from ‘I’ being relegated 
to a non-referring grammatical form (Glock A Wittgenstein Dictionary 160-164) to 
Stanley Cavell reading it as an insistence on a self that emerges from its own disrupted 
and uncertain agency (The Claim of Reason). By analysing Jorie Graham’s formally and 
topically self-excavating poetry – particularly in juxtaposition with Alex Blazer’s 
account of Graham’s work – I hope to demonstrate how Wittgenstein’s denial of the 
picture of an inner/outer divide is neither reductive nor limiting. By avoiding both a 
prioritisation of the physical over the mental, and language over other forms of 
experience and expression, this reading of Wittgenstein seeks to retain what might be 
called a humanism without essentialism. Creativity of expression, exemplified in the 
play and challenge of poetry, is key to this picture, which shows the value of the 
incomplete, the gesture, in addition to the defined and circumscribed explanation. 
How, though, are we justified in taking a gesture, say, as an explanation? There seems 
an immediate problem about what counts as a sufficient explanation, since a gesture is 
of a completely different order from  a definition or a rule; it cannot represent, exhaust 
or make unmissable what it tries to explain (and indeed, is often used where exactly 
such things seem out of reach). Should not an explanation be compelling and reliable? 
This same question seems to be what haunts the responses mentioned above that still 
seek an essence at the heart of aesthetics – that there must be some singular kind of 
thing that counts as an explanation and that has the right properties to demand our 
assent. And it is exactly this conception of explanation that Wittgenstein sees as 
inappropriate to aesthetics. 
Throughout Lectures and Conversations, and indeed in much of his later writing, 
Wittgenstein argues against this explanatory worry, presenting it as driven by a species 
of scientism and a misunderstanding of the varieties of explanation, perpetrated when 
we reduce it to a single type. In this respect, examples from the arts are used by 
Wittgenstein precisely because they ‘point away from rationalistic conceptions of 
human behaviour in general on which one can (in principle) always say, if asked, what 
one is doing, and how – that is, provide one’s (relevant) beliefs, desires etc.’ (Graham 
McFee ‘Wittgenstein, Performing Art and Action’ 92). Our behaviour in responding to 
music or describing it to someone else instructively fails to fit the model of placing our 
experience under a given rule or concept. And yet we can still give and understand 
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explanations. In Culture and Value Wittgenstein writes ‘the simplest explanation is 
sometimes a gesture; another might be a dance step’ (79e). On the one hand, it is very 
easy to imagine that one might convey the sweep and gravity of Rachmaninoff’s second 
piano concerto with a pirouette or some apt bodily convulsion, on the other, one might 
be reluctant to call this an explanation when it might better be called an intimation, or 
translation, or impression. But what exactly is unsatisfactory here? Partly it is because 
we often have in mind the kind of explanation that is sought in natural science – an 
explanation ought to classify what it explains, and be independent of it; an explanation 
also ought to be reliable. But aesthetic responses muddle this model. Wittgenstein in 
Lectures and Conversations imagines a tribe who put on records for particular purposes, 
and these are interchangeable, as long as the effect is the same:  ‘certain music makes 
them walk like this. They play a record to do this. One says: “I need this record now. Oh 
no, take the other, it is just as good”’ (LC IV §9). Is this ridiculous?
3
 It would certainly 
be counted as strange behaviour in anyone who wanted to show an appreciation of 
music, and indicates that Wittgenstein roundly rejects a causal account of art 
experience. We must avoid the temptation of an ‘ascent to explanatory generality’ 
driven by an empiricist model of perception and interpretation (Hagberg Meaning and 
Interpretation: Wittgenstein, Henry James, and Literary Knowledge 5). 
What then is going on in aesthetic discourse, if we are not looking for a causal or 
definitive account? Perhaps Wittgenstein is at risk of reducing aesthetic judgement to 
nothing more than a boo-hurrah response. If we express ourselves about art but there is 
nothing to guarantee the same response between people or occasions, does it 
communicate anything more than like or dislike? This seems hardly likely, since else 
aesthetics would not occupy its important place in Wittgenstein’s thinking, nor be 
considered a ‘very big and entirely misunderstood’ subject (LC 1). That full explanation 
or mere pleasure may seem the only options we have again relates to the narrowness of 
types of explanation that we are primed to accept in philosophical conversation. In fact, 
what constitutes an explanation legitimately varies with the field of enquiry, and 
                                                             
3 Wittgenstein clearly intended it to be alien to our normal lives, though it is also worth noting that in 
some cases we do in fact use music like this, even if it would appal Wittgenstein to think so. Classic FM, 
for example, continually markets particular music for such functions as ‘relaxing’ or ‘soothing’, looping a 
small number of familiar pieces and performers until they lose all meaning; films endlessly reuse musical 
tropes to reliably prompt us emotionally for what is happening on-screen. Likely this sort of enjoyment 
or reception would not count as the kind of appreciation that we have in mind in aesthetic judgements 
or experience, though they do belong on their outskirts, and contribute to a description of how a 
particular culture relates to music. Cf. LC I §35: ‘In order to get clear about aesthetic words you have to 
describe ways of living.’ 
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arguments in aesthetics can be just as important and precise as in other areas. We need 
to bear in mind, however, that ‘our response to disagreement varies from one type of 
case to the other, depending on the significance of our agreeing or failing to agree, on 
the place of agreement and disagreement in a context of life, rather than simply on the 
extent or frequency of agreement or its opposite’ (Lars Hertzberg ‘On Aesthetic 
Reactions and Changing One’s Mind’ 95). Although Wittgenstein undoubtedly placed 
great weight on our primitive or visceral responses – seen most clearly in his Remarks 
on Frazer’s Golden Bough (e.g.: p137-9) – he resists the temptation to see these as 
being purer or more certain than our linguistic or more sophisticated responses. As I 
will argue in Chapter 3, our notions of justification are less simple than is usually 
assumed; modes of expression and measurement are not unproblematically hierarchical, 
nor are our claims made in isolation from the pictures and priorities of our life and 
language. Rather, what Hertzberg calls the significance of our judgements (what 
Wittgenstein would more likely call this consequences – cf. PI §§30, 207, 238, 268, 486 
etc.) are equally seen in our instinctual behaviour and the wider, more complex 
elements of our life; which of these is more important, immediate or informative will 
vary depending on a particular case. As Hertzberg notes, a reaction can be immediate, 
considered, malleable, physical, and may be considered by others to be irrelevant or 
deeply meaningful. Sometimes we attribute our behaviour to our circumstances or our 
social role, at other times these can be bracketed off as marginal. Sometimes a blush is 
social, sometimes personal; nothing determines this in advance (Hertzberg 103). In 
Lectures and Conversations Wittgenstein tries out a variety of concepts to characterise 
aesthetic responses. These include appreciation (I §18), realms of experience (II §5), 
(dis)content (II §9), disgust and discomfort (II §10). Wittgenstein’s remarks are 
minimally elaborated in the text, being the compiled notes from students in the lecture, 
but several approaches to aesthetics tinged by his account have applied these notions, 
especially the latter three, to describe how we come to see an artwork in a particular 
way. In different ways, these take on a supposed gap in how explanations in aesthetics 
work through Wittgenstein’s concepts of ‘seeing-as’ (taken from Philosophical 
Investigations p195 onwards), and non-rational persuasion (as explored in On 
Certainty).  
Mark Rowe has discussed the possibility of ‘Criticism without Theory’ in terms of 
seeing-as, or aspect perception. How we see an object can radically shift, without 
requiring any change in the object or our knowledge of it – most famously described via 
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the ‘duck-rabbit’ of PI p. 194. Having used this phenomenon to undermine first 
Cartesian models of perception and then Gestalt psychology (see in particular PI 196-
204), Wittgenstein discusses the apparently strange combination of seeing and thinking 
that goes on in such cases. Most often, the moment of sudden aspect shift is emphasised 
by commentators as most easily applicable to our responses to pictures (e.g.: Joachim 
Schulte Experience and Expression 54-57), but this is only one part of this idea. Rowe 
reiterates that it is not always a case of a sudden switch from one aspect to another, one 
ultimately present in the picture (like the duck-rabbit), but can be a matter of non-
representational organisation (e.g. seeing a row of dots as grouped 1-5, or 2-4, or 3-3) or 
a matter simply of degree of association – now this music feels right, or from this point 
of view the picture tells us something new, or read this way the poem comes alive 
(‘Criticism without Theory’ 74-5). This may be a matter of demonstration or response 
or description, rather than explanation. The central drive of Rowe’s arguments is that 
there is nothing to explain, if we are looking for some underlying theory or unifying 
notion, but by placing many examples together something comes into view. 
This has particular implications for how we think about the role of the critic. We do not 
hold art up to a universal standard or set of rules, nor is taste simply a matter of 
enjoying what is well-regarded. Wittgenstein certainly thinks that there is such a thing 
as a person of good judgement, but this will show in connections made between 
examples, technical understanding and the ability to convey an impression. ‘In what we 
call the Arts a person who has judgement develops. (A person who has a judgement 
doesn’t mean a person who says ‘Marvellous!’ at certain things.) [...] We distinguish 
between a person who knows what he is talking about and a person who doesn’t’ (LC I 
§17).  
As touched on above in notions of explanation, a critic does not seek to replace the 
artwork with an explanation, but moves the viewer into a position from which to see the 
work differently. This can work to make the apparently incomprehensible accessible 
and refresh the overly familiar. An instance of my own experience of the effect of 
putting together examples could be Barnett Newman’s painting ‘Queen of the Night II’ 
(1967). Shorn of representational or cultural context, Newman’s abstract fields of 
colour, often with ‘zips’ across their surfaces, can reflect blankly back at the viewer, 
epitomising the kind of art that many people find boring because it is hard to find the 
right way to see them. ‘Queen of the Night II’ is a deep purple rectangle, stood on its 
narrow edge, with a thin lighter strip running down it close to the left hand side. But 
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putting the piece together with its title, referring to Mozart’s ‘Die Zauberflöte’ (1791) 
and its most famous aria, the imposing column of purple becomes expressively 
majestic, the zip as piercing as a high C or a beam of light, without ever becoming 
representational. This effect was enhanced in the 2002-3 exhibition of his work at the 
Tate Modern, when the piece was positioned along a darkened corridor, prompting the 
viewer to walk up to it as if approaching a throne. Nothing about the artwork has 
changed, but the context within which we view it is transformed in a way that an 
informed critic could describe or propose. Alternatively, a skilful critic could provide 
‘an insight which can remove the thick glaze of familiarity from a well-known text’ 
(‘Criticism without Theory’ 79), or open our eyes to things to which we had previously 
not paid attention, or the right kind of attention – ‘though, of course, our eyes were open 
already’ (Oswald Hanfling ‘Wittgenstein on Language, Art and Humanity’ 91). This 
may take the form of additional background knowledge, or putting two apparently 
unrelated works together, or changing the setting or presentation of the piece; many 
things might be gained by, say, comparing a Bosch altar triptych and a Dalían 
dreamscape, or explaining the developments in oil paints and Van Gogh’s pictures, or 
isolating for analysis the drama and foreshadowing of Milton’s line-breaks in the 
opening of Paradise Lost.
4
 Rowe makes a comparison not unknown in Wittgenstein 
scholarship, likening the effect of such insights to a new joke: ‘like good jokes they 
point out unseen but obvious connections between things with which we are thoroughly 
familiar’ (‘Criticism without Theory’ 80). With a direct inheritance from Wittgenstein’s 
remark that ‘a serious and good philosophical work could be written that would consist 
entirely of jokes’ (quoted in Norman Malcolm’s Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir 27-8), 
several writers make use of the strange mechanisms of jokes to escape from the rigidity 
of analytic philosophy. See, for example, David Schalkwyk’s ‘Fiction as “grammatical” 
investigation: A Wittgensteinian account’, Roger White in ‘Throwing the Baby out with 
the Ladder’, or indeed, the Wittgenstein-inspired poetry of Rosemarie Waldrop. The 
latter is discussed in forensic detail by Marjorie Perloff in Wittgenstein’s Ladder (205-
8), noting Waldrop’s skilful parody of Wittgenstein’s style, though the critic seemingly 
fails to spot the quite joyful accumulation of childish jokes of the level of ‘when is a jar 
not a jar’. This strikes me as odd, given that this tone provides a further resonance with 
Wittgenstein and his serious engagement with this level of fooling, not to mention his 
                                                             
4 Of Man’s First Disobedience, and the Fruit 
Of that Forbidden Tree, whose mortal taste 
Brought Death into the World, and all our woe [.] 
(see Thomas N. Corns, Milton’s Language for in-depth discussion.) 
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own fondness for such humour in his correspondence with Gilbert Pattisson (see 
Raymond Monk The Duty of Genius 294-5).  
Most often, the kinds of jokes that philosophers are thinking of (and make) are of the 
logical variety, as catalogued by J. Allen Paulos in I Think Therefore I Laugh.Certainly 
the categorical confusions and grammatical contradictions jokes of this sort highlight 
are part of what Wittgenstein must have meant by his comment. To use Paelos’ 
example, by pointing out that from saying ‘I have a pain in my foot’ and ‘my foot is in 
my shoe’, it does not follow that I have a pain in my shoe’, something about our 
bewitchment by language can be clarified; such jokes simultaneously provide the kind 
of ‘delight’ that Rowe links with critical insights (‘Criticism without Theory’ 80). 
However, I would urge that Wittgenstein’s use of jokes should also be understood more 
fulsomely, in the way that jokes can release tension, be a form of social regulator, let us 
play with ideas without consequence or prick someone’s pomposity.  
In Chapter 3, the effect and importance of Wallace Steven’s incorporation of humour – 
both silly and wry – into the potentially ponderous notion of a Supreme Fiction is 
shown; irony and wordplay can be more expressive and more human than an argument, 
something Wittgenstein understood and to some extent utilised in his method (Joachim 
Schulte ‘The Builder’s Language’ 24-5). Jokes can alter our view of things in these 
ways too. They can be, if largely indirectly, a form of persuasion. 
Persuasion 
Persuasion couples naturally with seeing-as, since what the critic may be doing is 
finding the right phrase or gesture that changes the viewer’s experience, rather than 
pointing out a rule. We can be called on to try out a new idea or angle. This means that 
persuasion is a much more various concept than merely rational argument, since it will 
depend also on its context; what is effective in one case may not be elsewhere. ‘In order 
to find the right thing to say I may have to know you’ (Hertzberg ‘On Aesthetic 
Reactions and Changing One’s Mind’ 96). 
The multitude of forms that persuasion may take will be examined repeatedly in this 
thesis, as a core part of both engagement with the limits of expression, variously 
conceived, and the activity of poetry. Why do we persuade rather than prove, demand, 
or perform? For example, Kei Miller’s poetry in Chapter 5 comments on how 
persuasion enters where two incompatible forms of discourse meet. These and other 
instances connect with the construction and development of the self in language and 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
33 
 
literature, notions of showing and responsibility, and arguments against what Charles 
Altieri has called ‘serial structuralism’ (‘Wittgenstein on Consciousness and Language’ 
1397). The importance of ‘knowing’ with whom one is speaking, as mooted by 
Hertzberg, and of recognising speaking as a form of activity will be stressed again in the 
analysis of the closing propositions of the Tractatus in Chapter 2.  
A development from the notion of persuasion is that of a practice-oriented reading of 
Wittgenstein, such as those sketched by both Richard Eldridge, as mentioned above, and 
Peter Lamarque. This questions the emphasis placed on rules in most accounts of 
Wittgenstein and language games. Undoubtedly, Wittgenstein devotes a lot of his work 
to the quandary of how it is that we learn and follow rules, which are neither causal nor 
arbitrary, and shows how important it is to know how to play the various language 
games of a culture (i.e.: to know how to obey, express and bend the rules). The key 
discussion of this is in Philosophical Investigations §§185-242, though it is an idea that 
resurfaces in many guises elsewhere. Following Gordon Baker and P.M.S. Hacker’s 
summary of how events unfold in Philosophical Investigations, in §§143-84 
Wittgenstein was trying to reconcile his suggestion that the use of a word is (usually) its 
meaning with ‘the indisputable fact that we commonly understand the meaning of an 
expression at a stroke’ (Wittgenstein: Rules, grammar and Necessity 23). How can 
something that is contextual and that develops over time be grasped in a flash? The 
relation with the question of how we make aesthetic judgements is easy to make; 
sometimes we identify a specific element or technique when discussing an artwork, but 
more often we seem to be captured or struck by the work as a whole, even if dealing 
with a complex object, an extended piece of music or an entire poem. Only afterwards 
do we analyse ‘with a later reason’, as Wallace Stevens calls it, in ‘Notes Towards a 
Supreme Fiction’ (CP 399). Within this, PI §§143-55 develops Wittgenstein’s 
insistence that such understanding is not a mental state or process, but an activity; the 
close relationship of the grammar of ‘to know’ with ‘being able’ is noted, and 
‘understanding’ with ‘”Mastery” of a technique’ (§150). Baker and Hacker compare 
knowing how to go on (following a rule) with ‘the dawning of an ability’ (23); rather 
than a binary of fact possession or not, knowing becomes a self-declaration of 
responsibility and capacity – something that may still be tested or developed through 
later applications. To follow a rule is, most often, to show repeated similar actions (or 
precisely the same actions, in cases like following a mathematical rule); a rule would 
not be, Wittgenstein notes in PI §199, something done only once by one person. 
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(Though Wittgenstein qualifies this as a grammatical remark about what we mean by a 
rule, rather than as being a statement about the essence of rules.) Hacker and Baker 
slightly overstate the case when they define following a rule as engaging in ‘an activity 
that exemplifies a regularity recognized as a uniformity’ (28) since they perceive rules 
as inherently normative (29), providing a constraint on our behaviour through standards 
of correctness. Similarly, and representative of the majority of accounts of rules in 
Wittgenstein, Jose Medina stresses the normative aspect of rules, that ‘against the 
background of a shared practice [...] the behavioural regularities of the pupil acquire 
normative significance and can be considered as indicative of his understanding or lack 
thereof’ (My emphasis. The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy 181). 
This same conception of rule-following runs through Eldridge’s previously mentioned 
counter to anti-essentialist readings of Wittgenstein, one that still accommodates the 
insight that aesthetic response can be neither the application of definitions nor reducible 
to individual mental states: 
Our practices of applying and projecting terms are autonomous, rooted directly 
in what we do. No mediating third entities – metaphysical atoms, simple ideas, 
mental processes, or whatever – ultimately support them. Yet practices can 
nonetheless be assessed as legitimate or illegitimate.  (‘Problems and Prospects 
of Wittgensteinian Aesthetics’ 252)  
In order to discover the normative power of aesthetic criticism, which seems to evade 
explicit rules or definitions, we ought to pay attention to how words, expressions and 
traditions are regulated, through the study of ‘perspicuous examples’ (251). The stress is 
on the importance of selecting the right examples, ones that shed light on each other, 
rather than showing merely superficial commonalities (254). For example, in Remarks 
on Frazer’s Golden Bough, Wittgenstein’s comparison of ritual sacrifices in an alien 
culture with the gesture in our own of kissing the photograph of a loved one is 
enlightening without being obvious; the connections and differences reveal the 
particularities of use of what at first seemed like a simple case (RFGB 123). Eldridge’s 
point is to show how such examples can get us closer to an understanding of what 
counts as aesthetic behaviour, by functioning as a kind of description of the practice, as 
a guide to what constitutes correctness in our behaviour. 
Leaving aside the shadow of essentialism mentioned earlier, the limitation of Eldridge’s 
account, though it is right to stress that judgement must be practice-involved (i.e. 
sensitive to context, and art as a continuing and developing set of practices) is the 
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primary status given to normativity in rules. I follow Michael Luntley’s recent 
reappraisal of the opening sections of Philosophical Investigations, which questions the 
strength and centrality of normativity granted by mainstream readings. In Opening 
Investigations Luntley takes seriously the metaphorical implications of the ‘path’ 
metaphors that Wittgenstein used in The Big Typescript, the late preparatory manuscript 
for Philosophical Investigations: 
A rule compared to a path. Does a path say that one is to walk on it (and not on 
the grass)? Does it state that people usually go that way? (§240) 
 
A rule is a kind of marked-out route, a marked-out path. (§242)  
 
A rule –as I understand it – is like a path in a garden. Or like the pre-established 
squares on a chessboard or the lines in a table. (§243) 
‘This suggests a much more modest sense of ‘rule’ than many commentators allow, rule 
as regularity with no more normative authority as the ‘right way to go’ than the trodden 
grass of a garden path’ (Michael Luntley, personal correspondence). 
Luntley argues in Opening Investigations that both the mainstream treatment of rules 
(as represented by Hacker) and the anti-theoretical therapeutic branch of Wittgenstein 
scholarship rely on an unwarranted degree of normativity in Wittgenstein’s conception 
of grammar. Whether grammar is conceived as a tribunal (like a ledger, BT §58) against 
which we measure an utterance for sense or nonsense, or we determine to proceed with 
a piecemeal investigation into whether what looked like a genuine philosophical puzzle 
is just a confusion of terms, what is common is the conception that grammar is 
normative. ‘That has to be the case, for otherwise there would be no authority to the 
grammatical investigation that would enable it to quieten the urge to philosophize’ 
(Opening Investigations 92). Both approaches are therefore ‘conservative’ since they 
work by reference to what is already there, what is done. And this accords with 
Wittgenstein’s own method, insofar as he urged that ‘[t]he problems are solved, not by 
giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known’ (PI 109) – 
which is, in part, concerning ourselves with the familiar uses of words. 
Luntley’s aim is to show that the view of grammar that both readings have is 
erroneously dependent on a view of grammar as authoritative, when in fact, if a rule is 
more like a path.Iit need only be a regularity. ‘A rule is not, however, a norm, 
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something that intrinsically binds us. A rule is a regularity and it is one that we feel 
bound by, but that is something about us and should not be reified or treated as if it’s 
something about the rule’ (97 my italics). He attempts to show that although 
Wittgenstein certainly did argue against the pursuit of ‘high theory’, this need not mean 
the impossibility of philosophy at all, insisting both that Wittgenstein’s insights left 
room for such work, and that ‘there is a distinctive philosophical craftiness, the craft of 
limning the details of our sense of being comfortable with the contingencies of grammar 
and of who and what we are’ (95). This partly depends on an account of the interrelation 
of grammar and the world, which theme I return to in Chapter 3, and partly on serious 
consideration of the path metaphor for rules. To BT §204 quoted above, Luntley 
responds:  
Clearly, both questions are to be answered in the negative. So, what is a path? 
It is a regularity, a way we regularly go up the garden. A rule is not a 
particularly authoritative proposition that qua proposition states that one must 
walk this way, or that one usually walks this way. Of course, we can state that 
we regularly walk this way and, if so, we articulate the regularity, but the path 
is no more than the regularity of how we go up the garden. There is no more to 
going up the garden path than going regularly, even if, once the path is there, 
we feel that we ought to stick to the path. That’s just how we are; we are 
creatures who enjoy a sense of pattern to things, we like to find and to make 
patterns in our behavior. (97) 
This is an important insight, and there is no reason to assume that our relationship to 
rules need be any more rigid or any less multifaceted than our relationship to paths. 
However, in pursuit of his point Luntley does do a little of the same simplifying, since a 
garden path or a woodland trail may emerge simply from repeated use, but a path, 
especially one ‘marked-out’ (BT §242) will have further consequences than regularity – 
the purpose of its being marked out, the parts of the garden that are shown off or hidden 
by it, the kind of terrain it covers and so on. More generally, while it is right that it is 
nonsense to say that a path forces us to follow it, the notion that there are paths at all is 
something taught, and does come with notions of correctness beyond regularity of 
behaviour, as Keep Off The Grass signs testify. True enough, nothing about paths 
instructs us to follow them in the manner of an order, but they have a grammar, 
nonetheless – even if the grammar is not necessarily normative, and can be merely 
descriptive or structuring, as Luntley suggests.  
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In Chapter 5, I discuss Wittgenstein’s patterns of metaphor in Philosophical 
Investigations, and how paying close attention to his choices can reward us with an 
understanding of his particular project. His repeated use of geographic or cartographic 
language is telling and thematic. For the moment I want to connect Luntley’s revision of 
the status of rules for Wittgenstein with another possibility of thinking about aesthetics, 
that is, the practice-oriented approach mooted by Peter Lamarque in ‘Wittgenstein, 
Literature, and the Idea of a Practice’. Like Luntley, Lamarque notes that the 
constraining power of rules is over-played in many accounts of Wittgenstein, when in 
fact rules are only one element of a language game, and need not be prior to or primary 
amongst such elements.  
‘Practice’ here points to something similar to what is meant by ‘language game’, but is 
preferable in some cases, especially where one wants to avoid stressing language over 
other aspects such as training, regularity, demonstration and so on. It is also helpful 
sometimes to avoid the temptation to use expressions such as ‘language game’ as if 
Wittgenstein had meant them as well-defined technical terms, when in fact his uses of 
them were quite sparse and variable (see Rupert Read ‘Throwing Away the Bedrock’). 
Wittgenstein himself referred to Philosophical Investigations as being written in 
‘colloquial (non-technical) prose’, this being one of the difficulties of its translation 
(Letter to Maynard Keynes in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Cambridge Letters 308), and as 
Marjorie Perloff has noted, his Austrian-German writing style is idiomatic and 
colloquial (Wittgenstein’s Ladder xiii-xv). Perhaps part of insisting that readers think 
for themselves, as in the preface of Philosophical Investigations, includes a reluctance 
to provide a ready-made set of tools and terms for thinking. As discussed in Chapter 6, a 
significant part of the poetic response to Wittgenstein and this research has been the 
questioning of technical terms and notations, to discover unexpected connections and 
ironies. My preference for the term ‘practice’ is therefore also deliberately flexible, 
drawing in different associations in different contexts.  
Lamarque’s account of practice readily permits that rules are important and one of our 
principal testing mechanisms for someone’s understanding, but it ‘should not be 
supposed, though, that initiation into the practice can only come about through the 
formal articulation of rules’ (378). Further, he argues that rules need not be the essential 
or most foundational ground of a practice; sometimes we learn rules because we are 
taught judgements, and cites On Certainty §140. ‘Wittgenstein sometimes suggests that 
agreement can be more basic than rules’ (382). Although mainstream scholarship has 
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emphasised the importance of rules (Lamarque’s principal target in this essay is John 
Rawls and his influence), this can be misleading: ‘Wittgenstein asks us to dig deeper to 
understand what it is for a practice to be governed by rules [...][I]t is more illuminating 
to think of conforming to a practice as engaging in activities of a certain kind, underlain 
by agreements, than merely to emphasize the rule-bound nature of practices’ (384).  
Lamarque’s chief interest is in literature as a practice, though his thoughts could easily 
be applied to other related areas. There is such a thing, he suggests, as reading ‘from a 
literary point of view’ (387), which is different from just plain reading. By paying 
attention to the particular history and context that literary reading, criticism and 
appreciation have, we might avoid the apparent difficulties of finding rules for this 
activity of “being literary” that need not apply to reading generally, nor be separated off 
from it. Practices can be ‘nested’ quite unproblematically, with rules and traditions 
governing when and how one is superimposed on another. Lamarque does wonder 
whether the ‘game’ analogy from Wittgenstein is quite weak on this point, since ‘only 
in rather special circumstances can one speak of games embedded in games’ (386), 
though I would suggest that this is an unnecessary worry. One need only note the 
abundance of computer games that incorporate mini-games within them, moments of 
games within games such as penalty shoot-outs in football, or concepts such as 
sportsmanship or gamesmanship within sport generally. A different limitation might be 
the circumscribedness that ‘game’ tends to bring as an association. For example, on 
most conceptions, a given game is capable of being recreated elsewhere, where this 
means that someone sees that two games are similar, or a set of rules or customs are 
adhered to again. Two games of football, for example, are instances of the same game, 
even if they are otherwise unconnected. If using game to describe a large scale practice 
such as literature, encompassing multiple languages and cultural endeavours, the subject 
is comparatively immovable, or else risks becoming so general that the term game is no 
longer useful for describing anything about it. That said, the possibility of making 
connections with a particular range of activities to constitute a nested practice, such as 
“being literary”, may allow for more piecemeal approaches that avoid this problem. 
The term piecemeal need not imply something haphazard or non-rigorous, though it 
does avoid the notion of highly-generalised answers to particular questions, tempting as 
they may be. John McDowell has described his own effort in Mind and World as simply 
assembling ‘reminders’ of our ordinary language use and the misleading pictures we 
have a tendency to build about it (95), recalling Wittgenstein’s remark ‘The work of the 
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philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose’ (PI §127). The 
degree to which McDowell succeeds in remaining true to his stated programme, or 
strays into theory making, is discussed in Chapter 3, in tandem with Wallace Steven’s 
poetry as a different kind of reminder, one that operates by imagery, association, irony 
and disjunction.  
Several philosophers of a Wittgensteinian bent have tried to find the balance between 
avoiding the high theory of metaphysics and dissolving the notion of philosophical 
activity at all. It may well be that Wittgenstein underwent this same continual conflict 
himself, as readings by David Schalkwyk (‘Fiction as “grammatical” investigation: A 
Wittgensteinian account’; ‘Wittgenstein’s “Imperfect Garden”: the ladders and 
labyrinths of philosophy and Dichtung’), Timothy Gould (‘Restlessness and the 
achievement of peace: writing and method in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations’) and Marjorie Perloff (Wittgenstein’s Ladder) have in different ways 
suggested.  
Michael Luntley has argued that the ‘reminders’ element of Wittgenstein’s remark is 
less important than the ‘assembling’, since the point of the kinds of examples that 
Wittgenstein uses is that though they are telling and revealing, they are neither 
extraordinary nor definitive. It is the connections we draw and the arrangement of things 
we already knew that make the difference: ‘It is the assembly that matters, not the 
reminders’ (Opening Investigations 107). Read has argued that philosophy is somewhat 
like meditation practice; it takes continued and repeated attempts to return from the 
philosophical to the ‘ordinary’, which itself includes the ‘striving for the extraordinary’ 
that Wittgenstein’s method is supposed to soothe (‘Throwing Away the “Bedrock”’ 96). 
There are almost as many ways of responding to Wittgenstein’s aversion to theory as 
there are readers of his later work, from mining it for fully-fledged theories, however 
disguised (e.g. Kripke’s anti-skeptical reading of the private language argument 
(Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language), to a more modest notion of philosophy 
(Luntley), from seeking to escape contextual philosophy as a temptation (McDowell, 
Read), to Joan Retallack’s emphasis on his silences and ‘(ambivalently) self-proclaimed 
failure’ (The Poethical Wager 152), to reading Wittgenstein as an ‘anti-philosopher’ 
who turns philosophy’s own nature against itself (Alan Badiou Wittgenstein’s 
Antiphilosophy).  
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In this study I push a conception of Wittgenstein’s project as a self-recognising falling 
short, an unending task that may provide temporary relief from the philosophical itch, 
but which no more dissolves the task of philosophy than a completed poem removes the 
urge to write verse. To conceive of the work otherwise would be to slip back into the 
kind of ‘boredom’ of metaphysics that Cavell perceives Wittgenstein and Austen to 
warn against. Metaphysical speculation looks like an engaged and productive 
intellectual response, but is actually the empty shuffling of concepts – ‘one more of the 
false or fantastic excitements that boredom craves’ (In Quest of the Ordinary 7). 
Without really engaging with the different circumstances in which we do philosophy or 
consider ethics and aesthetics – our agency, embodiment, tradition and voice – we 
would be merely following rules of no consequence, swapping symbols. This is why the 
notion of practice is so important and no more possible to philosophically define than 
‘appreciation’ (LC I §20) or ‘game’ (PI §75). The solutions to our quandaries must 
emerge, just like the quandaries themselves, within particular practices, and be satisfied 
by developments both within and of the practice. I therefore argue that, by avoiding the 
prioritisation of rules in favour of seeing practices as simultaneously expressive, 
coercive, limiting, enabling, natural, historical and sophisticated, a more coherent view 
of both Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the role of aesthetics within it becomes available. 
This will likewise throw some light on the kinds of examples that Wittgenstein 
assembled and arranged, which are striking but not definitive. We may ask, for instance, 
why ‘the responses and comparisons Wittgenstein considers are generally responses to 
complete works of art’, and the implications for conceptions of perception and 
temporality this has (Ian MacKenzie ‘Wittgenstein and Aesthetic Responses’ 95), or 
how things are altered or made problematic depending on whether we are talking about 
a tradition we are part of or one of a very different culture (LC I §§26-35).  
Reading the Tractatus 
Although this emphasis on practice seemingly places itself firmly alongside the later 
Wittgenstein’s polymorphous view of language, rather than the crystalline clarity sought 
by the Tractatus, it would be wrong to suppose that the early and later material have 
nothing to say to each other, or that the various interpretations of the Tractatus cannot 
provide insights into what Wittgenstein’s project was and how it developed. As I will 
argue, against both the orthodox ‘two Wittgensteins’ story (or even three, as debated in 
The Third Wittgenstein) and the ‘resolute’ reading’s tendency to highlight continuities 
between early and later Wittgenstein, the same attitude towards the aesthetic (and 
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ethical and religious) drives Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and Philosophical 
Investigations, but the conception and enactment of that attitude undergoes shifts as 
Wittgenstein changes his method, his working assumptions about language, and his 
world view.      
It will therefore be of benefit to mention some examples of how Wittgenstein’s earlier 
work has been understood, with particular emphasis on its applications of and in 
aesthetics. Currently two types of readings dominate how the Tractatus is viewed – the 
still orthodox ‘ineffabalist’ view and the ‘resolute’.  
The ineffabalist readings, such as those given by G.E.M. Anscombe or P.M.S. Hacker, 
suggest that Wittgenstein delivers a conception of a world built of facts: propositions 
are sense-making because they are able to picture the facts – that is, objects’ situations 
and relations to other objects. Language is capable of picturing these relations because it 
has an internal order, a logic. And logic describes not facts but the possibilities for the 
arrangement of propositions, such that they are capable of sense. But since logic is what 
licenses propositions, it cannot itself be the subject of them and cannot be treated as an 
object; it is transcendent (TLP 6.13). It cannot be said.
5
 However, the ‘tautologies [of 
the Tractatus] shew the “logic of the world” [though] what they shew is not what they 
are an attempt to say’ (Anscombe An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 163). 
Logic can be shown (or shows itself) from the fact that we are capable of producing 
sense-making propositions, that there is a controlling order to the relations objects can 
have with each other. In trying to show this, Wittgenstein is forced to state things that 
are technically nonsense, but point towards something true yet ineffable, which the 
acute reader understands by having worked through the propositions of the Tractatus. 
The ineffable can make itself ‘manifest’ (TLP 6.522) but cannot be put into words.  
Growing scholarship exists about Wittgenstein’s own aesthetic tastes and the 
circumstances in which the Tractatus was developed. As well as research piecing 
together the genesis of the text (e.g.: Prototractatus, a facsimile of and commentary on 
Wittgenstein’s early manuscripts), others such as Janik and Toulmin talk about 
Wittgenstein’s intellectual and cultural surroundings. They write of his generation in 
Vienna being raised ‘in an atmosphere so saturated with, and devoted to, “aesthetic” 
values that they were scarcely able to comprehend that any other values existed’ 
                                                             
5 see also Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 25: ‘What can be said can only be said by means of a proposition, 
and so nothing that is necessary for the understanding of all propositions can be said.’ [New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1961] 
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(Wittgenstein’s Vienna 44). This hierarchy of values was unquestionably influential on 
Wittgenstein, not least in the importance of music and literature throughout his life and 
the sharp distinctions he made between true appreciation and mere enjoyment.  
In Michael Nedo’s Ludwig Wittgenstein: Ein Biographisches Album, the parallel 
importance for Wittgenstein of intellectual clarity and aesthetic form is displayed, both 
in the book’s content and its mode of presentation. The text is sparse, a combination of 
biographical notes and quotations from letters and manuscripts, arranged alongside 
photos from Wittgenstein’s life in ways that suggest, but do not make explicit, 
connections and causes. Particularly interesting are the composite and comparative 
family portraits that Wittgenstein made, set against his remarks about family 
resemblance (268-9). The style seeks to emulate Wittgenstein’s own writing, using 
compressed ‘arguments’ arranged strikingly, rather than a linear discussion. The tone 
seeks a fine balance between the practical and the contemplative, with little extraneous 
decoration. Examples of Wittgenstein’s own artistic endeavours are given, including a 
simple but expressive bronze bust, made under the tutelage of Michael Drobil (251). 
Typically, Wittgenstein was less than satisfied with his efforts and their originality: ‘At 
the time I modelled the head for Drobil too the stimulus was essentially a work of 
Drobil’s & my work was again really one of clarification’ (CV 16e). (Connecting this 
critique of his own originality with Wittgenstein’s remarks on a supposed ‘Jewish 
mentality’ in Culture and Value, and how this reflected the culture of anti-Semitism and 
Jewish Intellectualism of fin-de-siècle Vienna has been instructively explored in 
Wittgenstein’s Vienna, as well as Gakis Contextual Metaphilosophy.)  
In this formally-conscious milieu, given the intertwining of artistic and all other values, 
aesthetics are equated with ethics. To be a ‘good’ work of art was just as much about 
selecting the appropriate mode of presentation – with nothing extraneous or disguised – 
as any technical, moral or didactic content; as Janik and Toulmin put in, ‘a technical 
perfection of form was the chief end of literature’ (80). The aesthetic carries the weight 
of an ethical activity, both in creation and appreciation, since only in aesthetic qualities 
could value reside. 
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s form – the propositions – attempts to make everything 
as clear and concise as possible, and it is in this context that he makes the claim (TLP 
6.421) that ‘Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.’ There is no meaning of the 
world in the world, since values can only attach to individual objects and actions; true 
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value – ethical value – belongs only to artworks, which are not regarded as objects 
caught up in the stream of everyday use and practicality. Instead, they are viewed as if 
outside of time, giving a glimpse of the world viewed as a limited whole. Any meaning 
of the world (as opposed to its contingent parts and their practical or purpose-linked 
meanings) lies outside time and space (TLP 6.4312). ‘The contemplation of the world 
sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole. The feeling of the world as a 
limited whole is the mystical feeling’ (6.45). Under this Spinozian rubric, all things that 
are somehow ‘higher’ lie ‘outside the world’ (TLP 6.41-642), which includes the ethical 
and the aesthetic: ‘It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is 
transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)’ (6.421).  
This co-placing of ethics and aesthetics is not unique to Wittgenstein – there being a 
flourishing, especially since the turn of the millennium, of scholarship on their 
interrelation – see for example, the 2004 (25.4) edition of Poetry Today dedicated to the 
theme. But if they are not only things of the same type but effectively identical, this will 
impact on how we talk about an aesthetic experience at all. To what extent is it correct 
to say that ethics and aesthetics are one for Wittgenstein? The original English edition 
translates the German ‘Ethik und Aesthetik sind Eins’ as ‘ethics and aesthetics are one’, 
whereas the 1961 revision has it as ‘…one and the same’. This revision strikes me as 
odd, since the sense of ‘oneness’ is actually weakened by referring it to characteristics 
(‘the same’) as opposed to suggesting an essential identity, and that they are ‘the same’ 
is attempting to refer to two things the characteristics of which Wittgenstein has put 
outside the possibility of expression. However, there are reasons to be dissatisfied with 
both translations. Kathrin Stengel has rightly pointed out that in Wittgenstein’s German 
‘Eins’ is more likely to refer not to absolute identity, but to an interworked unity: only 
in their ‘complex unity, can ethics and aesthetics be considered individually at all’ 
(‘Ethics as Style: Wittgenstein’s Aesthetic Ethics and Ethical Aesthetics’ 611). A 
similar thought runs through Robert Eaglestone’s questioning – responding to TLP 
6.421 – of whether the separation of ethics and aesthetics (especially in literature) is too 
easily presumed, and that much of criticism’s frustrated efforts to (re)unite the two 
comes from misrecognising their originary unity (‘One and the same? Ethics, 
Aesthetics, and Truth’). In the Tractatus’ case, it is important to keep in view that the 
unity suggested is a matter of logical form, rather than content, so that the connection 
between ethics and aesthetics is not one of literature showing us morally uplifting 
content or examples – whether didactic or more closely imagined or inhabited – as a 
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Nussbaumian humanism (e.g., Cultivating Humanity), or what Eaglestone calls a neo-
Aristotelean ethical criticism, would seek (‘One and the same’ 536). Approaches of this 
kind certainly tells us something about humans and our relations to narrative, reading 
and so on, but are hard-pressed to answer the sorts of criticisms that Richard A. Posner 
makes in ‘Against Ethical Criticism’: that being bookish does not make us better 
people, that the moral view propounded in a text (whether shared by the author or not) 
is not a criterion for aesthetic greatness or mediocrity, and that an author’s moral life 
should only be considered separately from an aesthetic evaluation of their work (2). 
Rather, on the Tractatus model, the ethical and aesthetic operate in the same way, as 
gestures towards what structures the world, but are not part of it; properly speaking they 
are ineffable. In both cases, they stand outside the boundaries of language, contingency 
and purpose; the correct contemplation of an artwork is as a limited whole, a world to 
itself, just as the correct response to an ethical question is not practical or measureable, 
but absolute. Perhaps one could say of the artwork that, like the mystical, it means 
seeing the world as a limited whole, to have a sense of ‘the world enclosed within all 
the possible forms of truth statements’ (Charles Altieri ‘Wittgenstein on Consciousness 
and Language’ 1419). The true or great artwork shows the possibilities of, or limits of, 
true expression or action within an artistic medium, form or tradition. It is complete, 
timeless, in the sense that what it ‘says’ accords with its form without any appeal to 
context, or conscious application of technique for effect (cf CV 5e). What art or ethics 
say is nonsense, insofar as their meaningful content cannot be delivered as propositions. 
Propositions – the pictures we make of fact in the world (TLP 2.1) – cannot encompass 
the means of making the pictures themselves, and so cannot say anything about the 
conditions of the ordering of the world, of which ethics and aesthetics are part. 
This does not preclude our making ethical or aesthetic judgements within the world, but 
does stop us from assigning a value to the world, and places the source of such values 
outside it. This distinguishes Wittgenstein from Schopenhauer, whose influence on 
Wittgenstein’s conception of the self is palpable in the Tractatus, since our world is not 
to be escaped, only circumscribed. This is important to note, since, as Russell B. 
Goodman argues, though ‘Wittgenstein’s view of the self does not, like 
Schopenhauer’s, lead directly to his ethics, it prepares the way by placing the self 
outside the phenomenal world’ (‘Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein on Ethics’ 442). But 
Goodman goes on to criticise Wittgenstein for there being no mechanism by which 
things ‘in reality’ can be good or bad, which misses the point of what an ethics of things 
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‘being the case’ is about: we do not decide in advance what is good and what is bad and 
then attempt to find a viewpoint from which to see actions or objects and judge them; 
rather, we form judgements within this world – about parts of it, about things that are 
the case – but treat our judgements (or their ethicalness) as something external to it. To 
be aesthetic as well as ethical is to be authentic to medium or form of expression. Here 
the influence of Karl Kraus is heavily felt, as Janik and Toulmin have also charted in 
Wittgenstein’s Vienna; finding the correct and honest way of speaking truth was as 
much a matter of language as of content, and here Wittgenstein differs from the Jung 
Wien generation of aesthetes, the later flow of which he was raised in. Integrity, Kraus’ 
perpetual watchword, comes not from heightened language, as if we could say the 
unsayable if only we could purify our expressions, but from recognising the limitations 
of any expression, and presenting this exacting modesty in the field or form suited to the 
purpose. Fineness of expression without being rooted in thought was a fraud and an 
insult according to Kraus, a sin he railed against in the particular form of Heine and the 
newspaper feuilleton (see ‘Heine and the Consequences’ translated with commentary in 
Jonathan Franzen’s The Kraus Project). Kraus’ difficult, almost unapproachable prose 
is designed to make the reader earn his insights and satire, as opposed to the idle 
ornamentation of the feuilleton style, which Kraus thought was lazy, cliché-ridden and a 
disguise for shallow thinking. It is in this sense that the Tractatus and its style represent 
not merely a book that talks about ethics, but an act of writing that is itself ethical: ‘the 
point of the book is ethical’ (Wittgenstein Letters to Ludwig von Ficker 94). Janik and 
Toulmin go on to claim that it was further ‘an ethical deed, which showed the nature of 
ethics’ (Emphasis in original. Wittgenstein’s Vienna 24) by separating off the ethical 
from attempts to underpin it intellectually; the aesthetic form and moral content of a 
work are identical and thus impossible to express otherwise. As Carolyn Wilde reads it 
in ‘Ethics and Aesthetics are One’, Tractatus proposition 6.422 insists that reward and 
punishment cannot reside merely in the consequences of the action, but must be ‘in the 
action itself’ (167). The truest and most powerful effect of a text – philosophical or 
poetic – would not be external events, such as morals drawn from them, but the direct 
impact of writing or reading the text. Ethical writing is thus not instrumental or 
intellectual, but performative. For Kraus, operating as a social critic and satirist, the 
perfect satire would be ‘a work which in no way changes the statements that are being 
satirized, but simply shows them in a light which illuminates their inherent hypocrisy’ 
(Wittgenstein’s Vienna 90). A comparison with the Tractatus is quite simple, then: its 
aesthetic form and its ethical content are singular, and the work is, if not a satire, at least 
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self-undercutting, without saying anything that seems exaggerated or false within the 
terms of philosophical logic. It shows itself through its presentation – though exactly 
what it shows remains ambiguous, as the discussion to follow shows.  
The question of presentation underpins much of Chapter 3 in this thesis, in contrasting 
and combining the analytic philosophy of John McDowell and the poetry of Wallace 
Stevens. As discussed in more detail there, McDowell aims at what has been called a 
deflationary realism about (moral) values in the world by undermining both realist and 
anti-realist stances (Tim Thornton John McDowell 63). Stevens, meanwhile, struggled 
with the need or desire for the world to have meaning, while still recognising that the 
shaping fictions we use to give our world meaning (including mythology and religion) 
have either ceased to satisfy, or must be rethought as fictions yet still meaningful. Much 
like Wittgenstein, Stevens saw the aesthetic, in the figure of the Poet, as the possibility 
of creating, critiquing and renewing the necessary fiction(s), which would be 
understood in different ways by different readers. In like wise, the different chapters of 
this thesis present a number of ‘occasions’ in which the boundaries of sense come under 
strain, and explore how different (poetic) responses use diverse strategies to continue or 
question communication with readers, including the ethical aspects of these activities. 
The diversity of contexts and methods is designed to ease or dissolve certain 
philosophical worries about apparently general problems, but will for that same reason 
not be able to provide general answers. Steven’s Poet must make lively a fiction among 
fictions; Jorie Graham’s stuttering stories must still engage a reader; Kei Miller’s 
Rastaman must persuade in stew and song. 
Reading the Tractatus 
Wittgenstein admits much the same in his preface: his method cannot expect to be 
effective on any but the right kind of reader – one who both speaks the language of the 
content and is alert enough to the form to see the nonsensicality. Many early readers in 
the Vienna Circle took the text as a logical positivist work, in which the exclusion of the 
mystical from the sayable was a practical and admirable step, in line with their principle 
of verifiability (Frederick Copleston A History of Philosophy: Logical Positivism and 
Existentialism 5) . But this reading is now rarely taken – in part because the positivist 
outlook has generally become increasingly less palatable since its heyday prior to the 
Second World War, and in part because it involves ignoring considerable parts of the 
Tractatus’ text, including much of the last section and Wittgenstein’s own preface. And 
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even for readers who follow the injunction to read the propositions of the book as 
nonsense, what are we to take as the residue of our reading experience?  
The ineffabalist or standard reading seeks to retain a genuine philosophical insight 
about language and logic; that the book shows us something that cannot be stated 
without incoherence, yet can be understood by a proper appreciation of its mode of 
presentation. The nonsense of the texts is of an ‘illuminating’, instructive, or 
transformative type (Atkinson The Mystical in Wittgenstein's Early Writings 97). But 
this still presents the difficulty of actually saying what it is that Wittgenstein’s nonsense 
has provided. Is it a philosophical theory of the traditional kind, though presented in an 
unorthodox manner? Or is it a theory at all? 
Cora Diamond has famously called the ineffabalist reading a ‘chickening out’ from the 
real philosophical challenge of the Tractatus (‘Throwing Away the Ladder’ 7). It is 
accused of attempting to retain a philosophical insight of the type that the text does not 
mysteriously reveal, but straightforwardly shows as nonsense – not because it is 
illegitimate in the positivist sense, but because the whole philosophical enterprise, 
including the Tractatus, is a bewitchment by language that we ought to be cured of by 
the kind of therapy that reading this self-negating text provides. The ineffabalist 
reading, while pledging itself to silence about what is revealed, nonetheless presumes 
that it is capable of taking up a view of the world from outside, as it were, in exactly the 
way the closing remarks of the Tractatus rule out (Warren Goldfarb ‘Die Überwindung: 
Anti-metaphysical Readings of the Tractatus’ 11).    
The so-called ‘resolute reading’ was propounded initially by James Conant and Cora 
Diamond, but picked up increasingly in the 1990s by Kevin Cahill, Alice Crary, Ed 
Dain, Rob Deans, Piergiorgio Donatelli, Burton Dreben, Juliet Floyd, Warren Goldfarb, 
Logi Gunnarsson, Martin Gustafsson, Michael Kremer, Oskari Kuusela, Thomas 
Ricketts, Rupert Read, Matt Ostrow and Ed Witherspoon, Phil Hutchinson, Denis 
McManus and the late essays of Gordon Baker (see Conant ‘Mild Mono-
Wittgensteinianism’ 111 n.3 and Silver Bronzo ‘The Resolute Reading and Its Critics’ 
46).
6
 Although many variants exist, they commonly suggest that the Tractatus 
                                                             
6 The term resolute was first coined by Thomas Ricketts, and first printed in Warren Goldfarb’s 1997 
review of Diamond’s The Realistic Spirit. Many other terms for the reading have been suggested, 
including ‘new’, ‘therapeutic’ and ‘austere’, depending on whether the emphasis is on the reading’s 
unorthodox, methodological or self-limiting character. ‘Resolute’ is most commonly used, however, so I 
will use this term throughout, particularly to avoid conflating this reading with a more general 
therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein, which includes both those who take the resolute reading and those 
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propositions, either in their entirety or as result of the ‘framing’ prepositions that begin 
and end a text, are demonstratively self-defeating, and leave nothing behind; we remain 
‘inside’, and give up on the notion of a view from outside as illusory. The Tractatus is 
inherently dialectical: the opening ontological claims are revealed to be incoherent by 
engagement with what they set out. They generate their own dispersal by encouraging 
us to think through their consequences (Goldfarb ‘Die Überwindung: Anti-metaphysical 
Readings of the Tractatus’ 12). They have done their work in displaying themselves as 
nonsense, as examples of the work philosophy ought to be doing on other sentences that 
are disguised nonsense – cases where our language betrays us into thinking we can say 
things that have no meaning, mistakes we ought to avoid making. One way of 
summarising the dichotomy between standard and resolute readings (which contains 
within it many variants) is the way that Juliet Floyd puts it in ‘Wittgenstein and the 
Inexpressible’: ‘The former kind of reader [ineffabalist] sees the inexpressible as a 
limitation, a reflection of what is illegitimate in grammar or fails to be epistemically 
justifiable; the latter [resolute reader] sees the inexpressible as a fiction, an illusion 
produced by an overly simplified conception of human expression’ (177). 
I will work through the implications of attempting to express the inexpressible in the 
next chapter, using Diamond’s appeal to an expression rooted in personhood rather than 
propositional sense. This can be considered separately from the issue of interpretations 
of the Tractatus itself. For the moment it will be more important to consider the 
implications for the text and its reception, and the ‘resolute’ response to questions of 
aesthetics.  
Essentially, the resolute reading is retrospective, perhaps only making sense when seen 
through Wittgenstein’s later work in the mode of therapy, irony and imagined forms of 
life. Though resolute readings do not depend on the later work for their specific 
arguments, it is hard to conceive of them getting purchase on the Tractatus without 
Wittgenstein’s later insights, while also assuming that the earlier Wittgenstein already 
had these views, or forms thereof – which is to say that philosophy of the essentialising 
sort that he attacks in Philosophical Investigations is not ‘incomplete’ and standing in 
need of an inexpressible structure but an altogether empty form of words; a purposeless 
form of talking, motivated and sustained by the erroneous impression that what is 
uttered says anything at all. It is not that we imagine something that cannot be said but, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
who find this method in Philosophical Investigations, but not in the earlier work. For a fuller account of 
the development of the term and the reading, see Silver Bronzo ‘The Resolute Reading and Its Critics’.  
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on the contrary, that we can say things that we only imagine we can imagine. The 
nonsense of the propositions of the Tractatus is not revealing of something deeper, but 
that all language operates in plain sight and nonsense is plain nonsense; nothing is 
revealed about the hidden structuring of the world, because nothing of that sort makes 
sense to imagine, even if we appear to have the words for it. Realising this, through the 
self-dissolution of the final section of the Tractatus, gives us not a clinching insight or 
residual intellectual accomplishment but the temporary and specific therapy we need to 
put aside the temptation to philosophise, the release that comes from concealed, 
troubling nonsense being revealed as plain and manageable nonsense. 
The resolute reading is of course not without its problems and detractors, notably Roger 
White (‘Throwing the Baby out with the Ladder’), Peter Hacker (‘Was He Trying to 
Whistle it ?’ and ‘When the Whistling Had to Stop’), Daniel Hutto (Wittgenstein and 
the End of Philosophy), and Jaakko Hintikka (‘What does the Wittgensteinian 
Inexpressible Express?’). The major points of contention tend to be: that the resolute 
reading unjustifiably does away with the say/show distinction (that they deny that which 
can be shown but not said), which seems to run against Wittgenstein’s expressed views 
(e.g. in his letter to Bertrand Russell  of 19
th
 August 1919, in Letters to Russell, Keynes 
and Moore 71-3); that its attacks on ineffabalist readings overstate the ineffability 
claims made (White 31); that there is a conflict between the way that resolute readers 
claim to regard the propositions as nonsense and their actual use of them in support of 
their arguments (Hacker ‘Was He Trying to Whistle It’ 110); the retrospective nature of 
the view, as mentioned above; the specific conception of ‘nonsense’ the earlier 
Wittgenstein held and the implications of this view – or the justification for assuming 
there is only one type of nonsense (Lynette Reid ‘Wittgenstein’s Ladder: The Tractatus 
and Nonsense’); and the consequences of this view for Wittgenstein’s ethical (and 
therewith aesthetic) ambitions. 
So intense have the debates between different readings been that the late nineties 
featured what was called ‘The Tractatus Wars’, a conflict still going on, though in a 
more compromising style – see for example the essays in Beyond the Tractatus Wars 
(2011), edited by Rupert Read and Matthew A. Lavery, featuring alternating 
contributions from either camp. I will not give a full account of all the criticisms just 
mentioned here, partly because it would not do justice to the increasing variety of 
readings being developed – from Conant’s ‘Mild Mono-Wittgensteinianism’ to Juliet 
Floyd’s exceptionally austere reading, which denies the possibility of the absolute 
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generality Wittgenstein sought to express, even in expressing its impossibility 
(‘Wittgenstein and the Inexpressible’ 185). At several points in this thesis particular 
arguments will be brought up, particularly in the discussion of the inexpressible in 
Chapter 2. Very generally, I do hold it to be an important insight that the ineffabilist 
reading implicitly assumes that there is a ‘something’ that cannot be expressed, which is 
already to say something about it; it assumes the generality of the limits of language 
(and this, if nothing else, is the residual achievement of the Tractatus) when such an 
idea makes no sense without retaining some elements of the Tractarian propositions at 
face value. By contrast, the resolute reading often goes too far in pressing for a 
deliberate and available solution to the ‘chickening out’ of ineffabalism. The charge that 
the whole book is plain nonsense (and not significant nonsense) seems a troubling 
position to be in, even given the very particular analysis of nonsense in Wittgenstein 
and Frege that Diamond gives in chapter three of The Realistic Spirit, and that the 
implied constancy of Wittgenstein’s views requires ignoring a considerable amount of 
biographical information, including remarks in Wittgenstein’s later writing about ‘the 
author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’ (PI §23; see also for example the Preface 
viii, §95 and §114). 
Among the casualties of the resolute reading is the possibility – or sense – of discussing 
aesthetics in terms of something ‘higher’ or ineffable. What looks like an attempt to 
reach beyond language is shown to be simple nonsense – no more or less meaningful 
that ‘piggly wiggle tiggle’ (Diamond ‘Ethics, Imagination and the Method of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’ 151) – and whatever value such an attempt has is limited to 
the demonstration of its hopelessness. Much like Kennick’s anti-essentialism mentioned 
earlier, there really is no ‘it’ that Art is, or that it speaks to, beyond what we can express 
in ordinary language. This need not, of course, mean that a resolute reader has no 
interest in art or that artworks are no longer of value. However, it does mean that there 
is a difficulty in reconciling a resolute reading’s treatment of aesthetics with what we 
know of Wittgenstein’s attitude towards art – its centrality to human experience and the 
difficulty of saying anything better than nothing (CV 26e). The latter remark could, I 
argue, be stretched to suggest that the closer an artwork comes to achieving perfection, 
the closer it comes to saying nothing at all, much like philosophical theses (§128). 
Indeed, the idea of saying nothing at all seems to be the overriding issue for resolute 
readers, though not necessarily in the same way as Wittgenstein meant it. On the few 
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occasions when resolute readers do write about art, it tends to be on the matter of the 
status of the ‘nonsense’ of art that exceed the forms of ordinary language.  
Rupert Read’s treatment of Wallace Steven’s ’13 Ways of Looking at a Blackbird’, in 
Applying Wittgenstein, is an excellent study of both Steven’s stretching of the language, 
and what it can tell us about how many of Wittgenstein’s imagined language games are 
not intended to make us imagine something ridiculous, but to make us realise that what 
he has suggested – what it is possible to put into language – is, despite appearances, 
impossible to imagine. Many of our philosophical confusions arise from believing that it 
must be possible to imagine anything that can be said, whereas actually our language 
makes it possible to say things that we only imagine we imagine. Steven’s dizzying and 
comic renditions of scale lead us to imagine that we could simultaneously see the 
movement of a single bird’s eye and a wide mountain landscape (ll1-3), and his 
crumpling of grammatical forms toys with our conceptions of time. A weakness in 
Read’s reading exists, though, in that it operates from the initial assumption that poetry 
or poetic language does something different from the “practical” work of ordinary 
language: poetry ‘can transport us; it can make a beautiful noise […] but it cannot 
transport us from A to B’ (Applying Wittgenstein 35). In other words, poetry has the 
ability to create certain moods or grammatical effects – in the Stevens case urging us to 
try to imagine things that on closer inspection turn out to be unavailable to our 
imagination, in the manner of Wittgenstein’s philosophy – but it remains strictly 
speaking, useless; it does no work in the ordinary flow of life; it stands idle. Read’s 
analysis does make a persuasive case for one way of reading Stevens’ poem, but the 
divide that the attendant view of “poetic language” opens up is somewhat reductive, 
based on an idea of idleness linked to a definite outcome. This goes against 
Wittgenstein’s own insistence on the great variety of forms of language and different 
games, and contradicts the very high value that he placed on poetry. The resolute 
reading is right, as I will argue in Chapter 2, about the nonsensical nature of ineffability 
claims, and does seem in harmony with a remark from the Tractarian period in Culture 
and Value about the difference between the effects of practical and ethical language: 
‘You cannot lead people to the good; you can only lead them to some place or other; the 
good lies outside the space of facts’ (5e). But it is important to avoid slipping into a 
positivist/practicalist view of language, and not to pretend that Wittgenstein’s text is 
cleaner and less human than it really is; its own correctness about where it oversteps the 
boundaries of sense feel less like a joke than a frustration – a theme I return to in 
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Chapter 5 and the ideal of achieving a ‘clear view’ or ‘perspicuous representation’ 
(sometimes rendered as ‘birds-eye view’) of grammar. A further indication of the 
development of Wittgenstein’s thought in this area, rather than a break or a continuity, is 
his comment in Culture and Value (7e) which links two key images from the Tractatus 
and Philosophical Investigations: ‘But now it seems to me too that besides the work of 
the artist there is another through which the world may be captured sub specia aeterni. It 
is – as I believe – the way of thought which as it were flies above the world and leaves 
it the way it is, contemplating it from above in its flight.’ (emphases in original). A 
notable variation in Wittgenstein’s notes is that ‘the work’ of the artist might also have 
been ‘the activity’ and ‘the function’, showing how Wittgenstein considered these as all 
part of the same practice.  
An alternative to the resolute reading that does manage to incorporate a sense of 
Wittgenstein’s work in producing the Tractatus, and not only its end result, is that 
provided by Daniel D. Hutto in Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy, which also has 
similarities with the ‘elucidatory’ reading put forward by Marie McGinn in ‘Between 
Elucidation and Therapy’. Wittgenstein is trying to show something that is not nonsense 
about the way language works, but he is simultaneously conscious that his own 
conception of language (at that time) prevents him from saying it in a way consistent 
with this conception. By using the ‘image of a world of facts which consists of objects 
in combination with one another’ – the metaphysical opening of the Tractatus that the 
resolute reading is obliged to consider completely meaningless – Wittgenstein is 
attempting to ‘make clear the distinction between content (objects), structure (the 
arrangement of objects in determinate relationships to one another in facts) and form 
(the possibility of objects entering into these determinate relationships)’ (McGinn 
‘Between Elucidation and Therapy’ 500).  
This distinction can be shown but not stated, since this would require being able to say 
something about language or the world from the outside, as it were; which ultimately 
means that the propositions don’t say anything at all in their own terms. Nevertheless, 
they are carefully designed to lead us to see for ourselves something that is not 
ineffable, but something that we in effect already knew, through our own everyday 
application of language. It is not a discovery of some hidden truth but points towards 
something that ‘lies before our eyes’ (501). Hutto accepts that McGinn’s elucidatory 
reading gets Wittgenstein out of the problem of wanting to say something impossible or 
from ‘outside’ language, but still questions whether it is legitimate to claim that he has 
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done so without actually saying anything; if anything at all is conveyed to the reader, 
language must in some way have been used inappropriately – though ‘self-consciously’ 
on Hutto’s reading (Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy 100). It is undeniable that, 
no matter how the evolution of Wittgenstein’s views is conceived, there is a tension 
between his earlier and later thinking.  
In common with most, I hold that both the idea of two radically opposed Wittgensteins 
of the orthodox reading (e.g. Hacker’s description of the Tractatus and Philosophical 
Investigations as ‘diametrically opposed philosophical masterpieces’ (Wittgenstein: 
Connections and Controversies 2)) and the idea of a real ‘mono-Wittgensteinian’ 
narrative are too simplistic – symptomatic, perhaps, of philosophy’s love of precise 
definitions and in direct contrast to the contextual and variable view of the world that 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is supposed to have inspired. Rather than treating the 
tension as a single about-face or a minor grumble to be overlooked, Hutto correctly 
identifies that Wittgenstein developed his thinking over time, in part in response to 
problems identified within his own work. He came to find his earlier work 
unsatisfactory not because it was simply wrong but because it no longer answered the 
questions that he had thought he had answered or that he now thought needed 
answering: 
The best way to smooth out these exegetical difficulties is to see his remarks as 
attempts at elucidation not as theory, without suggesting that they succeeded in 
being such. Concentrating on the actual status of his remarks, the [variety of 
other] interpretations fail to distinguish clearly what he was trying to achieve 
from the extent to which he was successful in achieving it. Clearly, he wished 
the Tractatus to be a work of clarification, yet in large part it failed in this 
purpose, as he later realised. That this is so is entirely consistent with the fact 
that he made erroneous assumptions and that he failed to express himself in the 
correct way.  (Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy 101) 
It is not unreasonable to hold that, although Wittgenstein was at the time of completing 
the Tractatus satisfied that he had stilled the questions of philosophy as best he could 
(TLP Preface) and that he had completed his ethical deed, he remained certain that very 
few people would understand it, that his efforts were imperfect and, further, that he was 
‘pushed by his own understanding of sense to regard [the propositions] either as 
statements of fact or as mere nonsense’ (Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy 102). 
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His return to philosophy thereafter came with a growing and specific dissatisfaction 
with the view of language that had pushed him into this mode of expression. 
Naturally, Hutto’s account is not without its critics in turn, particularly Read, who takes 
Hutto to have a more limited conception of what thought and language are like than is 
justified by the account thereof in the Tractatus, and to introduce theoretical elements 
that do not (despite Hutto’s claims to the contrary) escape Wittgenstein’s injunction 
against theory, by being situated in specific occasions of use (Read ‘A No-Theory?: 
Against Hutto on Wittgenstein’ 74-5. For Hutto’s argument for how occasions of use 
function in the Tractatus, see ‘Two Wittgensteins Too Many’).  
The Mystical, Faith and Terror 
My own concern here, with both Hutto’s account and the resolute reading, is that 
analytic philosophy generally feels permitted (or compelled) to omit one aspect of 
Wittgenstein’s worldview that has particular importance for aesthetic considerations, 
namely his unquestionable struggle with ‘the mystical’ – to include the religious, which 
is deeply entangled with the aesthetic and the ethical. On the one hand, most 
commentators simply ignore this aspect, assuming a clean separation between analytic 
philosophy and religious thought (or better, a religious view on the world). Hutto, for 
example, lists four possible readings of the Tractatus in addition to his own (positivist 
theory; ineffable, necessary truths; therapeutic nonsense; or a set of elucidations) but 
does not consider what Wittgenstein’s troubled views of faith might add to the mix 
(Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy 101). The contrary holds true of those studies 
that have, on the other hand, taken Wittgenstein to be a straightforwardly mystic or 
Christian thinker. These include Russell Nieli’s Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to 
Ordinary Language, which draws parallels between the Tractatus and Christian 
mystical traditions, particularly notions of a ‘flight’ from the world and the profanation 
of language, James R Atkinson’s The Mystical in Wittgenstein’s Early Writing, which 
emphasises Wittgenstein’s desire to contemplate objects in the world without using the 
language that inevitably creates a separation between speaker and object, but thereby 
insists on a truth about things which is nonetheless supposedly ineffable (140), and 
Walter Glannon’s insistence that Wittgenstein remained in search of some shadowy 
truth beyond language in ‘What Literary Theory Misses in Wittgenstein’ (263-4). James 
W. McClendon and Brad J. Kallenberg have gone so far as to argue that Wittgenstein 
was a committed (if unorthodox) ‘Christian in philosophy’ who underwent a conversion 
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event during the First World War (‘Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Christian in Philosophy’ 
131).  
In their favour, such accounts have clear parallels with the mystical forms of discourse 
exhibited in the Tractatus, including language that is at times specialist, literal, 
metaphorical or deeply ambiguous, an insistence that the methods of ordinary 
communication are inadequate for expressing the text’s message directly, and an appeal 
to the author’s own person for understanding rather than purely the text itself (TLP 
6.54). There is also considerable biographical information from Wittgenstein’s service 
in the First World War and after that suggests an encounter with faith of some kind, in 
particular through Tolstoy’s The Gospel in Brief, which he repeatedly recommended to 
friends (e.g., see his letter to von Ficker of 24/07/1915 in Wittgenstein: Sources and 
Perspectives 91, and his continuing admiration for Tolstoy’s moral teachings mentioned 
by Fania Pascal in her memoir of Wittgenstein, in the same volume, 55-56.)  
Such claims, however, do need considerable refining, since as in most things, 
Wittgenstein’s attitude towards faith is complex and idiosyncratic. Atkinson accurately 
notes that Wittgenstein in every  instance uses the term ‘the mystical’, rather than 
mysticism or mystic, so it should not be inferred that he ‘is referring to a body of beliefs 
held by mystics’ (The Mystical in Wittgenstein’s Early Writing 93). Marjorie Perloff 
charts his increased interest in the mystical during the period of the completion of the 
Tractatus in Wittgenstein’s Ladder (25-32) and Bertrand Russell’s bemusement at the 
change, when the two met again after the conflict, writing to Lady Ottoline: ‘I was 
amazed to learn that he has become a complete mystic [...] and is thinking seriously of 
becoming a monk.’ (20/12/1919, cited in WL 30). However, tellingly, Russell goes on to 
say that ‘I think (although he would not agree), that what he likes best in mysticism is 
its power to stop him from thinking’ (30). This seems like a particularly apposite remark 
given Wittgenstein’s own later preoccupation with being able to stop doing philosophy, 
to find the right words to give himself a moment of rest from its temptations and 
apparent troubles (see ‘Restlessness and the Achievement of Peace’ by Timothy Gould). 
If Wittgenstein was close to adopting a form of religious faith, it was not a conversion 
to an orthodox Christianity, though the forms of religiosity that may have appealed were 
Judeo-Christian, given his cultural background and circumstance.
7
 More likely, he saw 
                                                             
7 For Wittgenstein’s early life and upbringing, and his family’s status as Jewish converts to Protestantism, 
see Ray Monk The Duty of Genius Chapter One; for a discussion of Wittgenstein’s views on Judaism and 
faith in Culture and Value, see Wittgenstein’s Ladder 75. 
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a mystical view of the world as a kind of discipline of the self (in both the sense of self-
control and of judgement or punishment) that allowed one to be a better person by 
escaping the hypocrisy of religious moral posturing, the superficiality of everyday 
society, and the ‘transcendentales Geschwätz’ (transcendental prattle) of ordinary life 
(letter to Paul Englemann, 16
th
 January 1918, in Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein 12e). 
To be good was to maintain one’s integrity (as Kraus urged) not so much in search of 
some further meaning outside the world, but as a way of accepting one’s place within it 
without pretension, pride or dishonesty. If the Tractatus attempted to do more than this 
– to reveal a secret, unearned, to its readers, or claim a higher status through such an 
insight, it would no longer be the ethical deed it set out to be. Indeed, it would have 
invalidated Wittgenstein’s own conception of the mystical, since ‘Only something 
supernatural can express the Supernatural’ (CV 5e). 
To grasp the wider, lived sense of Wittgenstein’s relationship with the mystical, I will 
here first briefly make a case for its inclusion as a consideration when discussing the 
Tractatus, and then show its continuing implications for understanding his perception of 
philosophy and how it ought to be carried out. I will draw on a dream that he wrote 
down among his school papers while a teacher in rural Austria. It is dated 1922, so after 
the completion of the Tractatus but before its English publication or the ‘middle period’ 
of his thought that is usually marked as beginning around 1929 and the Lecture on 
Ethics. It certainly indicates a soul far from at ease with issues of God and conscience. 
The text is reproduced in Ilse Somavilla’s facsimile edition Licht und Schatten, 
published in 2004. Wittgenstein dreamt that his favourite sister Hermione complimented 
him for having a better or higher soul than others. When he woke he was filled with 
shame by his own smug arrogance at the imagined compliment; and worse, in 
atonement for the arrogance he crossed himself, but was too lazy to get out of bed and 
make proper obeisance. He suddenly saw his own worthlessness (Nichtigkeit) and felt 
that God was directly ordering him to get out of bed and on to his knees. Terrified, he 
obeyed, then rushed to the mirror, staring at his own grey reflection in horror. He 
realised that he had to admit to all the worst things about himself, or go mad. Eventually 
he went back to bed and did not dream anymore; he noted that he felt normal in the 
morning, but dull and tired.  
On its own the dream does little to illustrate Wittgenstein’s more prolonged view of 
religious belief or sinfulness, but the fact that he wrote it down – with some care and 
corrections, as can be seen in the manuscript version – suggests that he considered it a 
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significant or at least unsettling experience. There is even a hint of sadness in the post-
script that in the morning everything felt normal, that the possibility of a religious 
experience had passed. The episode bears a striking resemblance to the much later series 
of ‘confessions’ that Wittgenstein insisted on making to some of his Cambridge friends 
(see Monk Duty of Genius 367), suggesting that the feelings described after the dream 
still clung to him years later, even if not taking such an explicit form. 
Somavilla reads Wittgenstein’s relationship to religious belief as twofold, consisting of 
both a dark, demanding threat of judgement, and the light of ‘the pure spirit and the 
true’ (Licht und Schatten; my translations). The dream and its aftermath placed 
Wittgenstein in such a twofold position: God’s terrible judgement, aroused by 
Wittgenstein’s failure to live up to an ideal of conscientious humility. Notably, 
Somavilla also claims that this darker side of belief was ‘not only mysterious but angst-
inducing’ (Licht und Schatten). A further glimpse of this conception of faith comes 
from Wittgenstein’s notebooks during the First World War. He records:   
[29 April, 1916:] Was shot at. Thought of God. Thy will be done. God be 
with me.... [5 May, 1916:] Now, during the day, everything is quiet, but 
in the night it must be frightful. Will I endure it?? Tonight will show. 
God be with me!! (MS 103 qtd. in Monk The Duty of Genius 138) 
McClendon and Kallenberg note of these remarks that ‘Wittgenstein [prays], and 
requests, not safety for himself or victory for his side, but integrity in face of death’ 
(‘Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Christian in Philosophy’ 137). Though I would not press the 
evidence as hard as McClendon and Kallenberg do, in seeking to establish Wittgenstein 
as a life-long Christian, it is certainly evidence that he thought of death, of being tested, 
and did so within an identifiably Christian framework.
8
 The emphasis, however, ought 
to be on the demands that belief is making, for personal integrity, not on a set of rules to 
be obeyed, or the promise of reward. This implies an involved view of belief. It is not 
only something to be understood, like creedal statements, but also something that makes 
demands on us and can unseat us from a comfortable life. I will return to the 
significance of this point later, but here it is worth noting that the mysterious is taken to 
be something more than what remains to be cleared up by explanation. Not only is a 
                                                             
8 Though whether this is connected with Wittgenstein’s possible beliefs, or more with his possibilities of 
expressing belief, given his cultural and linguistic content, is of course open to question, particularly if 
recalling the remark in Culture and Value about how the language of dogma is as much part of its 
controlling influence as its ideas. (32-3) 
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belief of this sort more deeply embedded than an opinion, it marks a question over the 
possibility of communication between believers and non-believers, where 
disagreements will not be on the level of the exchange of facts. To understand 
someone’s belief, a mystery, that is not ours, we must, to use a formulation more 
reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s later writing “take his game into ours, so to speak” 
(Donald W. Hudson Wittgenstein and Religious Belief 164). 
Clearly such considerations connect with Wittgenstein’s later method and views, 
particularly in On Certainty and his lectures on religious belief, in which the 
consequences of beliefs or the occasions of meeting foreign beliefs provide stimuli for 
considering how convictions, culture and faith emerge in our living, our whole lives 
(e.g. PI§19, OC §§18, 137, 239, 609). Here, my aim is to show the importance of 
considering Wittgenstein’s relationship with faith when attempting to understand his 
writing, both in terms of his style and form, and his likely conception of his own 
project. Ignoring or simplifying this aspect, as the majority of studies do, leaves out 
more than just biographical colouring. This connects both with the understanding of the 
Tractatus discussed above and possible approaches to the later work. In both cases, it is 
important to note the irresolvable discomfort of Wittgenstein’s writing, both for himself 
and the reader. This recurring unsettability is part of what makes a poetic consideration 
of his work so valuable and in turn makes his philosophy so suitable for talking about 
the motivations and techniques of poets, whether John Burnside’s obsessive probing of 
the “almost there” and “nearly felt” (see Chapter 2), Kei Miller’s fluctuations between 
registers of language (Chapters 2 and 5) or Jorie Graham’s hesitations and anxiety, 
which hint at but resist the kinds of spiritual resolution offered by religious faith 
(Chapter 4).  
The kind of spiritual struggle that Wittgenstein recorded in his notebooks, especially in 
the inter-war period, might easily be paralleled with such remarks by Schopenhauer as 
‘The prayer, “Lead me not into temptation,” means, “Let me not see what manner of 
person I am”’ (The World as Will and Representation, vol I 470), with its simultaneous 
clinging to and rejection of Christian faith, its demands for a personal honesty that 
terrifies. And this terror is part of the reason why the resolute and ineffabalist readings 
feel so unsatisfactory, though it is rarely put in these terms.  
Wittgenstein was not devout in any conventional sense. He certainly did not consider 
himself so to be, and was often fiercely critical of religion; Bertrand Russell records him 
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being surprisingly hard on Christians in his early Cambridge years, and his 
correspondence with Englemann reveals someone convinced of their own venality:  
I am slightly clearer in my own mind about my lack of decency. If you tell me 
now I have no faith, you are perfectly right, only I did not have it before either. 
It is plain, isn’t it, that when a man wants, as it were, to invent a machine for 
becoming decent, such a man has no faith. But what am I to do? I am clear 
about one thing: I am far too bad to be able to theorize about myself’ or ‘I am 
not happy, and not because my rottenness troubles me, but within my 
rottenness.  (Letter to Englemann 16
th
 January 1918)  
But Wittgenstein unquestionably felt himself judged, or in need of judging, as his dream 
recounted earlier suggests. Like Kierkegaard, whom Wittgenstein read and admired in 
many respects (Drury ‘Recollections of Wittgenstein’ 87), it was not faith Wittgenstein 
had, but an ardent desire for it and an inability to give up the intellectual integrity that 
prevented him from finding an acceptable form for it. He thought, for instance, that for 
Ficker’s Der Brenner to call itself ‘a Christian journal’ was ‘intellectual make-believe’ 
(Letter to Englemann 5.8.21, in Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein 45e). He considered 
himself to be not religious, but to see everything from a religious point of view (Drury 
‘Recollections of Wittgenstein’ 79). I take this to mean not through the lens of a 
particular religion, but in terms of his comments in his lectures on religion about how 
such deep rooted things as belief show themselves in our everyday behaviour – in our 
choices and limits and commitments – rather than recitations of creeds (LC  72). In 
these lectures he again does not subscribe to (a) faith, but refuses to dismiss such a way 
of life; rather he presents his bafflement at what is demanded of someone to really hold 
consequential religious beliefs (53-5). This means both the commitments that underlie 
expressions of belief, beyond the conceptual content of dogma, and the ways in which 
the possibilities of expression, especially between believers and non-believers, seem to 
curve in on themselves, leaving communication not impossible, but unsatisfied or 
misdirected.  
Later Writings 
If there is a genuine unity between Wittgenstein’s earlier and later thought, one which 
survived not a sudden transformation but a gradual unpicking of the constraints of the 
Tractatus, towards the ‘rough ground’ of Philosophical Investigations (§107) and the 
heterogeneous epistemic holism (or alternatively what Daniele Moyal-Sharrock 
characterises as ‘animal certainty’) of On Certainty (Readings of Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty 2), I argue that it lies in his sustained fascination with the multifarious limits 
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of expression, as they feature in the Tractatus, his lectures on ethics, religion and 
aesthetics, as well as the revolutionary conception of sense-making in On Certainty. 
How are the limits of expression to be discovered or thought about, how they are put in 
place and how do they shape and produce our behaviour? Religion, poetry, music and 
philosophy are all caught up in his sensitivity to the decent response, the correct 
expression and the clear idea. It is thus an important question to consider not only the 
content of his writing but his chosen mode of presentation. 
Although giving an integrated account of Wittgenstein means considering his biography 
and working context, I remain wary of falling under the thrall of a ‘personality cult’, 
prioritising biography and the testimony of disciples over analysis of his writing – of 
which Wittgenstein scholarship has on occasion been accused, for example by Randall 
Collins (The Sociology of Philosophies 36, 175), Frederick Copleston (Contemporary 
Philosophy: Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism 7) and W. W. Bartley III 
in his controversial psychoanalytical biography, Wittgenstein. Rather the intent is to 
provide a framework for contextualising some of his remarks and recurring themes that 
might otherwise seem unconnected or inconsequential. Although I stop short of Alan 
Badiou’s portrayal of Wittgenstein as an ‘antiphilosopher’, whose challenge to the 
orthodoxy of thought of his time was inherently mediated by his own personality, since 
it is only in the confessional ‘act’ of expression that carries the ethical charge 
(Wittgenstein’s Anti-philosophy 88), it is hard to deny that his later style and method 
encourage the reader into something more like a conversation than a lecture, and in such 
encounters one does benefit from discerning what kind of voice (or voices) one is 
listening to.  
Philosophical Investigations in particular has been discussed in terms of its style and 
structure, with commentators noting the diversity of conflicting voices, the themes 
returned to or interrupted and several possible readings of the lines of argument. It has 
been described as confessional (Hent de Vries ‘From “ghost in the machine” to 
“Spiritual automaton”: Philosophical meditation in Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Levinas’), 
a kind of drama or performance (Eldridge Leading a Human Life), as proposing and 
demonstrating a 'self-monitoring, self-interrogative approach' at variance with normal 
philosophical practice (Hagberg ‘Wittgenstein’s Voice: reading, Self-Understanding, 
and the Genre of Philosophical Investigations’ 502-3), as a series of linked narrative 
threads (Austin E Quigley ‘‘Wittgenstein's Philosophizing and Literary Theorizing’), as 
seductively unorthodox and indirect, demanding ‘an existence at once inside the 
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profession of philosophy and outside it’ (Cavell ‘The Wittgensteinian Event’ 9), and as 
necessarily multi-vocal persuasion (David Stern ‘Texts and Style’), even leaving aside 
those who would prefer to ignore the style and mine the text for straightforwardly 
theoretical arguments, such as Peter Strawson, whose early review of the book saw the 
style as a difficulty to be overcome (‘Critical Notice of Wittgenstein’s  Philosophical 
Investigations’), or more recent scholars such as Jaakko Hintikka, who see 
Wittgenstein’s style as a reflection of his own impatience in explaining, rather than any 
deeper philosophical motivation (Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-
Half-Truths).  
Much has been made of Wittgenstein’s choice of style, as much in the conversations 
and imagined cases of the Philosophical Investigations as the clipped declarations of the 
Tractatus. Amongst many, the work of David Stern, David Schalkwyk and James Guetti 
takes this aspect seriously, and one can also point to significant artistic responses to his 
style, such as Eduardo Poalozzi’s series of prints As Is When (1965), or Jan Zwicky’s 
poetry collection Wittgenstein Elegies (1986), which reflect Wittgenstein’s formal 
concerns as much as his subject matter. Ed Kanterian has noted the similarities in 
Wittgenstein’s search for an acceptable mode of presentation with Nietzsche’s poetry-
prose, and the influence that Lichtenberg’s, Weininger’s and Kraus’ aphoristic style had 
on his early work (‘Philosophy as Poetry?’ 103), not to mention Schopenhauer’s 
influence, in both his solipsism (Hacker Insight and Illusion 75) and his gift for 
epigrams.  
Most famously, this intellectual combat of voices takes place in the Philosophical 
Investigations, as has also been variously analysed by, for example, Stanley Cavell 
(‘The Investigations’ Everyday Aesthetic of Itself’), Marjorie Perloff (Wittgenstein’s 
Ladder) and Ben Tilghman (Wittgenstein, Ethics and Aesthetics). 
As Hagberg has argued in ‘Wittgenstein’s Voice: Reading, Self-Understanding, and the 
Genre of Philosophical Investigations’, interlocutor voices are put to many uses in 
Wittgenstein’s later work, as seducers, sounding boards, common sense or orthodox 
philosophy, guys, or mutually critiquing parallels: ‘Some of the voices present here 
articulate positions that are and always were alien to Wittgenstein’s style of thought but 
that he sees as being or as having been attractive to other thinkers (e.g., reductive 
behaviourism). On the other hand, there are numerous other voices that articulate 
positions and views to which Wittgenstein himself has felt genuine intellectual 
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attraction’ (500). Similarly, David Stern lays out the complexity of identifying any one 
of the voices present as Wittgenstein’s “own”:  
Indeed, even if a proposition is not put in inverted commas, and does chime 
with a number of other passages, that does not by itself show that it is a view 
that Wittgenstein endorsed. For a substantial fraction of what is said there 
consists of attempts to express “what we are tempted to say” about 
philosophical problems, which is “of course, not philosophy but it is its raw 
material (PI §254) If the dissenting voice usually known as “Wittgenstein’s 
interlocutor” speaks, often indicated by putting those words in quotation marks, 
or placing a double dash before them, the very fact that the passage in question 
set out the views that it does us actually excellent evidence that Wittgenstein 
did not accept them [...] However, in most cases, it is not so easy to tell the 
many voices in Wittgenstein’s writing from his “philosophical treatment” 
(§254) of them.  (‘Texts and Style’ 16) 
For a fulsome account of different exegetical approaches taken towards Wittgenstein, 
see Wittgenstein and his Interpreters. As Stanley Cavell argues, the seductiveness and 
difficulty of the text lies in part in its form, refusing to resolve into a philosophy text 
(‘The Wittgensteinian Event’), even though the majority of interpreters are tempted into 
treating it as a disguised presentation of a philosophical doctrine of position. Among 
these might be counted Michael Dummet’s ‘full-blooded conventionalism’, Barry 
Stroud’s naturalistic view of logic, Saul Kripke’s communitarian conventionalism, 
Hacker and Baker’s pragmatic conventionalism, and Kenny’s neo-Aristotelean reading 
(Eldridge Leading a Human Life 91-107). Even the generally accepted notion of an 
interlocutor voice within the text underestimates the complexity of its composition. As 
Hagberg puts it, ‘we should be wary of the singular term interlocutor: there are a 
number of voices that appear throughout these writings, voices manifesting distinct 
movements and shifts of thought that articulate grammatically fueled philosophical 
confusion each in its own way’ (‘Wittgenstein’s Voice’ 500).  
These multiple forms of articulation and re-articulation, echoed in Jorie Graham’s 
revisions and contradictions (Chapter 4), are more than a stylistic tic. They appear to 
have been fundamental aspects of Wittgenstein’s thinking. The latter chapter explores 
the effects of such devices in poetry, in ways that illustrate how Wittgenstein 
complicates the notion of the author, and the importance he placed on finding the right 
voice as well as the right words. In his letters it is remarkable how often he complains 
that he cannot explain what he would like to in writing, but must do it in conversation 
(mündlich) (e.g.: letter to Russell of Christmas 1914 in Ludwig Wittgenstein: 
Cambridge Letters 91). His notebooks abound with the repetition and revision of 
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precise expressions and analogies, seeking the telling formulation. What it is possible to 
say, and how, underlies his preoccupation with exact phrases and examples; a search for 
clarity, but also persuasiveness and balance. Where in the Tractatus the attempt was to 
use (or show the impossibility of using) language in its most general form, divested as 
much as possible from mere contingency, in the later writing the focus is on the 
illumination afforded by particular examples, voices, and circumstances. Despite his 
themes and arguments operating at a level of abstraction familiar to philosophers, his 
technique is often to provide reminders of the unusualness of this use, however similar 
to everyday uses it might look (e.g. PI §§19, 94, 98, 108, 132). Famously, 
‘philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday’ (§38). Language when 
not on holiday is rarely as monosemic and clear in intent as a philosophical example 
would wish, and is laced with colloquialisms, jokes, abbreviations, history, slang, 
hesitation, circumlocution, power-relations or malapropisms, which prevent any hope 
for a single, definitive understanding of any utterance – at least, not of the type sought 
by a view of language that Wittgenstein attacks in Philosophical Investigations (§81), as 
if meaning were something read off a sentence, like deciphering a code. 
Wittgenstein claims that this view simply fails to have (or makes itself blind to) its roots 
in the language it is trying to understand. A large proportion of Philosophical 
Investigations is devoted to pointing out the varieties of use that are available for terms 
for which we think we already have an exhaustive definition, examined in isolation The 
approach is ‘self-monitoring’ and ‘self-interrogative’, to an extent that ought to preclude 
the text’s assimilation to a ‘methodological mainstream in which generalized positions 
are propounded and defended’ (Hagberg ‘Wittgenstein’s Voice’ 502-3). Sometimes this 
reflexive and non-general method merely enumerates the many different uses of a 
common term, such a reading (§§156-171) or being guided (§172-3); sometimes we are 
shown how the application of a word that we think we have is actually unavailable, 
either because we conflate different modes of expression, like treating a pain like an 
object one can possess (§§244-8), or because the expression has become detached from 
its actual use: ‘a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part 
of the mechanism’ (§271). The history, force and unpredictability of human lives and 
their language games are continually recalled, alongside diverse uses and different kinds 
of difference between cases (e.g.: §§6, 17, 335, 376, 444, 527, 531, 558; p179, p181).
9
  
                                                             
9 Megan Quigley has productively compared Wittgenstein’s treatment of language as necessarily 
underdetermined and entwined with our wider lives with James Joyce’s determination that ‘languages – 
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It would require more space than can be afforded here to talk in detail about the very 
many different readings of the Philosophical Investigations as a whole or the various 
parts of it. Most writers tend to position themselves in similar camps to those discussed 
in relation to the Tractatus, above – those who see Wittgenstein as providing 
substantive philosophical theories (even if these are presented in an unorthodox manner 
or are an incidental outcome of his work) and those who see his major insight and driver 
to be a therapeutic release from philosophical theorising. The latter release might be 
complete, like a disease cured, something open-ended like a talking cure, or merely an 
escape from a particular type of theory.
10
 Alice Crary introduces a collection of essays 
on the therapeutic interpretation thus:  
Wittgenstein's primary aim in philosophy is – to use a word he himself 
employs in characterizing his later philosophical procedures – a therapeutic 
one. These papers have in common an understanding of Wittgenstein as 
aspiring, not to advance metaphysical theories, but rather to help us work 
ourselves out of confusions we become entangled in when philosophizing.  
(The New Wittgenstein 1) 
The anti-theoretical reading is increasingly widely accepted, though it remains 
problematic, particularly in a context such as aesthetics, where the relations between 
text and reader, and between form and content, are so important. What counts as a 
theory can be a point of contention, and what is meant by therapy as an alternative is 
difficult to pin down. If the assistance Wittgenstein offers to the philosopher is not 
spelled out in the text but takes the form of a conversation or a relationship, issues of 
responsibility and commitment arise. What is the relationship between the therapist and 
the patient? Is a cure being applied or is it ongoing ‘work on oneself. On one’s 
conception’ (CV 24e)? Is a privileged position assumed by the Wittgensteinian 
philosopher against those who are beguiled by language and the problems of 
philosophy? If the notion of therapy being used is similar to the relationship between 
psychotherapist and patient, questions about power-relations, norms of behaviour and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
rather than God-given or quantifiable – are social games, enmeshed in the power relations of 
nationhood, gender, race, and sexuality’ (‘Modernist Fiction and Vagueness’ 106). Though the authors’ 
individual preoccupations and techniques differ widely, a Modernist treatment of Philosophical 
Investigations is certainly plausible. I agree with Quigley’s highlighting of the role of vagueness in 
Wittgenstein’s attacks on mainstream philosophy, though within reason – vagueness itself is adaptive to 
its particular cases of use.  
10 It would be difficult to provide an exhaustive or definitive list of which writers consider themselves as 
theorist or therapeutic readers of Wittgenstein, especially since a favourite criticism to make of any 
given interpretation of Wittgenstein is that it falls into the trap of presenting a theory. To give some 
examples of the key scholars in each camp, Kripke, Hacker, Luntley and Stroud in various ways attempt 
to distil theory from Wittgenstein’s remarks, whereas Goldfarb, Hagberg, Cavell, Diamond and Hutto 
position themselves as working against theory.  
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what counts as an answer arise. It is worth bearing in mind Wittgenstein’s own 
comment on Freud, called in the notes by Rush Rhees in Lectures and Conversations on 
Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. Wittgenstein was by turns a fierce critic 
and admirer of Freud, praising his insights into how our patterns of thought and 
justification stand in need of continual examination but dismissive of Freud’s 
systematising use of sexuality, and understanding of what makes an explanation (e.g. of 
a dream) ‘complete’ (42-49) as misguided attempts at securing scientific standing for 
his theories. 
On the one hand this reflects the philosopher’s and scientist’s wish for a single form of 
explanation, as opposed to accepting that the multitude of different ways we have of 
explaining things is a natural and important feature of human life. All explanations will 
emphasise or ignore certain features, depending on their focus and method, and it is this 
that Wittgenstein attempted to bring into view (cf Z §196; Sass ‘Wittgenstein and the 
Nature of Psychoanalytic Explanation’ 257). This theme is treated as part of On 
Certainty’s interrogation of our notions of knowledge, knowing, doubting and 
persuading. Avoiding the scientistic view of language which he arguably held in writing 
the Tractatus (Avrum Stroll Wittgenstein 57-64), here Wittgenstein is insistent that what 
counts as a justification or evidence may take many forms and need certainly not be of 
the scientific type; one chooses particular knots for particular purposes (OC §142) and 
at some point justification ‘comes to an end’ (§192). To impose a single form of 
explanation would break apart the way in which a given language game works – it adds 
nothing and ‘its only effect is to arrest the game’ (Moyal-Sharrock Understanding 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty 66).  
On the other hand, Wittgenstein’s reservations about Freud concern the relationship 
between therapist and patient. The complexities of this relationship should not be 
overlooked: the position of power of the therapist; the assumption of a “normal” to 
which the patient can return; the attractiveness of an explanation to one’s thinking, 
which may be something very different from clarification or resolution. Even a counter-
intuitive or painful analysis of one’s thoughts or dreams can be preferable to a feeling of 
being adrift or out of control.
11
  
                                                             
11 The complexities of the patient/therapist relation are far greater than I can do justice to 
here, and it remains an area where Wittgenstein’s writing may be usefully applied. Relatively 
few texts treat it directly, though some, such as J M Heaton’s Wittgenstein and Psychology, do 
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What is the model of therapy presented in Wittgenstein’s writing? Eike von Savigny 
stresses that it is a particular kind of treatment for a particular kind of trouble: ‘it is all 
being done in a perfectly cool, calm and collected style; there is nothing emotional 
about it. In the interest of insight, it is all reason and argument, even if implicitly so, 
designed to provoke his readers to think for themselves’ (‘Diagnosis and Therapy’ 43). 
This is true enough, given that the confusion Wittgenstein addresses is in large part 
intellectual, and that he uses the tools and tones available to philosophy. However, this 
account somewhat overplays the calmness of the process. Philosophical therapy can be 
exceedingly hard and unsettling, if it is to escape the superficial sophistication of 
intellectual life that Wittgenstein abhorred.
12
 Time and again Wittgenstein exclaims on 
the difficulty of uncovering the unseen frameworks of our thinking, of removing the 
lenses through which we had forgotten we were seeing the world (e.g.: PI §§24, 89, 
103, 106, 114,120, 340). 
The Wittgensteinian philosopher ought to be wary of assuming that he has attained the 
position from which to see ‘the world rightly’ (TLP 6.54), or even that a ‘clear view... a 
perspicuous representation’ (PI §122) of the language at hand is possible. Rather, it may 
be that we are being urged to recognise that philosophy (as a profession) is, or ought to 
be, ‘haunted by the success of its escape from [its] obligation’ as therapy (Cavell In 
Quest of the Ordinary 12).
13
 We may well be on our guard against our bewitchment by 
language but being the therapist alert to common blind-spots and confusions is no 
guarantee of safety, nor of attaining perpetual release in being ‘capable of stopping 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
explore how a Wittgensteinian model of the talking cure can escape some of the issues that 
theories of psychology encounter, including the supposed problem that psychotherapy cannot 
‘escape the words and concepts that make it possible’ (2). For a very instructive account of 
how the relationship has been depicted and deconstructed in the area of contemporary British 
and Irish theatre writing (in ways that philosophy has not yet adequately addressed) see Ariel 
Watson ‘Cries of Fire: Psychotherapy in Contemporary British and Irish Drama’. If Philosophical 
Investigations can usefully be treated as a dramatic, rather than didactic, text (Eldridge Leading 
a Human Life), then the presentation of the relationship of voices within the text, as well as 
with the reader, will be part of its effectiveness, and an area of consideration for interpreters. 
 
12 See for example, Raymond Monk’s account of Wittgenstein’s rocky relationship with the Apostles club 
and life in Cambridge generally (Duty of Genius). 
13 Cavell here draws an explicit connection between (Socratic) philosophy and poetry, with both 
conceived of as originally engaged in education – therapy – and in direct competition for this role in 
Plato’s writing. He argues that academic philosophy has lost these roots and suffers thereby. It is worth 
noting that Wittgenstein similarly complains that people no longer see poetry as having ‘something to 
teach them’ (CV 42e), an anxiety regularly raised in contemporary discussions of the role of poetry in 
society. Part of the aim of this thesis is to put such concerns, for both practices, into illuminating 
contexts – see particularly Chapters 3 and 5. 
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doing philosophy when [we] want to’ (PI §133). The peace (Ruhe) that Wittgenstein 
seeks is ‘temporary and provisional’ (Gould ‘Restlessness and the Achievement of 
Peace’ 75) and it would be a mistake to assume that Wittgenstein provides a technical 
manual that negates language’s pitfalls. I discuss this provisionality and notions of 
perspicuous representation in more detail in Chapter 5, in relation to cartographical 
metaphor in Philosophical Investigations and the poetry of Kei Miller.  
Here my intention is only to point to the types of relation that might be conceived of 
when we call Wittgenstein’s method ‘therapy’. Despite the easiness of assuming that 
both the philosopher and the psychotherapist carry out talking cures, with language 
being their tool and focus, we could also consider it a kind of physiotherapy, where the 
patient learns not to understand themselves but by degrees to move or hold themselves 
differently.
14
 And this process can be as gradual or revelatory, as confrontational or 
communal, as indirect or direct, as conscious or unconscious, as any of the many varied 
examples given in Wittgenstein’s writing. An important part of this alternative 
description is its emphasis on practice – that knowledge, skill and language only have 
their place within specific practices, and that understanding a practice often requires 
taking part in it for a significant period, whether physically, linguistically or culturally. 
To recall Peter Lamarque’s ‘Wittgenstein, Literature, and the Idea of a Practice’ 
mentioned earlier, and Michael Luntley’s Opening Investigations, there are many cases 
in which rules are neither more important than, nor foundational to, participation in a 
practice. This includes the activity of philosophy where, at least in Wittgenstein’s 
conception, the objective is a transformation of the self rather than the gaining of new 
information (PI §§126-129). Keeping use in mind preserves us from the confusions 
brought on by study (§132); training and custom underpin explanation (§197-8), and the 
quandary of the philosopher is more like someone struggling to orient themselves 
within a landscape (§123). This further supports the practice-oriented treatment of 
Wittgenstein’s work this study follows, emphasising understanding through significant 
engagement with a practice, even where engagement precludes an explicit 
understanding of its rules. This kind of engagement is exemplified in aesthetic practice, 
particularly poetry, which subsists on but startles our usual language habits. 
                                                             
14 To my knowledge no literature exists charting a detailed comparison between Wittgenstein’s method 
and physiotherapy, though some research in physiotherapy does draw on Wittgensteinian concepts or 
expressions, such as ‘now I can go on!’ (PI §151) in Health Humanities (P Crawford et al.), and the role of 
the physiotherapist – as an interlocutor who helps not by winning arguments but by imposing and 
demonstrating rules of behaviour – is occasionally mentioned in Wittgenstein scholarship, for example 
Sebastian Wyss’ ‘Does Wittgenstein have a Method?’. 
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Belief, Ritual and Poetry 
In order to make the case for this reading, I want to return to the notion of religious 
belief. It is clear from the notes we have of Wittgenstein’s lectures on this topic that his 
interest was in how a set of beliefs ought to have consequences – limiting, motivating or 
explaining certain actions – rather than in the nuances of dogmatic concepts or the truth 
of particular claims. What makes religious belief difficult to talk about is not its content, 
but how it hangs together through being rooted in a particular form of life. In Lectures 
and Conversations, he discusses the notion of the Last Judgement. Belief in this concept 
does not seem to be primarily about an ‘expression of belief’ (55), nor is it something to 
be understood or defined through ‘normal reasons’ (56). Wittgenstein discusses the 
disconnection between types of belief, especially scientific and religious, where the 
different kinds of argument may simply not touch each other. ‘A man would fight for 
his life not to be dragged into the fire. No induction. Terror. That is, as it were, part of 
the substance of the belief’ (56). Historical evidence (e.g.: for the existence of the 
person Jesus Christ) and scientific evidence seem to be quite beside the point for 
understanding what something like the Last Judgement means to a believer. Similarly, 
when seeking to understand a custom or belief from a culture different from one’s own, 
Wittgenstein in Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough scorns the value of assimilating 
other beliefs to a single explanatory framework (i.e. Frazer’s narrative of progressive 
rationality and science). His preferred method would be to create networks of 
connection, analogy, human communalities, developments over time, and (re)applied 
symbols. 
As Brian Clack has noted in Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion, it would be very 
challenging to assemble a coherent anthropological method from Wittgenstein’s 
remarks in this collection, and at times it can appear as if Wittgenstein wanted to have 
his cake and eat it, too: to understand an ancient rite through analogy with something 
familiar; to leave the ancient rite exactly as it is and not attempt to bring it into our usual 
way of seeing the world; to make comparisons between cases without saying anything 
further; to emphasise the commonality of human experience and human ritual behaviour 
without positing a biological or systematic explanation of our behaviour. The most 
common reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks is as a kind of expressivism (David 
MacArthur ‘Wittgenstein and Expressivism’). The intellectualism and instrumentalism 
of Frazer are criticised, to be replaced with rituals in which we just do something that 
satisfies our instinctual reactions, this marking the end of any explanation or 
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justification. We simply ought to describe and see connections and differences between 
cases, rather than seeking to theorise or find root causes. Several of Wittgenstein’s 
remarks can be interpreted in this light, particularly the comparison of burning in effigy 
and kissing the picture of one’s beloved (RFGB, 123), and the satisfaction of beating the 
ground with a stick when angry (137). Others do not fit so simply, such as the role an 
historical explanation might play in how we see the (imagined) ritual of men riding 
other men at a festival (143). For discussion of Wittgenstein’s expressivism, or 
otherwise, see Robert L. Arrington and Mark Addis’ Wittgenstein and Philosophy of 
Religion, and Anthony Rudd’s Expressing the World: Skepticism, Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger. 
Clack argues convincingly that expressivism alone would be a very poor treatment of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks, and in all likelihood a less than satisfactory methodology for an 
anthropologist interested understanding another culture (Wittgenstein, Frazer and 
Religion 21-50). The warning expressionism gives against reductive instrumentalist 
accounts, and the way it challenges the priority, whether historical or logical, of a belief 
over a practice, is certainly useful, but it has limited scope for more positive 
contributions. We are at risk of a banal relativism (the impossibility of translation) or 
the simplistic alignment of vastly different experience with our own. Not everything is a 
good candidate for paraphrase into something more practically understood (LC 71). Not 
all rituals aim at catharsis or wish fulfilment (or anything at all), and in any case we 
could only understand what was being released or wished for given a firm 
understanding of the ritual in question.  
Clack instead presents Wittgenstein as sketching a Spenglerian concept of ‘expression-
media’ (Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion 161-6), by which the focus on the individual 
is replaced with a view of rituals and mysteries as manifesting the values and 
preoccupations of the society performing them. That I kiss a photograph of a loved one 
is not to be understood in term of my own personal feelings, but through what it says 
about what kinds of love are played out and represented in my Form of Life. A whole 
society manifests itself in its ceremonial behaviours (as well as institutions, laws, art 
etc.) – an extension of Wittgenstein’s remarks that ‘An entire mythology is stored 
within our language’ (RFGB 133) and ‘to imagine a language means to imagine a form 
of life’ (PI §19).  
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There is undoubtedly value in seeing our ceremonial or aesthetic acts within a greater 
context of community, place and history, which avoids the threat of banality posed by 
expressivism. As will be argued in subsequent chapters, the deep and necessary 
connection between language, form of life, and the creating and appreciation of art is 
key to understanding Wittgenstein’s position, as well as the power of art to affect us as 
it does. The language of poetry is not purely instrumental; neither is it arbitrary or 
merely demonstrative. The difficulty of combining the poetic and the philosophical can 
in some ways be analogous to the way that Frazer (according to Wittgenstein) relegates 
non-scientific ideas to the realm of mistakes rather than paying attention to what they 
can reveal about the humans performing the ritual (cf Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion 
22). 
Although his account takes little or no account of Wittgenstein’s later work in On 
Certainty, and thereby misses important questions about our grounds for acting as we 
do, as well as our instinctual or codified behaviour, Clack’s model is usefully sensitive 
to the position of the witness or reader of the event, who must be in a position to 
understand how these expression-media manifest the society’s key concerns and values. 
Such a witness must, therefore, be either an outsider who nonetheless has a deep 
understanding of the culture or an insider, perhaps late in a culture’s history, able to 
look back on what has been (171-3).  
Specifically, both Wittgenstein and Spengler seem to have in mind great artists as those 
who can obtain such a position. The idea of the select few capable of obtaining such a 
view does match onto some of the remarks Wittgenstein makes in Culture and Value, 
for example on Mendelssohn’s and Mahler’s different limitations as composers (4, 17, 
76-7), though another pertinent example is recounted in Somavilla’s Licht und Schatten, 
extracted from a letter of Wittgenstein to his sister Hermione. The parallels with both 
the closing propositions of the Tractatus and the idea of really worthwhile art emerging 
through an awareness, and re-valuation of one’s culture’s deep values, are striking. 
In the letter, a culture is compared to a room made of tinted glass, through which we see 
the world. If we never discovered the impermeable boundaries of the room, the coloured 
light we receive would simply be the norm, and many people know nothing else. Those 
who do come up against the boundary realise that what they see is not ‘pure’ light, but 
something filtered. They may respond with laughter or melancholy – realising that their 
view of the world is lesser or ridiculous, or that they will never achieve unmediated 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
71 
 
knowledge. Still others may not see the boundary as a boundary, but as just another 
thing within the room, so nothing changes for them. The exceptional individual, 
however, thinks: “I must escape into that light”, and attempts to break through the glass 
into freedom. 
Truly significant people (especially artists) are those who have engaged with the light 
and the boundary – in Wittgenstein’s letter either through humour, melancholy or 
attempting to break through. The reason their work is so gripping ('es ergreift’)(Licht 
und Schatten 45) is that it unsettles our comfortable cultural spectrum. One could 
compare the notion of being gripped with Wittgenstein’s remark on poetry being able to 
‘pierce’ us – ‘uns durch und durch gehen’ (Zettel §155), a particular image I return to in 
Chapter 4. In reading impactful poetry, the ‘familiar surroundings of the words’ (our 
shared Form of Life) invite us into the poet’s art, but the arresting deployment of words 
does not lead to a swift conclusion, but lets ‘our thoughts roam up and down’ (§155), 
perhaps changing the landscape we thought it possible to explore. 
This is a return of sorts to the insistence on a historically informed conception of art, as 
marked by Eldridge in ‘Problems and Prospects’, above, but with a far greater emphasis 
on the context and consequence of the aesthetic creation and contemplation. To 
understand art is to take, as far as possible, a view of the culture within which it was 
produced. This is not to say that art from another tradition cannot be assessed and 
applied according to one’s own rules (e.g.: Picasso’s appreciation and appropriation of 
African art, which was in part a reflection back on the limitations and cruelties of his 
Western tradition; see Patricia Leighten ‘The White Peril and L'Art nègre: Picasso, 
Primitivism, and Anticolonialism’); understanding will always be implicated in the 
position from which one takes a view. But to really get to the mystery or terror at the 
heart of art and ritual requires an involved understanding of the human instincts, modes 
of expression, and inherited attitudes that a culture possesses. Connected with 
Wittgenstein’s notions of integrity, elusive clarity and involvedness discussed above, a 
discussion of art in which categorisation and essence overtake experience and reverence 
would be as much a mistake as a philosophical discussion that takes language out of its 
everyday use and makes it idle. He is always seeking a path between the traditional 
dichotomies of practical and poetic language, spontaneity and rootedness, speech and 
silence, conceptual and experiential understanding, expression and silence. Examples of 
this effort abound in his writing, though by their nature are not biddable into a single 
statement of intent, and are often used only selectively by commentators. To mention a 
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few, the closing of the Lecture on Ethics which treats ethical statements as both futile 
and greatly to be respected; the holistic reading of the Tractatus I have argued for 
above; the discussion of seeing-as in Philosophical Investigations, in which our 
perception of an object can sometimes be an act of interpretation, sometimes something 
unconsciously assumed or forced from us (Malcolm Budd Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Psychology 77-99; Garth Hallet A Companion to Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical 
Investigations” 664-668), likewise Zettel §199; rule-following, also in Philosophical 
Investigations, as an intricate balance of nature, training, description and spontaneity; 
the remarks on how opinion and its expression are controlled through dogma and 
convention in Culture and Value (32-33); the so-called hinge propositions in On 
Certainty that traverse the border territories of grammar, remaining perfectly ordinary 
yet non-epistemic propositions (§151), complicating our notions of certainty and trust 
(§509), literal and metaphorical meaning (Avrum Stroll ‘Wittgenstein’s Foundational 
Metaphors’); the ‘confessional form’ of Philosophical Investigations, as taken up by 
Stanley Cavell’s project in The Claim of Reason (Hent de Vries ‘From “ghost in the 
machine” to “Spiritual automaton”: Philosophical meditation in Wittgenstein, Cavell, 
and Levinas’) and Bob Plant in ‘The Confessing Animal in Foucault and Wittgenstein’.  
In taking this integrated view of Wittgenstein’s work – neither as divided into two (or 
three) contrasting philosophies nor as a consistent outlook with only superficial 
differences – I hope to demonstrate a genuinely productive method of philosophical and 
literary critique. In the chapters to follow I will approach some of the many points of 
contact between Wittgenstein’s philosophical concerns and poetry, showing the value of 
both treating the poems discussed with a Wittgensteinian eye and how poetry can 
perform, accentuate or bring into question aspects of language and art as treated by 
philosophers and critics. The importance of poetry in particular to Wittgenstein’s 
writing will be repeated, since this underpins much of the motivation and shape of this 
study. Among the many examples he gives of the arts, second perhaps only to music, he 
regularly draws on poetry to show the possibilities of language beyond the narrowly 
instrumental confines normally drawn up by philosophers (what Mikel Burley 
appropriately calls their culturally ‘tin-eared’ thinking, in ‘Reincarnation and the Lack 
of Imagination in Philosophy’ 40).   
Time and again Wittgenstein invokes poetry, with reminders that our language games 
are not only about giving information (Z§160), and the impression that a poem’s words 
make on us (§170), the special status of a musical or poetic theme (§533), the 
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importance of an appropriate reading (PI p214) and even the effects of typesetting 
(Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology vol I. 190); how words in a poem can be like 
pictures or a painting (Nachlass 18-19), the physicality of reading (39), that poetic truth 
and coherence with reality need not be the same thing (46), of poetic moods (CV 75), 
the cultural background needed to understand or admire a poet (CV 96), or perhaps most 
famously, that philosophy ought really to be done in the manner of poetry: ‘philosophie 
dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten’(CV 28). 
This last remark – the precise translation of which into English can generate 
considerable material alone, as discussed in Chapter 5 – provides a running reminder in 
what follows. What would it mean to conduct philosophy in the manner of poetry? 
Wittgenstein appears to have had in mind a consideration for the exact choice of phrase 
or meaningful gesture, and for language that prompts further thinking. His grouped 
remarks in the later philosophy have this feeling of guiding us over a landscape but not 
saving us the effort of travelling for ourselves. His writing is not poetic in the sense of 
being fantastical, or in its style and form – though it does aim at and often achieve 
‘literary qualities’ (Joachim Schulte ‘The Builder’s Language’ 25). Rather, it is poetic 
in the way it invites us to roam (Z §155) and its attempt to change a point of view rather 
than provide new information. Without making a misguided claim for the nature of 
poetry in general, as a practice and in the examples studied here, one can find 
instructively overlapping concerns and techniques. John Burnside’s exploration of water 
in Swimming in the Flood places together poems in which it appears as threat, escape, 
comfort, mirror, promise, betrayal and the sublime, deepening our possible responses in 
a manner reminiscent of the way Wittgenstein selects and contrasts analogies in 
Philosophical Investigations. Wallace Stevens’ felicitous loosening of grammar to 
allow meanings to proliferate,
15
 and how he allows repetition and tautology to bring 
forward or obscure meanings
16
 can illustrate the peculiar view on our habitual language 
that Wittgenstein often attempts to bring into view. Kei Miller’s attention to the 
rootedness of language, as well as its potential for growth in new soils (Writing Down 
the Vision), is a reminder of the historical but underdetermined view of language and 
behaviour that Wittgenstein urges. Jorie Graham performs in ever-shifting ways the 
anxiety of attempting to say, wanting to say, fearing to say, those things that seem 
inexpressible or inadmissible. 
                                                             
15 For instance, in ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’ (CP 129) in which the identities of the singer and the 
sea repeatedly come together and move apart, in grammar as well as sense. 
16 For instance the meditation on forms of repetition in ‘Notes Towards a Supreme Fiction’ (CP 405).  




In some ways, Wittgenstein could be considered a Romantic, or a late example of that 
movement, which is one of the reasons for choosing the poets discussed here, who in 
different ways are connected with, but outside, this tradition. Taking Wallace Stevens as 
a significantly similar example of late-Romantic writing, or writing ‘in the wake of 
Romanticism’ (Simon Critchley Things Merely Are: Philosophy in the Poetry of 
Wallace Stevens 20), a certain heritage passes from him to both Jorie Graham and John 
Burnside in ways both openly acknowledged and implicit. Though Wittgenstein’s 
writing has at various times been claimed as modernist, post-modern, scholastic, war-
literature, confessional, deconstructive or as performance, there are useful parallels 
between his style and project and that of the Romantic poets. Mark Rowe has made this 
connection in ‘Success Through Failure: Wittgenstein and the Romantic Preface’ and 
‘Wittgenstein's Romantic Inheritance’, as have Read (indirectly) in Applying 
Wittgenstein by discussing Wallace Stevens’ ’13 Ways of Looking at a Blackbird’, 
Eldridge in Leading a Human Life, Stanley Cavell (In Quest of the Ordinary) and John 
Churchill (‘Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy’). Wittgenstein’s rejection of the 
attempted clarity of the Tractatus in favour of the mingled, tangled lines of argument in 
Philosophical Investigations and the multi-stranded way of thinking he encouraged can 
be read as a rejection of Classical ideals of harmony and balance. The emphasis laid on 
the communal in the private language argument (PI §§241-315) is not, I suggest, a 
rejection of the individual, as some communitarian interpreters have claimed, but rather 
a rejection of the Cartesian rationalist self-transparent ego in favour of a (Romantic) 
subject, whose world-experience encompasses nature, language, training, change, and 
partial, unreflective or provisional knowing. 
Romanticism as a lens may therefore be particularly productive for considering 
Wittgenstein in relation to poetry and personhood, as Cavell has also claimed in 
extended treatments of the relations between a certain kind of philosophy and 
Romanticism, and the idea of a Romantic philosophical tradition. Or, alternatively, one 
might chart a tradition of Romantic anti-philosophy, as Badiou claims in Wittgenstein’s 
Antiphilosophy, making connections between Wittgenstein’s personalisation of 
philosophy and Nietzsche’s. This thesis could only scratch the surface of the possible 
applications of this way of thinking, but it will endeavour to show how the techniques 
and concerns of a certain kind of twentieth- and twenty-first-century poetry can enrich 
our understanding of a certain strand of twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy. 
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Wittgenstein’s continuing contribution to both philosophy and the arts, directly or 
indirectly, rewards attention. Though Romanticism as a school of thought is arguably 
something belonging to the past – and perhaps even Wallace Stevens’ placement as a 
late-Romantic  already incorporates a retrospective or nostalgic element – the concerns 
and ways of seeing the world that it developed remain useful critical and creative tools.  
As Marjorie Perloff has claimed in Wittgenstein’s Ladder (185), Wittgenstein 
bequeathed to artists of his own time and today an obsession with ordinary language, 
and also the question of who is speaking. With Kei Miller, we may ask who can claim 
to be the native speaker in a world of globalised languages, where the exile and the 
immigrant have the tools to make themselves heard. With Wallace Stevens, we may 
encounter the attraction and repulsion of a world-shaping fiction, and ask who is 
speaking for whom in our institutions, art and media. With Jorie Graham, we may trace 
and retrace the frames that give meaning to our thoughts and our selves, oscillating 
between the desire and the fear of laying claim to our own voices. With John Burnside, 
we may long for the unsayable, the unattainable, even while sinking it into the beastly 
and bodily realities of everyday life. Where each encounters the finality or faltering of 
expression, we may be reminded to look to the pictures that bewitch us and the practices 
within which we can create, control, or make ourselves understood. 
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Chapter Two: Inhabiting the 
inexpressible and the ineffable 
Introduction 
As discussed in the last chapter, the limits of language play a continuing, developing 
role in Wittgenstein’s thought. The ultimate limit, often so conceived, is The 
Inexpressible. This chapter analyses what it means to attempt to speak, or speak about, 
the inexpressible, particularly within the philosophical framework set by the Tractatus. 
This includes both the limits of sense – what cannot be said – and nonsense, both of 
which play a major role in the different analyses of the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy as a whole. 
Almost inevitably, especially given the realist conception of the inexpressible I claim is 
behind some of the more problematic readings of Wittgenstein’s work, the discussion 
leads to a consideration of the ineffable – the supernatural or religious. In particular, the 
Western Christian mystic tradition, here represented by the late-antique Pseudo-
Dionysian corpus, can be used to understand what Wittgenstein was responding to, and 
changing, in the Tractatus and his later work.  
Admittedly, the inclusion of Pseudo-Dionysius in a thesis otherwise engaged with 
twentieth-century philosophy may seem a little incongruous. However, as I hope to 
show in the coming discussion, there are several parallels, commonly under-
acknowledged, between mystic thought and the responses of twentieth-century 
philosophy and poetry, which the direct language of the latter makes easier to discern. 
Moreover, as an exercise in approaching the ineffable through precise and varied 
techniques, the Pseudo-Dionysian text has few rivals, though many imitators. 
Wittgenstein at times seems to be in harmony with the urges of the mystic, at times 
directly critical. Ultimately, this chapter performs something of a Wittgensteinian turn 
itself, by considering the inexpressible and ineffable in grammatical, rather than 
epistemic or ontological terms.  
The language of speaking beyond meaningful language is shown to have a number of 
techniques and grammatical forms, and these are further discussed in relation to 
Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics and Kierkegaard’s paradoxes of faith and indirect 
communication. We speak and do not speak.  
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
77 
 
But can we speak and not make sense? The different types of nonsense and their 
implications for interpreting Wittgenstein are scrutinised, largely through a reading of 
Cora Diamond’s resolute reading of the Tractatus and subsequent work. Questions 
about understanding speakers as well as their speech arise, leading to a treatment of 
Wittgenstein’s remark in Culture and Value about the ‘background’ against which what 
we say has meaning.  
Not only does this aid in understanding the technique applied by the mystic (and its 
counterpart in Wittgenstein), but it provides an avenue of comparison with the 
techniques and practices of poetry. Kei Miller’s series ‘Church Women’ from the 
collection The Kingdom of Empty Bellies provides illustrations of the same grammatical 
and metaphoric techniques, and with concerns similar to those of Pseudo-Dionysius, but 
here used not to impress mystery, but to share stories, introduce characters, and 
investigate from within the many facets of belief. Belief and poetry are both equally 
communal acts, whose mystery and ineffability we regulate, as well as being regulated 
by. 
I briefly consider some solutions to the mystic’s paradox, including the use of meta-
languages and Tim Knepper’s notion of ‘relative ineffability’ but argue in the end for a 
domestication of the term instead, which emphasises the importance of, and variety of, 
practices that attest to the various limits of expression. Domestication denies the 
possibility of ‘the inexpressible’, but only as conceived of as exceeding the situatedness 
of any effort to express it. This analysis does not close off the ineffable or inexpressible 
from our use, but reconsiders what it is that is being attempted. Only on a referential 
picture of language does its failure to reach outside itself become a problem.  
Finally, an alternative conception of the ineffable as not the unreachable thing beyond 
the wor(l)d, but as the inescapable incompleteness within everyday experience is 
examined, through the poetry of John Burnside. This permits a slightly different view of 
his work than the more usual Heideggerian reading, with fruitful results, and illustrates 
some further points about the force and facility of poetry for addressing our limits of 
expression.  
The Inexpressible 
To ask the question ‘What constitutes the Inexpressible?’ is immediately problematic, 
and arguably of the same order of question that Wittgenstein warns about in 
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Philosophical Investigations §24: ‘If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-
games in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: “What is a question?”’ 
The fact that we can formulate sentences in this way does not guarantee that a helpful 
answer can be given in the same form. As mentioned in the previous chapter, to ask 
‘What is Art?’ can be accused of presuming the thing – or the uniformity of the thing – 
that is being inquired into; it is an essentialising question that blinds us to the great 
variety of uses of language. Immediately before §24, Wittgenstein gives a list of the 
great variety of language games available to us, in each of which language behaves in 
different ways, then says ‘It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in 
language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, 
with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)’ (§23). 
This section will discuss the conception of the inexpressible in the Tractatus, in 
particular the different readings that are available of the final propositions, extending 
the discussion in Chapter 1. This will prepare the ground for further discussion of 
Wittgenstein’s conception of the ineffable, as well as building up a late-Wittgensteinian 
analysis of ineffability claims. 
What is meant by the inexpressible here, then, needs a little demarcation. In line with 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus project, it refers not to anything within our language, such as 
the taboo, difficulties of fine shades of expression, or the physically unutterable, but to 
what is placed outside language. On Wittgenstein’s maximally generalised account of 
language, the inexpressible is what cannot be uttered with sense. Whether this means 
that there is something that cannot be said but can be shown, or gestured towards, that 
Wittgenstein wanted to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate uses of language, 
or that Wittgenstein perceived all such questions to be misguided nonsense, depends 
largely on one’s interpretation of the Tractatus. Before returning to this specific 
question of interpretation, I will give a brief account of how talking about the 
inexpressible might be framed.  
 REALISM  
Despite the fact that the inexpressible is unmistakably part of our common experience – 
we know, at minimum, how to use the word – it is difficult to provide a self-consistent 
and helpful account of what it “is”. To demand to talk about things beyond the limits of 
language as though naming “things” – which much of the Western philosophical 
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tradition may be thought of doing – requires one to posit a parallel world that is 
sufficiently different from our own to elude description or apprehension, yet about 
which claims can be made (even if only the claim that it is inexpressible). This may be 
called the realist notion of the inexpressible.  
Or, more modestly, one might claim to have knowledge of this world, but from a 
vantage point outside language. Most normally this means being able to make claims 
about the world as a whole – its nature or necessity –  that are not possible to perceive, 
state or corroborate from within. This accords with the ineffabalist reading of the 
Tractatus described in Chapter 1, in which Wittgenstein attempts to give the reader an 
insight into the structure and logic of the world that could not be expressed in either 
ordinary language or his logical system.  
More modestly still, one might insist on a more austere treatment of the inexpressible, 
and deny that the speaker who invokes the inexpressible has managed to say anything at 
all; all that can be experienced is a failure to communicate (whether realised or not), and 
the utterances, however much they may initially look like valid sentences, are little 
more than noise. This conception can itself be taken in a variety of ways, either as a 
positivist response that leads to a more limited view of what constitutes acceptable 
language use, or towards a challenging of the view of language that lead us into this 
question in the first place, which I will align with some aspects of the resolute reading 
of the Tractatus.  
The realist conception of the inexpressible is that there is something of which words fall 
short of capturing. The inexpressible is of a different category to what could ever be 
reached in language. The motivation for such a conviction most often lies in the way 
language is viewed as a medium between us and the world, and therefore a later and less 
reliable aspect of the world that is really out there. What is truly ‘real’ is inexpressible, 
since an expression cannot capture the thing itself. The classic illustration of the worries 
this creates about knowledge may be Plato’s Theaetetus, which Wittgenstein read and 
translated. In a letter to Drury in 1944, he said that ‘Plato in this dialogue is occupied 
with the same problems that I am writing about’ (‘Conversations with Wittgenstein’ 
149). This comes a considerable time after his discussion of related themes in his 1930 
series of lectures; ‘Remember the trouble that the word “is” has given to philosopher’ 
(Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1932 4). 
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In the Theaetetus, Plato develops what will become the Theory of Forms as a means of 
combating the stark choices presented by Heraclitean Flux on the one hand and 
Parmenidean Being on the other. These latter two positions are perhaps best represented 
by Heraclitus’ aphorisms of perpetual change and Parmenides’ monist verse, 
respectively: 
We step and do not step into the same rivers, we are and we are not. 
(Heraclitean fragment, qtd. in Jonathan Barnes Early Greek Philosophy 
117) 
What is for being and for thinking must be; for it can be and nothing 
can not. (Parmenidean fragment, qtd. in Barnes Early Greek Philosophy 
133) 
 
Either we inhabit a world of flux, in which the appearance of knowledge is an illusion, 
since words cannot ever refer to the same thing twice (and by extension cannot ever 
themselves be used twice, or be re-used by the same user), or we live in a world in 
which change is an illusion, since to be or not be is a strictly binary condition, meaning 
that there is no possibility of something becoming something else, or even any 
delimiting of multiple objects. Our words and thoughts are themselves an illusion, since 
to think or speak is a movement, a change. In either case, ultimately all communication 
becomes impossible, since both words and individuals are swept away in the flux, or 
else the idea of there being two individuals who communicate violates the oneness of 
the unchanging world. The Theaetetus addresses the problem of something’s ‘always 
slipping out and away while one’s speaking and precisely because it’s flowing?’ (182D) 
by splitting the idea of knowledge from that of perception, and instead coupling it to 
true belief (David Bostock Plato’s Theaetetus). This, while avoiding the uncertainty of 
relying on accounts based on perception, still ends up positing the necessity of an 
unchanging foundation of the world – the Forms. Our knowledge of the world is only 
commensurate with the reality of it, unlike the certain knowledge available “directly” 
through the Forms, unmediated by perception or language. The objects we see around 
us are imperfect copies of their essential form, and just so our knowledge of them is 
partial or secondary.   
Given that words are references to things on Plato’s model, they become copies of 
copies, further distancing us from knowledge of the true object. As Morris Partee has 
noted, Plato insists on treating words in the manner of objects themselves, or pseudo-
objects (‘Plato’s Theory of Language’ 113), but this in turn means that words used 
directly to refer – in their literal or default meaning – are closer to the truth than 
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metaphorical or fictional uses, since these are an imitation of normal use – a copy of a 
copy of a copy. This forms a large part of Plato’s rejection of poetry, beyond his moral 
claims in the Republic about suitable representations of gods (97). Where philosophy 
attempts to find the Real behind the words and behind the objects, poetry plays with 
shadows of meaning, is derived from objects that never were.  
Plato’s realism about the inexpressible leaves our whole world as an illusion, though 
one in which degrees of truth permit us some kind of grasp on reality, and in which the 
philosopher’s contemplations of increasingly higher forms of knowledge are offered as 
guarantors. Leaving aside the threat of an infinite regress in Plato’s account, of forms 
reliant on further forms, all the way back to the ‘Good’ and the ‘Beautiful’, it also 
suffers from the almost universal problem of the inexpressible, in that once it has been 
determined that something beyond the possibility of our saying exists, it must 
simultaneously resist all efforts to communicate it. Even if the philosopher can claim 
that he has achieved knowledge of a higher realm, how is it that he can put this into 
words, or explain how he is able to think about something that is by definition beyond 
thought? What cannot be said – what is outside language – cannot be a “truth” since that 
resides in language (Atkinson The Mystical in Wittgenstein’s Early Writing 96). 
The Ineffable 
This paradox lies at the heart of mystical thinking but not only as a limitation. The 
positing of what eludes expression can in itself be generative. To investigate the 
thoroughness and depth of attempts to speak and not speak the inexpressible, this 
section will analyses the grammar of the works of Pseudo-Dionysius, a preeminent 
example of mystical claims of ineffability. 
The works that make up the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus are attributed to Dionysius the 
Areopagite, mentioned in Acts 17:34 as converting to Christianity following St. Paul’s 
address on the ‘unknown God’. However, it is generally believed that the Dionysian 
texts were actually composed much later (early-sixth century) given the Neo-Platonic 
tropes they contain and other textual indicators.
17
 The corpus includes four treatises – 
The Divine Names, The Mystical Theology, The Celestial Hierarchy, The Ecclesiastical 
Hierarchy, and ten epistles.  
                                                             
17 For further information see Pseudo-Dionysus: The Complete Works. Trans. Luibheid, Introduction. 
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The works of Pseudo-Dionysius comprise an extremely influential and sustained 
attempt to engage with the inexpressible, describing the path to God in terms of the 
ineffability of the deity and the inadequacy of any form of knowledge for grasping its 
truth. Many later texts, such as the anonymous fourteenth-century tract The Cloud of 
Unknowing, have been modelled on the Pseudo-Dionysian search for knowledge (or 
perhaps ‘hyper-knowledge’) that is not constrained by the limits of human 
understanding. What makes the corpus of interest to this study is the thoroughness of 
Pseudo-Dionysius’ apophatic approach, which goes beyond the mere assertion of 
ineffability to insist also on the ineffability of this ineffability.
18
  
The question of saying anything at all lies at the heart of Pseudo-Dionysius’ discussion 
– as both a logical possibility and a moral decision. While silence is frequently hallowed 
in mystic writing, and speech that claims to describe the ineffable deity risks 
blasphemy, there nevertheless seems to be the urge, and duty, in the mystic experience 
to communicate itself at some level. Russell Nieli in Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to 
Ordinary Language writes: 
[I]t is sometimes seen that refraining from words is the first prerequisite for 
expressing the experience – a view which gains additional support when words 
are looked upon as the product of a human speech-act, in contrast to the divine 
action (grace) in the experience. Silence may thus be held as the only manner 
of symbolisation which does not profane, either by suggesting that the 
experience is an act of human will, or that the Reality revealed through it is like 
an everyday ‘thing’ in the mundane world. (89)  
And yet, the profane speech – often very formalised – is often all we have for asserting 
the ineffable. It may already be too late, as Derrida insists, since to have asked the 
question about whether one can or should not speak is to be swept up in language that 
has ‘started without us’ (‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ 29). Part of the interest of 
this conundrum is the complexity and inventiveness with which Pseudo-Dionysius 
responds to this paradox.  
Tim Knepper has modelled the distinct levels of grammatical ineffability assertions in 
the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus, which this chapter builds on: the referential, the 
                                                             
18 Given the centrality of this text to the Christian mystic tradition, I cannot hope to do full justice to it 
here, or give even a summary of the many different approaches taken to it, either theological and 
philosophico-critical. I use it here chiefly as a seminal example of the techniques of mysticism, meaning 
that I do not address in detail questions of pseudonymity, differences in Christian and Neo-Platonist 
conceptions of God, the tradition and origin of the texts, or the ‘autoerotic’ nature of the ascent 
identified by Julia Kristeva (Tales of Love 108-9). For background on Christian Mysticism and 
apophaticism in particular, see Denys Turner’s The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism, 
particularly Chapter 2. 
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grammatical and the symbolic (or within, at, and above the speech act) (Knepper 
‘Ineffability Investigations’ 69). The model is realist, in keeping with the Western 
Christian tradition, in which for all its denials, mystic thought tends to be an assertion of 
the attributes of an existing God, even if these assertions are negative – in contrast to, 
say, a Buddhist tradition of purely negative contemplation, an unlearning or emptying 
out (Don Cupitt Mysticism After Modernity 5). 
 REFERENCE 
The referential level of language covers assertions made in terms of the qualities that an 
ineffable God either cannot be said to have, or exceeds absolutely. Since direct 
attribution of qualities to a being that is, by definition, beyond description is clearly 
impossible, this takes the form of negation and ‘hyper-predication’ (69). In each case 
such formulations are designed to frustrate any attempt to refer to God in terms of 
readily available concepts – of identifying God as some ‘particular thing’. Hyper-
predication occurs where Pseudo-Dionysius proclaims God to be beyond or above a 
particular property (e.g. hyper-good, hyper-being), or more broadly beyond all 
properties: ‘hyper all as hyper-beingly hyper-being before all’ ( Divine Names, 5.8, 
824B, cited in Knepper, ‘Ineffability Investigations’ 69)
19
 and negation occurs where 
predicates are serially removed from possible application to God, e.g.: ‘It is neither 
perceived nor is it perceptible. It suffers neither disorder nor disturbance and is 
overwhelmed by no earthly passion’ (PDC 141).  
These methods of what might be called anti-reference are ultimately problematic, since 
a negation that denies any exceptions, or denies fundamental qualities necessary for a 
‘thing’ to be picked out, fails to have any meaningful term to which it can be attached. 
The actual speech-acts that Pseudo-Dionysius makes are not in themselves senseless, 
insofar as we understand the words and the phrase, but without being situated in a 
discourse that successfully picks something out, they are effectively empty. Each time it 
appears that Pseudo-Dionysius may be able to say something through negation, this 
avenue is shut off by the next negation, so that although each individual step might 
appear to carry sense, if at no point a successful reference is admitted, there is no 
starting point from which to gain traction; the argument is an illusion. Chapter VI of the 
                                                             
19 While I have used Luibheid’s translation for material quoted from the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus 
elsewhere, in cases where the ‘hyper’ prefix plays an important role in interpreting the sense of the 
excerpt, I have used Knepper’s translation, as cited, since his own translations retain the Greek term 
(and its subsequent multiplicity of meanings) rather than using one of the available English alternatives 
(e.g.: above, beyond, more than), each of which narrows the potential understanding of the text, as will 
be discussed shortly.  
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Mystical Theology is effectively a long incantation of succeeding properties the divinity 
does not have, being ‘not a material body, and hence [having] neither shape nor form, 
quality, quantity or weight. It is not in any place and cannot be seen nor be touched’ 
(140-1). There is apparently no mechanism by which Pseudo-Dionysius can refer 
beyond these negations without self-contradiction. So no matter how thorough this 
denuding of God from inappropriate attributes, no point of contact arises, and what 
looked like language at work may turn out to be free-floating verbiage. In its one 
moment of positive attribution, Chapter VI seems to point to and rule out this concern. 
It begins with ‘So this is what we say. The Cause of all is above all’ (140). Immediately 
the attribute of causation has been applied. However, given the neo-Platonist milieu of 
Pseudo-Dionsysius’ writing, it must be acknowledged that cause need not mean our 
current notion of necessary causation, but can be treated as something more like a 
Platonic Form, indicating its primary status. At the same time, the opening of ‘So this is 
what we say’ brackets off what follows as something contained in language, and 
therefore at best an approximation of what is. 
The process of negation, however, is not simply one of denial or self-devaluing speech. 
Both the hyper and negation methods have finer distinctions that can alter the 
implications of their application. Pseudo-Dionysius maintains a distinction between 
apophatic and aphaeretic negation, while hyper is capable of a number of different 
translations. 
Aphaeresis is the more common technique in the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus, and relates 
to the steretical (privational) use of negation, as in the examples from The Mystical 
Theology quoted above (141). Apophatic examples also appear, however, which use a 
hyperochical (pre-eminent) logic of negation. The latter technique seeks to deny the 
applicability of concepts, but without implying a privation, instead suggesting the 
inadequacy of the terms themselves. According to Turner, ‘We must affirm and deny all 
things of God; and then we must negate the contradiction between the affirmed and the 
denied’ (The Darkness of God 22). That is, we must preserve the idea of God from 
implied lack, and suggest not a short-coming but an excess or exceeding of the property 
implied. Knepper conceives this act as ‘pre-eminence’, though other translations also 
use ‘superabundance’ or ‘super’, or compound predicates, such as hyper-full, hyper-
having or hyper-excess (e.g.: ‘Ineffability Investigations’ 70; Negating Negation 49; 
PDC 107). Neither is entirely satisfactory, since both imply the best, or the most, of a 
given predicate, whereas Pseudo-Dionysius’ logic seems to demand something beyond-
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the-best or beyond-conceivable-quantity. I use super-eminence as a marker for this 
distinction. For example, when Pseudo-Dionysius says: ‘when we talk of God as being 
without mind and without perception, this is to be taken in the sense of [super-
eminence] and not as a defect’ (PDC 107) my insertion replaces Luibheid’s translation’s 
‘what he has in superabundance’, since it is clear that Pseudo-Dionysius does not 
simply mean that God has the most/keenest perception, but that God has more-
perception-than-maximum-perception.  
The same more-p-than-maximum-p logic is in play in instances of the hyper prefixed 
attributes of God, so that hyper means not only ‘beyond’ in the negative or isolating 
sense, but also ‘above’ in a positive and excessive sense. To say that God is ‘hyper-
good’ attempts to mean both that he is beyond the concept of goodness, and that he 
overflows that idea; this double implication denies a separation of God from the 
concept, while excluding him from identification via that concept.  
 ASSERTION 
The second level at which Pseudo-Dionysius attempts to express ineffability is 
grammatical, such that it is the speech-act itself which presents the ineffability, rather 
than separate concepts being denied or exceeded through reference. This may take the 
form of direct assertion of ineffability: ‘it cannot be spoken of and it cannot be grasped 
by understanding’ (PDC 141). Or it can be what Knepper calls ‘ineffability hyperbole 
[… :] the assertion that God is hyper name and speech […] hyper even ineffability 
itself’ (‘Ineffability Investigations’ 71).  
If the claim is made that God is hyper-effable, it is reasonable to assume that this means 
beyond human knowability, not supremely knowable; but when it is claimed that God is 
hyper-ineffable, the presumption must be in favour of super-eminently ineffable, rather 
than merely effable. But super-eminently ineffable would become a straight-forward 
contradiction, on the same level as speaking about something's unknowability. It may be 
an alternative to return to the more-ineffable-than-maximum-ineffable idea, but to 
introduce constraints on the notion. The first would be something like 'conceptual 
ineffability'. Without requiring any absolute ineffability, it may be possible to state that 
a given thing exceeds (is hyper to) any given attempt to conceive it, since a distinction 
can be drawn between the idea of the ineffable thing and the capacity to conceive of it 
as a whole or as itself. It is possible to accept that God is beyond our ability to know 
(hyper-effable) while simultaneously noting that our conception of ineffability (which is 
a rational possibility but not something in itself conceivable) is inadequate for any 
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attempt to provide a definition of God. Rather it is the dizzying excess of God as 
knowable entity that stimulates and frustrates those attempting to comprehend his 
nature; hyper-ineffability is an illustration of our own limitations, rather than an attempt 
to overstep those limits. 
 THE SYMBOLIC 
The third level of ineffability identified by Knepper is the symbolic, wherein metaphors 
are used rather than literal assertions. Not only are the claims thus distanced from being 
obliged to make a definite claim on the ineffable, but the ways in which metaphors are 
used in the corpus are deliberately contradictory, refusing the reader the possibility of 
conceiving of either metaphor in full.  
Knepper categorises these expressions as ‘above’ the level of the speech act, since they 
operate between a number of statements that reinforce or counter each other, rather than 
being intrinsic to the speech acts individually (‘Techniques and Rules’ 20). Two forms 
of metaphor are particularly common in the corpus, those relating to light and visibility, 
and those relating to spatial movement. 
God is extendedly equated with light and its beneficence in the Divine Names: ‘Good’, 
‘Beautiful’ and ‘Light’ are all intertwined, and light is the mechanism by which all 
creatures see, by which knowledge is imparted and truth revealed. (Light here is used in 
the perfect, Platonic sense; the sun’s rays are merely a ‘dull image’ for which the Good 
is the far superior ‘archetype’ (PDC 72). The use of light as a metaphor is explicit.) 
However, it would not be possible for the thorough ineffability of Pseudo-Dionysius’ 
account to be maintained if the Light of God could be, however metaphorically, neatly 
aligned with our perceptual capacities. The divine light must exceed all notion of light, 
and thus ‘divine darkness’ is the subject of the hymn that opens Mystical Theology: 
Trinity!! Higher than any being, 
  any divinity, any goodness! 
 Guide of Christians 
  in the wisdom of heaven! 
Lead us up beyond unknowing and light, 
 up to the farthest, highest peak 
  of mystic scripture, 
 where the mysteries of God’s Word 
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  lie simple, absolute and unchangeable 
  in the brilliant darkness of a hidden silence. 
 Amid the deepest shadow 
  they pour overwhelming light 
  on what is most manifest. 
 Amid the wholly unsensed and unseen 
  they completely fill our sightless minds 
  with treasures beyond all beauty. (135) 
Repeatedly, light is shown not as the highest achievable station but something to be 
superseded: ‘Lead us beyond unknowing and light [...] in the brilliant darkness of a 
hidden shadow [...] Amid the deepest shadow they pour overwhelming light’ (135). As 
seen in the series of hyper-predicated cases, a denial of light as an attribute of God is not 
presented as an affirmation of its opposite (darkness) but rather a denial of light’s 
adequacy to represent God. The metaphor both invokes and subverts darkness by 
making it brilliant, having it stand in for the super-eminence of light. In trying to grasp 
the metaphor of something so full of light that it precludes vision, and so perfectly dark 
that it is luminous, the reader is caught in a motion between two polarities, unable to 
achieve stability. This tension is directly paralleled by the paradox of removing all 
knowledge from ourselves in order to know more of God; chapter two of The Mystical 
Theology begins: ‘I pray we could come to this darkness so far above light! If only we 
lacked sight and knowledge so as to see, so as to know, unseeing and unknowing, that 
which lies beyond all vision and knowledge’ (138). This follows the conclusion of 
chapter one, in which Moses, in approaching God, achieves such closeness to the divine 
that he loses all knowledge and ‘belongs completely to him who is beyond everything. 
Here, being neither oneself nor someone else, one is supremely united to the completely 
unknown by an inactivity of all knowledge, and knows beyond the mind by knowing 
nothing’ (137). All that remains is epectasis – ‘a spiritual effort, the soul’s straining 
towards the divine; a movement which requires us, however far we have reached 
already, to press ever onwards to a higher degree of love and of knowledge’ (Edouard 
Jeaunaue ‘Pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Maximus the Confessor in the 
Works of John Scottus Eriugena’ 147). 
Later in this chapter I will return to how these different grammatical forms of 
ineffability-talk are important for understanding exactly how Pseudo-Dionysius’ project 
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functions, including Knepper’s offered alternative of ‘relative ineffability’. First it will 
be instructive to turn to Wittgenstein’s own engagement with these same limits of 
language.  
As noted in the previous chapter, it would be remiss to exclude from Wittgenstein’s 
early thinking the importance of the ineffable or inexpressible, in the sense of the 
mystical mentioned in the Tractatus (6.44, 6.45, 6.522). However, it would also be 
incorrect to directly associate his writing with a specific mystic or religious doctrine, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. His conception of the inexpressible hinges on logical possibility. 
As Ben Tilghman notes, when TLP 6.45 says ‘To view the world sub specie aeterni is 
to view it as a whole’, this is a reference to Spinoza, for whom this view means to see 
the world ‘in its logical connections, its necessary connections, with everything else’ 
(Wittgenstein, Ethics and Aesthetics 53). To view the world as a whole is also a 
metaphor for seeing it in its connections – its logical possibilities. For something to be a 
fact is for it to occupy some space within ‘logical space’ (NB 83). Where certain forms 
of speech or value fall outside logical space, they become unsayable. Ethics and 
aesthetics fall into this category, since, as Wittgenstein explores in his Lecture on 
Ethics, the grammatical structure of such statements precludes them being considered as 
state of affairs, or facts. 
The ineffabalist reading suggests that Wittgenstein did think that by pointing out these 
limits of the possibility of language, something about the nature of the world or of logic 
could be gestured towards that could not be said; by contrast the resolute reading 
presents a well-constructed piece of nonsense, the analysis of which leads to the relief 
of seeing what looked like a serious quandary as just a trick played by language. 
Through an analysis of the Lecture on Ethics, I will attempt to show how the resolute 
reading’s deconstruction of the ineffabalist position is correct, but how that is not the 
end of the story. 
Ethics 
The Lecture on Ethics – Wittgenstein’s only public lecture to a non-specialist audience 
– took place in 1929, therefore marking a transitional point between the earlier 
Tractarian work and what would become Philosophical Investigations. It shows an 
abiding concern with the limits of language, though the examples are rooted in very 
ordinary examples of behaviour, and seek to understand our urge – our epectasis – to 
say what cannot be said, as well as define our limits. 
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Yaniv Ickovitz has identified in the lecture (and in the Tractatus) Wittgenstein’s 
negative response to the dominant method of moral philosophy of the time, and in 
particular that of G. E. Moore (Wittgenstein’s Ethical Thought 29). As the discussion to 
come will illustrate, this was not a case of arguing against Moore’s claims or 
conclusions, replacing them with another theory, but of rejecting wholesale the 
possibility of an adequate theorising of ethics. At the heart of this rejection is Moore’s 
idea that there is such a thing as ‘The Good’, independently of things-that-are-good, and 
that we could know it. At the outset of his Principia Ethica, Moore makes the 
apparently innocuous assertion that his project is ‘the general enquiry into what is good’ 
(2). On Moore’s view, to adequately answer the questions we ask about moral issues, 
there must be such a thing as Goodness that is distinct from mere pleasure or 
instrumental behaviour (Ickovitz Wittgenstein’s Ethical Thought 30). But Wittgenstein’s 
move – one illustrative of his whole approach to philosophy – is not to answer the 
supposedly difficult questions, but to ask in turn what the framework is that leads us to 
ask such questions in the first place. Are the ethical claims we want to make about the 
world of the same type as factual claims? If not, it cannot be (as on Moore’s model) that 
they are different insofar as they have a special kind of object as their target, since that 
would just be helping oneself to the thing contained in the question. Instead, we need to 
look at what we do and why in making such statements. 
In the lecture, Wittgenstein differentiates between events in the world, or the state of 
affairs, and ‘ethical propositions’ (LE 6). No statement of a natural fact can have an 
ethical value, because facts are relative to the definite claims they make on the world, 
contingent on how things are. By contrast, the feeling we have for ethical matters is that 
they must be something more robust than such facts, that we ought to be able to make 
ethical claims that would hold true in whatever circumstances. ‘Ethics, if it is anything, 
is supernatural and our words will only express facts’ (7). This restrictive sense of 
language as requiring determinate sense clearly follows on from the model of the 
Tractatus and logical possibility. A proposition makes clear its relations to the world in 
its meaning, primarily through creating a picture of the world that matches what is the 
case. In Culture and Value, remarks from a similar time (November 1929) underscore 
this idea of language being circumscribed by factual content: 
What is Good is Divine, too. That, strangely enough, sums up my ethics. 
Only something supernatural can express the Supernatural. 
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You cannot lead people to the good; you can only lead them to some place or 
other; the good lies outside the space of facts. (5e) 
Ethical statements attempt to make direct claims, which both exceed the factual, and 
contain within them their own resistance to disproof. They want to say that something is 
right or wrong, irrespective of circumstance; we are ‘tempted to use such expressions as 
“absolute good,” “absolute value”’ (LE 7). Such expressions are incorrect uses of the 
terms concerned on a determinate view of sense-making, since they try to refer to 
situations that preclude change or error. Compare this to 4.023 and 4.024 in the 
Tractatus: ‘A proposition must restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no’ and ‘To 
understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true.’ For concepts like 
absolute good, these options and contingencies disappear, since the claim does not 
permit alternatives, and to state the case for its truth is just to restate the whole. This 
means that either we are uttering a tautology (what’s good is good) or talking nonsense, 
because there is no framework around the thought that would allow us to understand it: 
to be absolutely good must be different in kind to being good for a particular purpose or 
situation, since it is not contingent on circumstance, so either the word ‘good’ is out of 
place here, or we are trying to describe something which is by definition beyond 
description (LE 11).  
Ethical propositions might, then, function more like similes than statements of fact, 
recalling the qualities of something else as an illustration of what we mean here. 
Religious language is evidently rich with such uses of symbol, allegory and allusion 
(the Lamb of God, the Dove of Peace etc.) to convey characteristics and values of what 
cannot be expressed directly. However, Wittgenstein argues that such attempts 
necessarily fail, since ‘a simile must be the simile for something’ (LE 10). In other 
words, if a simile is to stand in successfully for the explanation of a thing, it must in 
principle also be possible to drop the simile and ‘simply state the facts which stand 
behind it’ (10). Ethical claims appear to want to stand outside of this network of facts or 
alternatives of expression – they just are. So how does one get to the starting point of 
direct assertion when the structures of symbolic language around the object prohibit this 
step? Since practical or factual content fails to satisfy what we want to say, as 
Wittgenstein puts in ‘all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and 
that is to say beyond significant language’ (LE 11). 
This construction links naturally enough with the mystic construal of language as a 
profanation. Not only are we attempting to go beyond what our everyday tools allow, to 
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do so would inherently do injury to the sacred or ethical we are attempting to express. 
As Nieli argues, after conversion or mystical experiences, the ‘old’ language of the 
everyday or the earlier religion is felt to be inadequate or an impropriety, leading to 
greater adherence to the new language, or in this case, to the desired step beyond 
language (Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language 76). Ethical claims are 
closely related to matters of faith, not only because of the interrelation of religion and 
morality, but because of the form or context of their expression. We assert a certain 
view of the character of the world for which no possible evidence would be sufficient, 
for which part of the power and puzzlement of the claim is its own awareness of its 
excessive scope. This awareness is key, since the doubled-over intension of the 
statement incorporates its self-defeat into its idea of itself. This distinguishes it from 
claims that might simply turn out to be wrong (uninformed) in the ordinary factual 
sense. In a certain way statements of this type demand assent in order to be understood, 
rather than demanding to be understood in order to obtain assent. In the concluding part 
of the lecture, Wittgenstein appeals to a common feeling in humanity in such situations, 
on which basis the urge to speak ethical truths, if not their content, can be understood: 
For all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to 
say beyond significant language. My whole tendency and I believe the 
tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to 
run against the boundaries of language. (11) 
Ethical propositions are thus ultimately ruled out as nonsense, because there is nothing 
that they can intelligibly refer to. No information is conveyed by such sentences: ‘What 
it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense’ (12). A positivist analysis would 
simply stop here. However, he goes on to say: 
But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally 
cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it. (12) 
Unlike speculative metaphysics and wrong-headedness, which are simply erroneous, the 
ethical manages to retain a solemnity and importance for Wittgenstein, even while it 
challenges his attempt to circumscribe the possibilities of meaning. Why not ridicule it?  
Part of the answer for this lies in Wittgenstein’s developing view that unpredictability 
and error are as much part of human life as correct sense making (Z §604); rather than 
seeking to create an ideal language that would avoid such errors, his efforts become to 
understand our motivations and the grammar of our expressions (PI §264) Another part 
lies in the importance that he already placed on the ethical and the aesthetic in the 
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Tractatus, not as mere trivialities but as perhaps too important to place a communicable 
value on. Here the question of attempting the inexpressible crosses paths with the 
intellectual and passionate writing of Kierkegaard. 
 KIERKEGAARD 
As Wittgenstein argues in the Tractatus and maintains in the Lecture on Ethics, a claim 
about the character of the world in its entirety can only be assessed – given meaning – 
from a point outside that world. Kierkegaard, whom Wittgenstein read and regarded 
highly (CV 36e, 61e) similarly takes this formulation, though his response is not of the 
frustration of attempts to speak, but of the paradox of faith:  
Faith is quite correctly ‘the point outside the world’ which therefore 
also moves the whole world. [...] Consider the absurd. The negating of 
all concepts forces one outside the world, to the absurd – and here is 
faith. (my emphasis. Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers 236) 
 
Kierkegaard’s precarious position in relation to faith and the absurd shows both the 
allure and the problems. Statements of faith are inherently attempts to think or say more 
than it is possible to do. Taking on a religious belief (specifically for Kierkegaard, the 
paradoxes of Christianity) requires accepting a proposition you simultaneously believe 
to be impossible; this is faith. It must therefore be absurd, ultimately, because there is 
no mechanism by which to give an assessment of, or a use for, such a proposition; it 
cannot be coherently thought. (This Kierkegaardian stance also sheds light on 
Wittgenstein’s remark that ‘If Christianity is the truth, then all the philosophy about it is 
false’ (CV 89e). This is a comment about the necessary status of a philosophy that seeks 
to explain faith, rather than about theologians having made errors.) 
There are a number of possible responses to this stance. One could argue that 
Kierkegaard has a non-cognitive or expressivist view of faith, and that it can be reduced 
to an emotional response or attitude. This would allow for the absurdity of the position 
he shapes to adopt, since it brackets out faith from the rational paradoxes it seems to 
generate, while retaining the passion that charges religious experience. However, such a 
resolution would be to miss the point of Kierkegaard’s central tension: to think oneself 
out of the necessity of thinking would be in bad faith (a refusal of the difficulty, not an 
embracing of it). Better, as David J Gowens has argued, to think of Kierkegaard not as 
urging ‘expression’ but ‘development’; the self is not something existing that says 
something (absurd) of itself in speaking of faith, but develops in the act of saying but 
not saying (Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker 57). 
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One might therefore merely take up the proposition provisionally, or transitionally. 
Differently from the idea of simile mentioned above, the statement does make a direct 
claim, but it is one that is offered only to set someone on the right path, and then 
withdrawn, acknowledging its own absurdity or inadequacy.  
The notion of indirect communication, is more than simply a failed attempt to 
communicate, as Jaime Ferreira argues in ‘The Point outside the World: Kierkegaard 
and Wittgenstein on Nonsense, Paradox and Religion’. There is an implied sense of 
duping the audience of one’s statements into accepting their meaning, but subsequently 
revoking the statement in order to guide the audience to some other realisation that 
could not be arrived at through direct communication alone. The comparison 
Kierkegaard himself makes is with a book that is written and then revoked, with the 
reader instructed to understand it in these terms (Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
619). It allows a ‘positive role for not speaking’ (J Phillips ‘Madness of the 
Philosophers’ 317) as a response to one’s having spoken. The parallel with the resolute 
reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus discussed in Chapter 1 is immediately striking; if 
Wittgenstein’s intent is for readers to throw away the text (the ladder) once they have 
understood what it means to do, it really is a book that is written and then revoked, at 
least for the individual reader:  
anyone who understands me eventually recognizes [my propositions] as 
nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He 
must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) (TLP 
6.54) 
An important difference is that the revocation here is done by the reader, not by the 
author, which will be discussed later in this chapter. The question remains as to what 
exactly has been achieved through indirect communication. If it is simply another, 
perhaps secret, way of communicating a (factual) truth, we are returned to 
Wittgenstein’s comment noted above about similes – it should have been possible to 
communicate any such information directly. Instead, Ferreira posits a reading of 
Kierkegaard as not only demonstrating, but actively endorsing the paradox of absurdity. 
By insisting on the irresolvable vacillation of the attempted thought, it might be possible 
to escape the idea that we are always replacing one (false) idea with another, and instead 
only do enough to remove the initial error: 
 
Dispelling illusion would not be the correction of misinformation, 
replacing incorrect propositional claims with correct ones; it would not 
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be a case of getting ‘it’ right rather than wrong. It would be, rather, a 
removal of misunderstanding which insists on the absurd, the 
paradoxical, as nonsense; it would communicate that there is no ‘it’ to 
communicate.  (Ferreira ‘The Point outside the World’ 40) 
 
Is this a counsel of despair? If nothing can be communicated, are all attempts to speak 
of such things futile? Much hinges on the status of the speech marks around ‘it’. It may 
be a refusal to replace the ‘it’ with something else of the same form, such as a theory ; it 
may be a rejection of the attempt to treat what is being communicated as something 
singular or definable; it may be a claim that arguments of this type about faith – in 
effect, metaphysics – are invalid, or result in nonsense. 
It may alternatively be argued that the proffering of an empty ‘it’ performs another 
function, that there is some special role that nonsense can perform in particular 
circumstances, thereby avoiding both a failure to communicate and cognitive emptiness. 
Kierkegaard’s absurdism, for example, attempts to find a space or an audience through 
ultimately nonsensical statements. Unlike the Pseudo-Dionysian mystic, Kierkegaard 
attempts not to escape the world but to commit to the entanglement of faith that shows 
itself unreachable. Similarly, some interpretations of the Tractatus have agreed that the 
propositions are nonsense, but of a particularly instructive type. Others, including 
George Pitcher, argue for there being very specific types on nonsense within 
Wittgenstein’s work, meaning that paying attention to his attributing the quality of 
nonsense to something is very important (‘Wittgenstein, Nonsense, and Lewis Carroll’). 
NONSENSE 
In ‘What nonsense might be’ in The Realistic Spirit, Cora Diamond identifies six 
standard types on nonsense and contrasts these to the kind specific to the work of Frege 
and Wittgenstein: 
1) Something said that is very obviously false 
2) Something wild inapposite – where it may be unclear who or what is 
being spoken of. 
3) Category errors (e.g. treating an abstract idea as if it were a physical 
object) 
4) Strings of words lacking syntactic structure 
5) A ‘respectable’ sentence but with an inappropriate or meaningless 
word(s) inserted into it (e.g. Jabberwocky) 
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These stands in contrast with the Frege-Wittgenstein (hereafter F-W) view Diamond 
espouses, and also the ‘falsidal’ (96) view that regards all such claims as simply degrees 
of falsehood, rather than nonsense being a separate category. 
Diamond insists on looking at the ‘work’ a word does in a sentence (its logical role), 
and how the same word can be misplaced so that it fails to do this work – for example, 
using a proper name in a place where only a certain type of concept (e.g. prime 
numbers) could have any business being talked about by the rest of the sentence. She 
uses Carnap’s example from ‘The overcoming of Metaphysics through the Logical 
Analysis of Language’ of a category error (type 3): “Caesar is a prime number”. For 
Carnap, who saw natural language as deficient, this sentence was meaningless because 
the Wortreihe (string of words), despite looking like correct syntax, failed to adhere to 
our protocols of use, including to what things properties relating to number could be 
applied. Metaphysical confusions – specifically in Carnap’s essay on Heidegger’s 
lecture ‘What is Metaphysics’ – are to be solved in this was as logical missteps The 
creation of an ideal language with a syntax that excluded such errors ought to be the 
chief task of contemporary logicians (228). A positivist reading of Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus would naturally accord with Carnap’s way of thinking, in which propositions 
that appear meaningful but are not statements of fact, are actually just empty and should 
be ruled out of meaningful discourse. 
An important difference in Wittgenstein’s case is, however, that he is not urging that 
language be corrected, only that certain apparently viable uses of it are shown to fall 
short of what they are purporting to do. Although we do not have a detailed response by 
Wittgenstein to the works of Heidegger, he is known to have responded to what he read 
with a great deal more sympathy than Carnap, comparing Heidegger’s Being and Angst 
to the astonishment one feels in running up against the limits of language, and agreeing 
that such astonishment could not be expressed in the form of a question (Wittgenstein 
                                                             
20 I would add to this list the special category of ‘bullshit’, as characterised by Harry Frankfurt in On 
Bullshit. This is a distinct category from lying (an untruth known to the teller for a specific purpose) and 
gobbledegook, since the bullshitter makes competent sentences but with no regard for their truth or 
content, since his only (‘panoramic’ 5) aim is to impress or affect the audience. Truth and falsity fall out 
of the picture, and the sentences are nonsense because their meaning is effectively irrelevant, rather 
than badly constructed. The activity might be close to Kierkegaard’s absurd statements offered without 
intending their meaning, but without the further recognition of an underlying (ethical) purpose, or at 
least not one related to the content or non-content of the pseudo-statement. 
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and the Vienna Circle Dec 30
th
 1929). In the same reported remark he connects 
Heidegger with Kierkegaard, whose work, as mentioned, Wittgenstein thought valuable. 
David Cooper’s ‘Ineffability’ provides an enlightening comparison of how Heidegger 
and Wittgenstein variously conceived of this astonishment, which I will draw on again 
later in this chapter. 
Diamond’s account of nonsense shows that Wittgenstein and Frege took a different path 
to both Carnap and the so-called natural view of nonsense, largely through the former’s 
insistence that sense or nonsense lies at the level of the sentence, rather than the word 
(‘What nonsense might be’ 100). ‘A proposition is not a blend of words [...] A 
proposition is articulate’ (TLP 3.141). In type 5 sentences, the natural view holds that 
the sentence “There was a fubbletop at the zoo” has a meaning, insofar as finding an 
alternative word for fubbletop, or providing a suitable definition of fubbletop to fit that 
sentence would solve the problem. “There was a _________ at the zoo” has a kind of 
meaning, based on the meanings of the ‘correctly’ applied words, that can be completed 
by inserting ‘rhino’, or some such beast. The F-W view by contrast treats the sentence 
as the sole carrier of meaning (and thus nonsense), so the whole of “There was a 
fubbletop at the zoo” is nonsense – there is no work that the other parts of the sentence 
are doing, even if it they look to be doing their jobs properly. Substituting ‘rhino’ would 
create a new sentence, with logical sense; the fubbletop sentence has no such logic, 
since it cannot have been determined ahead of time what the correct logic was. The 
apparent meaning of the natural view is only a later imposition once we realise what 
would fit in the place that fubbletop is occupying.  
Diamond’s account does not address what exactly is meant by a nonsense word, 
however, though her examples do use things that look obviously to be of this type. If a 
word only receives its sense in sentences, has a word that is a nonsense word received 
this status in advance? The natural view allows that you have used the wrong sort of 
concept in a nonsense sentence; the F-W view means that no such context has been 
established in the first place. Some nonsense words do seem to have achieved just this, 
through repetition, such as the words of ‘Jabberwocky’, but those may be special cases. 
In The Big Typescript Wittgenstein addresses a similar question, and relates nonsense 
words also to the contours of our language: ‘there is a sound to the sentence in our 
languages. (Hence nonsense poems like those of Lewis Carroll.) And often what we call 
nonsense is not something that’s arbitrary’ (§74). I suggest that the answer lies in the 
surrounding practices and the tonality of a language – the ways we announce with stage-
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setting, gestures or tones that we are speaking nonsense (but that we are recognisably 
speaking, not just making noises) – though this would fall outside the exchange of 
logically valid or invalid sentences that the F-W reading is here concerned with. The 
key point is that for Wittgenstein there is no ‘positive’ nonsense. Any nonsense comes 
from no actual work having been done, even though it may look like it. This could be a 
string of nonsense words or a grammatical confusion like ‘I feel Jones’ pain’ (‘What 
nonsense might be’ 106-7). The apparent difference between these cases is a 
psychological one – our familiarity with the words in the former – not a logical one. 
Wittgenstein was fully aware of the possibility of nonsense having an effect, but this 
would be a feature of its context, rather than its content. To say to someone “Milk me 
sugar” can cause bewilderment, but that does not mean that the nonsense sentence was 
an order to be surprised (PI 498-9). On Diamond’s view, according to Warren Goldfarb, 
‘one cannot take Wittgenstein’s metaphysical pronouncements to be striving to express 
ineffable truths; if they are nonsense, they are simply nonsense [...] the dissolution of 
concepts we thought we had’ (‘Die Überwindung: Anti-metaphysical Readings of the 
Tractatus’ 12). 
Diamond narrates a consistent view of nonsense in Wittgenstein’s philosophy both early 
and late, which accords with her resolute reading of the Tractatus, and quotes examples 
of his discussions of nonsense from Philosophical Investigations §500 as well as a 
lecture from 1935 (‘What nonsense might be’ 106-7). This is not a given, however, 
since Wittgenstein’s view of the versatility of language, particular in matters of 
reference, did develop over time, so that as mentioned above, the degree to which words 
are considered as doing other things than referring (or failing to) and may be 
accompanied by non-verbal indicators or ‘kinesic codes’ (Adam Kendon Gesture 284), 
does vary with his writing. For example in Culture and Value (echoing St.Augustine 
and sounding a distinctly different tone from that of the Tractatus), he seems to find a 
positive role for nonsense, even if it has no positive content: ‘Don’t for heaven’s sake, 
be afraid of talking nonsense! Only don’t fail to pay attention to your nonsense’ (CV 
64e).  
Diamond’s argument has similarities with Hutto’s in ‘Two Wittgensteins Too Many’ 
that even in the Tractatus Wittgenstein has a notion of language as ‘occasions of use’ 
(37), since she distinguishes between something making sense according to our rules 
and ‘making sense’, wherein the hearer of the sentence, as much as the speaker, must 
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take ownership of it for sense to have been transmitted (or not) (emphasis in original. 
‘What Nonsense Might Be’ 111): 
The hearer’s activity in understanding is close to the speaker’s in constructing 
the sentence – the hearer has in a sense to make the sentence his, but using the 
rules. The user of language – speaker or hearer – is a thinker of senses 
according to the rules. (111) 
Until sense has been made, a sentence literally has none, and sense is created through 
the communicating individuals applying and following appropriate rules. (‘Rules’ is 
used in the broad sense of rule-following in Philosophical Investigations, rather than as 
a synonym for interpretation.) Here the importance of Wittgenstein’s phrasing of the 
conclusion of the Tractatus comes back into view. It is the reader for whom the 
sentences become nonsense, not that the sentences themselves are in advance knowable 
as nonsense. 
Proposition 6.54 implies that all the preceding contents should be disregarded by the 
reader who understands them, though different interpretations disagree on whether this 
is because Wittgenstein considers them to be attempts to say more than can be said (as 
with the ethical propositions in the later Lecture on Ethics), or because the conclusions 
of the propositions operate to undermine the effort by which they were achieved 
(meaning that some leap of faith is required, or that the propositions are in some way 
metaphorical), or because understanding the propositions reveals them as nonsensical in 
a way that reconciles the reader to necessary (and perhaps therapeutic) failure in the 
aims and methods of philosophy. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the standard reading of these passages is that Wittgenstein is 
referring to the propositions of the Tractatus as nonsense, usually of a special type. 
Either they somehow contain the necessary information to come to see something not 
accessible through words, or they point towards something about language and the 
world only expressible outside them. But these ineffabalist readings, as argued, are 
forced to presuppose or put into words the thing that was meant to be ineffable. John 
Hyman, for example, says: 
Hence, if philosophy sets limits to what cannot be thought, if it demarcates the 
ineffable, it can also reveal the correct attitude for us to take towards absolute 
values. In matters of value, Wittgenstein holds, we must be reverent, but mute. 
And this is something philosophy can teach us.  (‘The Urn and the Chamber 
Pot’ 149) 
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On the conception of nonsense that Diamond finds as a running thread in all 
Wittgenstein’s writing, there is no such thing as a special kind of nonsense, since it is 
always a status accorded a sentence, based on the rules followed by both hearer and 
speaker. Hutto criticises Diamond’s attempt to draw a distinction between kinds of 
nonsense based on their hearers, since ‘how can uttering one bit of [nonsense] be more 
attractive than uttering another’ (Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy 94). That is to 
say, what effect (if any) can a nonsense utterance have if there can be no aspect of the 
utterance that affects its attractiveness separable from the hearer’s disposition? Why is 
TLP 6.54 such a continuing source of fascination, where piggle-wiggle is not? On the one hand 
this argument is correct in insisting that relying on a special kind of nonsense is invalid; 
something either says something or does not. On the other, it levels its criticism at the 
wrong point of Diamond’s account. If we pay sufficient attention to the importance of 
the ownership that the hearer places on an utterance, not only the speaker’s intent or 
rules of production, then while it is not possible that the nonsense could impart 
knowledge or content in some cases but not others, it remains open whether the effects 
of the utterance can be more than mere nonsense for the hearer, if it leads to a change in 
the way that the hearer looks to the world, or applies rules to it. As Bernard Harrison 
argues in reference to literature, utterances that appear to have no factual content can 
nonetheless have ‘the potentiality to set the established structures of my self in motion 
towards change’ (Inconvenient Fictions 3).  
Diamond claims in ‘Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’ 
that there is such a thing as ‘understanding a person who talks nonsense’(156) that does 
not violate the conception of nonsense already discussed. The understanding, 
importantly, does not issue in a new set of propositions, since that would be a 
translation of nonsense, implying that it did originally have sense. Rather, the forms and 
rules that the speaker of nonsense appears to be following give the hearer an indication 
of what is being attempted, and permits them an imaginative empathy with the 
motivations and concerns expressed (160-1). ‘It is not people but only an individual 
who can be judged’ (Perloff Wittgenstein’s Ladder 71). The attractiveness of ethical 
statements, while still failing to state anything (ineffable or otherwise) lies in our ability 
to say ‘me too!’ when someone seeks to say something beyond our ability to do so in 
meaningful language, such as our wonder at the existence of the world (LE 8). Strictly 
speaking such a sentence is a misuse of language, but it can draw us into seeing the 
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position of the speaker in a new light, perhaps one we had not previously thought of for 
ourselves. 
In ‘On Reading the Tractatus Resolutely’ Conant and Diamond have argued that the 
propositions at the end of the Tractatus are nonsense, and convey no information, but 
that crucially, Wittgenstein says not “anyone who understands them eventually 
recognizes them as nonsensical” but ‘anyone who understands me’ (my emphasis) (TLP 
6.54). This same view underpins Diamond’s later article. We might come to understand 
something of the person making the nonsensical, ethical or ineffable claim, even while 
denying that they had managed to say anything. It is this notion of personhood that 
Diamond draws on in distinguishing between nonsense with no further consequence and 
nonsense that aids us in understanding someone. She argues that ethical claims have a 
particular standing in this setting, since they are attempts to express an attitude towards 
life or the world, but have no access to special content; the ethical cannot be gathered 
into a definition in this way: 
What I am warning against is any idea that we should take Wittgenstein’s 
remarks about ethics to constitute philosophical analysis of a kind of discourse, 
rather than as remarks aimed at bringing about a kind of self-understanding 
though the reader’s imaginative activity. (‘Ethics, Imagination and the Method 
of the Tractatus’ 164) 
Ethics (and by extension aesthetics) are therefore unlike more simple excludable 
nonsense, which for Wittgenstein did include metaphysics – perhaps best thought of as 
attempts not to express but to define the inexpressible. These latter could safely be 
relegated to the world of error or meaningless chatter (or ‘transzendentales Geschwätz’ 
as Wittgenstein derides it in a letter to Paul Englemann of 1918) (Letter from Ludwig 
Wittgenstein 10-11), since nothing is shown about the person by these confused 
shufflings of empty signs. The Ethical, however, goes deep into our shared values and 
attitudes, even where our articulations of them lack definite sense. They are rooted in 
our Form of Life (PI §19), or perhaps better our ‘patterns of life’ (Wittgenstein Last 
Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology I 211), meaning the myriad ways we might 
repeat or reformulate our behaviour or thinking against a common background, to 
differing degrees exact, unpredictable or transferrable. Michel ter Hark has argued that 
this concept provides an extension of the material in Philosophical Investigations, using 
Wittgenstein’s later considerations of psychological indeterminacy and vagueness 
(‘”Patterns of Life”: A third Wittgenstein concept’). It is the notion of background that I 
want to turn to now, as a way of showing how Diamond’s reading of nonsense as 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
101 
 
making understandable a person must have its basis in our overlapping and communal 
experiences, leading into a renewed discussion of how we might understand attempts to 
express the inexpressible, both as a practice as an artistic device. 
Background Practices 
The inexpressible (what I find mysterious & cannot express) perhaps provides 
the background, against which whatever I was able to express acquires 
meaning. (CV 23e) 
This remark can be taken in a great variety of ways, depending on the context in which 
it is considered to have been made. On an ineffabalist Tractarian reading, the mention of 
the inexpressible might mean indicate the profound truths that can be shown but not 
said; if read as a comment belonging with the work in Philosophical Investigations, it 
could be a reminder that our ability to make meaning depends on a vast scaffolding of 
training, experience and practice, but that this scaffolding is often hard to see because it 
is so familiar and so extensive. Is Wittgenstein trying to identify what the inexpressible 
‘is’, or to explain what it is that leads us to posit something inexpressible? In the 
quotation above I have replaced Peter Winch’s rendering of ‘geheimnisvoll’ as 
‘enigmatic’ with ‘mysterious’; partly because this seems a more natural translation, and 
partly because it seems a better fit with both the above readings. The inexpressible is not 
a riddle, but a conviction about the whole. 
The date of the remark is 5th October 1931, placing it well after the completion of the 
Tractatus but relatively close to the Lecture on Ethics (1929 or 1930), and not too long 
before the dictation of the Blue Book (1933-4), the manuscript circulated among 
Wittgenstein’s students containing early forms of much of the material of Philosophical 
Investigations. I therefore argue that it marks a transitional period during which the 
concerns of the Tractatus became more embedded in questions about our everyday lives. 





 October 1931 respectively. The first runs: 
Nothing we do can be defended definitively. But only by reference to 
something else that is established. 
I.e. no reason can be given why you should act (or should have acted) like this, 
except that by doing so you bring about such and such a situation, which again 
you have to accept as an aim. (23e) 
This denial should colour our approach to the inexpressible as background, since it 
should help us to avoid the temptation to see the idea of ‘background’ as another 
variation of the view from ‘the point outside the world’, as what stands independent 
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from, and in some sense guarantees our conditional utterances. The attempt to break 
through to a definitive explanation, much like the absolute claims of ethics, makes no 
sense, or cannot be made to have any sense, if there is no possibility of reference to 
something else. The use of accept is interesting, since it implies that our aims, our 
understanding of our own actions, might at times be imposed on us or become clear to 
us only from the outside, as a function of the wider framework of language within 
which we acted. The emphasis on action rather than speech is also notable. Nothing we 
do is being considered, not nothing we say. This clearly marks a shift from an analysis 
of concepts towards investigations of broader human life. 
The third remark runs as follows: 
Work on philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really 
more work on oneself. On one’s own conception. On how one sees things. 
(And what one expects of them.) (24e) 
It reveals Wittgenstein’s continued adherence to Loos’ convictions about integrity of 
form in architecture, coming three years after he had been involved in architecture 
himself by overseeing the design of Haus Wittgenstein for his sister. Despite his later 
disillusionment with Loos because of the latter’s increasing tendencies for propounding 
theories, the remark clearly places a sympathetic emphasis on integrity and use. As 
Janik and Toulmin put it:  
The principles of architectural design, as Loos himself taught them, were 
entirely open to the future. The architect could not prescribe in advance the 
future forms of life or forms of culture; changes in those external forms would 
call for a new creative response from the architect himself; and in this sense, 
the theory of design which Loos taught – and exemplified in his buildings – 
was directed at a truly functional architecture. [...] style remained the servant of 
use. (Wittgenstein’s Vienna 252).  
This ethos was not limited to architecture, though this was Loos’ prime mode of 
working. Robert Jensen has suggested that when Loos wrote ‘Ornament and Crime’ he 
‘may very well have had [the primitive sensuality of ] Klimt more firmly in mind that 
any architect’ (‘A Matter of Professionalism’ 202). The relation of architecture to use 
was a matter of integrity, where unnecessary decoration was a mere distraction or 
dissemblance. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this same vein of a search for integrity runs 
through Wittgenstein’s writing. Seeing things and saying things clearly and honestly is a 
matter for philosophy, art and architecture equally, and this may involve realising one’s 
own unnecessary ‘decorations’ – prejudice, habit, pretence, lack of decency. 
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Wittgenstein’s Haus Wittgenstein is a model of his efforts to create the space and 
dimensions of a building that perfectly suited both its function and his own sense of the 
materials. The art-book Wittgenstein - Biographie, Phlosophie, Praxis (ed. Joseph 
Losuth) has usefully explored through photography and biography the correlation 
between Wittgenstein’s strict ethical code and the uncompromising precision of his 
approach to the task. In more detail, artist David Connearn has written about how 
Wittgenstein’s door-handles for the building not only matched the specifications of the 
finished rooms, but underwent an unusually particular design and production process. 
Evocatively, Connearn has reproduced the handles as closely as possible, and sees in 
them parallels with Wittgenstein’s ethos and later philosophy: 
Everything about the design of the handles is indicative of a hands-on working 
knowledge of the material requirements – not of a cast, but of their fabrication. 
The radius of the bend in the right-angled handle is tight, but not arbitrary. It is 
the minimum radius achievable, not in a cast object, but by actually bending 
the material.[...] A limited design vocabulary is established: bend, house, 
wedge, bear, fix. Each function is then interrogated as though being defined, or 
searched for its minimal condition or ‘rules’ of operation and application, in 
relation to the context of ‘usage’ – the practical and aesthetic conventions, 
habits and training, which ground and inform the character of the 
understanding of an object’s identity, utility and, occasionally, its beauty. 
(‘Everything is what it is and not another thing’)
21
 
This is another reminder that the job of philosophy, on Wittgenstein’s account, is not to 
provide new information, but to see what is already known more clearly and honestly. 
The emphasis is on activity and craft rather than something static and definable, and on 
a kind of decency over an impressive or superficial answer. The idea of the 
‘background’ should therefore, I argue, account for this interest, for which Diamond’s 
account of understanding the speaker of nonsense provides a useful bridge. The 
background is that which contextualises a failure to make sense, so that we are able to 
imaginatively, or momentarily, inhabit the nonsensical position as our own, to 
experience the same frustrated aspiration or confusion, and treat it not as an aberration 
but as an expression. 
In this formulation, Diamond’s explanation of ethical statements is relatively easy to 
assimilate; we tend to share similar views of what is good and ideals of perfection, so 
that even if ‘murder is wrong’ is technically nonsense, it takes very little to make the 
                                                             
21 David Connearn regularly uses a Wittgenstein in a scholarly and materials-based creative process. He 
has also written essays on Wittgenstein’s work on colour and contributed to a project to recreate 
Wittgenstein’s house in Norway, which was knocked down not long after his death. His contributions to 
two Wittgenstein-centred exhibitions, ‘Wor(l)ds in Collision’ and ‘Good Lines’, are discussed briefly in 
Chapter 6. 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
104 
 
leap to understanding. Claims over greater distances, such as between cultures, to those 
with severe mental illness, or into other species are more difficult. Moments of 
understanding may be possible, but increasingly fleeting or imaginary. When Diamond 
reads a similar desire and capacity to understand the suffering of another (in this case of 
animals raised and slaughtered in industrial farming) through the character of Elizabeth 
Costello in J.M.Coetzee’s lecture-novel ‘The Lives of Animals’, the requirement is 
harder, and the moment of empathy further away from the possibility of expression. It 
become a dangerous ‘exposure’ (‘The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of 
Philosophy’ 72). As John McDowell notes in his response essay, Costello is by necessity 
‘unhinged’ by her inability to give a rationally convincing argument for the reality of 
her horror, especially at her moments of claiming to know what it is like to die as a 
slaughtered animal (‘Comment on Stanley Cavell’s “Companionable Thinking”’ 134). 
This terminology suggests not only a form of mental dislocation, but a breaking from 
the cultural and human background that underpins our capacity to make sense – our so-
called hinge propositions that in On Certainty Wittgenstein uses to show how the 
empirical content of our lives can – arguably in a non-empirical way – be the sure and 
necessary ground to our knowledge and understanding (OC§§ 96-7, 110). As Danielle 
Moyal-Sharrock puts it, ‘Our basic certainty is not a knowing; it is that on which 
knowing is somehow based’ (‘On Certainty and the Grammaticalization of Experience’ 
44). Similarly, when Read reflects on derangement in ‘Wittgenstein and Faulkner’s 
Benjy’, and what the consequences are for understanding persons with, for example, 
‘serious cases of schizophrenia’ (269), we may have to give up on the idea of 
understanding their thoughts, for these will lack the necessary background or what we 
could categorise as content. The sufferer is left ‘terribly far from us’ (279), and our 
possibility for understanding them may be limited to what commonalities remain in 
ritual, embodiment or speculative imagining. This challenge can make Diamond’s 
model of understanding the person speaking nonsense (and in turn, her resolute account 
of the Tractatus) seem less accessible, but the idea of background in Culture and Value 
can frame a reasonable notion of how nonsense of the kind described could be 
understood, even while being held as merely provisional or indicative of a less 
determinable drive, such as the running up against the walls of our cage. 
Wittgenstein seems to be positing something that is on the way to, but not identical 
with, the concept of ‘Form of Life’. The latter denotes the inextricable links between 
language, history, tradition, rules and instinct, knowledge of which is required for 
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understanding a person or a group and their behaviour – an insistence that Wittgenstein 
uses to remind philosophers that the meaning of words comes neither so simply nor so 
isolatedly as has often been assumed (PI §23; p174). While one ought to remain wary of 
treating Form of Life as a technical term, one aspect of its repeated use is certainly that 
is used in a set of ways that suggest there are many different forms of life, or levels at 
which form of life could be considered. Depending on what we are interested in, we 
may consider Form of Life to capture all human life (PI §206), or a particular nation or 
historical period, or a particular social group within such a setting. With ‘background’ 
Wittgenstein seems to be positing a single background – the very deepest level 
underlying our expressions – but also a personal or individual one, echoing TLP 6.54. 
Even if Wittgenstein had by this point moved on from this mode of thinking, he 
recognised that his ‘thinking, like everyone’s has sticking to it the shrivelled husks of 
[...] earlier (withered) thoughts’ (CV 27e). Background could denote an appreciation of 
the complexity of human thought and expression, though not at that stage the 
multiplicity of background that Wittgenstein’s thinking in Philosophical Investigations 
would embrace, and that On Certainty would elaborate on (e.g.: PI §§206, 240-1; OC 
§§ 213, 286, 525). 
As Cooper has noted, the remark in Culture and Value is also distinguished from 
Wittgenstein’s earlier concerns by the fact that the search is not for the ‘transcendental 
conditions for the possibility of representation’ (‘Ineffability’ 1), but for a more 
descriptive account of our actual practices. The background is not separated from the 
language act it supports, nor from the subject making the act, but stands in for the 
multitude of communal and contextual judgements, traditions and expectations that 
allow us to operate in our language. But likewise, the context that enables our action is 
not just there, a space into which we are received. It is activated – given meaning and 
shape – by the same practices that it makes possible. Our explanations will need to start 
from within this sphere if they are to gain any purchase on our recognised modes of 
living. The notion of background provides both the structural support and opportunity of 
contrast/correction to our utterances, since it is constituted by the same range of 
activities and concepts as the acts themselves. ‘Our words are set against, but not set 
over against, a world which is what it is in virtue of intentional practices, linguistic ones 
included, whereby things stand out and take on their identities’ (4). 
This still leaves us with the question posed earlier, however: in what sense is this 
background ‘inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express)’? It is 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
106 
 
not merely a practical consideration that we are not able to say everything that 
contributes to our linguistic activities simultaneously, and therefore some of it has to 
stay in the background at any given time. What is the remainder that is mysterious? One 
answer, which accords to some extent with Wittgenstein’s comment on Heidegger’s 
project quoted earlier, is to consider that the way that our significations within language 
work usually block us from seeing the supporting background. On some occasions our 
usual view of things is disrupted – by a transformative experience, a bringing into view 
of what we had taken for granted, or the Angst-like experience of finding ourselves at 
the limits of our language; we are unhinged. We find ourselves unable to form a 
question that addresses our dislocation, and this feels mysterious and inexpressible. But 
the dislocation need not itself be anything esoteric at all. We must have some access to 
the background (and its occasional slippage) to ‘measure the failure of words or even to 
experience the failure – or even to understand it at all’ (Robert Innis ‘Language and the 
Thresholds of Sense’ 114). Similarly but distinctly, the perpetual movement between 
the horns of the paradox of faith for Kierkegaard can be seen in terms of background; 
we attempt to keep in view both our fallen, human, articulate condition and the 
inhuman, irrational, godly perfection that is demanded of the believer.  
The remainder of this chapter includes readings of the poetry of Kei Miller and John 
Burnside. The former of these I use to illustrate aspects of the Pseudo-Dionysian 
‘mystic flight’, as described by Russell Nieli in Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to 
Ordinary Language. Characters in the ‘Church Women’ series experience a 
transformative loss of ego or embodiment, and encounters with the unutterably other. 
And yet, they remain unmistakably human, their bodies and earthly attachments 
catching them in their flight, and shaping their moments of ekstasis in prosaic, 
communal ways. Kei Miller’s poetry thus performs something of the regrounding and 
acknowledging of the human impulse towards the inexpressible that Wittgenstein begins 
in the Lecture on Ethics and continues in his later writing. We understand the Church 
Women, truly see them as people, even if what they reach for is nonsense or inarticulate 
song. This is followed by some brief suggestions for a Wittgensteinian resolution of the 
Pseudo-Dionysian attempt at the mystic, in which ineffability as a practice – both as a 
way of seeing the world and as a form of behaviour we can accommodate within our 
lives generally – is considered. Finally, I present a reading of John Burnside’s ‘Parousia’ 
as an alternative conception of the ineffable, as intrusive rather than elusive, and 
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consider this a further helpful illustration of Wittgenstein’s transition in thinking about 
the inexpressible, from external to internal to language. 
Church Women 
Kei Miller’s poem sequence ‘Church Women’, is part I of his first collection, Kingdom 
of Empty Bellies. The women depicted have a complex relationship with expression (as 
language and song) and the various aspects of religion, including worship, scripture, 
community and authority. Miller makes particular use of physical direction and spatial 
relations, and the diverse narratives that can be told thereby about voices and the loss of 
voice. The slippages between the expressible and inexpressible, between registers of 
piety and holiness, and physical discomfort and envy, between forms of language, 
exploit and perform the attractions of seeking to step outside language. The poems are 
vignettes, glimpses of the characters in moments of elation or emotion, so the analyses 
here are similarly compressed, building up a series of repeated images and devices, 
rather than arguing for an overall theme. 
‘Uphill’ 
Sister Maisy must walk uphill to church, 
dirt road rising sharp as a steeple, 
past the rum bar always full 
of heathen people, like her husband. 
But Maisy walks straight, knows Heaven 
is a place that don’t reach easy   
but step by step in pink bathroom slippers 
that make the uphill softer 
on her feet. Maisy dreams on a place 
flat as lake water; day and night 
she meditates on 
the scripture promising 
valleys to be exalted and every mountain 
to be made low. 
In ‘Uphill’ Pseudo-Dionysius’ mountain ascent to enlightenment is transplanted into 
Sister Maisy’s long walk to church ‘in pink bathroom slippers’, begrudgingly passing 
those ‘heathen people, like her husband’ who prefer the easy road to the rum bar. The 
‘upness’ of her path, her determination to get to ‘a place that don’t reach easy’ – the 
literally raised destination of the church – enact her sense of moral worth. Indeed, the 
attendant righteous and positive meanings of ‘uphill’ in Jamaican speech build this 
sense of worth in from the very beginning. We are called to imagine a pilgrimage, a 
difficult journey made from the world of sinners to redemption. Miller undercuts Sister 
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Maisy’s gravitas, however, by turning her thoughts to her own weary feet and physical 
effort, the sharp line breaks beginning to mimic her shortening breath. Thinking not of 
the holy destination, she dreams of the land flattened out, of how the journey would be 
easier if the difference between high and low were erased. Just as in mystic flight, the 
symbolism of direction is robbed of its simple meaning by the quality of the movement, 
because the further uphill Sister Maisy goes, the greater her distraction from the 
ultimate goal. Does she achieve greater unknowing as her thoughts stray from the 
unknowable she thought she knew? She dreams and meditates – both unuttered 
activities, though her muttering is almost audible – of a world where the distances she 
must currently traverse are nullified through the power (‘the scripture promising’) that 
she continues, almost without thinking, to approach. The last line of the poem, ‘to be 
made low’, is a tired exhalation of breath; unstated, she has reached the top of the hill, 
and no more is said. Perhaps she has turned ‘silent completely’ (PDC 139), with no 
further need of, or access to, language. Perhaps, out of breath, her attempts to speak at 
the summit become nonsense to any listener, save one who understood her journey’s 
reason and route. 
‘Off-key I’ 
She did not trust the pastor’s wife, didn’t 
believe a woman with squinted eyes could see 
Heaven and the Glory, much less reveal 
it to her. And she did not like how 
the tiny woman, baton raised, would lead 
the choir to fold songs, crease them under 
then over, form them into peacocks 
      or spiders. 
She didn’t trust these Anansi harmonies 
crawling up her shoulders, as if to keep 
her down; the church woman would lift her voice 
(it could only manage one note) 
and power it through the ceiling 
until old sisters 
added their own 
crocus-bag sounds. 
The chorus floats like newspaper 
up to God’s heaven where, 
smiling, He adds it to His fold. 
‘Off-Key I’ revolves around the rituals of worship, contrasting the ornate musical 
performances led by the pastor’s wife with the simpler view of appropriateness held by 
the Church Woman. As in ‘Uphill’, there is a relentless push upwards in this poem, as 
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the Church Woman resists the ‘Anansi harmonies / crawling up her shoulders, as if to 
keep / her down’, lifts her voice and ‘power[s] it through the ceiling’, the song 
eventually reaching ‘God’s heaven’. Vitally, her song is never ascribed words or even a 
tune ‘(it could only manage one note)’, and is as unmusical as ‘crocus-bag sounds’. This 
is in contrast with the artfully constructed music of the pastor’s wife, who ‘leads[s] / the 
choir to fold songs, crease them under’ like precisely ironed trousers, or origami birds. 
How could something so full of human intent, craft and pride reveal God’s glory? The 
imperfect (perhaps insincere or distracted) vision of the ‘woman with squinted eyes’ 
betrays that her sight is fixed not on God but on her own excellence. Moreover, with the 
apophatic lessons of Pseudo-Dionysius in mind, the formlessness of the Church 
Woman’s song is surely a more apt appeal to the divine than the complex, preening, 
teasing repertoire of the choir. The choir music’s repeated zoomorphism (‘peacocks / or 
spiders’) gives it energy and life, but it remains essentially earthly (perhaps soul-less), 
locked off from the ineffable. The Church Woman, though, chimes with the paradoxes 
of mystic theology, the limitation of language that seeks to express that beyond itself. 
‘[I]n the end... one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate 
sound’ (PI §261). However, as Wittgenstein in the same passage goes on to reiterate, 
‘But such a sound is an expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game’ 
(§261). Miller outlines concisely but colourfully just such a language-game, which 
serves to explain both the motivation for the crocus-bag sounds and various aspects of 
their meanings. The Dionysian appeal to the ineffable is shown to rely on its grounding 
in a common (essentially effable) practice, whose earthiness is announced in the crocus-
bag’s rough material and agricultural associations. 
This final stanza of this poem remains somewhat ambiguous. When God receives the 
inarticulate sound of the church woman he ‘adds it to his fold’, a choice of words that 
echoes the choir being led to ‘fold songs’ under the pastor’s wife’s instructions, and also 
recalls the animal qualities already attached to that music through the association of 
fold, flock and sheep (the Lord as the Good Shepherd.) Perhaps this degree of 
circularity serves to confirm that whatever our attempts to escape the physical realm, we 
can never escape our life as animals – we belong among the peacocks and trickster 
spiders. We may be in God’s care, but remain tied to our created nature. The metaphor 
of ascent created by the raising of song is reversed or confused by God’s ambiguous 
smile. Is the song a gift treasured, or expected tribute received? Is the smile amused or 
pleased? In either case, God does not speak, or need not. 




She closed her eyes tight 
against the unbalancing, 
reciting the careful instructions 
that might save her life 
if the plane stalled in flight. 
But the sharp lifting disturbed 
her horizontal comfort; 
in that tummy-twisting moment 
she erupted – pentecostal frenzy, 
ballistic shooting psalms, 
we were certain she had gone 
mad. Perhaps the ascension brought her 
too close 
to God. 
Ostensibly a snapshot of a nervous flyer, ‘Take Off’ contains intricate parallels with the 
Dionysian ascent. Again, Miller’s topic is ‘ascension’, literally physically, but also 
(with a light dusting of irony) spiritually. The ascent is seemingly imposed on the 
woman, a vertical disruption of her ‘horizontal comfort’. One does not have the 
impression from the description of her nervousness that taking the flight, or the very 
notion of flying, is the result of her own conscious choice or free will. Her eruption 
from ritual recitation of safety regulations into ecstatic language is equally involuntary: 
‘we were certain she had gone / mad.’ She thus carries many hallmarks of the aspiring 
mystic, who may be regarded by others as having ‘gone out of his mind’ (PDC 110) 
‘from the perspective of ordinary speech and intellect’ (Knepper ‘Techniques and 
Rules’ 19); to have become unhinged, in McDowell’s sense mentioned above. The 
closeness to God, whether through ascent or fear of death, has overcome her ability to 
express, much as Moses must ‘plunge into darkness’ (PDC 136) in search of the higher 
realms of light. Her approach to God has only gone part of the way, however, as she 
retains the ability to express ‘higher truths’ – the language of worship – without 
ascending entirely beyond speech into the ineffable. Unknowing precedes revelation. 
Her elevation is, however, recorded from an outside perspective (the other plane 
passengers), which informs the language of its description; quite apart from the wild 
vision of her explosive speech, the poet’s narrator is limited to similes that evidently fall 
short of their target. The insinuation of ‘frenzy’ is of something like xenoglosslalia, but 
still couched in such recognisable terms as ‘pentecostal’ and ‘psalms’; even apparent 
madness must be framed within appropriate rules, or placed against a common 
background for both utterer and audience.  
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Three other poems in this sequence present the relative powers and limitations of 
language in different modes. ‘Tongues I’, ‘Tongues II’, and ‘Off Key II’ all deal with 
circumstances that lead the Church Women to speak, mostly in the worship context, and 
unpick the psychology and ironies inherent in each. Miller has described in his Bocas 
Prize-winning collection of essays Writing Down The Vision: Essays and Prophecies 
(2013) his upbringing in the Jamaican church, in both Pentecostal and Anglican styles 
of worship, before losing his faith in his late teens. His relationship to this loss is 
complex, as his poetry often shows, particularly in the later collection There is an Anger 
that Moves (2007). To give up his faith was not a sudden relief from error but a 
genuinely felt loss, something that is often portrayed as a failure rather than an 
achievement, yet something resolvedly irreversible. Thus, the poems described here 
manage to be by turns sympathetic, satirical, frustrated and sad; there is something 
genuinely at stake in exploring these Church Women and how they live that preserves 
the poems from what might otherwise become mawkish or parodic. The insider-outsider 
viewpoint throughout is also key to Miller’s ability to observe, understand and 
communicate. Having grown up in Jamaica but lived in the UK for much of his adult 
(and writing) life, he steps between multiple camps. This facility opens up new 
possibilities of seeing, but can also leave him marginalised by the societies he straddles. 
The collision of cultures and language is played out most richly in The Cartographer 
Tries to Map the Way to Zion (2014), which provides the framework for Chapter 5. One 
might add to this liminal status his increasingly powerful speaking out against 
homophobia in his native country and elsewhere;
22
 to speak love from a position of 
being hated requires strength, honesty and gentleness, which are all apparent in these 
poems.  
‘Tongues I’ 
When, during worship, the song ripens 
and lyrics become inadequate, 
women will strip Britain 
off their tongues, allowing them to dance free; 
to reach down the spirit-well 
and bring back domed ceilings, 
crystal windows, Roman columns, marble tiles. 
                                                             
22 In ‘Dear Uncle Brendan (and Auntie Kay), can we talk about our island, and how buggered things have 
become?’ (2014) Miller addresses both the muddiness of his affectionate and distant relationship with 
the Church, and the political and moral conflicts around homophobia, HIV/Aids, the religious community 
and Jamaica’s buggery laws.  
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Cabala-builders, the women 
erect castles in which God 
will reside, while the men watch 
and stay outside. 
Just as the writer’s position may be outsider, insider or marginal, language itself can 
become foreign to its own users in certain contexts. In ‘Tongues I’ this loss of facility in 
a language figures as self-defining act, a gesture towards freedom (though still 
described to some extent by the ‘outsider’s’ tongue). As the women ‘strip Britain / off 
their tongues’, the colonial language, indeed any language, as being inadequate to the 
act of worship, the men (including Miller himself?) ‘watch / and stay outside.’ Unlike 
the panicked ejaculations of ‘Take Off’, however, this hyper-lyric expression remains to 
some extent purposeful, a common group ideal through performance, even where ‘lyrics 
become inadequate’. This is reinforced by Miller’s use of long vowel sounds in the 
description of the song (‘down’, ‘domed’, ‘Roman columns’ etc.), slowing the pulse of 
the song to something more dignified than the ‘ballistic’ muddle of ‘Take Off’.
23
 The 
element of chant evoked in the description is instead communal, a public rather than 
private sloughing off of conceptual sense. While giving up on extractable ‘content’, the 
form of the song remains – an ‘inarticulate sound’ that is nonetheless generative since it 
‘occurs in a particular language-game’ (PI §261). The language retains a certain power, 
even if it cannot itself say what it aims at. It performs an including and excluding role 
by providing the basis of a community act, and separating the voluble women from the 
silent (or silenced) male on-lookers.  
‘Tongues II’ 
Beware of the church woman; her tongue 
sharp like serpent. 
Under the shade of a broad Sunday hat, 
eyes brimstone burning, 
she will town-cry the soft secret rising 
in Martha’s unmarried belly; 
gong-mouthed, she will call down 
Heaven-healing 
for the lewd cancer dancing 
inside Billy. 
                                                             
23 A further contrast to ‘Take Off’ is in the directional metaphor of ‘down the spirit-well’, invoking depth 
and internalisation, rather than ascent, though this is confounded in a typically Pseudo-Dionysian way, 
since the wisdom sought in the depths is brought ‘up’ and used to construct (i.e. build up) the ‘castles in 
which God / will reside’. 
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With her, rumours digest easy 
into sermons; 
Beelzebub salivates on her tongue, 
disguising himself as God. 
‘Tongues II’ is a parable of the power and danger of speaking, and culminates in a 
portrayal of language as the opposite of divinity (‘Beelzebub salivates on her tongue’). 
Words, even if conveying the truth, can be destructive – embarrassing, hypocritical, 
condemning – in contrast to the ‘eloquent and taciturn, indeed wordless’ nature of the 
Dionysian devotee (PDC 136). Using a multitude of biblical images Miller builds a 
contrast between the combining power of (lyric-less) song, both in ‘Tongues I’ and in 
‘Off-key I’ (which immediately precedes ‘Tongues II’ in the series) and the divisive 
effects of gossip and judgement delivered under the guise of sermons. Just such an 
admonition is also given in Pseudo-Dionysius’ Letter VI, which warns against hasty 
judgement and hypocrisy: 
Do not count it a triumph, reverend Sosipater, that you are denouncing a cult or 
a point of view that does not seem to be good [...]. For it could be that the one 
hidden truth could escape both you and the others [...]. This is what you will do 
if you trust me. You will cease from the denunciation of others and you will 
speak about truth in such a manner that everything you say will be irrefutable. 
(PDC 266) 
Both this extract and the poem have an element of self-refutation within them. ‘Tongues 
II’ is itself a judgemental and sermonising piece – indeed is the poem in the sequence 
that most expresses a firm opinion about a Church Woman, rather than painting a 
picture more open to interpretation. It commits the sin it warns against. As a stand-alone 
poem this might simply reduce the spirit of the poem to self-righteousness, but in the 
context of the Church Women sequence, its difference to other pieces is marked, 
therefore seemingly self-conscious. By first spurring the reader on to concur with its 
judgement, the subsequent realisation of the inherent contradiction turns the poem into a 
further performance of the temptation of denouncing others, accomplished by the 
positioning of the poem within the wider whole, rather than through direct expression. 
Letter VI runs the similar risk of hypocrisy, being scathing about Sosipater’s rush to 
judge others. However, the second part of the letter presents an alternative to 
denunciation, or even argument. It asks for a leap of faith, and advises against making 
any claim that is not ‘irrefutable’. Given the context of Pseudo-Dionysius’ apophasis, 
this is in effect a recommendation not to speak at all, in recognition of the fallibility of 
human judgment and the limitations of language. Language cannot speak the irrefutable 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
114 
 
without profanation. Since any assertion is, by the nature of language, potentially 
refutable, and any judgment, as an act of exclusion, potentially mistaken or imperfect, 
one should either only utter/endorse that which everyone agrees on (tautologies) or 
remain silent.  
It is simple to make an immediate connection here with Wittgenstein’s remark in 
Philosophical Investigations that ‘If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would 
never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them’ (§128). What 
philosophy ought to be engaged in, in other words, is to remind people of what they 
already know (CV 72e), but had forgotten or overlooked thanks to the bewitchments of 
language or pictures (§115) or the dullness of habit. When proceeding without 
recognising this, philosophy leads to error, such as when a universal law is imposed 
where a description of particular cases is needed, contorting or misusing language to 
make it fit a frame, as though wearing ill-fitting shoes (CV 47e). Such attempts to speak 
from ‘outside’ our language games look like access to the truth but are in fact misguided 
or simply nonsense. In effect, it is a council of silence in respect to the ‘truth’ about 
which Sosipater would endeavour to speak. In a non-Wittgensteinian context, this might 
cancel out any effort to speak, since philosophy is conceived of as (logically) prior to 
our everyday practices. In the practice-oriented method I am laying out, however, the 
situation is reversed, as what we call philosophy is shown to emerge from our practice: 
its pictures of how we and the world behave have been confusedly held up as models or 
reasons, rather than as descriptions of a certain range of activities, or activities that 
emerge from our overall view of the world (cf.: PI §§134, 241; OC §§215, 403, 410, 
449). Take, for example, the idea that to have a thought is to have a picture of an object 
in your mind; this is often true, but to think it is essential to thought leads to all manner 
of confusion. Sometimes it makes more sense to think of ourselves thinking with our 
pen (CV 24e) or as acting only as part of a group, and the picture of thoughts happening 
in our heads means no more than to point to a ‘box’ in which thinking is happening 
(PI§293). It means something in our language but remains only a picture. Ordinary 
language is ‘all right’. It is not speech itself that should come to an end, but the urge to 
talk one’s way out of it, as it were, through philosophy. The philosopher’s sermons will 
serve an evil purpose, like the devil-inspired tongue, fitting the world to a standard that 
become malicious with the unthinking application of (moral) standards to all situations.  
Finally, ‘Off-Key II’ provides an image of the deep-seatedness of words in our 
existence, and the gap between words and the extra-linguistic world. 




The police never knocked or shouted 
Open Up! or flashed their warrants; 
(things don’t work like that here) 
just boots and the door collapsing –  
a confused woman holding her nightie 
at the place where a sagging breast 
would fall out; rubbing eyes against 
the blackness (she thought it was her soul) 
and the words Jeeee Zus was rising 
out of her belly. Her son was calling 
Mamma, and only when the baton hit her 
she knew she had stood to save him. 
 
That night the woman learned 
how to put Heaven in her voice 
how to prophesy – call down Armageddon, 
flood-water, twenty plagues on Babylon – how 
to brawl down Jericho or sing It Is Well 
even though the ground refuse to shake 
and the jail-walls don’t turn to dust and the locks 
don’t break – even though 
her son not coming out. 
 
Each Sunday, the woman finds herself 
in church, singing the wrong key –  
Egypt and Israel are heavy 
on her tongue and push the notes off-centre. 
Her song will rise to the Saviour, but might bang 
against the padlock of His heart. 
 
In a moment of crisis the most divine name is invoked, more physically than 
consciously: ‘and the words Jeeee Zus was rising / out of her belly’. The words are one 
and the same movement as the attempt to protect her son from the advancing police 
(and ultimately equally ineffective). Following the detailed and grounded physical 
descriptions of the first stanza, in the second her rage in the face of injustice and at her 
own impotence transfers into the bombast of religious rhetoric. Miller constructs 
another successful juxtaposition within the sequence, as the previous poem, 
‘Hallelujahs’, shows a pastor using presumably similar rhetoric to powerful effect, 
producing ‘lightning [...] ready to charge out.’ However, where in that poem the context 
of the church service empowers his words, in ‘Off-key II’ the curses and pleas fall short 
of such an effect: ‘the jail-walls don’t turn to dust [...] her son not coming out.’ The 
performative power of words is conditioned by the language game within which they 
operate.  
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The poem deals with apparent failure on two levels – the intractability of real-life events 
to passionate invective, and the inability of the woman’s prayers to penetrate the 
‘padlock’ on God’s heart. A more complex reading is, however, also available, which 
sees that although the prayers and wailings do not have their immediate desired effect, 
they nonetheless perform a role, much like ethical propositions in the Lecture on Ethics. 
Miller again notes the communal experience of church-going, where the performance of 
the woman’s grief finds a place to express itself.
24
 This is not to say her hurt is 
dissipated – related tales of incarceration from scripture remain ‘heavy / on her tongue’ 
– but the ritual and repetition of ‘Each Sunday’ serve as an outlet and, perhaps, comfort. 
Further, though the prayers and hymns seem to go unanswered, this is a positive lesson 
in the Dionysian sense, since the search for God in that tradition is not to answer 
practical demands, but to offer Truth. Language fails to force God to act, because it is 
intimately linked to normal life; only by divesting ourselves of earthly desires, however 
justly harboured, can we and our songs ‘ascend’. God’s reaction to this song, unmoved 
by its pleading, is of course a counterpoint to ‘Off-Key I’, in which a smiling deity 
receives the inarticulate sounds of worship, expressing nothing but themselves.  
Finally, another iteration of the confounded ‘ascent’ metaphor is present – the appeal 
projected up to heaven (set against the worldly ‘going down’ of the son) is frustrated by 
its literalness; it has not achieved the ‘hyper-good’ or the ‘unknowing’ required for 
revelation, but is bounced back, like the frustrated Dionysian mystic, into the 
difficulties, iniquities and hopes of human life. 
Solutions: Meta-languages, Relative Ineffability and Domestication  
Given this discussion above, how are we to think of Pseudo-Dionysius’s reach for the 
ineffable? Its elaborate and multilayered denials of the expressibility or knowability of 
God at the same time seek to detach themselves from human practices, even our 
humanity and individuality. Even the pseudonymous nature of the author of the corpus 
can be read as a further sign of the failure of the word and the individual; we cannot 
even know who wrote the work, since they have removed themselves from the seat of 
                                                             
24 As Kevin Corrigan has noted in ‘"Solitary" Mysticism in Plotinus, Proclus, Gregory of Nyssa, and 
Pseudo-Dionysius’ there is a conflict, both actual and perceived, between the neo-Platonic and Christian 
mystic traditions, about the degree to which the mystic is alone – both in his separation from other 
souls, and the unreachable, annihilating communion with God. Here the stress that Miller places on the 
communal, even when the Church Women mostly remain unnamed, and the distant characterisation of 
God, are symptoms of the importance for a shared practice. The failure of the Church Women to “take 
off” on mystic flight is in part connected to their embedding in society and ritual; Miller treats this with 
his habitual mixture of tenderness and irony. 
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authorship, as suggested by Charles Stang (Apophasis and Pseudonymity in Dionysius 
the Areopagite). The images of the divine that this stranger offers are not even the 
suggestions and withdrawals of Kierkegaardian indirect communication, who at least in 
his own Pseudonymous writing as Johannes Climacus allows irony and details of 
contemporary Danish society to point towards an existing author (Concluding 
Postscript 617-20).  
A common reading is to treat the method as a form of what Knepper calls ‘apophatic 
abandonment’ that, in its own consistency leaves only an empty notion of Godhead, 
with the message of failure to know the ineffable a lesson in the impossibility of 
achieving the hyper-knowledge of the divine.
25
 Pseudo-Dionysius is a de facto atheist, 
since the only way to posit God without profanation is to insist that there can be no 
God, at least as far as our human ideas of being and God go. To attempt holiness is to 
resist all attempts at understanding, and insist only on the inadequacy of this world and 
our understanding. However, as Knepper has argued, this reading seems more a product 
of our own times, in which arguing God out of existence is a more acceptable notion. It 
sees the negation of all attributes of God as evidence of his nothingness but, Knepper 
argues, this conclusion is not justified, given a full understanding of the notion of hyper, 
discussed above, as excessive positivity: ‘not a God that is utterly removed from all 
things and utterly devoid of all things, but a God that preeminently pre-contains all 
things’ (Negating Negation 41). Likewise, as Don Cupitt characterises the modern and 
post-modern condition of theology, we are happier to treat all theology on the level of 
mythology, excepting personal choices to believe in particular versions (Mysticism After 
Modernity 2); this view of belief as a matter of choice is starkly at odds with both a 
realist idea of the ineffable, but also Wittgenstein’s analysis of belief in his later writing. 
Our beliefs go much deeper than mere opinion or choice, and show in our ways of 
behaving (PI p178; OC §317). 
 META-LANGUAGES 
Alternatively, as some other traditions have determined, if all language is inadequate to 
express knowledge of God, and error is inevitable, we ought to be free to use whatever 
language we decide to discuss God, as long as we do so in the knowledge that can only 
ever be a metaphor and a shortcoming. Metaphor becomes ‘by default, the language of 
                                                             
25 For examples of straightforward denial of Pseudo-Dionysius’ ability to say anything, see John Hick 
‘Ineffability’, or for the “post-modern” ‘anti-onto-logical’ readings, the work of John Caputo and Kevin 
Hart. An overview of post-Derridean readings, see Chris Boesel ‘The Apophasis of Divine Freedom’, as 
well as other essays in Apophatic Bodies. 
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the ineffable’ (Conrad Ostwalt Secular Steeples 4) More like Kierkegaard’s view, an 
untruth that in its withdrawal leads the believer closer to understanding can be a good, if 
married with sufficiently modest ambition. Wittgenstein considered something along 
these lines in Culture and Value, in how the language of religion has many ‘levels’, 
with different symbols and modes of talking suitable to different kinds of believers 
(37e). This may be connected with his (perhaps Kierkegaardian) contemplation of the 
reason for the Gospels being given in four separate and widely differing accounts, 
recorded in a remark the previous month (36-7e). But in the Pseudo-Dionysian case, 
where no information is given, does metaphor do anything at all? As discussed earlier, a 
symbol or metaphor that refuses to grant any likeness at all with the object being 
gestured towards does nothing. The only possibility of it having any guiding effect is 
through a free interpretation made by the hearer, with no restrictions, which both 
renders the text itself irrelevant, and opens up a corrosive and unjustified view of all 
meaning as requiring interpretation. The continual regress insisted on might satisfy a 
certain ‘level’ of believer in practice, but can never satisfy the mystic’s own putative 
effort. 
Knepper has suggested two ways in which a Wittgensteinian response to the Pseudo-
Dionysian corpus could provide a release from the problems of self-defeat and 
emptiness discussed earlier, both centring on an idea of non-absolute, or relative 
ineffability. In ‘Techniques and Rules’ a collection of solutions that I have grouped 
under the umbrella of ‘meta-language’ are presented. In ‘Ineffability Investigations’¸ he 
invokes Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks in Philosophical Investigations as a 
means of bringing the concept of ‘ineffability back to the everyday’ (65). The meta-
linguistic effort essentially says that while Pseudo-Dionysius does make ineffability 
claims, these are relative, by virtue of the language or worldview from which the claims 
are made being distinct from that to which they refer. If the ineffability claim is made 
about another realm – one of higher understanding – then the sentences in this realm 
will still be valid, since it is at least true that, given the existence of the other realm, our 
lack of ability to express anything about it need not mean that there is not someone else 
in that higher realm who can make such claims. If hierarchies of higher beings are part 
of Pseudo-Dionysius’ account (which is clear given the dedication of Celestial 
Hierarchies to explaining the nine ranks of angels), then his sentences might thus be 
acknowledged as making sense insofar as we allow the existence of these beings. 
However, clearly this is still problematic, since Pseudo-Dionysius cannot coherently 
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make any claims about what such a higher level of understanding would entail, or how 
he came to the realisation of this hyper-level of Being. Knepper argues from numerous 
examples (‘Techniques and Rules’ 14-15) that this is the move that Pseudo-Dionysius 
makes, and that though the problems above need addressing, from Pseudo-Dionysius’ 
own perspective he can claim to have received divine revelation while still admitting 
that he has no means of expressing or understanding the ‘superfacts’ (Cupitt Mysticism 
After Modernity 5), since he remains a (human) being. For the current purposes of 
interrogating attempts to say the unsayable, and the grammatical structures used in this 
effort, it remains interesting to interrogate whether this, or other ways of classifying the 
mystic’s actions can be made sense of. It rests on the presumption of both the concepts 
of God and divine revelation, and simply posits an ineffable level of hyper-being 
beyond our own. The claim of having received a revelation of the ineffability of God, 
even without seeking to express the content thereof, conflicts with that same 
ineffability. Further, the distinction between semiotic systems mapped out in the 
previous paragraph must in this case be absolute, since any connection at all between 
our own level of being and any other would entail a shared character of being. Even 
intermediate levels of understanding, such as angels, would be of no help; they do not 
fit the idea of ‘intermediate cases’ (PI §122). Whatever properties are attributed (or not) 
to God via hyper-being, understanding would have to have some overlap with our own 
level of understanding to be received but further, the structure of that understanding 
(the logic of it) must coincide if such things as ‘thing’ or ‘being’ are to have any 
purchase. A meta-language has to have a relation of some kind with the initial language 
or practice for the term to mean anything. 
An alternative escape would be to treat the meta-linguistic argument in a similar way to 
the conflictive metaphors discussed above, as a way of avoiding self-contradiction 
through continual deferment or rebuff of meaning. By invoking hyper-ineffable as 
super-eminently ineffable, at each stage where Pseudo-Dionysius acknowledges the 
impossibility of the assertion, this in itself counts as a performance of that ineffability, 
something like: “God is so very ineffable that even the attempt to say that ineffability is 
beyond our ability!” Without the meta-linguistic set-up, this would be limited to a single 
demonstrative gesture, but if we permit the idea of a hierarchy of linguistic clusters, 
such that each utterance of ineffability is made through its own denial into an utterance 
of the next level, there is no prima facia necessity to stop the string of expressions 
generated. (“When I said x, my sentence was self-defeating, but viewed from the 
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position that emerges from that, x+1, I am again bound to make that move; when x+1 
fails, it automatically creates position x+2…”) Clearly this performance could never 
successfully say the thing that Pseudo-Dionysius would like to say (without saying), but 
it could be seen as a way of communicating the perpetual state of unknowing to the 
attentive reader; the unsettle-ability of the assertions enacts the thing that cannot be said. 
This view does permit Pseudo-Dionysius to go on with the discussion, provided he is 
happy for it never to reach a conclusion (or content), which does seem to align 
reasonably with the necessity of unknowing in the pursuit of knowledge. However, 
while this ‘ratcheting up’ may be effective in poetic or gestural terms, one is still left 
with the sense that there has to be something behind the shifting layers of words, 
whether this is the realist’s ineffable ‘something’ or merely the derivable content of 
what the utterer wished to convey. Deferral mimics the search for Truth through 
Unknowing, but cannot become that search itself, since it relies on cognition of the text 
(or at least its constituent parts) to get off the ground.  
Parallels can be drawn with the various interpretations of the closing remarks of the 
Tractatus. The ineffabalist reading allows that what is said is nonsense, but that it still 
shows us something worth seeing. This can be conceived of as a form of meta-language 
(as, for example, described by Robert J. Fogelin in Wittgenstein 102), but would meet 
the same objections I have just outlined. Further, at least in his later notes (1930), 
Wittgenstein explicitly rejects his own ladder image from Tractatus 6.54, which would 
otherwise lend some weight to the notion of someone making utterances from a ‘higher’ 
plane. In Culture and Value we find: 
Each sentence that I write is trying to saying the whole thing, that is, the same 
thing over and over again & it is as though they were views on one object seen 
from different angles.  (My emphasis. 9e) 
I might say: if the place I want to reach could only be climbed up to by a 
ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place to which I really have 
to go is one that I must actually be at already 
Anything that can be reached with a ladder does not interest me.  (10e) 
Does this mean that Wittgenstein’s notion of ascent has changed over time or that this 
should colour our understanding of the Tractatus? For a useful discussion of 
Wittgenstein’s metaphors of this type, see David Schalkwyk’s ‘Wittgenstein’s 
“Imperfect Garden”’, and the discussion of cartographical imagery, including the notion 
of ‘perspicuous overview’ (PI §122) in Chapter 5 of this thesis. The answer to the 
immediate question in part depends on the reading of the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s 
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work generally. The mainstream ‘two-Wittgensteins’ story might chart a switch from an 
attempt to escape language to one of exploring its inner boundaries, with the explicit 
rejection of a second order of philosophical discourse coming in Philosophical 
Investigations §121; the ‘mono-Wittgensteinian’ story would understand this internal 
picture to be available also in the Tractatus. Diamond’s account is of the latter type, 
meaning that the parallel drawn with Pseudo-Dionysius above would be with the person 
who speaks nonsense – who gives the impression of climbing or wanting to climb the 
ladder – but who neither makes sense nor imparts any sense to the reader, but who 
might nonetheless be understood, at least as a person whose aspirations and frustrations 
we might recognise as (potentially) our own.  
 RELATIVE INEFFABILITY AND DOMESTICATION 
In ‘Ineffability Investigations’, Knepper attempts ‘a recovery of the ordinary uses of 
ineffability [to…] dissolve the metaphysical problem’ (65). Despite all the 
contradictions and problems that Pseudo-Dionysian ineffability writings encounter, it is 
obviously true that we do know what someone is talking about when the word 
‘ineffable’ and its mode of discussion are used. Therefore, understanding what it is that 
happens in such cases may provide Pseudo-Dionysius with a reading that allows a 
relative ineffability in another sense than the meta-linguistic one; we can show that 
there is such a practice as talking about the ineffable, and we can say whether or not 
Pseudo-Dionysius is engaged in the same practice, irrespective of whether or not his 
specific claims stand up to scrutiny (and perhaps also because they do not). Indeed, the 
aim in this Wittgensteinian move is not to identify the validity of the ineffability claim 
per se, but to show how such moves are still part of our normal language games, and 
thereby disarm the either/or dichotomy that someone speaking about the ineffable must 
either be achieving extra-linguistic revelation, or be spouting pure nonsense. The 
rejection of such talk as simply nonsense would fit the resolute or the positivist reading 
of the Tractatus, depending on whether the nonsense spouted is considered grounds for  
therapy or censure.  
Ineffability is usually characterised as what is unutterable, too great for description in 
words, or what must not be uttered. As a practice, usually in ritual, it is characterised by 
exactly the sorts of strategies that Pseudo-Dionysius has been shown to be deploying in 
this analysis: denial of properties (or the adequacy of properties), assertions of 
ineffability, denials of the applicability of effability concepts (either in terms of 
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privation or excess), the use of irresolvable metaphors or linguistic clusters, and (as the 
discussion of ‘Tongues II’ suggests) demands for trust by truth seekers, precisely on the 
basis of a lack of possible knowledge. It is a demand for mental and verbal silence 
(Webb Keane ‘Religious Language’). Further, the shapes deployed in the mystic 
endeavour take certain recognisable forms – the use of opposites (e.g. light/dark), of 
ascent and descent, of repetition or reiteration (such as in the list of variations on the 
Divine Names (PDC 57)), and certain culturally powerful symbols.  
Without insisting on a single definition of what constitutes an ineffability practice, 
especially since its connection with ritual makes it a prime candidate for the kind of 
family-resemblance status that Wittgenstein applies in Remarks on Frazer’s Golden 
Bough, one way of considering what makes the activity feel understandable but 
nonsensical – and often also so mysterious – is to think of it as a kind of language game 
that consciously pushes against its own boundaries, much like ethical statements feel 
like they are running up against the bars of a cage (LE 12). To use a spatial analogy, the 
game showcases its own failure, either by exhausting what can be said within it in a way 
that suggests that there is more beyond this, or by circumscribing a hollow within itself 
it cannot fill. It is thus to some extent rule-governed; there are ways of behaving and 
speaking that demonstrate that I know how to continue (PI §150). There are rules to 
follow in this type of conversation, and other people will be able to alert me if I make a 
mistaken or irrelevant move. Understanding may take the form of a self-declaration: 
‘Now I can do it’ (PI §151). There is such a thing as learning how to obey the rules of 
such a conversation (and how to go against them), and this may be a process of being 
guided by others, or come as a sudden realisation, but is in neither case separate from 
the practice one is attempting to enter into, or maintain. 
Knepper suggests that this ordered and circumscribed ineffability provides space for a 
‘relative’ ineffability by avoiding the temptation to look for and critique ‘absolute’ 
ineffability (‘Ineffability Investigations’ 75). And indeed, it does allow him to give 
some coherence to the positive claims that Pseudo-Dionysius makes about God (e.g. 
Cause of all things) without debarring ineffability entirely. Most explicitly in Negating 
Negation, the move is used to critique readings of the corpus that settle on apophatic 
abandonment, either on the basis of Pseudo-Dionysius’ direct claims of God’s 
ineffability, or by emphasising the ‘merely’ metaphorical nature of the language used to 
discuss God. As has been outlined here, both strategies ultimately fall short of being 
able to coherently read the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus. Knepper’s solution in Negating 
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Negation is to preserve a perspectival ineffability, similar to that discussed (and 
rejected) earlier in this chapter, such that ineffability within our own sphere of knowing 
need not be a barrier to there being higher intelligences for whom God is not ineffable, 
and with whom communion is sought by the mystic, in the effort to move closer to the 
true absolute divinity. As a reading of Pseudo-Dionysius that is likely to be closer to the 
original writer’s intentions, this does make sense, and Knepper provides considerable 
textual evidence for non-apophatic claims in the corpus text, as well as arguments for 
considering the corpus as a whole, rather than just concentrating on the more directly 
apophatic Mystical Theology, as most readings do:  
All this is apophatic abandonment—attempts to minimize the necessity and 
ultimacy of the hierarchies and hierurgies for return due to the conviction that 
if God is absolutely ineffable, then nothing can be literally true with respect to 
God, not even the hierurgical rituals that are revealed by and effect uplifting 
through the hierarchical ranks. Such rituals and ranks must therefore be just 
one among many different possible routes of access to God. And even if they 
are personally or communally useful, they must ultimately be kicked away like 
so many Wittgensteinian ladders that not only serve purely provisional 
purposes but also thwart higher spiritual aspirations. 
Although such a Pseudo-Dionysius may well be in step with our times, he is at 
odds with his own writings. (Negating Negation 71) 
Knepper’s alternative is to avoid claims of absolute ineffability, but this is still in 
exchange for retaining effability on the level of a higher intelligence (as described by 
Pseudo-Dionysius) inaccessible to human minds, being both ‘Known Hyper Mind (and 
Said Hyper Logos)’ (119). The apophatic abandonment reading has its wings clipped, 
but Knepper misses the real Wittgensteinian point that would be a potential solution to 
or avoidance of the troubles mentioned above. Relative ineffability treats the claims of 
ineffability in the same way as absolute claims, but tries to administer non-contradictory 
restraints, such that ineffability just means ‘ineffable for you’. But as the preceding 
analysis has shown, such boundaries could only ever be artificial and self-defeating, 
since their defined imposition implies or relies on a standpoint beyond the boundary 
itself. The position seeks to both describe and not describe itself, since any description 
would violate the initial assumption of ineffability, yet it must state the limits it seeks to 
impose, in detail and to varied degrees, such as occurs in the listing of qualities denied 
the ineffable God in the Mystic Theology. 
The problem is that the way the ineffability is made ‘relative’ is merely an attempted 
short-circuit of the existing arguments. Instead, I propose a ‘domestication’ of the 
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ineffability claims, in the manner of the series of reminders that Wittgenstein 
recommends as therapy for philosophical confusions (PI §127), and using McDowell’s 
terminology discussed in Chapter 3. The aim is to avoid the unnecessary (and unending) 
creation of meta-languages, by showing that language games can and do contain their 
own pushing at their boundaries. Philosophy ought better to attempt to, as it were, leave 
everything as it is, and ‘speak the language of every day’ which is, and has to be, 
adequate for answering our questions (PI §120).
26
  
This has two strands.  
The first, through the analysis of the grammatical structures in play and by drawing 
connections with the same employed in other contexts (Kei Miller’s poems), is to 
remove the temptation to think of the Pseudo-Dionysian text as unique and context-free. 
Instead we might consider how the same tools are used in other ways to produce other 
results. The way we think about the language we use stands surrounded by different 
practices, with attendant objectives and possibilities. Further, not all uses of words are 
referential, but may also be expressive, a form of gesture, and so on. Where our 
language stumbles is in the move towards naming absolutes, in denying or prescribing 
constraints on a given operation of language. Instead, by including our understanding of 
the practices that surround mysticism, we can know what it means to talk of ineffability, 
without also having to over-reach ourselves by insisting that the content of what is said 
is its only value. Kei Miller’s Church Women are shown singing, talking and 
worshipping, and thereby describe a variety of interactions with the putatively ineffable, 
while remaining concrete, effable and entirely human. The Pseudo-Dionysian case is 
just such a thing, though it veils its activities in abstractions. They remain utterances 
made for and by humans, even if they exceed the uses and meanings of words 
sanctioned by our everyday practices. By pointing to how the ritual or theology is 
underpinned by our practices, rather than preceding and enabling them, for example by 
comparing its techniques with the less problematic activity of poetry, we remove its 
spookiness (MW 94) or emptiness.  
The second strand is to consider the mystic’s claims themselves not on the level of the 
meaning of individual utterances, but on the level of a practice. Wittgenstein’s single 
                                                             
26 This point has wider implications than this discussion, as a way of using Wittgenstein to critique other 
methods of thinking, such as deconstruction, which struggle with ‘denouncing a metaphysic of presence 
in a metalanguage in which presence is inevitably reinscribed’ (Perloff Wittgenstein’s Ladder 71). See 
also Charles Altieri ‘Wittgenstein on Consciousness and Language: A Challenge to Derridean Literary 
Theory ‘ 
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mention of theology in Philosophical Investigations is as follows: ‘Grammar tells us 
what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.)’ (§373). I suggest that insofar 
as we are familiar with self-overstepping language games, such as the one being 
performed by Pseudo-Dionysius, we can recognise what he is attempting and why, but 
that this need not commit us to endorsing the content (if any) of the moves in the game. 
The meta-language game is neither necessary nor helpful, since it must presume that 
what is inexpressible in one language game is expressible in another – in other words, 
that ‘it’ is something. There is no thing that is the inexpressible, though there are things 
that are inexpressible, or not expressed, within language games. Games and practices 
can be nested, so that one can comment on another (Lamarque ‘Wittgenstein, Literature, 
and the Idea of a Practice’ 386) but this relation is not one of further guarantee, but itself 
a feature of the use or meaning of the practice. 
Corollary to the above, to understand a practice is not necessarily to exhaust it. In the 
‘rule-following’ sense, we might ‘know how to go on’ without having, or being able to, 
in explain advance all the steps we take, or how they work. To an extent, and in some 
circumstances, we ‘obey the rule blindly’ (PI §219). In this case, we might understand 
the person’s behaviour in making ineffability claims, as long as we don’t presume that 
for this to be the case there must be something else underwriting the meaning that they 
seek, and fail, to transmit. Alternatively, it is useful to remember that some practices are 
based on the very possibility of their inexhaustibility, or incompleteness. In resisting 
resolution into a concrete (name-like) statement, some practices open up possibilities 
for further activity than prima facie understanding, without thereby falling into 
unintelligibility or nonsense (Z §160).  
Clearly poetry is a prime example of this balancing act of being comprehended but not 
(necessarily or simultaneously) comprehensively, of suggesting and withholding what 
would be expressed determinately in ordinary discourse. In this respect I argue exactly 
the opposite to Badiou’s conception of poetry as essentially a practice of naming or 
inventing names, with no further reference outside itself (Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy 
108-9). Badiou treats a poem as a single proposition, one so withdrawn into itself that, 
echoing Wittgenstein’s remarks in Philosophical Investigations that naming is like 
attaching a label to something (§15), it becomes a mere preparation for use (§26). ‘We 
may say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been named’ (§49). 
Wittgenstein’s point is that without being used in a sentence, a name is not a thought – 
as shown in the discussion of nonsense above. Badiou reads this as denying that poetry 
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is really thought at all. A poem is essentially an object rather than an expression – a 
proposition revisited in Chapter 4 of this thesis. By contrast, I argue that a poem only 
makes sense in use, in a language-game, and demonstrates that naming is far from the 
only use that words can have. Wittgenstein’s limiting picture of language in the 
Tractatus caused him to exclude poetry from forms of legitimate expression, but not 
because he welcomed this or failed to see it, but because he thought thereby, from 
within the tension of his austere view of language, to preserve its value, and all values. 
The capacity and responsibility of the poet to create, confound and refresh was, I 
suggest, a major spur to the re-evaluation of Wittgenstein’s language picture. In Zettel 
he again notes that the ineffable finds itself only within a language game: ‘Why should 
we not say the unverifiable? For we ourselves made it unverifiable.’ (§259), and in 
Culture and Value ‘The poet too must always be asking himself: 'is what I am writing 
really true then?' which does not necessarily mean: “is this how it happens in reality?” 
(46e)’. There is considerable value, in relation to both the ineffable and nonsense, to 
recalling Maria Balaska’s suggestion that ‘If we understand meaning as the recovery of 
contexts of significant use, it is easier to decouple meaning from particular propositional 
content and understand it in more holistic terms’ (‘The Notion of Happiness in Early 
Wittgenstein’ 409) – that is, as what opens us towards seeing something as significant. 
In the final section of this chapter I want to look at the poetry of John Burnside, which 
trades powerfully on the capacity of language for being understood without being 
exhausted – for revealing without defining. A close reading of his poem ‘Parousia’, 
shows some of the same techniques of meaning deferral, conflictive metaphor and 
denial found in the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus, but situated within a literary practice that 
can survive, indeed flourish, through the ambiguities of boundaries, the preservation of 
uncertainty, and the paradoxes of ineffability. What is of particular interest is how 
Burnside’s conception of the ineffable reverses many of the ambitions and directions of 
the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus, in a way that invites an interior, rather than exterior 
conception of the ineffable.  
Parousia 
John Burnside is known for his near-obsessive unearthing of the magical and elusive in 
the world around us. Gemma Green describes him as ‘revealing the wide open spaces 
between what we are able to know and touch, and what lives and breathes invisibly 
amongst us’ (‘Infinity and Beyond’ 50). Jaime Robles, in her thesis on dark lyric 
writing, for which John Burnside is a major character, notes the ‘liminality behinds 
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which lies an unseeable unknown charged with potential realisation’ as a common 
feature of his poetry and prose (‘Dark Lyrics’ 32). Burnside has referred to his own 
writing as philosophical, insofar as it is ‘provisional’, offering the reader incomplete 
thoughts, spaces and pauses between words, gestures towards what is mysterious in the 
everyday (‘Strong Words’ 260). There is a Heideggerian sense of the unencompassable 
encounter to Burnside’s poetry, marked by the importance he places on maintaining a 
solicitous, provisional view of the world around him, in which we live but do not settle. 
Though Graeme Richardson’s claim that this is ‘Heidegger as lyrical interlude’ is 
excessive (‘John Burnside’s Poetry: No Ideas but in Somethings’), the influence is 
explicitly acknowledged: 
We have Heidegger to thank for understanding that the real problem for 
humankind is our homelessness. [...] I’d rather follow the path of homelessness 
to wild dwelling than accept the costly shelter of a certain kind of building – 
building that displaces, violates and domesticates what some have called, in 
translation and as a kind of shorthand, the great spirit.  (Burnside ‘Interview’ 
Agenda: Dwelling Places 22-3)  
Despite concluding that his ‘lifelong engagement has been with Heidegger’, Burnside 
also confirms the influence of Wittgenstein, Marx and Sartre, as well as Merleau-Ponty, 
Levinas and Benjamin on his poetry (24). And indeed, shorn of the incantatory tone of 
Heidegger, which Burnside’s fondness of lingering over hollowed-out vowels and 
repetitions of particular images and objects (blood, bone, foxes, liminal spaces etc.) tend 
to generate, his writing exhibits many of the desires and demands that we find in 
Wittgenstein – to take a closer look at what is passing by; to appreciate the delicacies of 
experience rather than seek to explain them; to find the unsettling angle on our lives that 
reveals the unseen background. In addition, despite an openly spiritual element to his 
writing, Burnside resists adherence to a doctrinal belief, but dwells on (or in) the 
attraction and elusiveness of the ineffable. His themes are often religious, or respond to 
religious texts and art, such as his long prose poem ‘Annunciations’ in Common 
Knowledge. But these act as provocations rather than conclusions, and his settings and 
concerns are also ecological and political. As Scott Brewster puts it, ‘in Burnside’s 
poetry the encounter with the natural world is so often about the disappearance and the 
limitations of understanding’ and most often occurs in landscapes of nature interrupted 
by man’s construction or ruination, or the eruption of nature into human spaces, or the 
gaps between them – the ‘liminal but potent waste grounds of suburbia’ ( ‘John 
Burnside: Poetry as the Space of Withdrawal’ 329, 338). 
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Burnside’s quest for the ineffable is therefore not the Pseudo-Dionysian one of stripping 
away worldly things, or removing himself from their influence. He is not looking so 
much for what is above, but what is behind, or immanent within. ‘At its best, the lyric 
opens a door in the everyday and allows me to pass into the otherworld behind the 
taken-for-granted’ (Burnside ‘Travelling into the Quotidian’ 61).  
I here want to look at one particular poem, ‘Parousia’, the final piece of the 1995 
collection Swimming in the Flood, connecting its techniques and concerns with the 
Pseudo-Dionysian corpus. Like many of his poems it combines a dark, unnerving, 
uncertain theme with a formal style that is surprisingly musical and clear, and 
‘suggestively confessional’ (Robles ‘Dark Lyrics’ 29). 
The title’s usual (theological) meaning is the Second Coming of Christ, though a 
number of attendant meanings are worth noting, including ‘being beside’, ‘arrival’ 
(especially of an important personage), ‘advent’ (New Testament) and ‘making a 
presence’ i.e. preparations to receive an important visitor. It can also mean in a Platonic 
sense the presence in something of the Idea after which is was formed, or an 
incarnation. The poem’s title does impel an initial religious reading – the imagined 
confusion and undoing of expectations of the Second Coming. In this vein Dennis 
O’Driscoll has noted the quantity of religious terms and associations in the poem: 
‘heresy’, ‘spirit’, ‘tangle of thorns’ etc. (‘Greek Bearing Presence: John Burnside's 
“Parousia”) 
However, the alternative meanings of the word parousia, and the poem’s churning 
through questions of location and presence – both within the world and within the self – 
allow us to also read the poem as a more generalised meditation on a world gorged on 
anticipations never realised, and boundaries in flux. Rather than an ineffability asserted 
as beyond us, this is a sense of the world itself evading our comprehension, pushing 
against our attempts to circumscribe it in understanding. It shifts in our pursuit of it, 
refusing the names we pin to it. If the Second Coming heralds the unmaking of our 
world, perhaps a prerequisite is our recognition of its unmakeability; that what appears 
solid and permanent is permeable and incomplete. Preparedness is a clearing within our 
usual living – the making of a presence by disrupting the usual layout of our thinking. 
A considerable part of ‘Parousia’ consists of discrete layered images, glimpses of things 
and animals, including the fox, which recurs in various elusive forms throughout the 
collection Swimming in the Flood, like a scout or guide preceding the reader into 
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uncertain country. Unlike in the Pseudo-Dionysian hymns and rites, the images are not 
ordered to a hierarchy intimating ascent or progression. Rather, there is an assault on the 
senses pulling in all directions, increasingly plugging us into the world of the poem. 
Everything from sight, sound and smell to sensations of posture is called on: ‘I knew I 
could squat/ in the fen-smell under the hedge/ or walk away through fields and timber 
yards’ (ll. 22-24). 
The game we might describe Burnside as playing becomes not that of trying to speak 
what cannot be spoken by retreating from the world to a better vantage point (as 
Pseudo-Dionysius may be conceived as doing) but to try and say anything at all that 
isn’t in some fashion itself ineffable, saturated with otherness. The ineffable, the 
spiritual, is oozing out of the world around us, encroaching on all that we previously 
considered to have been fixed and comprehended. Negation here functions as 
‘suppression rather than denial’, which Marshall Brown has argued may be a key but 
under-voiced characteristic of the lyric tradition of which Burnside is part (‘Negative 
Poetics’ 131). For Burnside, poetry operates as a continuing demarcation of how it is we 
are to dwell in this world, which, far from closing down our words to the merely 
possible or definable, is a spirit way of thinking, such that certain language use 
‘simultaneously brings the unsayable as such into the world’ (‘Strong Words’ 260-1; 
Burnside quoting Heidegger’s ‘The Origins [sic] of the Work of Art’). 
However, the rules of the game by which Burnside proceeds are strikingly similar to the 
Pseudo-Dionysian approach. ‘Parousia’ uses proffered but withdrawn images (things 
are ‘tricks of the light’, have ‘shifted closer’ or are mere ‘echoes’), directional tension 
and a refusal to be resolvable, in order to draw the reader out of the ordinary. But 
instead of removing the aspirant from the world, or his self, Burnside seeks to stitch him 
into the great tapestry of the world, the ‘mystery of the real’ (‘Strong Words’ 261). 
What enlightenment may come will be a thing of the world: the final section of the 
poem begins with the line ‘All resurrections are local’.  
This insistent religious vocabulary pushes us to think of enlightenment, a witnessed 
event or divine vision, but the poem is bracketed as speculative or doubtful: ‘I could 
imagine’, ‘I think’. This is not an uncommon feature of Burnside’s poetry, which 
invests heavily in the reader’s being content to have the uncertainty or vagueness of 
elements of the poem stated outright. Most often this creates a careful, almost-touching, 
provisional atmosphere, such as in the uncompleted images of ‘Creaturely’ from the 
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collection Black Cat Bone: ‘The fox turns in the light with something slender // caught 
between its jaws and no one knows / for certain what it is’. Typically the highlighting of 
partial and provisional knowledge is partnered with very specific and reliable detail 
about the natural world – trees and plants in particular are used to root the airiness of 
experience in the recognisable and categorisable. A quick glance through the same 
collection throws up barley, yew, sumac and maple, pines, beechwoods, barberry, 
goldenrod and alstrœmeria within the first 20 pages. This has the effect of shimmers of 
identifiable content that flash and disappear amongst hard and unhardened words and 
scenes. The question becomes whether this hazy vision is to be something whispered 
and loaded with magic, or whether it represents a frustrating holding-back: ‘one 
wonders if human aspiration should be limited to such carefully schooled inhibition and 
hankers after direct utterance in a poetry made from the half-seen and the half-intuited’ 
(Christopher Whyte ‘Twenty-One Collections for the Twenty-first Century’ 81). As 
with the mystic who speaks but refuses to stand behind his meaning, a poet who crafts 
his worlds to be seen only slantwise or in a mist, the result on the reader can be 
enchanting, but also deflating, depending, to use Diamond’s model, how the reader 
applies which rules to the text. Graeme Richardson, for example, sees not enticing 
reticence but plodding vagueness. In ‘John Burnside’s Poetry: No Ideas but in 
Somethings’ he calls attention to the frequent use of ‘something’ in the collection The 
Light Trap (25 times!) and complains that Burnside is a ‘mystagogue’ and ‘preoccupied 
with the limits of being’ without reaching the agonies or ‘calculated comedy’ of, say, 
Kafka’s ‘intolerable situations’. 
Despite the hyperbole of the latter complaint, it does touch on how Burnside’s 
disconnection is at the same time contained; his style remains elegant even in his dark 
or aversive studies and his form is more traditional than innovative (Robles ‘Dark 
Lyrics’ 29). This can make even his serial killers, spiritual seekers and under-explained 
images seem oddly homely; not too distant from us. In ‘Parousia’ the refusal to resolve 
is essential to the power and purpose of the writing. It escapes exhaustion in a way that 
both frustrates and refreshes; it permits a glimpse, but no panorama, a feeling of sense 
but no summary. This operates simultaneously at the level of the poetic construction (its 
rhythm that rises and falls in prominence, the pressing but incomplete narrative voice) 
and the objects in the poem itself. Everything in ‘Parousia’ strives to escape our grasp – 
sounds almost heard, tricks of the light – like a bull-fighter’s cape, drawing us on then 
dancing away.  
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Eventually this slippage applies even to the ineffable within the happening. Burnside 
complains that ‘I always knew / something was close, but all I ever saw / was blood-
warm, vivid, wholly physical’. How can something so solid, certain, contain a 
revelation? The level of proof is wrong. If ‘[o]nly something supernatural can express 
the Supernatural’ (CV 5e), what is most graspable is least enlightening. Doubt is 
enthroned where we would normally expect solid ground; the phantom becomes not 
what eludes our knowing but what remains stubbornly within it, or is so solid our words 
gain no purchase. As with the notion of background discussed above, if we try to grasp 
too tightly, the things normally so familiar as to go unnoticed (‘streetlamps and walls/ 
[...] the neighbour’s door’) become uncanny. The poem offers us ambiguity and 
ordinariness, and in their combination unsettles both. 
Though the later sections of ‘Parousia’ become more forceful (‘I could understand’, ‘I 
always knew’) it’s not clear that these represent an escape from the imaginary 
beginnings of the poem – whether the entire piece is imagined, whether the imagined 
has become real, or whether the imagining has made things real – or even, whether part 
of the point of the poem is the erosion of the difference between the ‘merely’ imagined 
and the ‘really’ real. Boundaries of this and other types disappear, collapse and 
coalesce, because everything is moving; the stream that is more a border is crossed; 
buds crack the ice. In a dance of continual deferral and a hope that never defines itself, 
the ineffable becomes not an unsighted horizon but a tickling closeness. We lose 
ourselves in a game of confounded expectations and ever-receding stand-points, but 
unlike the Pseudo-Dionysian acolyte, under Burnside’s spell we haven’t rejected the 
world but sunk deeper inside it, blurring the distinction between the holy and the 
humdrum. 
Is Burnside’s ineffable, then, nonsense? It roots itself in our physical and cultural 
spaces, remains restless rather than silent, and the poet seems as ill-placed to make 
claims about the inexpressible as the reader. On the grammatical level of reference they 
use their own failure as the means of catching at the reader, a common experience. On 
the level of assertion they do the opposite, and bemoan how the expectations of 
revelation are disappointed because they do not disappoint or elude. On the symbolic 
level they frequently use readily available images, particularly religious ones, but 
befuddle the context or meaning: ‘For the sign I have waited to see/ is happening now/ 
and always’ (ll. 73-75);‘the nailed palm healing’ (l.80)). Like Wallace Stevens’ ’13 
Ways of Looking at a Blackbird’, as analysed by Read (see Chapter 1), we are being 
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asked to imagine something that surpasses what the logic of the words and our form of 
life allows, or what the images are usually used to do. The poem is in that sense 
nonsense, or at least idle, rather than containing words doing their usual work. 
This reading, though, would put the poet into the same bracket as a case of severe 
mental illness, whose works, at least, fall sufficiently outside our form of life to lack 
propositional sense, even if they appear to be understandable. Clearly such a blanket 
excluding of poetry from ordinary sense-making would take far too strongly the notion 
that language always communicates something, something determinate. Wittgenstein’s 
remark that one should ‘not forget that a poem, even though it is composed in the 
language of information, is not used in the language-game of giving information (Z 
§160) is often quoted, but frequently without the sentence immediately before: ‘The 
way music speaks’. It is not, then, an attempt to excuse poetry from sense-making, but a 
reminder that Wittgenstein came to see that there are different ways of speaking than in 
sense-determinate propositions, or with the aim of reference. In strictly referential terms 
poetry is perhaps nonsense, along with vast swathes of our ordinary speaking and 
practices, but this does not preclude it from conveying understanding to those familiar 
with the language game.
27
  
Returning to the inexpressible and the mysterious in the background (CV 23e), this may 
be where the ineffable, or better the mysterious, lies in Burnside’s writing. The poems 
only make any sense because we are familiar with so much of what is happening – the 
settings and their parts – yet through the practice of poetry Burnside is withdrawing that 
familiarity from us. Not with flamboyant inversions of our expectations, but by re-
drawing, from within, limits of saying.  
These limits are not of a philosophical generality, however. Burnside stops short of 
claiming that there are absolute limits, but instead offers provisional and contextual 
limits. In this instance, for this person, the moments within his poem have produced a 
profound uncertainty or unreasoned reverence. The mystery is often fleeting – ’animals 
glimpsed as they flit across our headlights’ (Burnside ‘Animals’ The Light Trap 18) – 
doubted even before it is recognised as something unusual. This provides a neat 
counterpart to the later Wittgenstein’s anti-intellectual view of belief – that the ritual is 
                                                             
27 Given this line of thinking coupled with Diamond’s model of understanding the person speaking 
nonsense rather than their words, one might go further and think of the implications of treating a text (a 
literary one) more like a person than a text, as famously described by Wayne Booth in The Company we 
Keep, though I do not follow this up further here. 
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accepted in the deed before any sense of justification comes into play (Clack 
Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion 108). By extension, the mysterious is not something 
we know, but encounter. It only emerges within the context of a Form of Life, and 
cannot be separated from it; but that does not make it inaccessible. Poetry can provide 
the gestures, the stretching of concepts, that allow glimpses of other worldviews or 
unhinge our own. The movement between mysteries is incremental and negotiable. 
Poems are demonstratively part of our everyday life – nothing is inexplicable about 
their materials, origins or uses – but they do not fit the kind of language use that 
philosophy habitually dwells on, being neither entirely information giving (Z §160), 
available to paraphrase (Philosophical Grammar 69) or separable from the various 
moods or cultural settings within which they attain their meaning and value (Z §§155, 
170). Part of their function is to repeat and reinforce the tropes and forms that we 
recognise, extending a shared language of symbols and understandings of feelings. The 
continuing popularity of the sonnet in English might say very little about the sonnet as a 
form, but perhaps a lot about English and the cultures that use the language (Don 
Paterson Reading Shakespeare’s Sonnets 485-494). Conversely – but necessarily in 
conjunction – poems can challenge or rekey these tropes, calling attention to what is 
taken for granted, upsetting comfortable understandings, and gesturing towards 
alternative pathways of thought. The effect can be excitement, defensiveness, sudden 
appropriation, revelation or even a ‘recoil from the strangely written word’ (Remarks on 
the Philosophy of Psychology vol I 190). To whatever extent unwittingly, we feel the 
associations of the words and forms that are rooted in our language and culture, and 
how our uses of them are shaped by familiarity and occasions. Wittgenstein remarks on 
a feeling of ‘disgust’ at the thought of a language that lacked this historical depth. To 
invent a new set of words and meanings would be only to play at being a language (CV 
60e).  
Poetry can no more escape the limits of expression, and utter the unutterable, than other 
forms of language. It may, nonetheless, provide a profound sense of the mysterious in 
the reader: by using tropes that a competent language user recognises as gestures 
towards the ineffable; by sufficiently reinventing those tropes to sustain the mysterious 
and not merely point out a familiar path; by being a strong example of a practice that 
encourages the reader to respond in the right way. There is such a thing as the right 
rhythm, reading, atmosphere, or voice, small changes to which can affect the whole 
poem (CV 14-15e). Burnside’s lyric writing, for example, paints a world mistily for us, 
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like seeing a familiar landscape after a snowfall. The smothering of landmarks, the 
unreliability of the ground, an eerie quiet – the effects can give us a taste of the 
mysterious within normal experience. 
A poem exhibits a whole language, a practice, just as ‘Parousia’ is rooted in a Christian 
culture. Its mysteriousness is the ripple it causes in the background of our Form of Life, 
like a shake of the curtain. Someone without such a background would see no ripple, 
since the world is not stitched together in the same way – the meaning would either be 
lost entirely or at best superficial – a recognition of mystery without access to it. As will 
be discussed in the next chapter, commonality of background – in stories and reasons, 
not only knowledge – is a key feature of our interaction with the world, and what we 
may say, or not say, about it. 
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Chapter Three: Adhering to Reality 
Introduction 
Having in the previous chapter discussed attempts to express the avowedly 
inexpressible, and how a domestication of ineffability as practice, through considering 
poetry, can put us in a better position to understand the mystical and the ethical, this 
chapter moves to consider a case in which the notion of meaning-making in general 
comes under scrutiny. How is it that what we express in language or imagination 
connects with the world we inhabit? Various philosophical traditions have put pressure 
on the idea of meaning being something in the world, either restricting it to the 
exchange of symbols within a system, relying on an untenable and solipsistic Cartesian 
picture of the self, or treating meaning as something less ‘real’ than physical facts and 
processes. This chapter argues that a practice-oriented view of language avoids this 
problem by denying the supposed split between the world and our conception or 
expression of it, without giving up the necessary resistance required for language to be 
meaningful, public and robust. 
To this end, I combine John McDowell’s seminal account of modest realism or 
‘minimal empiricism’ in Mind and World (MW xi), and Wallace Stevens’ poetry, 
particularly his concern with the idea of a Supreme Fiction, and the long poem entitled 
‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’. McDowell is a useful case because his approach is 
Wittgensteinian in tone and ‘diagnostic’ in spirit (MW xi), as well as making specific 
reference to Wittgenstein’s remarks in Philosophical Investigations, for example the 
private language argument (18-23). McDowell has written insightfully on Wittgenstein 
elsewhere, including four influential essays on ‘Issues in Wittgenstein’ in his collection 
Mind, Value and Reality. There are, however, a number of points on which McDowell’s 
position as Wittgensteinian may come under scrutiny, and this chapter allows some 
extensions and challenges to his main account. Among these, as with the previous 
chapter, are the effects of appreciating seriously the contribution that poetry can make to 
philosophical enquiry, both as a counter-example to apparent problems and as an 
alternative space for experimentation, refreshed imagery and practice-specific concerns. 
Wallace Stevens provides a very fruitful partner in this discussion, not least because of 
his own philosophically aware and motivated writing, but also because of his recurring 
themes, incorporating both Romantic and Modernist elements. 
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While exploring what Stevens came to see as the major theme of his poetry, the idea of 
a Supreme Fiction, this chapter will also provide a reading of McDowell’s always-
already conceptualised notion of experience, in which a partially re-enchanted world is 
returned to our possibilities of meaning through Bildung. In discussing many of the 
challenges offered to McDowell’s account, I will suggest how a less minimal view of 
experience can add to the concepts he seeks to apply. Stevens’ poetic encounters are key 
to this enrichment, just as McDowell’s framework of a partially re-enchanted world 
provides a coherent way of understanding Stevens’ aspirations Toward a Supreme 
Fiction. Matthew Muter has characterised this search in tellingly Wittgensteinian terms: 
‘Stevens [...] often wants us to relinquish the hold that certain questions have on our 
imaginations, precisely because they are no longer intelligible as questions outside of a 
religious cosmology’ (‘Wallace Stevens, Analogy, and Tautology’ 742). Poetry is such 
a potent tool for this task (and thus responsible for executing it) because much of what 
is problematic about religious accounts of the world is dependent upon and generated by 
the complex articulation of linguistic modes (e.g.: metaphor, analogy, symbol) that 
poetry operates in. A poem is a text that we read in a certain way - a literary practice – 
‘and we do so because we are rewarded for it’ (Robert B Pierce ‘Defining Poetry’ 159). 
It can equally challenge philosophy’s traditional terrain by setting its responsive and 
allusive techniques against the regularity and conceptualising methods of traditional 
philosophy; Richard Kuhns in fact reads ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ as a 
specific attack on Descartes’ Meditations. It is an affirmatively incomplete 
investigation, provoking the reader into response, rather than setting out conclusions. 
(‘Metaphor as Plausible Inference in Poetry and Philosophy’). Part of the project of 
relinquishing old pictures, in religion as in philosophy, is to point to our experience and 
how it is shaped, contingently, by our pictures in language. Muter sees in this Stevens’ 
favouring of ‘pre-linguistic experience’ (742), but, as this chapter will argue, the divide 
between linguistic and pre-linguistic is not simple and never definitive. Given the 
sensual quality of language itself – something Stevens celebrate in ‘Notes’ – and 
McDowell’s arguments against the viability of non-conceptualised experience, these 
revisions of techniques and pictures must occur within language, must be modifications, 
not denials or prescriptions.  
The chapter interweaves analysis of McDowell’s position and readings of two of 
Stevens’ shorter poems, in order to bring the chief issues, problems and their treatment 
into view. It concludes with a longer analysis of ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
137 
 
read as providing the kind of rich, continuous notion of our imaginative and social 
engagement with the world that McDowell’s account lacks.   
 Though broadly concurring with the account McDowell gives, this chapter does 
question some aspects of it. There is also a general question about whether his method 
is Wittgensteinian at all, since it attempts to “solve a problem” of how language and 
world connect (the harmony of ‘thought and world’ (PI §429)), where Wittgenstein 
would presumably see this as something to be addressed through reminders of discrete 
cases (Tim Thornton ‘The harmony of thought and reality in McDowell and 
Wittgenstein’). By tying both McDowell’s solution and Stevens’ poetry to the level of 
practice, I hope to introduce a less theoretical, more example-driven way of seeing the 
supposed problem. 
One aspect that might be thought missing from McDowell’s account is something he 
might well have adapted from Kant’s Critique of Judgement, the notion of aesthetic 
contemplation in which, entirely unspookily (cf. MW 94) and without withdrawing our 
conceptualisation from the world, we allow that sometimes, for some people, our 
conceptualisation can be provisional or have multiple aspects. This is the capacity that 
art, perhaps especially the verbal fluidity of poetry, exploits. Art engages our 
‘responsive imagination’ (emphasis in original. Carolyn Wilde ‘Ethics and Aesthetics 
are One’ 170) in a way that is neither forced from us, nor an act of interpretation. With 
the addition of a more comfortable attitude toward determinate meaning, though the 
parallel practice of poetry, philosophy may avoid the seeming necessity of certain 
limiting views of language. 
The attempt in this chapter is not, however, to simply elide philosophy and poetry, as if 
once we have admitted that both are forms of word-use any distinction between them is 
artificial. This is the mistake of much of the critical theory that, having rejected the 
possibility of absolutes or metaphysics, abandons notions of difference between 
language usages on the basis of those same absolutist forms of reasoning (see Michael 
Fisher ‘Stanley Cavell’s Wittgenstein’ and Charles Altieri ‘Wittgenstein on 
Consciousness and Language: A Challenge to Derridean Literary Theory’). When 
Cavell asks at the end of The Claim of Reason whether philosophy could become 
simply another form of literature and still ‘know itself’ (496), this need not be a worry 
that philosophy can no longer make the kind of claims it would wish to make and that 
poetry is simply a game with no further consequence. This would indeed be the concern 
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of traditional substantive philosophy, but falls out of sight on a practice-oriented view 
of language such as that given in this thesis and interrogated in this chapter via 
McDowell’s and Stevens’ work. Rather, for philosophy to ‘know itself’ it will need to 
retain its recognisable forms and techniques even while calling these into question; its 
distinction from poetry does not come from some essential quality but from the how of 
its practice. When it is claimed that philosophy ought to be written in the manner of 
poetry (CV 28e), this does not elide the two, but demands a certain spirit and a certain 
care for the use of language, which philosophy and poetry both rely on to establish their 
particular roles in a culture. As Marjorie Perloff says, ‘the possibility of reading the 
Investigations and related lecture notes as themselves poetic is hardly likely to arise’ 
(Wittgenstein’s Ladder 79) yet there are links between how poetry can address the 
world and how philosophy operates; both rely, at least in the mode that Wittgenstein has 
in mind, on a kind of seeing-as, rather than being bearers of new information (CV 28e, 
67e; Z §§155-60; PI pp193-208).   
In the context of McDowell’s Mind and World, Anthony J. Cascardi’s positioning of 
modernism as the battle to come to terms with the Enlightenment division of rationality 
and anthropomorphism, or mind and nature, is instructive (‘Cavell and Kant: The work 
of Criticism and the Work of Art’ 58-9). Aesthetic modernism’s aim is ‘to present for 
judgement creations that, while confounding our categories, our established way of 
conceiving them – even as art – still strike us as meaningful’ (R. M. Berry ‘Stanley 
Cavell’s Modernism’ 43).  
As this chapter will outline, McDowell’s project is modernist in this sense, attempting 
through his insistence on a modest realism about meaning in the world to accommodate 
us to our dominantly causal view of the world that is potentially pernicious, but only if 
treated as if inevitable and complete in itself. To this end, this chapter explores the role 
that art, specifically poetry, can play in reminding us of our capacity for, even 
enjoyment of, the confounding of concepts within our practices of applying them; we 
create meaning and fictions in harness but in ways that, seen in the right way, do not 
threaten our grasp on the world. Work in philosophy as in poetry is partly a matter of 
adjusting long-held perspectives, and the work does not have an ending (Z §447).  
Sometimes poetry’s representation of the ordinary can be like the attempt to see things 
without recognising them, or to test the ways we seem to have to see them (PI §§139-
141)  whether explicitly, such as with Craig Raine’s ‘A Martian send a postcard home’, 
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or in Wallace Stevens’ more subtle disorientation of assumed understanding, through 
collisions of scale, for example in ‘Anecdote of the Jar’ (CP 76) , when we are 
prompted to picture as if on an equal footing the jar and the entire state of Tennessee, or 
in curtailed grammatical forms and ‘odd syntax’ (Helen Vendler On Extended Wings 
13). These demand a strange, attentive looseness to Stevens’ poetry, holding things 
provisionally against what turns may come, such as in Canon Aspirin’s tumultuous, 
building dream in ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ (CP 402-404). Importantly, in no 
wise are these disorientations transcendental; rather they provide a counterpoint to the 
forms and tones that regulate our belief systems (Brown ‘Negative Poetics’ 135).  
In ‘The Philosophical Significance of a Poem (On Wallace Stevens)’, Simon Critchley 
uses Wallace Stevens to insist that the persistent concern of Western philosophy with 
‘the relation between our thoughts and the things which those thoughts might be said to 
be about’ (269) might be approached in ‘interesting and unforeseen ways’ (271) through 
the reading of poetry, specifically in this instance Wallace Stevens’ ‘The Idea of Order 
at Key West’ (CP 128). Indeed, Stevens has readily leant himself to philosophical 
discussions, partly through his own interest in the subject, sufficiently so that as early as 
1967 Ronald Sukenick could complain of numerous ‘slipshod’ attempts to find parallels 
‘in thought, and even in language, with systematic thinkers’, where the search for a 
single coherent picture overlooks the complexity and obscurity of the poems: 
‘philosophy cannot serve as a gloss for Stevens’ almost impenetrable phrases’ (Musing 
the Obscure 1) . Critchley is himself wary of cherry-picking the poetry for convenient 
or memorable phrases, and argues explicitly for poetry’s value to philosophy as poetry 
in Thing Merely Are. Critchley goes on in ‘The Philosophical Significance of a Poem 
(On Wallace Stevens)’ to tease out the questions of imagination’s relation to, and partial 
authority over, reality in this poem (to use Stevens’ usual terms for this dichotomy). 
Stevens proves to be irreducible to either ‘linguistic idealism or anti-realism’ (287), 
since the complex relation between imagination and reality remains an inter-dependency 
that denies ultimate priority of one over the other. 
Like McDowell, Stevens recognises the importance of constraint on our capacities, in 
terms of the friction that creates meaning (§PI 107), the effectiveness of writing, and the 
pleasure of the success of meaning. Life, like a poem, should ‘resist the intelligence / 
Almost successfully’ (‘Man Carrying Thing’ CP 350), through a process of guiding and 
challenging our craving for meaning-making. McDowell’s effort, meanwhile, is to bring 
the world and our thinking back together, building at least partially on a notion of our 
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being (factually) correct about the state of the world when we speak of it. But this is not 
a reductive account of the relation between our linguistic practices and the ‘general facts 
of nature’; as with Wittgenstein’s efforts in his later writing, the view is that ‘our natural 
history constrains but does not determine our concepts and language-games’ (emphasis 
in original. José Medina ‘Wittgenstein’s Social Naturalism’ 81).  
It is, therefore, not necessarily at the junction of truth that mind and world meet, even if 
an assumption of reliability of experience underpins the possibility of language. As 
David Schalkwyk urges, ‘the world is always already “in” language in the form of its 
instruments of representation. [...] In other words, in terms of its sense, though not its 
truth, a lie, a speculation, a wish of a work of fiction is not less beholden to the world 
than a factual report may be’ (‘Fiction as “grammatical” investigation’ 289).  
It is this crucial point that opens up this discussion. It seeks to remove from 
McDowell’s account some restrictions that are shown to be problematic, while 
providing reminders of how Stevens’ poetic project is shaped by, and comments on, 
similar concerns. Although it is not necessary to agree with Schalkwyk in his extension 
of the above quotation that ‘each depends in the same way on prior appropriations of 
the world which are not yet moves in the language-game’ (My emphasis. 289), his 
general argument supports the usefulness and versatility of fiction, since it is a world-
involving practice even when not mimetic (295-7). The possibility of a fiction’s being 
interpreted and re-interpreted, rather than merely decoded, also has implications that 
will be indicated in this chapter, including the pedagogical, ethical, creative and 
corrective. Rather than discussing a particular work of fiction, however, the point of 
argument here is the conception of fictions as shaping and constraining our worldview; 
fictions considered as, in various ways, the boundaries and backgrounds of our language 
games. Wallace Stevens’ repeated engagement with the importance of such fictions, and 
the notion of a ‘Supreme Fiction’ – and what that might mean – provides a canvas upon 
which to sketch a number of comments on McDowell’s realism and re-enchantment, 
both its potential and its shortcomings. 
Stevens is a particularly apt poetic case study, because his writing does at times mimic 
the form of philosophy, with sequences that resemble logical arguments, and a penchant 
for the ‘if/but’ formulation of analogies that operate like hypotheses (Helen Vendler 
‘Wallace Stevens: Hypotheses and Contradictions’). This characteristic is more 
prevalent in the earlier poetry than the later, which Vendler reads as a gradual eliding of 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
141 
 
the structure into a more direct apposition of images. Like the propositions in the 
Tractatus, the linkages between points/images are reduced or removed, so that 
argumentation is replace with demonstration, with similar intriguing effects. However, 
the questioning, testing voice remains important throughout Stevens’ writing, in the 
retractions and self-corrections found in parts of ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, 
such as the moment when the topic of the poem’s prevarication – its uncertainty of 
whether it is, or should speak, the high-flown ‘poet’s gibberish’ or the quotidian 
‘gibberish of the vulgate’ – is itself performed by serial questions: ‘Does it move to and 
fro or is it of both // At once?’ (CP 396 ix ll. 1-4). To read the poems solely as 
arguments, however, would be to misunderstand the process unfolding. Merle E. Brown 
claims that all Stevens’ ‘genuine poems may be called poems “of the mind in the act of 
finding / What will suffice”’ (Wallace Stevens: The Poem as Act 62, quoting ‘Of 
Modern Poetry’ ll. 1-2). The poems perform, rather than argue, such that Stevens may 
work through many different positions and thoughts in one poem, without the relation 
between the thoughts needing to be one of succession, contradiction or agreement.  
Although Cary Wolfe has characterised Stevens’ repetitions and probings of key ideas 
and expressions as almost ‘systematic’ (‘The Idea of Observation at Key West’ 263) 
(such as the assemblages of “nothingness” and “nakedness” in ‘Notes’ (CP 402-3)), far 
better, as Frank Doggett has argued in Wallace Stevens’ Later Poetry, to think of the 
poet having an unrelinquishable ‘sense of the world’ (148) – an understanding of, and 
attitude toward, his environment and possibilities, from which no ‘ordered, 
philosophical system’ (148) ought to be deduced. Piecemeal and in performance, the 
poet finds the ‘intimate discord’ between name and object, word and thing, in ways that 
unsettle rather than argue; these are displays rather than descriptions of otherness 
(Michael Murray ‘The Conflict Between Poetry and Literature’ 75). Stevens ‘never 
stays philosophic for very long; he is himself only when he is most evasive’ (Harold 
Bloom The Poems of our Climate 216-7). 
I suggest that Mind and World might in fact provide a framework more attuned to 
Stevens’ concerns than first appears, especially given the distant relationship between 
analytic philosophy and literature (standing in some contrast to Continental philosophy, 
of which Critchley’s Heideggerian analysis of ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’ 
mentioned above stands as a pertinent example). This suggestion applies in particular to 
the late poetry, as much in terms of remit as in content. Merle E. Brown’s reading of 
‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ in Wallace Stevens: The Poem as Act notably puts 
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the Poet in a position similar to McDowell’s stated aim of providing not a theory or 
even a new worldview, but a set of ‘reminders’ to help us recognise where our treatment 
of language – specifically the stark modern contrast between ‘natural’ and ‘human’ – 
has blinded us to the availability of other possibilities: ‘The poet […] would simply 
have ordinary men be aware of the affirmative truthfulness of the poet concerning [the] 
falseness’ of the fictions about the world within which we normally live (My emphasis. 
Brown 116). But these fictions are not debased on account of being fictions; instead the 
value of the fictions themselves, the ‘heroism, of their fictive efforts’ is revealed by the 
poet’s work. For Stevens, the poet is a ‘potent figure’ who ‘gives to life the supreme 
fictions without which we are unable to conceive it’ (‘The Noble Rider’ 31). 
Mind and World incorporates the distinct but inseparable notions of imagination and 
reality that Stevens requires, while also arguing for a re-enchantment of nature. As I will 
argue, this latter notion has been under-defined in McDowell’s text, and undervalued in 
responses to the work. I present a reading designed to chime with Stevens’ Romantic 
outlook, in which re-enchantment is given a stronger but still not “supernatural” role, in 
line with Stevens’ poetic project. Emphasising McDowell’s concentration on context 
and the treatment of experience as set within a wider group of practices, such an account 
will be able to treat poetry as a thing in itself, rather than secondary to some more 
profound, disguised, intellectual content. It will also showcase the ‘antidualistic 
function of the poet’s attention to the commonplace’ that Siobhan Phillips stresses in 
her account of the everyday temporality at the heart of Stevens’ writing (The Poetics of 
the Everyday 73), and attend to the fact that Stevens thought a poet ought to ‘take his 
station in the midst of the circumstances in which people actually live’ (qtd. in Phillips 
75). 
The following section will give a targeted reading of McDowell’s key moves in Mind 
and World. This is interspersed with close readings of some of Stevens’ poems, so that 
the issues at stake in both streams can be usefully combined. Central to this approach is 
the preservation of the tension between ‘being a poem’ and ‘doing philosophy’ while 
holding them in dialogue. The poems are examples from Stevens’ mid-to-late poetry, 
showing the development of his thought in this period, culminating in his long poem, 
‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’. The focus on this poem will demonstrate some of 
the commonalities between Stevens’ conception of the world and what re-enchantment 
could be made to do for McDowell’s account.  




The chief concern of McDowell’s Mind and World is to unpack the possibility and form 
of the justification of judgments by appeal to an extra-conceptual world, that things are 
‘thus and so’ (26). To frame this using terminology that links with Stevens’ theory of 
poetry, imagination must be possible, must exceed mere reality, but must also be 
answerable to, or adhere to, reality. In other words, we want the world to provide a 
check on our imagination, for fear of sliding into idle fantasy and solipsism, without 
making our thinking and saying reducible to a causal, mechanical element of the world, 
removing the possibility of it having meaning.   
When speaking, therefore, about judgements, McDowell means rational moves that are 
in principle (if not necessarily actually) open to the assessment of others. A rational 
move is one made within a language, in the broadest sense, and not a private sphere of 
consciousness. This is what makes agreement and disagreement possible. Such a stance 
can give a coherent account of how we use language and form communities of thinkers, 
but must guard against a coherentism divorced from the physical realities of life. 
McDowell can be classified as a ‘modest’ realist, seeking to stand in contrast to both 
bold realism and anti-realism without becoming merely ‘banal’ (Luntley Opening 
Investigations 103). He categorises the ambitions of philosophy as seeking both a 
‘tribunal’ (MW xii) of experience and a vision of language that allows meaning: on the 
one hand, we need something raw, independent of our thinking, which will offer a 
standard; on the other, we need to be able to explain why this, being thus distinct, might 
impact on our thinking at all. We have a ‘tendency to oscillate between two unpalatable 
positions: a coherentism that loses the bearing of empirical thought on reality altogether 
and a recoil in a vain attempt to the Given’ (MW 108).
 
For a clear account of the 
conception of the Given McDowell uses, see Richard Bernstein ‘McDowell’s 
Domesticated Hegelianism’, showing McDowell’s domesticated use of Hegel and his 
concept of ‘immediacy’, in relation to the ‘philosophical anxiety’ McDowell claims to 
have identified (10-11). The Given here stands for the idea that there is an external 
world – simply ‘given’ – that we receive and then subsequently conceptualise; this is 
designed to provide a backstop to what and how we think about the world, and is most 
popularly and powerfully conceived in terms of scientific truths (laws of nature) upon 
which our ideas of meaning and value are imposed. Indeed, this division is in many 
ways the dominant feature of the modern worldview, which is what makes it so hard to 
think of any other arrangement existing (Michael Friedman ‘Exorcising the 
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Philosophical Tradition’). Annie Dillard, considering our enthrallment to the meaning-
free idea of the world, sums up its apparent hopelessness as:  
Nature’s silence is its one remark [...] Now we are no longer primitive; now the 
whole world seems not-holy. We have drained the light from the boughs in the 
sacred grove and snuffed it in the high places and along the banks of sacred 
streams. We as a people have moved from pantheism to pan-atheism. Silence is 
not our heritage but our destiny; we live where we want to live.  (Teaching a 
Stone to Talk 69) 
What drives a positing of a Given, then, is to allow us to ‘acknowledge an external 
constraint on our freedom to employ empirical concepts’ (MW 6). This is supposed to 
give us a ‘final justification’ for the moves we make in the ‘logical space of reasons’
28
 
beyond the range of our ‘space of concepts’ (5). If we want a radically independent 
world-in-itself to constrain our freedom, it must be outside our conception of it but yet 
be the cause of what is in our conceptualised content: pointing at something that is 
‘simply received in experience’ (6). It can only, of course, be pointing, because it is by 
definition beyond the conceptualised experiences we are seeking to justify through it. 
This is supposed to act as a guarantor of our imagination, to enable us to ground our 
conceptualised experience. McDowell argues, however, that the Given proves in the end 
to be ‘useless for its purpose’ (7). 
‘Jouga’ 
This same quandary of our connection to and intimacy with an indifferent physical 
world occupied Stevens’ thinking, especially in his middle period. From the same 1947 
collection Transport to Summer, as ‘Notes’, ‘Jouga’ opens with the lines ‘The physical 
world is meaningless tonight / And there is no other’ (CP 337). 
In it, the intimate relation of a guitar player (Ha-eé-me) and his instrument is described 
as a vortex of exchange, difference and communality; both are beasts, but ‘not quite two 
of a kind’. The quick, circling feel of the poem replicates a noodling, jangling kind of 
sound (‘his tap-tap-tap’) rather than deliberate – meaningful – playing; certainly the 
impression is not of Stevens’ applause for the music they are making. The poem 
expresses an unsatisfied and restless mood, as if the opening commitment has left things 
tiringly unanchored. It ends with the guitarist falling asleep, and the sounds of nature re-
entering: first the ‘wind and the sea’, then the jaguar. 
                                                             
28 This is McDowell’s phrase – borrowed from Wilfred Sellars’ ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ – 
to suggest the arena of rational thought (‘placing things in the space of reasons’), as opposed to the 
‘realm of law’, the causal world (MW 5n). 
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It is quite straightforward to read this poem as a return of the ‘Man with the Blue 
Guitar’ (1936), but in somewhat contorted and sardonic form. He has become ‘an 
imbecile’ whose name may be ‘Jamie’ voiced in the slur of a drunk or as an echo of 
baby-babble, with the guitar-as-wife (and vice-versa) representing the repetitive trials 
and conversations of marriage. Stevens’ use of apparently meaningless nonsense sounds 
for the title and the guitarist’s name is a distinctive technique of his for highlighting the 
meaning or mood of a poem (Irvin Ehrenpreis ‘Strange Relations: Stevens’ Nonsense’ 
219), here signalling the fine gradations between meaningful and meaningless, human 
and natural sounds. Echoing Diamond’s nonsense speaker discussed in Chapter 2, 
propositional nonsense might still reveal something about the speaker, without itself 
being resolved into sense.  
That said, Steven’s nonsense sounds seem hardly arbitrarily chosen and have a number 
of sonic suggestions. Helen Vendler in ‘Stevens and the Lyric Speaker’ gives just such 
an interpretation, connecting the title Jouga to ‘the marital yoke (in French, joug)’ 
(137), claiming that ‘Stevens can imagine no end to this debased conjugal union except 
for a merciful obliteration of its guitarist in sleep’ (138). Vendler also, in ‘Hypotheses 
and Contradictions’, sees in ‘Jouga’ a deformation of the Spanish jugar, ‘to play’ (109) 
marking a parallel to the guitarist’s mangled name, Jamie. This would coincide with the 
poem’s insistence on a kind of game being played out and the sense of its not quite 
being able to say things as ‘properly’ and purposefully as it might like.  
By contrast, Brian Glaser reads Ha-eé-me as more straight-forwardly autobiographical, 
with the stress on the ‘me’ and the ‘Ha’ denoting some self-mocking of the player/poet 
whose music is imbecilic (‘Ambivalent Posthumanism’ 212). The animal self-identity 
of the ‘great jaguar’ is contrasted to the human ‘not beasts’. The distancing between the 
human mind and reality of nature is a burden or a failure. Thus, framed as a poem about 
the relation between the human imagination and the real, an alternative dance emerges. 
The poem begins and ends with the ‘meaningless’ physical world, particularised by ‘the 
wind and the sea.’ This is almost a repeat of a line in the earlier (1937) poem ‘The Idea 
of Order at Key West’ (CP 128-30): ‘The meaningless plungings of water and the 
wind’, in which the sea – following Critchley’s account (‘The Philosophical 
Significance of a Poem’ 227) – stands in for ‘the real’, colluding with and resisting the 
woman’s song: ‘She sang beyond the genius of the sea. / The water never formed to 
mind or voice.’ (CP 128). Stevens seems to be drawing a distinction between the 
inevitability of the real world, and the active, creative operations of human behaviour 
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(or better, human interaction). If the poem is not ‘meaningless’ it is only because of Ha-
eé-me’s playing of his guitar, whatever we may think of the noise produced. 
The dichotomy closely mirrors McDowell’s separation of the ‘realm of law’ and the 
‘logical space of reasons’ (MW 5); imagination and rational thought are qualitatively 
different from the causal operations of nature. However, they are not, for that reason, 
cut off from each other. Although Stevens only later sought out ways to overcome this 
divide, as will be discussed, the seeds of a rapprochement are sown here. Since Ha-eé-
me and his guitar (wife?) are not just music makers, but also beasts of a certain kind, 
they are firmly rooted in the physical world. The ending of the poem muddies the water 
perfectly with the introduction of the jaguar – another beast, firmly part of the natural 
world, yet one that ‘will make a little sound’ (CP 337). Its sound is at least its own, 
continuous with its life, rather than the merely ‘rented’ music of human language 
(Muter ‘Wallace Stevens, Analogy, and Tautology’ 760). Tentatively, in its movement, 
it provides the bridge between the physical world and the imaginative act of music-
making; there is, in life, some quiet semblance of meaning, even though its ‘little sound’ 
may be drowned out by the jangling of a guitar – the more obvious noise of human 
meaning making – and only noticed once the music stops, perhaps only by the wakeful 
poet, while others sleep. 
Stevens’ discomfort with a straight dichotomy between imagination and reality is useful 
for understanding McDowell’s objection to the idea of a Given. If the world is just 
‘there’, without meaning, what possible relation could there be between my thinking 
about the world and the world itself, given that the two things are of a radically different 
kind? Certainly, physical forces impact on us (nature as the realm of law), and cause 
events which may give rise to moves in the space of reasons – but these causes cannot, 
according to McDowell, be justifications, only ‘exculpations’(MW 8). A physical event 
may make a claim understandable – give it a context within which it makes sense – but 
this falls short of being a reason, insofar as it lacks the element of a claim being made 
about the world. 
It should be stressed that McDowell undermines the endogenous as much as the 
exogenous Given. Not only can the idea of an independent outer world not be an 
ultimate justification of our actions but we must give up the idea of something Given 
“inside”, too. It is not the case that basic experience, even something as simple as 
feeling pain, must be first something natural and non-conceptual, and only later 
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conceptualised; learning behaviour takes many forms, and the conceptual or linguistic 
response need not be at a further remove than an animal cry (PI §244). Nor are our 
means of conceptualisation already given, needing only to be matched up to our 
experiential intake; Kant’s a priori categories are, for example, in this sense an 
endogenous Given, whereas we must leave open the possibility that these are also 
subject to revision and commentary. Such a view means a rejection of attempting to 
explain the nature of consciousness and its interaction with the world in terms of 
‘sempiternal objects or standing inner archetypes’; how we make meaning and 
judgements is ‘something that is established within language games and nowhere 
outside of them’ (Eldridge Leading a Human Life 174). 
 ‘Bouquet of Roses in Sunlight’  
The complicated way, then, that our imagining of the world connects with its rigidity 
forms part of what makes expression possible – the friction between what we are 
capable of uttering, and the ‘real world’ consequences. The word both falls short and 
does not. The mind strives to ‘attain that which is not itself’ (Frank Doggett Stevens’ 
Poetry of Thought 98) but in doing so already posits its target as something other. In 
‘Bouquet of Roses in Sunlight’ (CP 430) Stevens explores this ongoing negotiation 
between poetic language and objects, as the roses both invite and escape metaphor: 
Too much as they are to be changed by metaphor, 
Too actual, things that in being real 
Make imaginings of them lesser things.  (ll. 4-6) 
The poem turns back in on itself multiple times, becoming a metaphor for the rhetorical 
device of metaphor and, perhaps, its failure. It resembles nothing so much as an 
impressionist painting, dealing in dashes of colour (pink yellows, orange whites, black 
reds, red, yellow and white) and the play of light, barely giving any sense of shape or 
arrangement. The roses themselves are not captured, but the experience of them: ‘this 
effect is a consequence of the way / We feel and, therefore, is not real, except / In our 
sense of it’ (ll. 7-8). This effect is unlikely to be accidental, given Stevens’ life-long 
interest in painting and particularly impressionism (Michel Benamou ‘Wallace Stevens: 
Some Relations Between Painting and Poetry’ 48).  
By resetting in this manner the painter’s attempts to capture reality as a further 
expression of experience rather than objects as they are, Stevens meditates on our 
attempts to grasp the world through language. The perpetual elusiveness of the roses to 
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metaphor, their being ‘too actual’, means that our imagining of them is a lessening of 
the real object, and that they resist easy manipulation by our imagination. Except that 
the roses are a fiction, too, a metaphor for the relation between reality and imagination 
Stevens wants to talk about. The poem communicates the primacy of these imaginary 
roses’ reality over our descriptions of them: ‘sense exceeds all metaphor’. Stevens 
deploys his recurrent Platonic symbol for the real in the sunlight that falls on the flower, 
creating a further layering of ways to read the lines. How does this reflect back on 
Stevens’ network of metaphors for the attempt to access direct reality? As James Seitz 
has argued in Motives for Metaphor, a failed metaphor can also be productive, since it 
calls attention not only to the likeness between tenor and vehicle but also the preserved 
difference; it demands the involvement of the observer in a way that brings one closer to 
the intended object as one falls through the surface level of comparison and is invited to 
reconstruct the image differently. Isabel Galleymore, who has studied how a range of 
poets use metaphor and the failure of metaphor for ecocritical purposes, notes how 
‘metaphors break down and reveal the gap between their representations and the 
environment itself’ (‘Trope on Trope’ 31). The limitations of metaphor for grabbing the 
roses both highlight the resistance of reality to our whim and, paradoxically, 
demonstrate the power of metaphor to communicate that same speechliness.  
Stevens emphasises the poem’s existence as language by framing the whole thing as a 
speech act. The opening ‘Say that it is’ (my emphasis) works to remind the reader that 
this is, after all, a poem, an expression. And what at first sight appears to be a definite 
claim about the way of the world in the final stanza is modified at the last to an 
impression: ‘This is what makes them seem / So far beyond the rhetorician’s touch’ (my 
emphasis). Nowhere does Stevens allow us to settle either for the real subjugating the 
imagination, or for imagination dictating what is real. The choice of these roses as the 
central image is entirely apt, for they, too, are a hybrid, plants taken from nature and 
placed into the artificial form of a bouquet. The real and how we would like the world to 
be is combined in these flowers, and that union is not without limit or cost, given the 
fate of cut flowers. 
Alternatively, the two elements of reality and imagination might be conceived of as 
confluent rivers, churning each other up as they meet and continue on in a third 
direction. In some cases, where their content is very similar, the waters may be 
immediately indistinguishable; in others, parallel streams of different colours and 
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character may flow for many miles beyond the meeting point, such as where the silted 
glacial waters of the Arve meet the clear water of the Rhône, at Geneva. 
B. J. Legget, in ‘Stevens’ Late Poetry’ characterises this poem as raising ‘pre-verbal 
sense’ (68) above verbal expression, as a pair with ‘Saint John and the Back-Ache’. The 
poems are interpreted as occasions of matters-of-fact overruling a subsequent 
imposition of concepts. Though Legget’s reading is given as one example among many 
different positions that Stevens adopts, so makes no claims to this being definitive, it 
would be an over-simplification to take this as central to what goes on in ‘Bouquet of 
Roses in Sunlight’ (and elsewhere). Rather, it provides a playground for the struggle 
between our desire to see the world as we would like, and the necessity of inhabiting a 
world that bites back. 
In just the same way, McDowell in Mind and World is at pains to stress the necessary 
partial passivity of experience (89), because this allows us to open ourselves up to 
influences from the world at large. We are in need of input into our experience (the 
inalienable need that McDowell adopts from Kant’s Critique of Judgment for both 
receptivity and spontaneity, which make a not ‘even notionally separable contribution’ 
to experience (MW 51)). But, while we must be partly passive, it follows that there is 
also a need for activity in judgement. Despite the welcome pressures of the external 
world, there is always a remainder that demands that one be held responsible for one’s 
acts. This responsibility is the companion to our spontaneity, to the extent that such 
responsibility pertains to a member of the practice within which one acts. In other 
words, in order to be considered to be a competent user of an expression, it is a vital 
assumption on the part of others that one has a measure of intention in the saying of it, 
as is appropriate to utterances of that type. Membership of a practice involves 
responsibility for one’s behaviour within that practice. When one makes a claim, one 
holds it up for judgement, within the suitable context for such a claim. Variety, a certain 
freedom, is required here if the concept of responsibility is to make any sense. If there 
were no rules for the use of the words then there would be no possibility of using them 
rightly or wrongly. 
It is important to note at this juncture that the notion of ‘concept’ and conceptualisation 
can be used in many different ways. Two of these are relevant here: 1) concept in the 
very general sense of our capacity to form and interrogate our mode of existence, and 2) 
concept in the more everyday sense of specific concepts – ideas of objects and our 
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thinking about them. McDowell, beginning with his Kantian framework, is deploying 
the first type of concept, which is to say that his interest lies in the general possibility of 
experience. Although reference is made to some more specific ideas and activities 
(learning how to use words, for example) these are of the very general type. However, 
with the insertion of ‘second nature’ (discussed below), McDowell’s kinds of concepts 
necessarily become, I argue, partly of the second type, since the capacities described go 
beyond our receptivity, out into the social and meaning-laden world. This shift is either 
not recognised or not made explicit in Mind and World, which has confounded some 
responses to the work. In Charles Taylor’s ‘Foundationalism and the Inner-outer 
Distinction’, for example, conceptualised experience is conflated with linguistic or 
conscious behaviour, meaning that the idea that ‘[o]rdinary coping isn’t conceptual’ 
(111) fails to gain purchase against Mind and World’s underlying project, which does 
not rely on the higher degree of conscious behaviour that Taylor is questioning, at least 
not until a point at which the criticism arrives too late. 
This shift is by no means fatal to McDowell’s account, though the lack of explanation is 
a shortcoming. A more embedded account of experience is needed. The poetry of 
Wallace Stevens opens up just such avenues of thought, with its combination of sensual 
experience, and testing of conceptual and grammatical relations, seen in particular in 
‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’. We can chart the interrelation of the different levels 
of concept, from the most abstract to the very particular, and how this is not a simple 
accretion of detail but a shifting, developing activity, a practice of attention giving and 
attention calling. Further, this focus on a kind of activity, rather than an overarching 
theory, may prove more acceptable to McDowell than the alternatives. As Stevens 
invites us to consider likeness, differences and difficulties, this accords with the 
‘standing obligation to engage in critical reflection’ (MW 126) that lies at the heart of 
how McDowell envisages a minimally prescriptive picture of our kind of experience. 
Bildungsroman: Inhabiting McDowell’s World  
Throughout Mind and World, and in his defence of it in subsequent publications (see 
especially his responses to the essays in Reading McDowell on Mind and World 2002) 
McDowell has attempted to present his work as being thoroughly non-theoretical, 
avoiding the temptations of speculative or systematic philosophy. Rather, he sees his 
role as solely the removal of the misleading picture which has ‘held us captive’, leading 
to the common paradoxes of modern Western philosophy. As A. C. Genova in ‘Review 
of Reading McDowell on Mind and World’ has it: ‘He conceives his project as: purely 
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diagnostic, therapeutic, non-revisionary, and non-constructive, directed to the exorcism 
of a wrong picture’. It is therefore quite difficult to establish a) whether removing the 
‘Myth of the Given’ necessitates replacing it with a different picture – which McDowell 
denies, and b) how, if we are able to resist the imposition of a new, equally limiting 
picture, our new circumstances are to be described.  
This latter objection is made strongly in reference to McDowell’s discussion of the 
ontology of reasons by Charles Larmore: ‘McDowell, however, is in no position to 
promise peace’ (‘Attending to Reasons’ 195). It remains an open question, I would 
contend, whether ‘peace’ is truly what is at issue, however. Recalling Wittgenstein’s 
remark in The Big Typescript, the objective is not to achieve stasis but a more modest 
form of philosophical activity: ‘its task isn’t to put something new in place of our 
language, but to remove certain misunderstandings from it’ (§67). McDowell’s aim is to 
unshackle in some sense our current view of the world from its self-imposed limitations, 
simply by a ‘reminder’ that the way we do things is in part the result of historical and 
contextual demands. This is chiefly achieved by paying attention to the notion of 
Bildung and a subsequent ‘partial re-enchantment of nature’ (MW 88). Following a brief 
account of how McDowell appropriates Bildung, a term with an established history in 
German philosophy, I want to suggest how the partial re-enchantment of nature might 
be accomplished, since from McDowell’s account ‘it does seem like some detailed 
exposition is needed’, though this need not necessarily be the task of philosophy 
(Brendan Boyle ‘The Bildungsroman after McDowell: Mind, World, and Moral 
Education’ 174). Here again Stevens’ poetry provides not only a helpful illustration of 
the issue but also in some ways a more effective, self-reflective response. The idea of a 
Supreme Fiction will be harnessed to this purpose, along with Stevens’ own view of 
modernity and modern poetry as attempting to get beneath the paint of the world, 
toward the world itself: ‘Modern poetry, Stevens says, undoes a painted world; he does 
not say that modern poetry in turn can apply only another coat of paint’ (Bloom The 
Poems of our Climate 174). 
Crucially, in this vein, the use of Bildung implies not a new and better version of how to 
look at the world, but a reminding (or in Hagberg’s rendering ‘re-minding’) of innate 
capacities of being a human in the world. If successful in this Wittgensteinian mode of 
instruction, we are ‘made mindful of the wide range of diverse cases that we separately 
and within their contexts readily comprehend but of which we lose sight when 
ascending to overgeneralizations [...] the question that calls for the generalized account 
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now seems crude, insensitive, unnecessary, beside the point, unintelligibly general’ 
(Wittgenstein’s Voice 510). By Bildung, McDowell means something like ‘having one’s 
eyes opened to reasons at large by acquiring a second nature’ (MW 84), where ‘second 
nature’ is the capacity of human beings to come to see the world (i.e. to be trained or 
educated) in specifically human, ethical and conceptual ways, partaking of what 
Aristotle calls practical wisdom. To use Richard Bernstein’s formulation: ‘it is our 
conceptual and judgmental capacities that open us to the world – a world that exercises 
a rational constraint on our knowledge’ (‘McDowell’s Domesticated Hegelianism’ 15). 
The multiple layers of openness, responsibility and capacity inherent in the above 
definition make it resistant to an easy shorthand; McDowell says: ‘I cannot think of a 
good short English expression for this, but it is what figures in German philosophy as 
Bildung’ (MW 84). As so often, German has provided a more useful word than the 
English ‘education’ or ‘training’ or ‘development’, but this does not mean that it is an 
easy concept to grasp, especially if its history of use is taken into account, as McDowell 
implies it should be.  
Rolf Selbmann, notes in Der Deutsche Bildungsroman that ‘Im unterschied zur 
Erziehung liegt das Augenmerk bei der Bildung auf einem betont herausgestellten 
Individualismus des zu Bildenen’ (3): ‘In contrast to education, it is a peculiarity of 
Bildung that it emphasises individuality in the one being educated’ (My translation). 
Factual learning is differentiated from the expanding of an individual’s understanding of 
the world, and it is something else again from the know-that/know-how distinction 
(Mitchell Green ‘Empathy, Expression, and what Artworks have to teach’). There is a 
sense of growing into what one ought to be, without this being determined in advance, 
which can even involve a sense of reclamation: Todd Kontje traces the origins of 
Bildung to Gestaltung – giving form to  with religious connotations. Since the Fall, 
mankind has become de-formed – entbildet – having ‘fallen out of their unity with God’ 
(The German Bildungsroman: History of a National Genre 1).  
McDowell’s use of Bildung marks his interest in the work of Hegel though in a 
‘domesticated’ form (MW 44-5, 83). Richard Bernstein makes the case for a stronger 
Hegelian presence in Mind and World than is generally noted, particularly in the 
appropriation of this term: ‘It is Hegel who sought to bring about the reconciliation that 
McDowell calls for. It is Hegel who assigns Bildung a central place in his understanding 
of human nature.’ (‘McDowell’s Domesticated Hegelianism’ 18). Further, the structures 
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by which Hegel’s philosophy develops can also be mapped onto the movements of the 
Roman, according to Michael Eldridge: 
In the Phenomenology, Hegel shows the reader the development of an open and 
intelligent mind in a complex society that lacks universally accepted values, as 
the main character encounters a wide variety of experiences. As is typical of a 
Bildungsroman, the center of interest is the links between the main character’s 
successive experiences and his gradual achievement of a fully rounded 
personality and well-tested philosophy of life.  (‘The German Bildung 
Tradition’) 
Amongst its many associations, I would like to stress the element of self-actualisation 
implicit in the term Bildung – that the subject being thus educated is both responsive to 
external stimuli and limitations, and responsible for the engagement with these factors. 
In the case of McDowell’s account we are partially passive in terms of our environment 
and capacities but stand under an obligation (arising both from our natural capacities 
and the traditions that these allow us to be initiated into) to reflect on these same ideas 
and practices, and our responsibility in taking them up (MW 126).   
The strong connection between Bildung and the genre of the Bildungsroman, already 
hinted at above, is inescapable, and although McDowell does not use the term in Mind 
and World, there is something to be gained by thinking in terms of a literary model, and 
what this would mean for McDowell. Not that Bildungsroman is a much easier term to 
pin down than Bildung; it has evolved over several generations of critical movements, 
such that a history would be needed rather than a definition. As Todd Kontje 
demonstrates in The German Bildungsroman, even what can be regarded as one of the 
genre’s founding texts, Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre has been interpreted 
variously by different critics since its initial reception. Schiller, commenting on a draft 
manuscript, thought that the novel reflected his own aesthetic theory but failed to state 
its overall ‘message’ clearly enough: ‘Er tritt von einem leeren und unbestimmten Ideal 
in ein bestimmtes tätiges Leben, aber ohne die idealisierende Kraft dabei einzubüßen’ 
(“He steps from an empty and unspecified ideal into a specific active life, but without 
losing the idealizing energy in the process.”) (qtd. in Kontje The German Bildungs 
Roman 10). Schlegel, on the other hand, saw the self-referential irony of Goethe’s work 
as ‘Poesie der Poesie’ – metafiction – which permitted a focus on the structure of the 
piece, and the internal discussion and stories within it, but lost sight of the individual at 
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the heart of the novel. Novalis in turn attacked it for its denigration of the mystical and 
fantastical, in preference for the prosaic and modern (Kontje The German Bildungs 
Roman 11-2). 
Although the Bildungsroman genre itself has not been starved of critical or 
philosophical attention, there is a difference between the kind of work that McDowell’s 
text invites it to do, and other treatments. As Boyle argues, ‘His invocation of Bildung 
invites us to see the genre as centrally involved with the problem of how the developing 
subject’ comes to be properly responsive to reasons – that is, the problem of how the 
developing subject’s conceptual activity comes to be properly constrained by others and 
the world’ (‘The Bildungsroman after McDowell: Mind, World, and Moral Education’ 
178). Boyle takes this invitation to analyse, persuasively, marital choices in Pride and 
Prejudice as both exercises in liberation-from and servitude-to, as the gradual 
transformation of the characters, particularly Elizabeth Bennet, transforms not the 
choice that must be made, but the responsible manner in which it can be made (179-
181).  
In this chapter I pursue some similar themes, but with a greater emphasis on the specific 
forms and techniques of genre – both Bildungsroman and poetry. For Bildungsroman 
Michael Minden in The German Bildungsroman: Incest and Inheritance specifically, 
makes the striking claim that the difference between Bildung and Bildungsroman is that 
the former is ‘basically linear’ whereas the novels are in fact ‘circular’ (1). Though the 
individual develops, he also returns – either to ‘home’ or into the surrounding social 
structures, such as marriage or (in Wilhelm’s case) the nobility. This circularity accords 
with the kind of feedback loop that McDowell envisions for the role of tradition in his 
model, such that we are brought into it through socialization, in a way that leads to the 
reinforcement of that same tradition but with the responsibility also to be rationally 
aware of this shaping structure. If Bildung in Mind and World meant merely a linear 
progression, like the accumulation of facts and skills, it would not sufficiently forcefully 
offer an escape from the ‘exculpations’ of causal effect, toward the responsibility of 
rational justification. Rather, the mutual critique and re-enforcement of the practice and 
its members allow it to sustain and develop. Further, the often episodic nature of the 
Bildungsroman appears to be a useful fit for the way McDowell sees our gradual and 
piecemeal introduction into (or structuring of) the World; unlike the animals, placed 
into an environment, the human world is partly the construction of our view on it and 
practices.  
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McDowell fleshes out his adopting of Building a little as ‘our second nature is the way 
it is not just because of the potentialities we were born with but also because of our 
upbringing’ (MW 87). The question that remains to be answered here is whether 
Bildung can legitimately be used for more than the refinement of our ‘inner’ life of 
thought and language – whether its formation of us as individuals also gains purchase 
on the world that we see, and partially construct, around us. Critics such as Michael 
Williams (‘Exorcism and Enchantment’ 106) have complained that McDowell’s 
examples of ‘second nature’ in action remain within the realm of customs and learnt 
behaviour (e.g. ethical behaviour, MW 84); if his account doesn’t reach further out into 
the world, can it be said that Bildung provides an escape from the Myth of the Given? 
Crucially, McDowell goes on to say: ‘the way our lives are shaped by reason is natural, 
even while we deny that the space of reasons can be integrated into the layout of the 
realm of law. This is the partial re-enchantment of nature that I spoke of’ (88). 
Re-enchantment 
McDowell’s ‘re-enchantment’ is problematic, as it seems to both do more and less than 
the stated aims of his project but provides the key to putting his ‘second nature’ to work. 
It takes the form of seeing the possibilities of conceptualisation as unbounded, such that 
our experience is naturally (or by second nature) (MW 84-6) always-already 
conceptualised; the possibility of meaning is therefore in some sense in the world. 
However, McDowell is at pains to draw a distinction between meanings (as discrete 
occasions of judgement) and an overall meaning or purposefulness to the world, which 
would be a regression to the ‘spookiness’ of ‘medieval superstition’, positing the natural 
world as a ‘book of lessons’ (MW 71, 109). ‘The world does not have a sense, but is 
sense’ (Muter ‘Wallace Stevens, Analogy and Tautology’ 748). Somewhat similar to 
Kant’s indeterminate concept developed in the Critique of Judgement in relation to 
aesthetic judgements, the world is positioned as being purposive without a purpose (MW 
64-66). McDowell encounters the same shifting sense of what it means to mean 
something that occupies Stevens in his interrogation of the bouquet of roses; something 
of meaning must inhere in the world that is both malleable to our sense of how language 
works, and confined by reality. It is fairly easy to hold one such view in mind, or the 
other, but not both; like the pivoted figures of a weather clock, one seems to recede just 
as the other comes into view.  
In this section I will show some of the relevant ways in which McDowell’s notion of re-
enchantment has been understood or criticised, as a means of testing its value and 
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limitations. As will be seen, many of the questions raised about re-enchantment can be 
addressed with further reminders drawn from Wallace Stevens’ meditations on 
imagination and reality, with an emphasis on ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’. 
Several commentators have raised problems with the discussion in Mind and World. R. 
Bernstein’s ‘McDowell’s Domesticated Hegelianism’, while acknowledging the 
importance of the idea of re-enchantment calls the account ‘extremely sketchy and […] 
filled with promissory notes’ (17). Bernstein questions whether McDowell, in the end, 
adequately provides a way to ‘rethink the concept of nature’, as is demanded (17). 
Charles Taylor’s ‘Foundationalism and the Inner-Outer Distinction’ suggests that 
McDowell’s account is powered by insufficient consideration of the embodied nature of 
thought, as presented in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and others: ‘our conceptual 
thinking is “embedded” in everyday coping’ (112). In part, this is motivated by a richer 
notion of ‘conceptualised’ than McDowell himself relies on, as discussed earlier, but it 
is certainly true that there is room for greater elaboration of the integration of subject 
and world, especially at more fluid points than the making of singular judgments. J. M. 
Bernstein’s ‘Re-enchanting Nature’ suggests that McDowell’s focus is too 
individualistic, falling short of social and political engagement. This is not just a 
complaint that McDowell’s examples of rational behaviour ignore or underplay the 
concrete social structures that determine our thinking and our choices, but also the 
danger of the ‘rationalization of reason’ (emphasis in original) (219), which is to say 
that the very picture of the Myth of the Given McDowell is combating also applies to 
the mode of reasoning that he finds acceptable to use, and that constitutes to a large 
extent the analytic tradition of philosophy. McDowell, in his response to Bernstein 
printed in Reading McDowell on Mind and World, acknowledges the importance of the 
social in our thinking, and in Mind and World historicises his argument with respect to 
the dominant paradigm of the scientific method. It does remain pertinent, however, to 
ask to what extent McDowell’s intellectual framework – given its own insistence on the 
openness of experience to the world – ought to recognise what shaped it. What brought 
about not only the anxiety it seeks to still but the methods by which it judges itself 
capable of stilling the anxiety? As Wittgenstein points out in Philosophical 
Investigations §24, there are many different kinds of description; so even if a 
philosophy attempted to content itself with only being descriptive, as McDowell’s 
methodological modesty does, ought it to limit itself to only one kind of description, 
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when there is ‘not one thing that we can call description’? (Clack Wittgenstein, Frazer 
and Religion 47). 
It is therefore, in part, a duality of thinking that makes Stevens’ ‘Notes’ valuable, in 
which multiple layers of ‘fictions’ are uncovered, but also where multiple responses to 
that discovery (themselves varieties of fiction) are tested. We need not only to recognise 
the patterns of our thinking but also how those patterns replicate themselves, with 
results that are more than merely intellectual. First, it will be useful to go into more 
detail about two specific objections to ‘re-enchantment’, both raised by Michael 
Williams in ‘Exorcism and Enchantment’. McDowell is charged with defending the 
need for re-enchantment at all, and also faces a related accusation of quasi-
foundationalism. I will show that McDowell’s vulnerability to these attacks can be 
remedied by a suitably robust conception of ‘second nature’, connected with Stevens’ 
‘Notes’. 
Williams asserts that McDowell conflates two different antonyms of ‘natural’ in making 
his case (103) – the supernatural (spooky) and the merely conventional. ‘Here 
convention must be taken in the broadest possible sense as having to do with every sort 
of rule-governed or normatively constrained activity’ (103). Though it is perfectly 
understandable to accent our worries about making the world seem ‘magical’, this in 
itself is not sufficient to motivate the view that McDowell claims to be attacking. If we 
are able to separate out the superstitious operations of the supernatural and the 
constructed elements of human behaviour there is no necessity to see the latter as 
anything other than normal human behaviour in the natural world, so why yoke it 
together with worries about the supernatural?  
[C]onventions, though rarely wholly deliberate creations, are none the less 
wholly human and, in that sense, wholly natural. But human practices, though 
constrained by the laws of physics and biology, are under-determined by them, 
and so do not simply 'belong to nature', in the sense of 'nature' that is opposed 
to 'convention'. This, however, is the only sense in which they are not ‘natural’.  
(104) 
Williams does support McDowell’s main thrust concerning the naturalisation of human 
behaviour, without reducing it to causal operations (104) – but in the process raises 
questions about the need for any kind of ‘re-enchantment’ to achieve this. In combating 
the straw-man of superstition, McDowell problematises his own position: do we need to 
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resort to re-enchantment, if all it does is betray a reluctance to let go of (and thereby 
gives credence to) the same ‘spookiness’ McDowell claims to be removing?  
Williams’ concern can in part be resolved by being cautious about overstating the 
degree to which McDowell’s anxiety about ‘spookiness’ is actually about the 
supernatural. His phrasing is primarily intended to highlight the discomfort we tend to 
feel about suggesting that meanings are real and ‘in the world’, thanks to our dominant 
paradigm of meaningless nature. McDowell would agree with Williams on maintaining 
the difference between the perfectly ordinary non-naturalness of convention and the 
‘magical’; his association of meaning with spookiness foregrounds the fact that this is a 
conditioned worry – one that is not groundless, but also not necessary. Re-enchantment, 
if all it did was to appease our discomfort about meaning in the world by paying lip-
service to our sense of wonder in the world, would be unnecessary and an obstacle. But 
the partial quality of McDowell’s re-enchantment (reclaiming meaning but not 
imputing an overall or predetermined purpose) means that the partial passivity of our 
judgements is accompanied by, at minimum, a degree of activity. This helps to stall our 
recoil from ‘spooky’ meaning into a meaningless world, by disrupting the thought that 
these are binary and exhaustive options.  
The second of Williams’ concerns that I want to address here is that McDowell never 
really succeeds in dismounting the ‘see-saw’ (MW 9) of the Myth of the Given, since 
his ultimate justifications come back to direct experience of the world – ‘manifest facts’ 
(MW 29) – such that an appeal is made to the same extra-conceptual world that has 
previously been shown to be useless for the kinds of justifications McDowell wants. In 
prioritising these manifest facts, is McDowell still positing the kind of foundational 
requirement that he has attacked, out of a fear of a ‘frictionless’ coherentism? If the 
‘order of justification’ is hierarchical and the kind of final arbitration we can expect 
from experience is brute causality, then we have scarcely escaped the Given, only 
pushed it a little out of sight. 
McDowell’s argument does seem to gesture toward such a hierarchy: ‘The thinkable 
contents that are ultimate in the order of justification are contents of experiences, and in 
enjoying experience one is open to manifest facts.’ (My emphasis. MW 29). Clearly 
McDowell still retains some attraction to an extra-conventional guarantor of last resort, 
and this appears to threaten the distinction he draws between explanations and 
exculpations of action. However, by its own lights the argument need not go this way, 
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and it is the kind of treatment of experience that Bildung allows that provides the 
possibility of escape. Appropriating §6 from section III of Lectures and Conversations 
on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, when Wittgenstein says ‘I should like to 
talk of the sort of explanation one longs for when one talks about an aesthetic 
impression’, there are many forms of explanation, the aptness of each will vary on 
specific instances of use, not on a pre-established rule. Brute experience, while often the 
quickest and most obvious way of having a false assumption about the world cleared up, 
can be part of a multi-stream, non-linear series of justifications, adjustments and 
accommodations, and in its turn be subsumed into the practice within which it took 
place. The notion that the ‘manifest fact’ is the end point of justification is not quite 
right (or need not always be the case) since there is a difference between something 
being practically or contextually beyond further justification, and by definition beyond 
further justification. The former is an everyday case, the latter is something that has 
been placed outside of our language games, beyond use. Like the distinction between 
some notions of Bildung and the structure of the Bildungsroman mentioned earlier, 
justifications are interwoven, rather than forming a chain. They may consist of causes, 
but also comparisons of like and different cases, new configurations (LC III §9), or a 
new word ‘thrown on the ground of the discussion’ (CV 4e). The line between 
explanation and exculpation may become blurred, though it is not clear that this need be 
the problem that McDowell’s account implies. In some cases a blurred line is the 
appropriate demarcation (PI §§71-77). An illustration of this worry may be how an 
apparent need for an underlying rational or causal model is a frequent part of analytic 
discussions of aesthetics. However much the impossibility of a deductive or essential 
concept of art is lauded, the suspicion remains that really we need some kind of Given 
or unconceptualised stimulus to ground our experience. Mitchell Green’s ‘Empathy, 
Expression, and what Artworks have to teach’ is one such example. ‘[The] ability of 
works of art to teach us things no doubt depends on there being a reliable causal 
connection between the thing represented and the pictorial representation itself’ (103). 
He further argues, in seeking to establish a model of how this relation can be define, 
that ‘all cases of expression are also cases of showing’ (103), which claim shifts into the 
realm of defining the activity into emptiness. I would suggest that what seemed like the 
key picture is being pushed beyond its actual usefulness (Z §240). 
Instead, part of what re-enchantment ought to do – and McDowell ought not be averse 
to – is put the meaning back into the world, or perhaps better, pull the world into our 
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meanings, relieving the concern about a hierarchy of judgements that relies on the same 
external ‘manifest facts’ that Mind and World sets out to remove. The re-enchantment 
becomes not the adding in of something new (as if it were something that we have been 
previously able to take out of the world, or that was missing) but a renewed alertness to 
what actually goes into our experiences, and how deeply our specifically human way of 
having these experiences has its roots in the world we inhabit. We access nothing 
supernatural or different in kind to the ordinary, but may yet marvel that the ordinary – 
especially ordinary language – could, through the order and placement of words and 
other elements, produce startling effects: ‘that just these orders of words can have been 
found, that these things can be said at all’  (Cavell Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow 
36). As Eldridge argues in Leading a Human Life, ‘[c]ulture-independent, autonomous 
practical reason is empty on its own. It can be exercised only within the opposed 
modalities of expressive freedom afforded within culture’ (86). Culture is thus the 
source of, and the constraint on, the ‘possibilities of partial expressive power’ (87) by 
which we express meanings. In this way both brute reality and second nature (however 
these are to be separated) provide for our partially passive, partially spontaneous mode 
of living. 
As the following discussion of Stevens’ Supreme Fiction will illustrate, imagination 
adheres to reality, but is not fully determined by it, and similarly our fictions of the 
world (our language-games) can be tested by it but neither created nor cancelled by it; 
the response to a flaw discovered in a fiction is another fiction, though hopefully one 
more sensitive to the demands and possibilities of reality, fusing the sublime with our 
images (Merle E. Brown Wallace Stevens: The Poem as Act 117). Fiction here need not 
be a derogatory term equating to a deliberate lie – that would certainly not suit 
McDowell’s modest or minimalist realism, nor Stevens’ role of the Poet. Rather the two 
qualities that it denotes might be that it is in some sense provisional, and has the effect 
of a story – linking together elements into a whole, without necessarily stating what the 
whole is, or demanding any particular form of relation between the elements. 
As has been noted, a number of critics of Mind and World point to the narrowness of 
McDowell’s conception of experience – the centrality of rational justification or the 
concentration on the judging individual. Where McDowell is (self-confessedly) least 
forthcoming is on what exactly he means to capture through his ‘sketchy and 
unsystematic’ notion of second nature (MW 178). Perhaps an unsystematic account is 
the only appropriate one since, in keeping with his Wittgensteinian outlook; further 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
161 
 
consideration of what this constitutes would be more an anthropological endeavour than 
a philosophical one. Yet, the sketch given is, I argue, too tied to the rational and the 
abstract to do the work it is designed to do and thereby reveal the complexity and 
richness that is implied by allowing everything we take as ‘second nature’ into our 
picture. This would necessitate a shift from his relatively thin concept of experience to a 
much ‘thicker’ one, to make use of Gilbert Ryle’s terminology from ‘Reflecting and 
Thinking’ in the way it has been deployed in anthropology by Clifford Geertz (‘Thick 
Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’). A thicker concept would 
include descriptive content as well as explanation – explanation at the level of practice. 
Stevens’ poetry offers this through his interplay of human voices and nature, and his 
glorying in experience as a general good; though as ever with Stevens’, this good is ripe 
with complexities and obscurities that reward exploration, never more so than in ‘Notes 
Toward a Supreme Fiction’. 
Wallace Stevens’ (Dis)illusion: ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’  
There is considerable debate about what Stevens’ purpose for and conception of a 
Supreme Fiction may have been. Though first published separately in 1942, ‘Notes 
Toward a Supreme Fiction’ also closes the 1947 collection The Transports of Summer 
and is the longest treatment of what Stevens came to regard as his chief poetic theme, a 
‘cardinal point in Stevens’ thought’ (Ronald Sukenick Musing the Obscure 25). It is 
discursive, at times a hymn of praise, elsewhere comic, didactic, uncertain or elegiac; an 
assemblage of elements that resists summary, though returning repeatedly to the worry 
of how we ought to conceive of our reality – by what ‘supreme fiction’ we can make 
sense of the whole. 
The first use of the term in Stevens’ poems is in ‘A High-Toned Old Christian Woman’ 
(CP 59) from 1922, where it seems to present poetry as a direct alternative to Christian 
religious belief, the difference being that poetry recognises its own fictiveness, making 
it a livelier replacement for the pompous and blinkered mythologies of faith: ‘Poetry is 
the supreme fiction, madame./ Take the moral law and make a nave of it’ (ll.1-2), 
punning on church architecture and ‘knave’; poetry will tease the static authority of the 
church. ‘This will make widows wince. But fictive things/ Wink as they will’ (ll. 21-2) 
They shift, challenge and subvert; Stevens notably again uses nonsense sounds to 
meaningful effect, playfully mocking the solemnity of church incantations: ‘Such tink 
and tank and tunk-a-tunk-tunk, / May, merely may, madame, whip from themselves / A 
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jovial hullabaloo among the spheres’ (ll.18-20). Religion is moribund, unlike the 
creative freedom of the poet.   
In ‘Stevens and the Supreme Fiction’, Milton J. Bates suggests that this closely follows 
the philosophy of George Santayana’s Interpretations of Poetry and Religion ‘published 
while Stevens was a student at Harvard and spent time in Santayana’s company’ (49). 
Certainly Stevens’ abiding concern over the possibility of religious belief in a ‘secular’ 
age, and his assertion that poetry provides a similar, though distinct function has 
affinities with Santayana’s portrayal of poetry “as religion” when it interferes in 
practical affairs, and religion “as poetry” when it ‘merely supervenes upon daily life’ 
(Gerald E. Myers ‘Review: Interpretations of Poetry and Religion’ 137). Both poetry 
and religion are human inventions, designed to give us a sense of meaning and direction 
but ‘[b]ecause many of the tenets of traditional religion – eternal damnation, for 
example – have become distasteful and no longer satisfy the imagination, Santayana 
maintains, poetry must step forward to provide us with a new mythology’ (Bates 
‘Stevens and the Supreme Fiction’ 49). 
However, Stevens’ later use of the term seems to be less directly contrasted to religious 
belief in general, but specifically to the belief of his time – inadequate, or at least so for 
him. Further, the confrontational tone of ‘A High-Toned Old Christian Woman’ has 
been replaced with something more considered, by turns joyful and yearning. The 
contrasts between imagination and reality, and consequently between diverse forms of 
truth and fiction, are no longer as simple (Stanley J. Scott Frontiers of Consciousness: 
Interdisciplinary Studies in American Philosophy and Poetry 74-6). The idea that 
theology could be treated as one fiction among others does not necessarily mean a 
derogatory view of it, given a positive view of the capacities of story and poetry to be 
more than mere lies or amusements – a view common to several other names relevant to 
this thesis, including Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein (CV 36-7e) and, in a somewhat 
different sphere, Tolkien in ‘On Fairy Stories’. Acknowledging something’s value as 
being linked less to its truth than to its effect generates much of Stevens’ ‘Notes’, 
including what it might mean for something to be true, rather than, for example, 
convincing, authoritative, or simply ‘there – like our life’ (OC §§300, 317, 344, 559). 
Among the various available commentaries, very few are able to explain coherently 
what Stevens meant by Supreme Fiction– whether the idea stayed constant in Steven’s 
mind or evolved over time, whether the endeavour to find a Supreme Fiction was 
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realised, or ever realisable, or even pursued at all. Bates suggests that it might refer to a 
‘more discriminating belief’ (‘Stevens and the Supreme Fiction’ 48) than religious 
conviction, that keeps its own fictiveness in sight. Jonathan Imber characterises it as a 
pursuit ‘of truth in post-religious Western culture’ with parallels to Husserl’s 
phenomenological project (‘The Vocation of Reason’ 4). Gerald Burns, aligning 
Stevens with a Heideggerian re-animation of the Orpheus myth, suggests that it is a 
‘supreme possibility, in whose truth it is perhaps impossible to believe, though no more 
so than it is impossible to believe those diverse abstractions that constitute a poem’ 
(‘Poetry as Reality’ 278). Critchley provides a ‘therapeutic’ reading of an 
acknowledged fiction as redemptive in the face of the impossibility of faith (‘The 
Philosophical Significance of a Poem’ 288), while Clive Stroud-Drinkwater sees 
Stevens as not spurning but mourning the possibility of a Supreme Fiction, in 
recognition that any such fiction must continually rest in the humanness of our 
imagination and language (‘Stevens After Davidson on Metaphor). Peter McCormick 
entertains ‘Notes’ as an example of the construction of real yet fictional worlds: ‘one 
comprehensive referential framework among others, the compliants of which are always 
actual individuals existing in an actual world and not possible entities subsisting in a 
possible world’ (‘Real Fictions’ 260). 
Gregory Brazeal identifies one of the most common themes in these accounts, a 
paradoxical yearning for the comforts of a no-longer believable belief (‘The Supreme 
Fiction: Fiction or Fact?’). He suggests that this idea stems in Stevens from a 
misreading of William James’ ‘The Will to Believe’, that belief follows the decision or 
capacity to allow oneself to believe, and that a sufficiently compelling fiction could 
ingratiate itself into belief. This seems to be an uncharitable reading of Stevens’ 
response, though the yearning, harnessed into poetic creation, is certainly present. 
Rather, Stevens seems to be expressing an exhaustion with, or of, the previously 
compelling values of his time, and to be seeking out ways to refresh or renew them – an 
ongoing task, or even a war (‘Notes’ CP 407). I draw a parallel with Wittgenstein’s 
engagement with Spengler’s Decline of the West. His cultural pessimism for the world 
around him, though undoubtedly motivated by the loss of his hyper-cultured Viennese 
world, as Marjorie Perloff has charted in Wittgenstein’s Ladder, also originated from 
the scientism he saw around him, of a society that had found its ‘method’, one that 
squeezed out individuality, profundity, faith and passion. Exhausted cultural values 
could only be listlessly repeated, or picked up for secondary purposes, like clichés 
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(Clack Wittgenstein, Frazer, and Religion 173-4). The duty of the artist, for both 
Wittgenstein and Stevens, is to refresh their own culture, especially language, without 
merely inventing something without roots (CV 60e) or endorsing commonly held 
opinion (CV 5-6e). To reject an unquestioning view of science as a replacement for 
religion, which both Wittgenstein and Stevens seem to have held to be the spirit of the 
age, is not to reject science itself, only its over-application. Nor should it seek to prove 
something or result in something definite like a dogmatic statement. To echo Stanley 
Cavell’s ‘Must We Mean What We Say?’, both philosophy and art are, and should be, 
‘powerless to prove [their] relevance; and that says something about the kind of 
relevance [they] wish to have’ (96). Stevens’ ironic mention of the Sorbonne at the end 
of ‘Notes’ is a comment on the poverty of such a worldview, compressed into the solely 
factual, the already-decided-upon (CP 406). We do not seek to invent a new faith and 
then believe it (this would in any case be to position belief too late in understanding a 
practice or ritual (Clack Wittgenstein, Frazer, and Religion 108) but to create and re-
create, in a perpetual taking up and making new of what remains of our social values. 
 One option would be to read Stevens’ ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ itself as a 
Bildungsroman. It begins with direct demands placed on the ephebe to let go of what he 
thinks he knows – ‘become an ignorant man again’, before running through a number of 
‘episodes’ in which the reader or the characters on show are tested, developed or 
ironized. It ends with what can be read as a hopeful (or ironic) note of completion and 
understanding – ‘They will get it straight one day at the Sorbonne’ – and, as Brown has 
noted (Wallace Stevens: The Poem as Act 109-11) is in some senses circular, since the 
conclusion is to a great extent exactly what was proposed at the very beginning; ‘You 
will have stopped revolving except in crystal’ (CP 407). The ‘ephebe’ addressed in the 
opening lines may also be the soldier addressed in closing, the word carrying the 
connotation of a young man undergoing military training. The reader has, perhaps, 
come to see things aright through the poem, in such a way that the tradition it seeks to 
establish can be perpetuated. The tradition is one of Bildung, however, not of a new set 
of rules; we each, individually and through society, come into our inheritance of 
society, understanding and narrative scaffolding. 
Accordingly, Brazeal counsels against trying to define precisely what Stevens thought 
the Supreme Fiction would look like, in favour of a Supreme Fiction, established for 
each individual subjectively and only in potentiality: ‘the work of creating the supreme 
fiction in all of its necessary, hard-won specificity would remain our own, and as yet 
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unperformed’ (‘The Supreme Fiction: Fiction or Fact?’ 98). It would be, perhaps ‘of as 
many meanings as of men’ (‘Bouquet of Roses in Sunlight’ CP 430). 
In this chapter I argue that Stevens’ concerns with the concept included an avoidance of 
settling on any specified content for such a fiction, and the ongoing necessity of its 
application. Theology becomes a frustration when it ‘fumbles around with words, 
because it wants to say something and doesn’t know how to say it’ (Wittgenstein RC III 
§317), and this is the diminished view of religion that Stevens seems to have held. 
Instead, we depend on our practices to give words their meanings, and for Stevens this 
practice is poetry. This reading thus lies somewhere between Brazeal’s insistence on the 
essential subjective component of such a fiction (in terms of creation as well as 
conviction) and Burns’ account, which grants a certain prominence to the poet (or at 
least, poetic language) that would fit with Stevens’ own comments on the ‘nobility’ 
demanded of the poet (The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words 44). In particular it is 
wise to pay attention to the fact that Stevens’ own most sustained treatment of this 
theme is entitled ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ (my emphasis), suggesting both 
the conscious incompleteness and specificity of his thinking. We may only be able to 
achieve a ‘misfiring attempt to express what can’t be expressed like that [...] but that 
isn’t the end of the matter’ (OC §37). 
There may never be an end of the matter. What follows is not designed to be a 
systematic account of a Supreme Fiction, nor is it an attempt to give an exhaustive or 
explanatory reading of ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’; this would contravene the 
nature of both Stevens’ investigation and my own. Rather, I assemble key impressions 
from Stevens’ poem, arranging these in a way that demonstrates the versatility and 
thoroughness of the poem’s exploration and performance of various positions. As well 
as deepening an appreciation of specific parts of the text, this will provide a structure 
for better understanding the whole, rather than deriving a single meaning. In the 
process, further connections are drawn with McDowell’s more austere notion of re-
enchantment, offering weight to what may be seen as an aspect of Mind and World 
needing further development (and not only through further philosophical analysis). At 
various points connections are also drawn with the kind of reading of Wittgenstein I 
favour, which variously support or develop the concerns raised above. The aspects of 
‘Notes’ to be discussed are arranged to parallel Stevens’ own divisions of the poem, 
under four major themes. After discussing the complex of imagination and reality, three 
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main edicts are addressed: It Must Be Abstract; It Must Change; and It Must Give 
Pleasure. 
 Imagination and Reality 
The President ordains the bee to be 
Immortal. The President ordains. But does 
The body lift its heavy wing.  (CP 390)
29
 
Stevens parodies the trappings of human authority, as the President, pampered by 
‘barefoot servants’ (390) and surrounded by the banners of his office, absurdly issues 
commands to a bee, attempting to halt the changes of the seasons, in the figure of the 
life-cycle of an insect. The attempt to order or defy nature is doomed, and bested by the 
lovers, who instead are attuned to its changes and rewarded with new beginnings: ‘This 
warmth is for lovers at last accomplishing / Their love, this beginning, not resuming, 
this / Booming and booming of the new-come bee’ (391).  
This may be read either as an example of the physical world placing a boundary on our 
designs, and the resistance of reality (and other lives) to our imaginative demands, or as 
the frustration of our tendency, especially in philosophy and science, for wanting things 
to obey our conceptions of them, to be defined and unchanging. We deny our 
limitations at our peril. Though the President is undoubtedly powerful (note his 
entourage and equipment) nature can resist the will of man and reality can resist mere 
words and titles. Stevens also questions the capacity for metaphor to impose itself, to 
make the thing described confirm to our association of ideas: ‘Is spring a sleep?’ (391). 
Far better, like the lovers, to align ourselves with the reality we inhabit. 
Yet the influence is not all one way.  The imagined and the real depend on each other:  
Two things of opposite natures seem to depend 
On one another, as a man depends 
On a woman, day on night, the imagined 
 
On the real.  (392) 
We are reminded that ‘the sailor and the sea are one’ (392). For Stevens, the sea often 
stands in for brute (‘given’) reality, the indifferent, moving mass against which we 
                                                             
29 Unless otherwise stated, all quotations in this section are from ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ (CP 
380-408). 
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might define ourselves, the reality that delimits our self-creation by its factual 
indifference; the elements are ‘instinctive, unwilled, perfectly spontaneous’ (Irvin 
Ehrenpreis ‘Strange Relation: Stevens’ Nonsense’ 227). As in ‘The Idea of Order at 
Key West’¸ however, this is not the impassable meeting of two boundaries; the sea in 
the latter poem is drawn into the self through song: ‘And when she sang, the sea, / 
Whatever self it had, became the self / That was her song’ (CP 128). In ‘Notes’, the sea 
carries the sailor, defines him, but does not (barring stormy weather) erase him. The 
preceding line ‘The captain and his men // are one’ (392) draws the same relationship 
between the individual and the community/society. A continuity is drawn between our 
physical existence and our being attuned to our environment, between the familiar 
sailor’s love and wariness of the sea, and our living within social structures. In Bildung, 
our induction into the community is on a par with learning how to respond to the 
physical world, and vice versa; the sailor does not fight the sea, but learns its moods. If 
our entrance into the world is (as on the McDowellian model) always conceptualised, 
partially passive and spontaneous, then our kinship with the world is perhaps best 
modelled by our kinship with others, rather than an alien realm upon which we impose 
ourselves. Human being are partly unpredictable not because we lack knowledge but 
because that constitutes part of what we regard as human (Z §604); since we are not 
bound to assume that we also have perfect knowledge of ourselves through 
introspection (McDowell ‘Intentionality and Interiority in Wittgenstein’ 303), we 
remain unpredictable also to ourselves. We learn about the world as we learn about 
people – through instruction, instinct, physical events, stories, errors, leaps of faith. 
Stevens’ brute reality of the sea is simultaneously partaken of, and a force of change and 
formation: ‘The partaker partakes of that which changes him./ The child that touches 
takes character from the thing,/ The body, it touches’ (392). The imagined and the real 
flow together in experience and expression: ‘O my companion, my fellow, my self, / 
Sister and solace, brother and delight’ (392). As the school of biosemiotic criticism has 
argued, a text, a world, a word can all be considered as environments, and our language 
and poetry can neither be separated from nor reduced to the natural world (Timo Maran 
‘Biosemiotic Criticism: Modelling the Environment in Literature’). 
The related worry that reality is not entirely open to our learning it; it resists us. In 
effect this is the same skeptically driven aim Cavell identifies as ‘a wish for the 
connection between my claims of knowledge and the objects upon which the claims are 
to fall to occur without my intervention’ (CR 352) as if this would provide us with a 
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guarantee of that same knowledge – ought, with effort, to dissipate with the re-
enchantment of nature, since this partial obscurity becomes no more and no less 
unsettling than the fact that one can partially understand a person. We cannot learn 
about the world without making an intervention into it – setting sail, as it were. Decision 
making, particularly moral decision making, is creative, not only a calculation. In 
‘Missing the Adventure’, Cora Diamond similarly insists that our living consists not 
only of applying general rules but also of taking risks, of taking ownership of our 
decisions, including moral ones (The Realistic Spirit 315-7). Description, telling stories, 
may inescapably be a moral decision. As Cary Wolfe asks in critiquing the sort of 
humanist thought that Diamond espouses: can the question of form – in literature and in 
philosophical enquiry – ever be decoupled from moral edification and ethical 
education? (‘The Idea of Observation at Key West’ 260). The answer to this question, 
from either side of a humanist/posthumanist perspective naturally exceeds the space 
available in this chapter. I would suggest that for Stevens, who once said ‘people ought 
to like poetry the way a child like snow’ (Letter to Hi Simons, 01/09/1940 in The 
Letters of Wallace Stevens 349), there is a complex of education, reclaimed innocence, 
and morality (though not morals) in a poem. How do children like snow? Generally as 
an excitement, an arena for games, a weirder of scenery; but the excitement lasts only 
for a while, until wet socks and numb fingers make the warm and dry indoors more 
appealing again.  
Part of Stevens’ conception of the role of the poet is thus as the continual refresher of 
language; finding new and startling ways in which to describe the world, knowing that a 
new poetry will always be needed eventually: ‘The poem refreshes life’ (CP 382). Since 
this description is also, however, a means of shaping the world, this freshness is more 
than mere decoration – it goes right down into our own liveliness. A world is 
continually renewed by our expression of it, and ourselves along with it: ‘The freshness 
of a transformation is // The freshness of a world. It is our own, / It is ourselves’ (397-
8). ‘World’ is a rich concept for Stevens, full of characters and sensuality. This fleshes 
out McDowell’s problematic distinction between a ‘mere environment’ that is inhabited 
(by animals) and our creation of a world through our human type of experience, and the 
exercising of that experience (MW 116).  
In Mind and World, McDowell has been criticised as drawing too sharp a distinction 
between human and animal life, especially considering his insistence on the physicality 
of our existence, and the inseparability of experience and its conceptualisation. See, for 
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instance, Crispin Wright’s ‘Human Nature?’. McDowell seems to want to say, simply, 
that our human lives are the lives of animals, but that because of our Bildung there are 
ways of seeing the world that are only open to us as humans (or humans with Bildung of 
this sort). However, questions remain about where this leaves our relations with 
animals, infants or adults lacking our kind of outlook (say through physical or mental 
disability). Unfortunately this is not a suitable space to look at this in detail, though in 
passing I suggest that the kind of sympathy for other forms of life that Stevens presents 
as an important facet of full experience of the world, for example encouraging the wren, 
too, to ‘whistle aloud’ (CP 405), ought to be part and parcel of the re-enchantment of 
the world. If meaning is partly inherent in the world, it ought also to be partly (limitedly 
and obscurely, perhaps) inherent in its inhabitants, as meaning might be inherent in 
birdsong, though not for us. Accordingly, Cary Wolfe has presented Stevens’ poem ‘Of 
Mere Being’ as an attempt to ‘detranscendentalize, detheologize, or naturalize the 
meaning of the bird and its message, now no longer taken to be a messenger of the gods 
or the heavens’ (‘Elemental Relations at the Edge’ 287), claiming the birdsong for 
poetry without reducing it to allusion to human concerns. The success or possibility of 
success for this strategy is beyond the current discussion, but Stevens’ precise 
awareness of how words come to mean, disguising their meaning, is valuable. It points 
again to how the world-creation of language, this refreshing of reality, is no free-
wheeling invention. Stevens insists on the resistance of the world to mis-description, 
and the power of poetry as relating to its applicability toward the world: ‘The 
imagination loses vitality as it ceases to adhere to what is real. When it adheres to the 
unreal and intensifies what is unreal, while its first effect may be extraordinary, that 
effect is the maximum effect that it will ever have’ (The Necessary Angel 6). Our 
potential for imagination (conceptualisation) is unlimited, but the success of that 
expression – the degree to which we are able to re-enchant the world – depends in large 
part on the surrounding circumstances. A poem and what it portrays are not unmediated 
expressions of pure emotion (as Romantic poetry has sometimes been associated with), 
but the writing creates a ‘cool distance’ that protects the poet from conflation with his 
own work (Marshall Brown ‘Negative Poetics’ 128). Rather, the poet is generatively 
constrained both by the experience itself (and its communicability) and the tradition of 
poetry within which he works. 
Richard Eldridge’s comment about Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument in 
Leading a Human Life also allows a fruitful comparison between Stevens’ work and the 
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concerns of a practice-oriented reading. He suggests that PI §§241-315 operate also as a 
critique of ‘the fantasy of having perfect control of one’s expressiveness’ (242). Where 
Wittgenstein undermines the idea that words can be private to the individual and still 
carry meaning (even to that individual), Stevens rebuilds the same connection between 
the imagination and reality; they depend on and exceed each other. Eldridge’s use of the 
word ‘fantasy’ naturally also recalls the work of Supreme Fiction and its incompleteable 
form. It is a fantasy in itself and as an ambition; there is no conclusion, only continual 
answers to unending questions. Without this recognition of constraint and falling short, 
the Supreme Fiction would be at best narcissistic (‘Marshall Brown ‘Negative Poetics’ 
128), at worst solipsistic. 
 It Must Be Abstract 
From the preceding discussion it is fairly clear that any Supreme Fiction must be 
abstract, rather than a defined, concrete text. There is no longer one master narrative and 
the Poet, having realised this void, is charged with charting the many fictions by which 
we live, granting us temporary mastery over reality through his descriptions (Ronald 
Sukenick Musing the Obscure 161). As well as this, however, Stevens also toys with 
several different elements of abstraction, turning them over in his poetry like a 
pleasingly hefty apple; since abstraction itself is multi-faceted, we ought to resist being 
held captive by one particular image of it. 
‘Notes’ strikes an imperative tone initially, urging an abstraction from the convoluted 
complexities of the world: ‘Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea / Of this invention, 
this invented world / The inconceivable idea of the sun’ (CP 380). The ephebe is 
immediately flung into warring currents of the real and the imagined, and the 
impossibility of reality. The sun stands in for reality in Stevens’ work (Roy Harvey 
Pearce ‘Toward Decreation’), indicating a distinction between it and ‘this invented 
world’; a distinction is also suggested between ‘perceiving’ and ‘conceiving’, (sense 
experience and thought) though this is itself complicated by applying perception to an 
idea, rather than something physical. 
The ephebe is further urged to ‘become an ignorant man again’, to see the sun ‘clearly 
in the idea of it’ (CP 380). This has obvious Platonic overtones, recalling the 
philosopher-rulers of The Republic, or the self-unknowing of the Pseudo-Dionysian 
mysticism discussed in Chapter 2. The philosopher’s abstracted knowledge is measured 
exactly in its distancing from the practical world, its closeness to the eternal and perfect. 
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As for Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius, the sun is the potent symbol of the good, the 
beautiful and real, a reality that cannot be seen through the clutter of everyday concerns. 
However, given Stevens’ high valuation of sensual experience and the devices of 
language, a more plausible connection may be made with Stevens’ near contemporary, 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), whose phenomenological reduction of all experience to 
phenomena – to what is purely “given” – sought to escape the naïve view of the world 
of our everyday experience, in search of an experiential essentialism (Patrick Colm 
Hogan Philosophical Approaches to the Study of Literature 108). To abstract from the 
flow of experience, to hypostatise, could be one of the tools in the poet’s kit in 
approaching a Supreme Fiction. Kathleen Dale has in fact described Stevens in ‘Notes’ 
as ‘tracing implicitly the steps of the “epoche”’ before finding ways to move beyond it 
(‘Extensions: Beyond Resemblance and the Pleasure Principle in Wallace Stevens' 
Supreme Fiction’ 255). Indeed, pausing only to warn against ideas of a generative, 
determining mind at work in the world (CP 381), Stevens ironizes the possibility or use 
of the phenomenological reduction, ‘so fatal to / The truth itself’ (381). He reminds us 
of even the scholar’s restless humanity (‘The philosopher desires’) and the deep roots of 
desire in the cyclical regenerations of the world (382), which can neither be escaped nor 
show us a deeper truth by their absence. Instead, the poem’s collection of moments and 
fables, variously interrelated, argue for a Supreme Fiction that moves, connects objects 
and finds patterns. 
The rejection of a definitive narrative continues in the rest of this section of the poem, 
as Stevens playfully intermixes mythology (Greek and Christian) with images of wild 
nature and the mundane frustrations of everyday life – especially, though not 
exclusively, the writer’s life. The freedom that this abstraction brings may be muted but 
characteristically satisfying in its meandering uneventfulness: 
It feels good as it is without the giant, 
A thinker of the first idea. Perhaps 
The truth depends on a walk around a lake, 
A composing as the body tires, a stop 
To see hepatica, a stop to watch  (386) 
Note, however, that Stevens rejects the thinker, not the ‘first idea’ itself; a world 
without a god need not be one without the possibility of truth, even if ‘the Truth’ is no 
longer available. It evades definition, but that prominent ‘Perhaps’ retains an openness 
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to the world that runs a little deeper than the Nietzschean relativism of multiple ‘truths’, 
which Stevens had explored in poems earlier in his career (Vendler ‘Wallace Stevens: 
Hypotheses and Contradictions’ 109-111). The Truth may not be a definition or a 
meaning, but an activity, a generation of ever more sensitive and ‘natural’ fictions 
(Brown Wallace Stevens: The Poem as Act 115-7). Nor need we imagine that this 
generation might come to an end somewhere. As I argue in more detail in Chapter 5, the 
idea of release from the demand to find or to make ever better fictions is at best 
temporary. As Wittgenstein recognised in Philosophical Investigations, there is no off-
switch for our urge for definitions, theories, metaphysical explanation. This is why, as 
Eldridge has argued, the text provides not a set of rules for stopping doing metaphysics, 
but a series of examples that will allow us to identify and dissolve the pictures we 
become enthralled by (Leading a Human Life 182). The text can only be a set of 
reminders, carefully assembled for a particular purpose (PI §127), and this exemplifies 
the temptation of overstatement that McDowell seeks to resist. Like a poet, the 
philosopher must again and again pick up language and see how it disguises differences; 
like a philosopher, the poet must tell not one story, but several, and severally, to keep 
the reader from falling back to sleep (CV 7e). 
 It Must Change 
Hand-in-hand with this openness and activity, Stevens’ world is thorough-goingly 
temporal, meaning that any Supreme Fiction that permits us to make our way therein 
ought to share this characteristic. 
The importance of the diurnal and the seasonal cycles to Stevens’ poetry is evident, both 
in the recurring use of such things as weather changes and sunrises, and the remarkable 
landscape of meanings he develops from what might otherwise be quite ordinary things 
to observe:  
The rising and setting of the sun are for most men at most times, as Stevens 
observes, no more than the meaningless recurrence of the quotidian. For only a 
few minds will the event gain import and the idea of ‘the universe of space’ or 
of the ‘infinity of the world’ or some other interesting concept be realized.  
(Doggett Stevens’ Poetry of Thought 1) 
The depth of commitment to specifically cyclical experience within his thinking would 
be equally hard to over-estimate. In The Poetics of the Everyday, Siobhan Phillips 
makes a compelling case for the entrenched and rich sense of repetition in Stevens’ 
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verse being not a simple reflection of his much-reported regular life-style, but a 
singularly productive force. As part of a larger study of ‘Creative Repetition in Modern 
American Verse’ Phillips shows differences in the ways that Frost and Stevens applied 
quotidian rhythms in their poetry – the former more often to give grounding and 
meaning to current events through their precedents, the latter to create an anticipation of 
what may come, what is made possible (76). The quotidian is the seat of both meaning 
and the possibility of change. Bloom goes so far as to suggest that for Stevens the 
‘prime materia poetica is the weather’, its shifts and cycles (The Poems of our Climate 
186). 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the normative power of language is not only a matter of 
express rules but also how we, as humans, respond to regularities, both our own and 
other persons (Luntley Opening Investigations 107-14). We do not act either randomly 
or according to unchanging laws; we create patterns, live by patterns that recur, ‘with 
different variations, in the weave of our life’ (PI p174). Change without form or 
repetition might have a flash of interest but, like too-strange poetry, will have no further 
or greater impact; it must be incorporated into our lives (Stevens ‘The Noble Rider’ 6; 
PI §199). Good writing, as Mario Vargas Llosa puts it, requires not just imagination but 
also ‘the trampoline of reality’ (‘The Art of Fiction 120’ Paris Review).  
In ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ this forward-looking, yearning repetition is in 
constant play, guarding against fixity or linearity. To the alertness to nature’s persistent 
patterns of life and death mentioned above we can add the reliable but impermanent 
qualities of flowers, days and several other features of the world: 
   Thus the constant 
 
Violets, doves, girls, bees and hyacinths 
Are inconstant objects of inconstant cause 
in a universe of inconstancy. This means 
 
Night-blue is an inconstant thing.  (CP 389-390)  
This awareness of the patterns of change in the world is more than being a sensitive 
observer. The very possibility of language and meaning depend on this liveliness. 
Centrally for Stevens, the Poet and his writing must remain alive and alert, so that each 
repetition creates the opening and significance of the next. 
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Section III of ‘It Must Change’ argues for the necessary dialogue and development of 
poetry and language in the figure of the General Du Puy who, cast in bronze, becomes 
ridiculous, an ‘illustrious ornament, / […a] setting for geraniums’ (391). Bates suggests 
that Du Puy was ‘presumably a French war hero’ (‘Stevens and the Supreme Fiction’ 
53) whose glorification is shown to be vain in comparison to the more homely good of 
lived experience. This chimes with Eleanor Cook’s analysis, noting that puy is an 
obsolete French term meaning ‘eminence’ (Poetry, Word-Play, and Word-War in 
Wallace Stevens 236), encapsulating the statue’s glorious uselessness, having stepped 
outside the stream of time. Perhaps this echoes Stevens’ own fear that he would be 
commemorated as a public figure, capable only of changing into eventual rubbish, while 
the life and liveliness of his poetry fell away (Bloom The Poems of our Climate 192). 
The depth and sense of fun of Stevens’ wordplay is further developed, though, when 
one notices that Puy is also a geological term denoting an isolated, volcanically formed 
hill – another fitting metaphor for the poet, singular and potentially explosive, for whom 
inactivity equals extinction. 
An additional connection might be drawn to the Puys, literary societies and their 
competitions that flourished in France in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This 
may seem a large step away from Stevens’ own twentieth-century Hartford, and 
generally sedentary life – he never visited Europe, for example. However, Stevens was a 
voracious gatherer of news from correspondents abroad, as Alan Filreis describes in 
Wallace Stevens and the Actual World. He was also an early and enthusiastic admirer of 
modern French art (Benamou ‘Wallace Stevens: Some Relations Between Poetry and 
Painting) and considered (for poetic purposes at least) French and English to be a single 
language (letter to Bernard Heringman 21/11/1950, in Letters of Wallace Stevens 698-
9). It is thus certainly a reasonable and instructive connotation to remark on, even if (as 
is the case) I have not been able to establish whether Stevens’ might have had it in mind 
himself. 
 These Puys competitions may have been one of the early sources of fixed forms in 
poetry, since entries were submitted in written as well as oral form, and often modelled 
on previous winners. Their functions included:  
professional and strategic relationships, as professional guilds sought to out-do 
each other in wit and song. Contestants were often asked to ‘graft new secular 
chants royaux, ballades, rondeaux, or religious serventois upon Refrains 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
175 
 
chosen or designed by the organizers.  (Yolanda Plumley, The Art of Grafted 
Song: Citation and Allusion in the Age of Machaut 156)  
Closely associated with these was the jeu-parti, a forum for:  
competitive and playful exchange. It was a lyric dialogue in which the 
participants debated a dilemma posed in couplets by the first speaker, the 
second speaker having to answer the first while also adhering to their meter 
and rhyme scheme. The jeu-parti was characterized by neither party actually 
altering their original position, thus leaving the door open for continued debate.  
(Tamsyn Rose-Steel ‘Church, Court, and Tavern: Games and Social Hierarchy 
in Some Medieval Motets’) 
Poetry thus becomes not a ‘dead’ object to be preserved and admired from afar, but a 
combative coming together of views and talents; it has, to appropriate the language of 
Kei Miller’s Rastaman, ‘livity’ (The Cartographer Tries to Map a Way to Zion 23). 
This notion of exchange, force and continual evolution chimes perfectly with Stevens’ 
mocking of General Du Puy’s statue, which has become lifeless and absurd, in contrast 
to the smaller honours and achievements of life. Change re-charges, just as 
multiplicities of meaning add flavour to our devouring of the poem. As Phillips puts it 
in her discussion of ‘The Man Whose Pharynx Was Bad’ Stevens ‘suspects that the 
benefits of timelessness, as well as the possibility of timelessness, are no more than 
fantasy’ (The Poetics of the Everyday 77). This distrust of the static extends to both 
meanings and our lives; though Stevens is perhaps the great poet of repetitions – as 
Phillips argues – it is also repetition with variation, with new experiences opened up by 
the accumulation of instances, the filling out of significance; ‘concepts are not for use 
on a single occasion’ (Z §568). As the consideration of cartographical metaphors in 
Philosophical Investigations will demonstrate in Chapter 5, Wittgenstein’s picture of 
language correlates well with Stevens’ valuing of  habitual landscapes revisited, the 
charting of weather patterns, the passing of one narrative into another, or into oblivion, 
for which the figure of Ozymandias stands (CP 395-6).   
Any Supreme Fiction could thus not be fixed, a static narrative, but would be inherently 
and continually renewed by re-telling and interpretation. It would not be a nostalgic 
foundation of some past perfection, but the continual creation of the possibility of a new 
story, ‘a kind / Of volatile world, too constant to be denied’ (CP 397); a Supreme 
Fiction would not reassure us of what has been said, but of the on-going expressibility 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
176 
 
of the world, its iterative imaginative creation. It therefore places a responsibility on us 
to continue this expression, as a means of becoming ourselves. This echoes the 
‘standing obligation to encourage critical reflection’ that McDowell sees as part of our 
mature human experience, our ‘inheritance’ (MW 126). To the extent that McDowell is 
a modest realist with a Wittgensteinian outlook, it will have to be a realism that 
acknowledges that the central activity of language is not merely to refer to or represent 
facts. Instead, what we can be realist about is situated within our ongoing activities. 
This means that ‘contingency and objectivity are not adversaries but bed-fellows, in the 
sense that it is in historically contingent practices that objective facts, norms, and values 
become available and compelling’ (Sedivy ‘Art from a Wittgensteinian Perspective’ 
73). In other words, change is part of our inheritance. McDowell could endorse 
something like this view, since he conceives his project as showing how human 
practices bring our criteria of correctness ‘into view’, though not ‘into being’ (‘Reply to 
Gibson, Byrne, and Brandom’ 285), which is in line with a theoretically modest 
Wittgensteinian approach, such as Alice Ambrose and Morris Lazerowitz propose in 
‘Commanding a Clear View of Philosophy’: propositions in philosophy are not 
‘empirical’; we will not discover anything (64), though we might uncover something. 
However, the examples used in Mind and World largely concern general or long-term 
cases, such as the formulation of ethical rules (MW 79). By contrast, the change that 
Stevens channels and challenges illustrates a kind of realism in action; worlds 
embedded in our words and vice versa. Stevens momentarily plays with the idea of the 
supreme poem being one ‘that never reaches words’ – sacrificed to meaning – but 
swiftly sees the nonsense of this – senseless and gibberish (CP 396). Similarly, 
Wittgenstein noted in Culture and Value: ‘Kleist wrote somewhere that what the poet 
would most of all like to be able to do, would be to convey thoughts in themselves 
without words. (What a strange avowal.)’ (23e). To the extent that ‘the meaning of a 
word is its use in the language’ (PI §43), a poem with no words would have no 
meaning, no more than a story never told. And to tell is to change; words, individuals 
and the world are interconnected in action and practice.  
This interconnection leads to the second notion of change; like Harrison’s concept of 
‘dangerous knowledge’, a Supreme Fiction must change us, too (Inconvenient Fictions 
3). The reader is encouraged neither to accept the proof of an argument, nor to accept 
something unquestioningly, but to ‘prove something, test something, against himself’ 
(My emphasis. Cavell Must We Mean What We Say? 95). As mentioned above, 
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Matthew Muter sees Stevens as having a decidedly Wittgensteinian project to rescue us 
from ‘the hold that certain questions have on our imaginations’ (‘Wallace Stevens, 
Analogy, and Tautology’ 742), specifically those driven by increasingly untenable 
religious images and traditions. In order to change our view of the world, we need to 
change our language as well as the ideas we express in it; the two affect each other. 
Muter, commenting on Stevens’ ‘Lions in Sweden’ shows how words like ‘soul’ cannot 
be simply discarded ‘without discarding the whole economy of which the soul was a 
part’ (745). We hanker after such ‘sovereign images’ (CP 125). Just so, Wittgenstein 
challenged Frazer’s accounts of supposedly primitive and superstitious beliefs in other 
countries, by pointing out that Frazer was perfectly capable of understanding how these 
people thought, using language such as ‘ghosts’; how did he learn such a concept if it is 
so alien, so beyond his own belief (RFBG 131)? We need to change not only our 
explicit thinking about what we believe but also the traces of previous ways of thinking, 
previous pictures of the world (CV 27e), and the poet’s new paths toward reality enable 
us to think, free us from the ‘palpable tyranny’ of entrenched expressions and thoughts 
(CV 37e). What seems mere fantasy now may once have been, or may become, our 
reality – and the reverse is also true.  
 It Must Give Pleasure 
Although fiction, as fantasy, might ordinarily be connected with the imaginer’s 
pleasure, it is worth remembering that a fantasy is not a single picture, but ‘a complex 
formation out of heterogeneous components’ (Z §652). Stevens’ account is accordingly 
extended and elusive. It contains celebrations (CP 398) and the simplest, stillest 
moments: ‘It was enough // for her that she remembered: the argentines / Of spring 
come to their places in the grape leaves’ (399), children at play scattering flowers (400) 
and ecstatic visions (402-3). At times this section reeks of sensual impressions and 
excess: 
The vines around the throat, the shapeless lips, 
The frown like serpents basking on the brow. 
[...] 
We drank Meursault, ate lobster Bombay with mango 
Chutney.  (CP 400-401) 
And yet, Stevens’ insistence on pleasure and lyrical fireworks is not a disconnect from 
the more ‘logical’ language of the earlier sections of the poem but a performance of an 
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equally and precisely necessary element. As I hope to show, pleasure plays a far more 
important role than mere wish-fulfilment, in ways that enrich McDowell’s re-
enchantment picture, and make it easier to accept the adjustment to our currently 
dominant naturalist view he seeks to instigate, providing a balance between nature and 
second nature, individual response and the demands of culture. 
This section of ‘Notes’ opens with what promises to be a celebration of hedonistic 
revelry, ‘speak of joy […] sing of it, borne on / The shoulders of joyous men’ (398) but 
this is soon undercut – ‘This is a facile exercise’ (398) – and followed by a switch to the 
reflective tone of earlier segments: ‘These are not things transformed. / Yet we are 
shaken by them as if they were. / We reason about them with a later reason’ (399). 
Pleasure is to be taken in a measured fashion not with wild abandon, and much of the 
rest of the poem details smaller, almost courtly activities – details of a memorable meal, 
restrained ‘humming [of] an outline of a fugue’ (402), the imposition of order and 
regularity on the world.  
In an early review (1943) Harvey Breit noted the coherence of the writing in ‘Notes’ as 
a whole, even if there was ‘a minimum of “paraphraseable” content’: 
The Notes is still Stevens’ syntax and phrasing, Stevens’ signature and 
sensibility, but it all has gotten united, single-celled, consanguineous. The 
words are in continuous interaction, concentrating the poem down.’  (‘Sanity 
that is Magic’ 48) 
So, pleasure for Stevens can incorporate rigour and consistency, both in style and 
content – a variation on, but not in opposition to the usual Romantic conception of 
pleasure as ecstatic (as stepping out of oneself). Certainly this fits with the image of 
Stevens as a man of habit, ‘happier [to be] doing exactly the same thing day after day’ 
(a 1944 message from Stevens, qtd. in Phillips 71). There must be change, but it ought 
to have its own weather, its roots in variation rather than revolution. Even the coda to 
‘Notes’ addressing the Soldier is couched in terms of traditions and repetitions. ‘And 
war for war, each has its gallant kind’ (CP 407), where this could equally refer to the 
different wars of the poet and the solider, or to humanity’s cycle of wars (and poets). 
Poetry, though clearly a very different pursuit from war, still has some parallels with it, 
some interdependence. Part of the coda seems like a justification of cosseted poetry in 
the face of the enormous, brutal fact of war (the poem was first published in 1942, so 
written during the Second World War); it could also be read, as Brown suggests, as 
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insisting on the gift that the poet gives the soldier – relief from illusion and despair, by 
both affirming the ‘illusoriness of the soldier’s fictions and the value of his fictive 
efforts’ (The Poem as Act 116). This reading is, though, quite ‘limited’ (116), 
particularly if taken as a summary of the poem as a whole. Stevens wants a poetry that 
adheres to reality, that is responsive to and responsible for its expression: ‘It is not only 
that the imagination adheres to reality but, also, that reality adheres to the imagination 
and that the interdependence is essential’ (The Noble Rider 43). Poetry must therefore 
acknowledge, differ from, battle with other human activities on all scales – from 
warfare to the blue woman looking out of her window (CP 399) – and tell the different 
stories that each requires. Poetry is not useless to the warrior, providing him with 
‘proper words’ (CP 408) for even the final moments of a life. These proper words are 
not definitive or monumental, but for each reader to modulate ‘in the blood’ (CP 407); 
reading and writing do not end because they are activities not outcomes.  
One crucial aspect of pleasure-giving, which this individuation touches on, is the 
inclusion of the individual and her responses as part of the ongoing fiction. Pleasure, 
except in the abstract, must belong to an individual and cannot be the outcome of a 
calculus or general rule. In binding the individual into the possibility of this fiction, not 
least through his very particular examples of pleasure, Stevens’ precludes the rush back 
to the ‘celestial ennui of apartments / That sends us back to the first idea’ (381). No 
more big ideas, but shared and unexpected pleasures, like watching ‘the way a leaf / 
Above the table spins its constant spin / So that we look at it with pleasure’ (406). 
Ultimately, it must be an individual ‘experiencing this’ (404) and not some idealised or 
generalised subject. This insistence could be read in agreement with Brazeal’s 
conception of the Supreme Fiction as one which each individual holds in potential but 
must live out and actualise for themselves (‘The Supreme Fiction: Fiction or Fact?’ 98). 
However, given the irreducibly shared nature of the language in which these fictions are 
told, too great an emphasis on individualism would also be a mistake. At most, each 
individual must experience and (partially) reinterpret the fiction as she lives it. Instead, 
keeping in mind Wittgenstein’s remarks in §§241-315 of Philosophical Investigations, 
it is instructive to think of the insistence on pleasure as a questioning of the supposed 
gap between the inner and outer of the Cartesian self. If something as “internal” as 
pleasure or belief is shown to be equally generative of, and generated by, our fictions – 
fictions that we share in our language and our behaviour – we may be less tempted by 
the endogenous Given, and also less tempted to think of language or rationality or a 
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causal model of the world as singular, universal and self-evident. As will be discussed 
in the next chapter, the ways in which we think of poetry are closely connected with 
how we think about ourselves as subjects – whether, for example, language is a personal 
expression in public form, or a personal form generated from public expression. What is 
the meaning of Wittgenstein’s remark that a ‘poet’s words can pierce us’ (Z §155)? 
Coda 
This metaphor is considered in various ways in the next chapter, through the poetry of 
Jorie Graham. If words and world constrain us, to what extent do we express them, or 
they us? Graham’s own poetic techniques of revision, omission and interruption are 
themselves partly an inheritance from Wallace Stevens’ interrogation of English syntax 
and signification. This inheritance is explored in detail in several contribution to Jorie 
Graham: Essays on the Poems (ed. Thomas Gardner) and, indeed, essays abound 
charting the several threads connection the two poets, such as Willard Spiegelman’s 
‘Jorie Graham's "New Way of Looking’, Mark Jarman’s ‘The Grammar of Glamour: 
The Poetry of Jorie Graham’ or Forest Gander’s Listening for a Divine Word. This 
chapter has attempted to show the potential and value of reading Stevens’ poetry as an 
encounter with similar themes and progenitors that McDowell addresses in Mind and 
World, not only extending the philosophy in ways pertinent to its stated Wittgensteinian 
heritage but also as opening up further readings of the poetry. The next presents a 
reading of Jorie Graham’s disturbances of ordinary language, and how these reflect the 
various limits of expression that run through this thesis, this time focusing on the notion 
of the self and its relationship with language. Where this chapter has sought to bring out 
a richer conception of the reality/imagination relation in support of an already 
Wittgensteinian philosophy, the next takes two strands: analysing a postmodern reading 
of an example of contemporary poetic practice to show points of agreement and 
difference from an Wittgensteinian approach, and to use this poetic practice to highlight 
aspects of Wittgenstein’s literary technique.  
  








In ‘Wittgenstein and the Inexpressible’ Juliet Floyd gives the following description of 
Wittgenstein’s method and character, several details of which would map seamlessly on 
to a description of the poet discussed in this chapter, Jorie Graham:  
Wittgenstein is a thinker who explores and fashions new analogies and models 
of his own: he rips phrases and ideas out of one context (sometimes from his 
own earlier writings, sometimes from writings of others) and throws them into 
another, often shifting metaphors over time into a number of different directions. 
This densely rich allusiveness, this transformation and self-transformation of 
language, this ramification and retransformation of words, formulations, 
problems, metaphors, and questions is an important feature of his writing 
throughout his life, constituting a kind of unity of approach that is not merely 
literary, but part and parcel of his ambition to transpose, revitalize, and recast 
our relation to philosophical questions.  (186) 
By altering our language, Wittgenstein changes not only how some recurring questions 
may be answered, but what questions there are that may be asked, or make sense to ask. 
Sometimes this alteration of our position deflates an apparently urgent problem, at other 
times it stirs up what we had thought were settled questions. Jorie Graham has a similar 
relationship to poetry, as discussed below, disrupting many mainstream conventions yet 
remaining outside the orbit of explicitly experimental poetry, with its accompanying 
worry of maintaining its own relevance or freshness (Andy Brown Binary Myths 9). She 
makes several references to Wittgenstein in her poetry, explicit or otherwise, alongside 
many other intellectual and artistic authorities or interlocutors (a habit she also shares 
with John Burnside).
30
 Connections between her work and Wittgenstein, both her own 
                                                             
30 For Graham’s quotation and incorporation of these sources see ‘Postlyrically Yours’ by Calvin Bedient, 
‘Countering Culture’ by Elisabeth Frost. Her quotations tend to be from philosophers, critics and 
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and more thematic ones, have been fruitfully drawn by Ben Luebner, using the image of 
erosion common to On Certainty (§99) and several of Graham’s poems, such as 
‘Philosopher’s Stone’ or ‘Prayer’, to situate her writing as a performance of the futility 
of philosophical theses that Wittgenstein attempted to show (‘Bedrock, Erosion, and 
Form’). In Leading a Human Life Richard Eldridge describes Wittgenstein as showing 
‘what it is like to live with an unappeasable wish to have an account of the nature of 
conceptual consciousness’ (3), and it is the unappeasableness that strikes a chord with 
Jorie Graham’s writing, in forms that also echo the demands of mystic flight in Chapter 
2 and the ‘war that never ends’ of Stevens’ poetic task (CP 408).  
This chapter situates itself partly in response to Alex Blazer’s study of late-twentieth-
century poetry, its relation to contemporary critical thought, and in particular the 
confrontation between the writing subject and death. His book traces a transformation of 
death’s conception as the absolute limit, the defining boundary – the engagement with 
which constitutes the Romantic subject – into death being used as a principle within 
language, and language becoming constitutive of the postmodern subject’s self. Graham 
is depicted as confronting death – or what amounts to the same thing, language – in the 
manner of a Romantic, but then hollowing out what looks like the metaphysical reward 
of staring death in the eye, to reveal the unspeakable void (and its annihilation) at the 
core of speaking. She is, like Stevens and Burnside, an inheritor of both the Romantic 
and High Modernist traditions (Thomas Gardner ‘Jorie Graham’s End of Beauty and 
Modernist Process’). This analysis clearly has several connections with the themes of 
this thesis, and provides a number of useful points of access to Graham’s poetry. 
However, the contrasts between Blazer’s approach and the practice-orientated 
Wittgensteinian view I have been outlining are also productive. I will emphasise a more 
‘domesticated’ idea of the self’s emergence in language and a reading of Graham that is 
the expression of a particular practice, unsettled and unsettling. Blazer’s self is 
wounded, hollowed out by language, and only reconstituted in its recognition of itself as 
an ‘other’ through the view or language of an other. As quoted in the previous chapter, 
the power of words to pierce us is not to be underestimated, as Wittgenstein’s remarks 
on poetry (particularly Z §155) illustrate. However, this chapter argues for a view of this 
piercing as less a tearing apart and reconstitution than a puncturing of our imagined 
boundaries or our analogies clothed as necessary forms.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
scientists, reflecting, especially in Materialism, the collapse of traditional dualism. John Burnside’s 
sources tend to be artists and writers, particularly of the renaissance. See ‘Kenneth White and John 
Burnside’ Marco Fazzini. 
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By thus retaining the Cavellian notion of responsibility as both the risk and the 
condition of participating in a form of life, Graham’s straining of syntactical and lyric 
conventions can be understood as an expression of personhood – anxious, urgent, 
precise and incomplete – entangled in, and empowered by, language. 
One of the ways of considering poetry at the level of practice in a way that connects it 
with the different facet of the inexpressible is through the idea of ritual. Drawing on 
Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, in particular, prompts a more 
careful understanding of poetry as a process, a convention, its effects, reception and 
tools. In this chapter the poetry of Jorie Graham is studied in terms of how she places 
and erases her own voice and self in her writing, and how her challenges to linguistic 
meaning, syntax and convention illustrate some of the Wittgensteinian themes of 
previous chapters. 
There are some remarks in Wittgenstein that attribute ritual and ceremonial behaviour to 
a metaphysical confusion of language – such as when an abstract concept is treated like 
an object, for an occasion of purging or invocation. For example, the figure of Death is 
slain or driven out in effigy, usually in a guise that recalls death’s literal meaning (e.g.: 
a skeleton), as though the closest approximation possible to ‘pure’ death, that elsewhere 
is found only its diluted instances (RFGB 135). The effigy takes the essence of the term 
on to itself, becoming vulnerable to punishment or entreaty, as if the performers of the 
ritual took ‘Death’ to be the name of a person. Such cases might be treated like 
philosophical confusions, in which the Wittgensteinian reminds the celebrants that their 
meaning of ‘Death’ has taken something of a holiday from its normal use (PI §38). 
(Wittgenstein makes an explicit reference at the same point in Remarks on Frazer’s 
Golden Bough to his own treatment of terms like ‘object’ and ‘complex’ in a 
metaphysical sense in the Tractatus, showing the distance he put between his thinking 
then and at the time of writing [1931].) The mysterious has then emerged “through” 
language as one of its many bewitching by-products; the same kinds of sentences and 
ideas that deal with ordinary objects are applied beyond their normal use, leading us 
into strange waters.  
However, unlike the author of the Tractatus, the Wittgenstein stops short of seeing 
many of the rituals connected with such idealisation of words as simply inadmissible or 
in error. Ritual actions have roots and contents, through both their own history and 
through their connection with the primitive and fundamental elements of life. The 
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people who practice a ritual that we do not understand are yet comprehendible, insofar 
as they will tend to be responding to some basic human need or desire – for rain, for 
crops, or in response to death or nature. They also display certain common (but not 
defining) forms, such as elements of treating a particular place or object with reverence 
or fear, symbolic destruction or construction, status assertion, chanting, seasonal 
timings etc. Through their connection with such near-universal factors, their value is not 
merely intellectual but an expression of a form of life. Although we may not see the 
world from the same perspective, the unfamiliarity will not be total. Simply through 
being human, the rites and mysteries of another culture will “not differ fundamentally 
from ours. Only their magic is different” (RFGB 141). This is to say, a mystery belongs 
to its form of life, and is mysterious within it; from outside it would be simply odd or 
lacking explanation. There are, however, diverse ways in which human forms of life are 
similar, and at these points we grasp the power of the mystery, even if (to whatever 
degree) we cannot experience it or explain it ourselves. Further, since these similarities 
may be physical and part of our natural history, the mysterious is not fully accounted for 
in term of language. To communicate earnestly with those of another belief requires 
more than understanding their words. 
Alongside or instead of dialogue of the traditional sort – such as the realist treatment of 
religious claims laid out by Paul J. Griffiths in An Apology for Apologetics – a 
Wittgensteinian approach would attempt to treat the experience of mystery as it is 
revealed in another’s behaviour; we may not truly understand what a word or an image 
means to someone unless we pay attention to “the consequences he does or does not 
draw” (LC 72). In quoting this remark, W. Donald Hudson adds “Consequences here 
evidently means conclusions” (Wittgenstein and Religious Belief 165) but this need not 
be so. The consequences of the consideration of something sacred or terrible will show 
in my behaviour as well as my explanations, and may be so deeply ingrained that no 
conscious conclusion is drawn; sometimes one responds as one responds. And this is 
not captured by a single word or idea but by the whole network within which our 
practices occur. 
Wittgenstein’s examination of ritual is used in two ways here. Firstly, as a further 
reminder of the great variety of language-games, their origins, objectives and 
performances, using poetry as a particularly useful counter-example of the bewitchment 
by language that can preoccupy philosophers. Secondly, it is a way of exploring the 
relation between the self and the language or society of its expression – here considered 
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through Jorie Graham’s writing in terms of the risk and responsibility of self-expression 
and the inexpressibility that may be the haunting or enabling centre of such rituals.  
The Writing Subject 
The usually assumed dichotomy in contemporary American poetry between mainstream 
(often confessional) and “experimental” poetry is complicated in Jorie Graham’s 
writing. She inhabits a space created by what Marjorie Perloff calls mainstream poetry’s 
being ‘trapped in an oppressive cycle of self-presence, the “cry of the heart” designed to 
convey some sort of unique personal experience’, which has begun to give way to a less 
reverential or sacred language, a ‘poetics that does accommodate the “extraliterary 
social dialects”’ (Wittgenstein’s Ladder 183). Though Graham’s poetry can certainly 
retain the tone of, or concern with, the sacred and profane – intimations of ekstasis – at 
the same time because she interrogates, undermines, hides and dismembers the self 
whose existence is the putative source of sincerity (especially in confessional poetry) or 
insight. Yet she also refuses to do away with traditional indicators of authorial presence 
or control. Undeniably her poems centre on a “voice”, distancing it from the more 
object-like poetry of the ‘Language’ school (Oren Izenberg ‘Language Poetry and 
Collective Life’ 133) but the voice is fractured, self-questioning and, as I will argue 
below, as much a coalescing point for the poem as a revelation about the poet. 
The self presented is often unstable or under question, oscillating between two ideas of 
the self: an untenably hermetic (Cartesian) subjectivity and the constructed, objectified 
self. Fear and desire on both sides interplay – the nullification of completion and the 
powerlessness of being subsumed into indifferent, infinite play. Kirstin Zona, in ‘Jorie 
Graham and American Poetry’ sees Graham as ‘charting the dance between autonomy 
and contingency’ (669) as a search for ethical accountability. Indeed, as Lyn Heinian 
argues, ‘[t]his sense of contingency is ultimately intrinsic to my experience of the self, 
as a relationship rather than an existence’ (‘The Person and Description’ 735). Though 
Graham is not unique in this dance, she is perhaps its most thorough and visible 
performer, making her ‘indispensible to discussions of American verse’ and 
explorations of ‘the play between [...] presence and absence, desire and dislocation [...] 
from which the ‘I’ emerges’ (Zona ‘Jorie Graham and American Poetry’ 670). This 
unsettled self whose subjectivity phases in and out seems at times certain only of its 
own uncertainty, becoming a question for and of itself. Like Stanley Cavell, and with 
parallels to Wallace Stevens’ preoccupations, Graham can be conceived of as ‘outlining 
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the necessity, and the lack of necessity, in the sense of the human as inherently strange, 
say unstable, its quotidian as forever fantastic’ (Cavell In Quest of the Ordinary 154). 
So, we may begin by asking: What kind of ‘self’ is at work at, in and through the poetry 
of Jorie Graham, one of the pre-eminently “difficult” poets of her generation (Andrew 
Langworthy Osborn ‘Admit Impediment: The Use of Difficulty in Twentieth-Century 
American Poetry’) whose writing grapples so resolutely with the fleeting paradoxes of 
subjectivity? As Ben Leubner suggests, like Wittgenstein’s use of interlocutors in 
Philosophical Investigations – which is a form of talking to oneself – Graham’s lyric-I 
is both an interiorisation and an exteriorisation, as the examination of the inner is made 
public, or made of the public, a notion returned to later in this chapter (‘”The Limits of 
my language”: Wittgenstein and Contemporary American Poetry’ 26). 
In ‘Opulence’ (The Dream of the Unified Field 192-3) she writes of the ‘tyranny of utter 
self-reflexiveness―/its nearness to the invisible’ in a poem ostensibly about the growth 
of an amaryllis, but which closely recalls the processes of bursting forth, of hollowing 
out that Blazer has elsewhere identified as key to Graham’s treatment of the self and 
language (e.g. in the poem ‘Chaos(Eve)’ analysed in I Am Otherwise 135). The sections 
below provide a reading of a selection of Graham’s poems as self-reflexive – not only 
as poems about writing poetry, which many assuredly are, but as excavating an idea of 
the self that is paradoxical, productive and problematic. 
Key anxieties in Graham’s writing are the self’s responsibility to itself and its world, 
and how the self can be regarded as constructed, expressed and destroyed by immersion 
in language. Nerys Williams describes Graham as having a particular attraction to self-
portraiture in poetry, with the simultaneous forces of representation, distance, distortion, 
confession and control that this medium implies (Contemporary Poetry). A self-portrait 
is, after all, something quite different from a ‘confession’ of the type more normal in 
contemporary poetry. For a self thus created in language, what are the regions and 
consequences of that language breaking down? The inexpressible may become the 
unliveable. By illustrating these issues I hope to show additional nuances in reading 
Graham’s poetry, while simultaneously creating a space in which to discuss the 
implications of, and potential alternatives to, such an account of the self. 
 ‘OPULENCE’: NARRATORS AS GHOSTS AND WORDS AS OBJECTS 
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‘Opulence’ follows very closely the life-cycle of an amaryllis:
31
 the surging stem (‘― a 
settling-ever-upward’), the ‘sound-free-though-tongued’ bud at its tip reaching upwards, 
the emergence of the flowers (‘stepping out of the casing outstretched’), the opening 
and spacing out of the four blooms (‘the fourness of it now maneuvering, vitalized, / 
like antennae rearranging constantly,’), the plant’s following the light ‘according to the 
time / of day’ and the dying away of the ‘wrinkled skirts of the casing’. 
As with much of Graham’s poetry, there is an intense closeness of observation and a 
pulsing sense of rhythm that – despite repetitions and digressions – means the poem 
itself feels like a continuously evolving process rather than a set of distinct images or 
phases. In fact, the whole poem of 51 lines is effectively one short statement (line one) 
followed by a long, fragmented and uncompleted sentence (it ends on an m-dash, not a 
full stop). There are no stanza breaks, the flow being broken up and controlled by 
dashes, varying line lengths and indentations. This has the effect of demanding the 
reader’s attention, holding up specific details to view, without settling on a single image 
or idea, even after the poem has ended. This form allows a variety of readings. It echoes 
the perpetual unfolding of life, but simultaneously brings into view the disjunct between 
the static written form of a poem and the movement through time it describes. There 
are, in addition, two particular features of this poem I would like to highlight: the 
position of the observer/poet and the multiple ways in which the narrative given is 
accented as a linguistic event, as opposed to or in addition to a physical one. 
The poem’s first line, ‘The self-brewing of the amaryllis rising before me’ is an oddly 
truncated opening, like a note to explain the theme of the poem, rather than part of it. It 
is a minimal explanation in the manner of a painting’s title. From this one sketched 
observation the rest of the poem flows, putting a grammatical divide between what is 
being described and the ‘me’ doing the describing. The only other intrusion of the 
narrator is in line 37, with the marker ‘when I look again’. Here again, the narrator is 
marginal, a sub-clause in the undeflected sentence, which merely weaves around the ‘I’, 
suggesting that the poem’s action has been going on, and continues, whether the poet is 
paying attention to it or not. The ‘again’ implies the poet already looked away at some 
point, but this is not related in the poem, and so is not positioned as being of any 
                                                             
31 See for example Amaryllis Growing, Flowering and Decaying, Time-Lapse by webiocosm: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUOzVynk4Ao (accessed 1st Dec. 2013). Hila Ratzabi, in her an 
interview with Graham Nothing Mystical About It (2006) discusses the poet’s beginnings as a film 
student and continuing interest in notions such as ‘real time’ in film. This awareness of the techniques 
and possibilities of film, as opposed to narrative, I argue, influence the rhythm and grammar of the 
poem. 
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importance to the amaryllis’ progress. The grammatical ambiguity of the first line might 
therefore not be picking out only a positional relation (‘before’ as ‘in front’) but also a 
hierarchical one – an act of prioritisation. Equally, the ‘before’ could indicate a 
temporal relation in the context of the gap between observation and writing, or self and 
language. 
The effect of this present but insubstantial narrator has been noted elsewhere – by 
Charles Molesworth in ‘Jorie Graham: Living in the World’ (1998), for example, or in 
Zona’s ‘Jorie Graham and American Poetry’ (2005). Jennifer Ashton, while providing a 
coherent overview of Graham’s position between mainstream and experimental poetry, 
partly as a result of discussions of the idea of agency within lyric poetry, emphasises 
Graham’s diminishment of the subject, claiming that she ‘portrays the self as something 
that is at once an effect of nonintentional material causes and indistinguishable from 
them’ (‘From Modernism to Postmodernism’ 161-2). However, she resists falling foul 
of the disenchanted worldview described in the previous chapter, by seeing Graham’s 
poetry as itself generative of the writing subject; her poems show ‘lyric subjectivity [...] 
coming into being’ (167). 
In ‘Opulence’ the effect of this is to foreground the autonomy of the plant being 
described, more so than if the narrator were not present at all, since it calls attention to 
the fact that this is a poem, an act of description or recreation, not the plant itself, which 
is thereby set at a slight distance. The final two lines of ‘Opulence’ underscore this 
independence, whether one reads them as acknowledging the ultimately unreachable 
place of the amaryllis, or as a comment on the ghostliness of the authorial presence: 
‘and no footprints to or from the place― / no footprints to or from―’ (ll. 50-51). 
What, then, is the role of the narrator here? If such observations as Graham thrives on 
are to be made about ‘The Visible World’ (the title of the next poem in the anthologised 
collection The Dream of the Unified Field) and involve digging one’s ‘hands into the 
absolute’ (194), what does this mean? Firstly, and most clearly, that there is an agent 
doing the digging, that the speaking, experiencing subject has not disappeared, and has 
not entirely given up control of the poem. This may constitute an insistence that just as 
there is ‘no self undefiled by experience, no self unmediated in the epistemological 
situation but a person instead’ (Heinian ‘The Person and Description’ 735), there is no 
poem, no experience, untouched by a subject, to some degree authorial.  
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Blazer reads this vacillation as Graham’s urgent desire for ‘cutting herself out of her 
poems’ (IAO 125), to achieve a poetry that escapes traditional notions of subjectivity, 
but Molesworth notes that Graham’s poetry, ‘stamped with authorial will’ (‘Living in 
the World’), is thereby separated from the work of the Language poets, despite her 
sometimes radical formal choices. Clearly one of Graham’s recurring struggles is with 
the status and meaning of writing poetry (as poet), but Blazer overstates the case. If an 
escape from the subjectivity of creative control were her main goal, randomised 
assemblages, systems of unconscious production or digital (re)productions through 
reader interface would be available to her. Things do not just happen in her poems, but 
are experienced, are made to happen, are directed. Like the complex status of ritual that 
Wittgenstein describes in Remark on Frazer’s Golden Bough, poetry and language exist 
neither as fully controlled nor as fully submissive acts; ritual may be conceived of as the 
giving of the self into a social act (Veena Gass ‘Anthropology, Wittgenstein and 
Frazer’s Golden Bough’). Further, the notion of an ‘absolute’ into which one can dig – 
in fact have a good root around in, as ‘The Visible World’ goes on to describe – is 
interestingly difficult.  
Are we to conceive of the absolute as something radically independent, a Kantian 
noumenal realm, or as the real thing really grasped, or as the underlying coherence of 
disparate experiences, like Douglas Adams’ ‘fundamental interconnectedness of all 
things’ (Dirk Gently’s Holistic Detective Agency 119)? It perhaps makes most sense to 
read this as some kind of untouched reality into which the human hand – the human 
organ of ‘work and exploration’ (Žižek The Seven Veils of Fantasy 16) – inserts an idea 
of order and pleasure in the creation of it. This order is, however, neither arbitrarily 
conjured by the poet’s imagination nor obedience to some pre-existing Platonic schema 
but a construction of their interaction; distinctions arise insofar as the hand’s 
exploration sets things apart. (Graham refers to ‘hands making and unmaking promises. 
/ Diggers, forgetters’ in ‘The Visible World’.) Žižek’s differentiation between physical 
intersection and directed or ‘Edenic’ (16) interaction is useful here, as a way of 
retaining the kind of agency Graham clearly displays in her poems, without retreating 
into the Cartesian notion of a pre-existing self. Language is made almost physical in 
places, both conceptually and in the way Graham layers her writing. It is something to 
be manipulated rather than solely a medium for communicating meaning. This effect is 
achieved partly through its placement on the page, partly through the treatment of words 
as objects. This linguistic materiality is a key consideration for many text-artists, whose 
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creations dwell as much on and in the form and setting of the words chosen as their 
meanings. The minimalist site-specific works of Alec Finlay or the manipulated print-
texts of Johanna Drucker are examples of this, briefly discussed in Chapter 6. Although 
Graham stops short of such object-oriented work in her poems, her formal decisions, 
such as her long lines, do have something painterly about them, structuring the page in 
terms of space and time as well as meaning. She also deploys typographical effects and 
disruptions of anticipated meaning in a way that lends a more solid, object-like sheen to 
particular words than a less crafted presentation might achieve. This is particularly 
evident in what one might call the “second wave” of ‘Opulence’, denoted by the short, 
stopping line eight ‘now,’ and running to about line 18. (The poem is not segmented by 
stanza breaks, but the indented lines and rhythmic stutters do to a large extent match up 
to thematic shifts.) Here, in lines 11 and 12, Graham includes a number of words that 
appear to be claimed as ‘lexical objects’ (Molesworth ‘Living in the World’) rather than 
deployed on the basis of their referential sense: 
bits of clench, jolt, fray and assuage ― 
bits of gnaw and pulse and, even, ruse 
All of which serves to remind us of the complex relation between the things presented 
in the poem, the act of writing and the poem’s reception by the reader. Graham is at 
pains to keep the linguistic (poetic) nature of the poem in view – its symbolic, revisable 
and transferrable qualities. Indeed, ‘Opulence’ like many other poems is as much about 
its language of expression as it is the object of description. The lexical objects, however, 
seem to be an attempt at something closer to ostensive definition than description – the 
‘thatness’ of the words substituting for the desired ‘thatness’ of the thing described, as if 
we could get direct access through the acquaintance that language blocks to (at least) the 
language itself. But in becoming objects the words return from signifiers into sensual or 
material effects, like Wallace Stevens’ nonsense words; we are drawn into the effort and 
feeling of the expression as well as or instead of experiencing the words’ meaning. By 
bringing into view the materiality of language thus conceived, Graham calls on what 
Michael Luntley describes as our ‘abilities other than and weaker than conceptual 
abilities, the abilities manifest in the regularities of word use’ (Opening Investigations 
99). Luntley’s attempt here is to move beyond the rule-following, normative conception 
of grammar discussed in Chapter 1, in order to allow for ways of explaining the world 
that are not ‘meaningful’ in the conceptual sense.  
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This materiality is worth devoting some attention, not least because it has been an 
accusation against Wittgenstein (and Cavell and McDowell) that they are too interested 
in, or too bound up, in words rather than worlds – that Wittgenstein’s problems and 
dissolutions are linguistic ones, and that outside of language nothing exists, or at least 
nothing of philosophical interest. For example, Charles Bernstein’s concern that 
Cavell’s textualisation of experience goes too far in ‘Reading Cavell Reading 
Wittgenstein’, J. M. Bernstein’s ‘Re-enchanting Nature’ on McDowell’s supposed 
failure to engage beyond the linguistic or conceptual in Mind and World, or Morton A. 
Kaplan’s ‘Human Reason and a Common World: Why Wittgenstein and Rawls Are 
Both Wrong’, and the limits of some expressivist readings of Wittgenstein explored in 
Gorazd Andrejč’s Wittgenstein and Interreligious Disagreement: A Philosophical and 
Theological Perspective). This thesis as a whole has attempted to show the poverty of 
overly-language-centric readings of Wittgenstein in particular, both as interpretations of 
his work and as positions for further intellectual endeavour. Jorie Graham’s 
materialising of words, as a parallel to Stevens’ sensuousness of language, can dissolve 
the supposed gap between words and other experiences. As also suggested in Chapter 3, 
something of this sort is accomplished simply by reminding ourselves of the naturalness 
and liveliness of our meaning-making, or, within the practice poetry, testing the 
operations of grammar and meaning in deliberate ways. Gestures, pointing, animal 
sounds liberate words from their surface meanings, such that boundaries between sense 
and nonsense, speech and reference are blurred. The effects of this blurring can be 
refreshing, as in Stevens’ exhilarating ‘Notes’, humanising, as in Miller’s domestication 
of religious striving, or unnerving in the way that Burnside’s animal guides are 
uncertain companions. 
Graham’s minimal insertion of the narrative voice in ‘Opulence’ is also a blurring – a 
small shift or shrug in the poem’s flow, enough to remind us in passing of the poem’s 
poemness. While it may strive to replicate the growth of the plant and/or the experience 
thereof, it always remains at a slight remove. This is re-enforced by the scattering of 
words in the poem that pick out boundaries, breaks or constrictions: fissure, frontier(s), 
fray, impregnable, imprisoned, knots, envelope, skin, monologue, formulaic etc. 
These considerations of difference between perception, meaning and expression offer a 
further possibility of response to the ‘lexical objects’ quoted above. It ought to be 
possible to uncover a coherent use of the terms as part of a literal description of the 
amaryllis, even where this is at first sight difficult. However, this would leave open the 
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questions of why these terms are italicised, and no others – ‘in an apparently random 
way where no such emphasis is required’, as Roger Caldwell has complained about 
other Graham poems (‘At a Suitable Distance’ 2003). Rather, if we make the slightly 
counter-intuitive move of reading the words not for their sense, but as items in 
themselves, as sonic units that echo and reconfigure each other, we can perhaps get a 
different sense of the pressing, tense, full feeling of a driving plant that Graham 
attempts to share. The words are being made to do something alternative that requires a 
shift in aspect perception. We may come to question whether we read a word as a 
meaning-unit, as symbol, as sound, as visual marker of shape and rhythm – or as 
disruption of any one of these readings. Graham’s non-intuitive choices of presentation 
send us, like Caldwell, in search of reasons, which may bring other readings into view.  
By reading this in light of Wittgenstein’s account of aspect perception in Philosophical 
Investigations, we can impose a somewhat more nuanced idea than merely noting the 
variety of possible senses, associations or tonal qualities of a given word or phrase. It is 
worth thinking of the element of force experienced by a competent language user in 
coming to see different aspects, which may be decided by the context, performance or 
accumulation of linguistic acts, without anything that might be construed as a change 
within the object (word) itself, or anything that could be identified as a causal link 
between the object and how it is seen (PI §§140, 178, 304; pp179, 205). Graham’s 
lexical objects can impose a different kind of seeing-as on a reader through the many 
formal and typographical tools at her disposal, made plainer by her willingness to put 
these tools on display – to keep drawing attention to the fact that what is being read is a 
poem. This level of imposition, which is somewhat different from a matter of 
interpretation, can also be linked with Wittgenstein’s suggestion that for many examples 
it is possible to see any one of the available aspects, but not simultaneously; and 
different aspects may ‘dawn’ on us at different times (PI pp194-7). Think, for example 
of concave models of faces that seem to either recede or protrude, it being possible only 
to see the face one way or the other, never both. Though one can of course be aware of 
the possibility of different aspects, which is at the heart of acts of interpretation, it is not 
in some cases possible to see something as several of it multiple possibilities at once. In 
the case of ‘Opulence’, the way that ‘clench, jolt, fray and assuage’ are deployed makes 
it difficult to incorporate them primarily as words used for their sense, but makes the 
words extremely effective for capturing the strange combination of tension and fluidity 
experienced in watching a flower bloom. Rhythmically, for example, the words carry in 
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them a sequentially reducing level of tension, as the vowels elongate and the sounds 
loosen. 
By deliberately calling attention to this aspect shift (as opposed to more understatedly 
allowing the sounds of the words to add resonance to the surface meaning) and by doing 
so at just this part of the poem, as the focus shifts from the initial ‘me’ and the 
abstracted ‘tyranny of utter self-reflexiveness’ towards the more direct depiction of the 
flower, Graham manages the transition between the narrative voice’s direct 
expressionand the verbal image of the amaryllis, which halos its directed object at a 
certain remove. The words become more object-like as the poet recedes. Paradoxically, 
as the mediating activity of words is accented, the poem is repositioned as a linguistic 
construct as we rebound into thinking about words rather than the things they pick out. 
This in turn gives impetus to some of the imagery and terminology Graham chooses, 
which draw on the physical acts and materials of writing: ‘so as to loosen the tight 
dictation’ … ‘and the envelope rips’. Then, in the poem’s closing stages (after the 
flower has bloomed) the allusions are to speech and consciousness:  
the monologue reduced – or is it expanded – to  
this chatter seeking all the bits of light  (ll. 42-3) 
and  
the light wide-awake around it – or is it the eye –  
yes yes yes yes says the mechanism  (ll. 48-9) 
With the tightening parallel this draws between the writing of the poem and the writing 
(creation, emergence) of the self through the activity, the amaryllis becomes a metaphor 
for the poem/poet within which it features.  
Blazer argues that Graham’s self is conceived as something that bursts out through 
itself, using the image of Eve erupting from Adam’s rib ‘like a judgement’ (IAO 133). 
Thus, being a linguistic being simultaneously creates the possibility of individual 
consciousness and annihilates it in the shared reality of language. This becomes the act 
of a Flagellant – ‘She flails herself with her own language to open herself to another 
possibility of being’ (IAO 125). The thrusting, self-exceeding plant of ‘Opulence’ 
mirrors this self-bursting push, with the smooth, tight, green skin of the stem becoming 
an ‘exclamation’ of flowers that, once released, expand, settle, take on colour, but 
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importantly have not reached a conclusion, only a particular stage – the ‘mechanism of 
the underneath’ (l. 49) is still ticking; the process never completed. 
However, a persistently violent presentation of Graham’s writing is not fully justified by 
her body of work, since it is difficult to detect anything so brutal in, for example 
‘Prayer’ (Never 3), which is nonetheless about the attractions of losing oneself into 
language: ‘The longing / is to be pure. What you get is to be changed.’ (ll. 14-5). Thus, 
while I suggest that Blazer’s depiction has a number of short-comings, as discussed at 
various points below, the almost metaphysical strain against the limits of language he 
detects in Graham’s writing (IAO 125) and the notion of the self being both hollowed 
out by, and (re)constituted by, the exposure to language are useful for understanding the 
way Graham turns language against itself, into (specifically) ‘broken literary speech’ 
(Reddy Changing Subjects 19). Initially, it will be useful to look more closely at the 
continual play of uncertainty that characterises Graham’s language, but in terms of 
redacted or questioned contents, and the breakdown of linguistic structures. Like the 
puy that appeared in Chapter 3 – the extinct volcano as image for the unproductive poet 
– Graham seems to fear completion or comprehension, as killers of the poem and the 
poet.  
 ‘DUSK SHORE PRAYER’: THE EVER-FLOWING SELF AND THE UNFINISHED POEM  
This notion of unbearable completion is a recurring feature of Graham’s poetry, 
touching form, content, and publication habits. In a 2003 Paris Review interview, she 
describes the aftermath of writing ‘The Taken Down God’, which appears in the 
collection Never: 
   INTERVIEWER 
Did you know immediately you had this amazing poem? 
 
   GRAHAM 
No. In fact, I had to fly back to the U.S. unexpectedly a short while 
later, and found myself alone in Cambridge in the middle of the 
summer. I thought Never was finished—in fact it was already 
delivered to the publisher. But I called Frank Bidart, and (he’s a 
guide on the path if there ever was one) he’s the one who said, 
when I told him about the event, You have to write that, you just 
have to write that. So I took the time of that solitude—which was 
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great, and full of fear—my daughter was very ill—to work the notes 
up into the final poem. Peter, still in Italy, spent the time walking 
from Todi to Assisi and back—which took him many days. So I felt 
that pilgrimage-walk of his somehow behind the poem—that spine 
of days. It was a very silent time. 
 
   INTERVIEWER 
So the book originally ended with the prior section? 
 
   GRAHAM 
Yes, the version going to press ended on “By the Way.” 
 
   INTERVIEWER 
How about the other long poem in that final section, “High Tide,” 
about your encounter with the homeless woman? 
 
   GRAHAM 
After “The Taken-Down God” presented itself, I knew the book 
was open again. As when painters say, Then the canvas had to be 
wet all-over again, once they touch it anywhere . . . I went back to 
my notebook and found the notes on that encounter with the 
homeless woman. I had to return to Italy then, so I ended up writing 
“High Tide” there—holding the book up. But my publisher is used 
to that.  (Gardner ‘The Art of Poetry No. 85’) 
 
This resistance that Graham’s poetry shows to a final form is particularly deeply 
engrained. Many poems feature internal revisions of the text as they go along, 
correcting an expression or changing viewpoint, keeping the poem lively by denying it a 
concrete final form. This is both an internal and external feature, since Graham 
frequently revises poems between publications, and explains her writing technique as a 
continual process of rearrangement: ‘I’d say I spend ninety percent of my time in 
revision. It’s a craziness. There are sometimes maybe thirty variants of the lineation of a 
stanza’ (‘The Art of Poetry No. 85’).  
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This attachment to revision and struggle with form and arrangement is strongly 
reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s notebooks and manuscripts, in which ideas are re-phrased 
and re-contextualised multiple times, and the idea of a definitive book seemed always 
unsatisfactory and impossible (PI Preface). Eldridge goes so far as to claim that 
Philosophical Investigations, even in its published form, displays Wittgenstein’s own 
methodological refusal to issue theses or doctrine, but only up to about §308, after 
which it becomes less rigorous, and sometimes didactic (Leading a Human Life 11), 
suggesting that the manuscript was never fully finished and polished. For Wittgenstein 
the matter was one of continual tinkering to find the ‘redeeming word’ (Daniele Moyal-
Sharrock ‘Wittgenstein on Forms of Life, Patterns of Life, and Ways of Living’ 22), a 
‘reproductive’ kind of thinking rather than simple creation (CV 16e), seeking ‘the 
counter-irritant to our irritated and restless fixations’ (Gould ‘Restlessness and the 
Achievement of Peace’ 89), releasing ‘mental cramp’ by inventing other ways to look at 
the use of an expression (Norman Malcolm Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir 50). For 
Graham, the restless fixation is generative, as well as something to be stilled, since the 
poem in some sense performs (and re-performs) the act of this search, each time 
deviating incrementally from the normal patterns of thought and expression (Z §349). 
 
In this section I will show some of the internal features of this approach, as seen in 
‘Dusk Shore Prayer’ (Never 31-2). It features retractions and constant interruptions of 
the lyric flow, owing perhaps more to painting than poetic form for its visual aspect, 
which is clearly one of Graham’s key concerns (Bonnie Costello ‘Jorie Graham: Art and 
Erosion’ 373). In Caldwell’s review of Never he bemoans ‘[a]n esoteric punctuation 
involving a bizarre system of round and square brackets [that] confounds the reader and 
gives the impression of unfinished work’ (‘At a Suitable Distance’). Though this is, in 
truth, a not unreasonable description of Graham’s difficult and typographically baroque 
collection, I would argue it is also an unfortunately reductive reading of what is 
happening in the poems, or what the impression of ‘unfinished work’ – or better, a work 
resisting completion – can be made to do. To give a flavour of the collection’s hesitancy 
at its height, here is the ‘third wave’ of ‘Dusk Shore Prayer’. As in ‘Opulence’ the poem 
is not broken up by full stanza breaks, but the spaces created by indents and curtailed 
lines do give some rhythmic and thematic demarcation: 
(which feels tugged) (the rows of scripting 
 [even though it’s a trick] adamant with 
self-unfolding) (wanting the eye to catch and take 
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dominant final-hold, feel the thickest rope of 
   waterlipped 
   scripting 
to be a producing of a thing that speaks [to whom 
one does not know, but a true speech]) – to believe this truly, 
     not in metaphor―  (ll. 10-18) 
Jorie Graham’s work here is unfinished, insofar as its intent seems to be to re-live and 
sustaina moment of conscious experience as an experience and not the memory or 
distilled lesson of one. Reading the poem is a re-enactment of the asides, self-edits and 
anxieties that constitute mental activity. As Helen Vendler puts it: ‘How to follow the 
flickers of consciousness without reducing it to ‘pure mentality’ (that Platonic fiction) is 
one aim of the poetry of Jorie Graham’ (‘Indigo, Cyanine, Beryl’). The extent to which 
this tactic of linguistic fracturing is effective does vary by poem and reader’s taste; 
when the bracketing-off of text becomes, if not systematic, then perhaps symptomatic 
(the great majority of poems in Never exhibit some of this punctuation) further 
questions are raised. Has the following of consciousness fallen into a trap of its own 
displacement strategy and become a code in itself? Is there some definite meaning to the 
brackets (and the choice of round or square); are there distinct meanings in each use, or 
do they eventually become mere stylistic tics? The brackets could be the whispering 
worry about overly smooth thinking or language, reducing it to the presentable and 
fully-formed mode of public discourse. Alternatively, they might undermine the very 
idea of smooth thinking, in which there is always an act of revision, hesitation or 
interpretation, pulling one away from the idea of the thing in itself. In the latter case, the 
effort required to achieve moments of recognition is highlighted. 
One’s attitude to the bracketing off and circling phrasing will to a degree be influenced 
by how the styling and its intent are interpreted. They could be seen, for example, as 
testing the limits of sense, depicting (either successfully or unsuccessfully) the 
breakdown of language, a perfectly conscious but deliberately anti-lyrical or anti-
Cartesian form of writing, or a refusal to commit to a single view or narrative – whether 
for reasons of ethics, anxiety or provocation. The habit of bracketing could be merely an 
unorthodox means of controlling the pace of the reader’s eye across the text – speeding 
over apparent asides, braking for unexpected turns and cul-de-sacs. Given the setting of 
‘Dusk Shore Prayer’ – the liminal beach-scene – it is perhaps easiest to read Graham’s 
stutterings as replications of the temporary nature of the shoreline. The poet or poem is 
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shifted in and out by the sea, leaving trails of words whose meanings may be lost or 
reconfigured by the tide. The sea is taken in the collection Never as a metaphor for the 
real, or its dissolution, in several senses, recalling Stevens’ brute reality engaged by 
song, W.S.Graham’s crossing of ‘the white threshold’ as an escape from words and 
conventions (Edwin Morgan ‘The Sea, the Desert, the City: Environment and Language 
in W. S. Graham, Hamish Henderson, and Tom Leonard’), or Burnside’s littoral space 
of quiet retreat (Julika Griem ‘John Burnside’s Seascapes’). The sea in ‘Dusk Shore 
Prayer’ moves and retreats, like a voice. There is ‘meaningless on (not in) the moving of 
the / waters’ (ll. 8-9). It is restless – it feels tugged (l. 10), adamant (l. 11) and pregnant 
with an urge to resolve into a single image.  
Given this setting, one can understand the hesitations, segmentation and narrative 
lacunae in terms of the strange and sudden violence at the centre of the poem: 
 And never to be 
emptied by the wound of meaning. 
The gash of likeness. The stump interpretation. (ll. 22-24) 
There is little in the preceding poem to anticipate this bodily and bloody imagery. 
Similarly to ‘Opulence’ but more overtly, the poem opens with a clipped introduction of 
its primary theme, ‘The creeping revelation of shoreline’, followed by concentrated 
descriptions of a scene that allude to writing, such as ‘golden sentences writ on clearest 
moving waters’ ... ‘the rows of scripting’ (ll. 7, 9). But unlike ‘Opulence’, which insists 
on minimising the lyric-I in favour of the observed object, here the focus attempts to 
simultaneously encompass the linguistic and the ‘inner’ experience. Spelling out 
positionally the self/other distinction as two distinct blanks to be filled, Graham slides 
into a drive-by Nietzschean call for becoming over being (an unfulfilled longing) before 
the jolting bodily turn quoted above. But how to read this image of a wound, and in 
what sense is it desired? Is the wish ‘[n]ever to be emptied’ a desire to avoid being 
wounded, or is the inevitability, necessity or even pleasure of the wound being invoked, 
with the hope that one will never cease emptying into/though the wound, or with the 
hope that one may incur the wound, but not be destroyed thereby? 
Much as Nietzsche’s ascetic model acknowledged, even savoured, suffering for its 
resulting spiritual growth (Tyler T. Roberts ‘“This Art of Transfiguration is 
Philosophy”: Nietzsche’s Asceticism’ 407-8), the injuries risked in making meaning can 
be key to the establishing of the self. The image of meaning-as-wound may be 
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talismanic of Graham’s poetry, conjuring an oppositional but mutually generating 
self/Other relation, through the objectifying work of language. 
Since language not only reveals our inner world but structures it, to speak is to open 
oneself up to the gaze of the Other. According to Blazer this implies a loss of the idea of 
an irreducible or unique inner subject (since everything, being in language, is sited on 
the same plane). One thus becomes, for oneself, ‘Other’, too; the self is ‘emptied out’ by 
being described in language: ‘[W]ords skin reality and expose a transcendent 
nothingness’ (IAO 130). There is “nothing beyond the text” in the sense that what was 
supposedly inner and subjective can only be actualised in the realm of public and shared 
language. However, Blazer differentiates between what he sees as an acknowledgement 
of the text as the final, labyrinthine boundary in Jon Ashbery’s poems (125) and 
Graham’s metaphysical gesture towards a ‘nothing’ that is beyond the text. She 
‘transcends language only to realize holes in the firmaments of being’ (125). The 
subjective self, or at least the kind of self we had imagined ourselves to have, is 
destroyed by the induction into language, and this is the self-confrontation that Blazer 
sees in Graham’s interpenetrating streams of language. One can, however, rebuild 
oneself, thanks to the same gaze of the Other, which has objectified one (given one 
existence) through language. The subjection of the subject to the laws of language 
structures it in such a way that the gaze of the other permits the seeing of the self as 
other, and therefore as a self: ‘the subject becomes an infinite vacillation between 
otherwordly obliteration and self-formation’ (133).  
Blazer quotes from Graham’s ‘The Dream of the Unified Field’: ‘I watch the head 
explode then recollect, explode, recollect’ (The Dream of the Unified Field 177). The 
self can stitch back together the shredded skin around the ‘hole’ in Being left by the 
discovery of the other. Blazer’s account is of a continual process inherent in language, 
though it is not clear whether only specific language acts, especially poetry, have this 
effect, nor whether this act of turning oneself inside out could rather be achieved as a 
developmental stage, an initiation into language use and full subjectivity (Is the 
significance of the wound of meaning the initial cut or the flow of blood that follows?) 
There are some echoes in this self-transcendence of the Pseudo-Dionysian epectasis of 
Chapter 2, seeking the loss of the self in pursuit of a Truth both more real and more 
personal, since the sought communion with God is the ultimate loss of the content of the 
self, but not utterly the self as self; the alignment of the self with perfect divinity 
obliterating the division between objective and subjective. The difference here is that on 
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Blazer’s model there is no original self to be transcended except as that act of 
transcendence into the gaze of the other. Subjectivity is created by its own recognition 
of its constraint by social and physical reality. 
The invocation of metaphor in ‘Dusk Shore Prayer’ quoted above (ll. 16-17) provides a 
way of both understanding Blazer’s thinking and of pointing out some of its excesses. A 
central part of the prayer of the poem seems to be for an escape from the continual 
deferral of meaning or failure of language to pick out things in the world. In common 
with the hesitations and revisions of the bracketed-off sections, the plea ‘to believe this 
truly,/ not in metaphor’ suggests that what can be represented in the poem (or conceived 
in language) falls short of the facts, that language at some level always operates as a 
clothing of reality (TLP 4.002) covering the thing in a way that protects it from our 
apperception. 
This observation is a generative factor in Blazer’s account, since the inescapable and 
irresolvable nature of language means that becoming objectified therein is precisely to 
give up on the idea that there might be a unique, contentful subject; the self becomes a 
metaphor, itself generated by a metaphor – the idea of a coherent subject. The poet 
battles with Manichean urges to both speak and remain silent: 
Silence rips the self asunder to a state of utter absence and intolerable negation; 
speech loses the self in the swirling storm of the symbolic order. Both end in 
failure – silence because it submits itself to an inadequacy of being in the face 
of the real other that the subject in the end can neither admit nor permit, and 
speech because it cannot adequately put forth one’s consciousness outside in 
order to simply engage, let alone surmount, the real of the other. Consequently, 
the perpetual vacillation between silence and speech constitutes human reality.  
(IAO 140) 
This account is variously productive and problematic, exhibiting a confusion between 
infinitely possible interpretation and a perpetual requirement to interpret, driven by an 
assumption that if language cannot represent the word it must be merely metaphorical. 
Though it is true that the signs we use in language are generated by us and our 
language, not the object under scrutiny itself, this does not mean that the relation has no 
existence at all (a notion that, as Bernard Harrison has argued, is a hangover from the 
idea that language must be either representational or arbitrary, ignoring our ‘structural 
fore-understandings’ (Inconvenient Fictions 251) in interpretations and the importance 
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of the practices that frame our forms of literature); rather, our practices – out of which 
language emerges, is controlled and evolves – allow us to establish generally acceptable 
and unacceptable uses of language, and practices are founded in our embodied and 
instinctual experience. Language is no more merely metaphorical than it is merely 
noise, or merely temporal; these are aspects of what we do. As Charles Altieri has 
argued, overlooking this fact lies behind much literary theory, in which the world has 
been ‘lost’ in language’s detachment from direct representation (‘Wittgenstein on 
Consciousness and Language’). In fact, this simply perpetuates the idea of a necessity 
for such representation, when our language is – as Wittgenstein shows – significantly 
more versatile and available. 
Much of the earlier part of Philosophical Investigations is devoted to showing how even 
small patterns of language are tied in with surrounding conventions, definitions, 
expectations, and so on. Ultimately, to imagine a language is to understand a form of 
life (§19); although always malleable in some directions, language is resistant in others 
(Z §§351, 374, 379). The adoption of words and gestures is not truly arbitrary, only 
contingent; ‘where are the bounds of the incidental?’ (PI §79). The view of language as 
infinitely interpretable therefore treats it like a layer of fog between us and the world, 
upon which meaning is imposed by the operations of the system. But this would make 
meaning a separate quality or process, an addendum – rather than seeing that within 
certain contexts meaning can be treated this way (as infinitely interpretable), but only 
because the majority of our language games do not require us to think in this way. 
Consider the following set of Wittgenstein’s remarks in Philosophical Investigations: 
The primitive reaction may have been a glance or a gesture, but it may also 
have been a word. 
Meaning is not a process which accompanies a word. For no process could 
have the consequences of meaning. 
How do I find the ‘right’ word? How do I choose among words? ... I do not 
always have to make judgements, give explanation... Sometimes I can say why.  
(emphases in original) (p 218)  
This provides a reminder that language, though certainly a system that precedes and 
exceeds the individual, is not something detached from human or worldly existence; the 
difference between a mere ‘animal’ response and the sophistication of language is a 
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matter of training and socialisation – Bildung – not an encoding that separates us off 
from the world. Our ‘standing obligation to engage in self-reflection’ (MW 126) that 
comes from socialisation also means that ‘to speak is to settle to be heard under some 
designation’ (Denise Riley ‘Lyric Selves’ 212). In the case of the poet, this includes 
accepting (as much as insisting) that one is heard as ‘a literary subject’, entering into a 
pre-existing conversation (212-3). 
Perhaps a helpful way of emphasising this acceptance of a role, which both enables and 
commits us to communicate, is the notion of voice. In The Claim of Reason Stanley 
Cavell repeatedly makes use of the idea of ‘finding one’s voice’ (e.g.:27-8, 110, 141, 
334, 447). Sometimes this relates to his analysis of Wittgenstein’s voice(s) in 
Philosophical Investigations, at others to the sense of responsibility and risk that comes 
from being a speaker, the processor of a voice – or the fear of losing one’s voice. The 
importance of maintaining disparate, even conflicting voices within Wittgenstein’s 
writing as part of his irreducible style, his yet unmistakeable voice is also discussed in 
‘The Investigation’s Everyday Aesthetics of Itself’.  
To have a voice is to have a (human) body. Other ideas of what it means to have a voice 
are largely parasitic on this idea, since electronically generated voices mimic or replace 
the lost human voice, animals only have voices insofar as we have given them a shading 
of anthropomorphism. (An animal can roar, bark, squeak or buzz, but to have a voice 
means attributing to it an intent, which may well be entirely true to that animal, but 
understood in terms of our own human wants or needs.) Further, a voice is something 
that we develop over time, both physically and in our relationships, politics, writing etc. 
(cf CR 27). It may be the best illustration of what undergoing the process of Bildung 
entails: responsibility, responsiveness, capacity. 
A writer develops such a voice, though there is nothing essential or prescriptive about 
this; writers reveal themselves differently, just as different readers can be more attuned 
to hearing a voice, or changes in it. Poetry can, as Elizabeth Austen puts it, be ‘a bridge 
between solitudes. At its best it transports us – through the nonlinear and irresistible 
persuasion of music and metaphor – into a state of receptive empathy’ (‘How Poetry 
Can Help Us Say the Unsayable’). But to understand the kind of work that Graham 
attempts to do on her inhabiting of subjectivity – the (re)porting of experience, the 
interrogation of responsibility – requires both the recognition of a voice and the ability 
to note its non-essential quality. Indeed, ‘voice’ seems to be a key factor in making 
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sense of the poetry. Despite changes in formal style during her career (compare the 
‘skinny’ poems of Hybrids of Plants and of Ghosts to the long lines adopted in 
Overlord, or the semi-rigid pattern of indented lines of Place) there is a recognisable 
quality to her harnessing of close observation and abstraction, the inter-penetration of 
inner and outer concerns and, often, a strange sense of distracted urgency, heightened 
and scattered by the re-doubling of thoughts or the use of brackets and blanks. Two 
concepts within Graham’s writing may illustrate this feeling of both ‘voice’ and 
‘objectivity’ of her lyric-I: the ‘glance’ and the intertwined notions of responsibility and 
incompleteness of meaning. 
In Isabel Galleymore’s essay ‘The Many Promises of Vision’, ‘the glance’ is introduced 
as a preoccupation of Graham's that emerges in the 1997 collection, The Errancy. ‘The 
glance’ may be taken here as a set of challenges that Graham identifies in the writing of 
poetry (and life more generally): that ‘seeing’ the world is always preconditioned by 
one’s position, attitude, memory etc., so that neutral experience (or subsequent 
description) remains beyond our grasp. We are surrounded by the ‘structural fore-
understandings’ which condition our interpretation of texts and experience 
(Inconvenient Fictions 251). Seeing the world is therefore inherently temporal, because 
there is no moment of pure apperception, but a series of movements, couplings and 
combinations of the practices that facilitate our lives – from ideologies to religious 
beliefs, genres, games and social settings. Consequently, no matter how immediately a 
poem, or any other experience, seeks to record an event, even the act of looking down at 
the page to write involves a break between the object and the description; that the 
materials of poems are thus at a remove from their purported objects. The glance 
connects and separates. Graham’s writing often reflects back on its own attempts to 
present an experience (such as the encounter with the homeless woman that sparked 
‘High Tide’ discussed in the interview quoted above.)  
Note here the distinction between ‘glance’ and ‘gaze’. Where the first implies a fleeting 
contact – perhaps a flirtation – that captures but remains at the end external to the thing 
perceived, the second is steady, penetrating, challenging. Blazer’s ‘gaze’ is a function of 
sustained attention and determination, whereas a ‘glance’ is an acknowledgement. The 
glance provides a certain space within which what is perceived can retain (or exceed) its 
status as object, rather than being claimed by the owner of the gaze. 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
204 
 
The lateness of vision thus implied recurs in many guises in Graham’s later collections, 
for instance ‘I went out afterwards to see.’ in ‘Recovered from the Storm’ (l. 1), in 
which the poem is something gained in the aftermath, rather than the storm something 
survived. (The Errancy 107); ‘If you look hard / it is a process of falling/ and squinting - 
& you are in-/terrupted again and again by change’ (ll. 1-4, ‘Nearing Dawn’ Sea 
Change) or ‘I can still/ feel it in my gaze, tonight, long after it is gone’ (‘No Long Way 
Round’ Sea Change 54). We are constantly reminded – as with the hesitations of ‘Dusk 
Shore Prayer’ – that the poem, even the experience of writing the poem, comes after, 
creates a break with, the experience it describes.  
Writing about an event is always necessarily subsequent to, and increasingly distant 
from, its putative subject. For this reason, Graham prefers to treat poems as a 
performance of (re)discovery rather than an attempted re-telling, generating moments of 
consciousness lived activity. Even as she writes, Graham appears to have one eye on the 
process of writing, commenting on the limitations and difficulties of finding the fine 
distinctions of meaning, ‘constantly turn[ing] her appalled eye on her own activity as 
she writes’ (Gardner Jorie Graham: Essays on the Poetry 6). The world is in that sense 
both ineffable and hyper-effable – there is no privileged access but our own fallible 
work; ‘Making sense of the world in language is inherently risky and an infinite task’ 
(Robert E. Innis. ‘Language and Thresholds of Sense’ 114). 
Our very seeing of the world is somewhat late, pre-filtered as it is by our perceptual 
capacities, interests and cultivated blind-spots. Though Graham does insist on the effort 
of re-creating immediacy – ‘porting’ not reporting events, by writing many poems in 
situ (Galleymore ‘The Many Promises of Vision’) – the reader is made constantly aware 
of this effort and its various codes, devices and failures. Put in Cavellian terms, in the 
‘violence of thinking’ (‘The Wittgensteinian Event’ 18) the World’s ‘presentness 
recedes with our attempts to make it present again’ (R. M. Berry, ‘Stanley Cavell’s 
Modernism’ 49). In Graham’s writing this manifests itself chiefly in questions of 
temporality, including the aforementioned hesitations and repetitions, as well as the 
difficulty of the notion of now – see for example ‘Other’ (The Taken-Down God) 
(which may also be an echo of the insistence on change in Wallace Stevens’ ‘Notes’): 
‘For a long time I used to love the word now. I murmured its / tiniest of songs to myself 
as a child when alone. Now now now/ now I sang’ (ll. 1-3)... ‘It could not be / absent’ 
(ll. 45-6). 
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Part of this is to acknowledge that what is “going on” is poetry, not reportage and, as 
has been noted, she does this by disclosing the formal and linguistic elements of the 
poem; Gardner comments on the ‘increasingly foregrounded stylistic means by which 
Graham replicates moments of consciousness’ (Jorie Graham: Essays on the Poetry 4). 
In fact, ‘some reviewers [have complained] that her linguistic records aren’t exactly 
poetry anymore’ (3), that they have become a meta-poetry that forgoes its supposed 
purpose in favour of a highly academic commentary on the notion of writing itself. 
This, however, is to ignore the many other issues Graham addresses in her work – 
especially ecology and the family – and the sonic and conceptual richness her verse 
produces, even while announcing itself as poetry. Leonard M. Scigaj argues that her 
distrust of closure and completeness, manifest in her linguistic and formalist delays and 
gaps, is a resistance to imperialist utilitarianism, making her writing political (even if, 
Scigaj claims, anthropocentric) (‘The World Was the beginning of the World’ 248). 
Alongside the complexities of observation noted in the ‘glance’, the incompleteness of 
meaning adds to the temporal depth and uncertainty of Graham’s writing. If the poem is 
a process of (re)creation, not only the writing but each reading must be felt as a 
productive event. Graham lets this idea of change play out in her published work, in 
poems that undermine their own completeness, refusing to look set or resolved. In 
‘Dusk Shore Prayer’ the stuttering bracket section at first appears to lead into a more 
definitely-voiced conclusion to the poem, with short direct sentences: 
As the sun goes down. Until it glimmers in 
the tiny darkness and the human will comes to the end. 
Having it go before one’s looking goes. The summer 
at one’s back. The path back barely findable.  (ll. 26-9) 
However, the sentences remain grammatically incomplete, so the effect is a slowing of 
the tempo, without actual resolution. The last line echoes formally, and ironises, the 
opening line of the poem (‘The creeping revelation of shoreline’), almost asking the 
question How did I get from there to here? The effect is to refer the reader cyclically 
back to the poem’s beginning, while withholding some core insight or moral that would 
render the piece completed. As Sean O’Brien put it in his review of ‘Place’, ‘This is 
writing not only about time but against time’.  
The operative image in the poem’s opening is the washing, tugging relation between the 
sea and the beach, suggesting an allusion to Wallace Stevens’ ‘The Idea of Order at Key 
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West’, but with the sharp relation of sea and singer replaced by intertwined movements 
of the shoreline. The difference between the poems being perhaps that Stevens 
eventually ‘turned / Toward the town... the glassy lights’, while Graham remains on the 
beach until the fading light renders distinctions invisible. We know, perhaps, less with 
certainty by the end than we knew at the beginning. 
Physicality and Absence of expression 
The ways in which such uncertainty and failure to mean are denoted in Graham’s 
writing can take many forms. As discussed above, the use of brackets, incomplete 
sentences and layered images batter against our normal codes of expression, stretching 
the language to breaking point. This section will take a brief look at the use of these 
interruptions of language as, in some ways, providing a genuine response to 
Wittgenstein’s question ‘For what does it mean “to discover that a sentence does not 
make sense”? (Z §274). What does it take for (suddenly or consistently) meaning to 
fail? 
Having discussed in Chapter 2 the philosophical import of nonsense, Graham’s 
demonstrative fracturing of propositional sense brings in a new level of disruption. Her 
sentences not only fail to mean in a propositional sense, they also fail to fail to mean, 
since her operation within the practice of poetry encourages the reader to respond in a 
specific, provisional way. Thus her repeated concerns with both the responsibility and 
risk of speaking: who is speaking and what is their relation to the sense of their own 
words, in a public, penetrating language?  
In posing this question of the limitations and responsibilities of conveying sense in a 
language that constantly defers and makes ambiguous meaning, it is important to keep 
in mind that there is a difference between ambiguity of meaning and meaning in 
general. This confusion can, for example, be found in Benjamin Ogden’s otherwise 
illuminating ‘What Philosophy Can’t Say about Literature: Stanley Cavell and 
Endgame’. By over-stating Cavell’s notions of meaning and the ordinary (as permitting 
loss-less paraphrase in the former case and as primary or ruling rather than underlying 
use in the latter) (135), Cavell’s insistence that our failure to grasp certain meanings is 
the result of our own aspect-blindness is made to look strange, if not imperialistic; that 
what something means can in specific cases be determined, even in cases of fractured 
language or partial information. But this is not Cavell’s position. Ordinary language 
does underlie but not determine our meanings, and if we speak beyond sense, as we 
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might in very many different ways, we contradict it. But still, as speakers with voices, 
we continue to make sense, or to allow senses to be imposed upon us, since our 
meaning or potential meanings show in our life and culture as a whole. This does not 
mean quite that it can be known what we mean, but it does mean that we expose 
ourselves to being understood, to being responsible for what we say. Odgen’s criticisms 
do not gain traction against this position, such that when he says ‘[In Endgame it] is 
Becket’s ability to retain a space of irresolvable ambiguity […] that invites continued 
investigation by the reader […] Without such a contested and unclaimable space, 
Beckett’s work would collapse’ (131-2), this is perfectly correct – provided that 
‘irresolvable ambiguity’ is not taken to mean a general or absolute failure to mean. 
Clearly Beckett performs the ways in which language is a flawed construct, but does so 
in a way that still rewards the attentive audience or reader. Cavell’s point is rather that 
this attentiveness is partial and structured by the practices we assent to or enter into, 
such that we have the tools to understand or be blind to subjects that are, often, too 
difficult to face directly. The example of non-human suffering, as mentioned in Chapter 
2, is a fertile area for such thinking. We have the language and the conceptual tools to 
discuss animal rights, notions of suffering and sentience, yet the very existence of such 
forms of discussion – debates of law or ethical principles, can be what prevents us from 
having to see – bear witness to – the individual and actual suffering of animals reared 
and killed for our own convenience and pleasure. We deflect the truly troubling reality 
of recognisable suffering into standardised forms of words and concepts. It is a distinct 
and torturous lack of ‘deflection’ (Cavell The Claim of Reason) or of coping skills, that 
drives Elizabeth Costello to become ‘exposed’ (The Difficulty of Reality and the 
Difficulty of Philosophy 72) and subsequently ‘unhinged’. 
Similarly, Graham’s work seems often anchored by an unrevealed core and carefully 
cultured ambiguity. Not only the unsayable or the unsaid but the deflected or denied can 
be conjured by the sort of linguistic breakdown Graham depicts – the bracketed text can 
be read against rather than as part of or addenda to the putative core text. For example, 
in ‘Underneath (Sibylline)’ (Swarm 23-25) the bracketed lines often take up the role of 
interlocutor, questioning or changing the preceding lines: ‘(Shouldn’t the red light 
blink?)’ or ‘(I can smell it, can’t you?)’. This internal mechanism of doubt and asides 
accents the play of consciousness it seeks to replicate. This is part of the attempt to 
‘port’ experiences into a poem, but is also a feature of the anxiety and difficulty of 
making meaning. It is a digression that Srikanth Reddy identified as singularly 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
208 
 
characteristic of modern American poetry and its excavation of the self. As briefly 
mentioned in Chapter 3, digression can be elusive, circular and invitingly open; it 
invites change through reading, not only of ‘the subject of one’s discourse, but also [of] 
the speaking subject’ (Changing Subjects 20).  
This split in attention or direction of thought is much like Wittgenstein’s use of 
interlocutor voices in Philosophical Investigations, without always making this explicit 
through font or punctuation. Indeed, it is often possible to read certain lines in multiple 
voices as things are proposed, then undermined or withdrawn. Graham’s interlocutors 
likewise seem charged with working out – like an equation, but also like a splinter – 
what wants to be said.  
Her asides hint at being ‘tempted to use such expressions [as go beyond the sayable]’ 
(LE 7) that one either falls short of, or immediately seeks to erase. This idea of the 
present-absence, the void in sense, can be found throughout Graham’s poetry, 
particularly starkly in the underscored blanks that begin to appear in The End of Beauty 
(1987), which Thomas J Otten has discussed in ‘Jorie Graham’s ________s’. In ‘To The 
Reader’, for example, Graham has the line ‘Mud, ash, __________, _____________ .’ 
Though there is insufficient space here to begin a detailed discussion of these blanks, it 
is worth noting that there are significant connections between the effect of the 
circumscribed (w)holes of the _______s and the fragmented/bracket text I have been 
discussing, not least the ‘wavering materiality’ (‘Jorie Graham’s ________s’ 240) of the 
ambiguous spaces created. Not only do these ___________s literally evoke 
Kierkegaard’s revoked texts, discussed in Chapter 2, but thereby call into question the 
act of revocation, which must, after all, have a context. In Graham’s poetry, the blanks 
can be guessed at, or can be treated as silences or regrets, telling us something about the 
poem’s speaker. The unexpressed, or repressed-expressed retains sufficient situatedness 
to communicate, at least, to the reader a puzzle or a feeling, or an incompleteness that 
itself lends importance to the text, as Wittgenstein suggests, contemplating Kierkegaard, 
might be the case with the incompleteness and contradictions of the Gospel stories (CV 
36e). Like Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations, Graham may also be conceived 
of as questioning the forms of writing that have been regarded as necessary for the 
treatment of certain questions – or self-conceptions – through fragmentation, 
formalisation, confession and retraction (Hent de Vries ‘From “ghost in the machine” to 
“Spiritual automaton”’ 78). Why does this or that constitute a poem or a sentence? What 
is revealed or taken back by these self-indicating gaps? 
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This association between bracketing and blanks reaches an interesting pitch in the 
graphic design featured on the landing page of Graham’s homepage: 
www.joriegraham.com:
 
Figure 1 Prayer03 Gregory Whitmore 2008 
Here, designer Gregory Whitmore has deleted all the text from one of Graham’s poems, 
leaving only the star-like punctuation, spaced as though still demarking the flow and 
pacing of the text. After some searching, it was possible to pinpoint the image as being 
of ‘Prayer’, which opens Graham’s collection Never. 
In this extreme form of a pseudo-utterance, an entire poem has been redacted yet 
preserved. It is not a random collection of dots. It refers. Does this constitute a denial of 
the original text or an enactment of its original attempt at meaning? Perhaps the text-art 
could be seen as more akin to a gesture than a proposition, performing similar 
destabilising work in our thinking about meaning as Piero Sraffa’s ‘Neapolitan gesture’ 
is supposed to have done for Wittgenstein’s thinking about logical form:  
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It [the anecdote] concerns a conversation in which Wittgenstein insisted that a 
proposition and that which it describes must have the same ‘logical form’ (or 
‘grammar’ depending on the version of the story). To this idea Sraffa made a 
Neopolitan gesture of brushing his chin with his fingertips, asking ‘What is the 
logical form of that?’ This, according to the story, broke the hold on 
Wittgenstein of the Tractarian idea that a proposition must be ‘picture’ of the 
reality it describes.  (Monk The Duty of Genius 260-1) 
In ‘What is the Logic of the That? Wittgenstein, Gesture, and the Arts’ Aaron Vinegar 
discussed Wittgenstein’s move after this encounter from the rigid propositional 
approach of the Tractatus towards what he calls a ‘language of gesture’ in the 
Philosophical Investigations: ‘Unlike a proposition or a logical form, there is no getting 
behind or above the gestural event, which embodies and unfolds its meaning in its very 
performance’ (1). I would suggest that Whitmore’s skeletal version of Graham’s poem 
is a gesture in this sense; its meaning is only available within the play between 
understanding or reconstructing it, and its resistance to giving up the poem and its 
meaning. This fleeting nature of gesture is also hinted at by the design, which fades out 
towards the bottom of the picture, like a voice slipping out of hearing. It clearly 
communicates yet withholds itself from definition separate from its context of 
encounter. 
The poem redacted by Whitmore ends with the lines ‘I cannot of course come back. Not 
to this. Never./ It is a ghost posed on my lips. Here: never.’ (Never 3). The partial 
deletion seems entirely apposite to Graham’s efforts to re-discover (not re-describe) 
moments of observation, consciousness and meaning in her poems, echoing the loss of 
the individuated moment, leaving only the markers of structure and time, the 
punctuation, behind. The flow into meaning that is the gesture of the poem both realises 
and obliterates itself, saving being caught up by an understanding reader. The necessary 
assistance of the reader, as witness to what is supposed to be happening, not merely 
being retold, is sometimes a conscious part of her process (‘Interview with Thomas 
Gardner’ The Paris Review No. 165, Spring 2003).  
Similarly, a prayer, dedicated by the speaker, must be given up, submitted, to fulfil its 
nature. What then would be the effect of re-uttering it, retaining it as a static text? 
Perhaps the gesture would be empty; perhaps the attempt would be impossible. 
 ‘TO THE READER’: THE POEM AS GROUND, THE POEM AS ABYSS 
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This unsettling poem begins in an assertion of certainty and truth, and ends in startling 
images of the impossibility of such surety in language and experience. ‘To the Reader’, 
first published in The End of Beauty but also anthologised in The Dream of the Unified 
Field, begins ‘I swear to you’, immediately demanding a relationship of trust with the 
reader. It continues, ‘she wanted back into the shut, the slow,// a ground onto which to 
say This is my actual life, Good Morning’. What follows appears to be a story of 
Graham’s childhood, the beginnings of her poetry – historical grounding for the 
truthfulness of what follows. If we can take at face value that ‘That girl on her knees 
[...] is me’, Graham parallels her engagement with the solidity of the earth and nature 
with her writing; like an archaeological dig, it is a matter of ‘digging that square yard of 
land up / to catalogue and press onto the page all that she could find in it’. The world 
appears as comprised of knowable, useable things to be discovered, rather than created. 
Like the Augustinian picture of language given in the opening quote of Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations, exploring the world is a matter of learning how to name 
and order what is already there rather than a generative act as such (§1). This grounding 
of what one finds has obvious attractions – that one’s discoveries have their own truth, 
duration and identity; the solidity of earth is a source of authority. 
The archaeological metaphor continues in ‘To The Reader’, as the girl finds herself 
increasingly able to order and arrange her world (not merely to catalogue it, but to 
change, judge and destroy its elements): 
She took the spade and drew the lines. Right through 
the weedbeds, lichen, moss, keeping the halves of things that landed in 
by chance, new leaves, riff-raff the wind blew in―   (ll.25-7) 
and 
She will take the ruler and push it down till it’s all the way in. 
She will slide its razor-edge along through colonies, tunnels, 
through powdered rock and powdered leaf, 
and everything on its way to the one right direction  (ll.31-34) 
The image of the hand as the organ of work noted in ‘Opulence’ is clearly present again 
here, as the girl finds new and powerful ways to relate to the world. Moreover, as a 
history of beginning to write poetry, the text shows the awareness of being able to do 
things with words beyond recognising and repeating their established meanings; the 
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power to manipulate our inherited speech towards things previously unexpressed – by 
oneself or even anyone. 
However, Graham is unable to leave things there. Her restless exploration of her images 
leads into questions of whether this picture of a self managing her language is 
sustainable; whether it is incomplete or, indeed, too complete: 
   Say we 
 
leave her there, where else is there to go? A word, 
a mouth over water? Is there somewhere 
neither there nor here?  (ll.47-50) 
This questioning allows multiple layers of meaning to come into operation. Initially it 
brings back into focus the story-ness of the girl in her ‘square yard of land’ (l.4), 
creating both temporal and narrative distance from the reader, like a camera zooming 
out on a scene we had previously seen in close-up; we are once again reminded of the 
formal structures at play in Graham’s creating of a poem. Then, Graham alludes to her 
positioning of the poem specifically against a poetic background, with her nod to 
Shakespeare’s Sonnet 18 in line 47: ‘(shall I compare thee)’. The hole in which the girl 
digs becomes the practice within which we find and manipulate meaning – it becomes a 
whole language ‘we must plough through’, including its different practices and rituals, 
its heterogeneous elements, words and pictures (RFGB 131).  
Blazer takes a further step in interpreting this poem, positioning the void which is the 
‘neither there nor here’ as the poem – the act of writing – itself, working to open up the 
‘wound of meaning’. Certainly, the unforgettably strange image at the end of the poem 
seems to serve this reading: 
and to some it is the hole on the back of the man running 
through which what’s coming towards him is coming into him, growing 
 larger, 
a hole in his chest through which the trees in the distance are seen 
growing larger shoving out sky shoving out storyline 
until it’s close it’s all you can see this moment this hole in his back 
in which now a girl with a weed and a notebook appears.  (ll. 64-70) 
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Vendler reads the gap, the hole in the man’s chest, as Graham’s realisation that all 
search for conclusions or antitheses in language is futile; ‘the desire for interpretation is 
simply a yawning vacancy, lethal to all hope of integrated summary in language’ (‘Jorie 
Graham: The Nameless and the Material’); understanding can never be closed. Blazer 
instead sees the hole in the man as expressive of the ‘overunning’ of writing (especially 
poetry) which will always exceed the possible questions set by or asked of the writer; 
the writer is therefore placed at the heart of the gap in subjectivity, generating or 
sustaining the hole through which the poet (the ‘girl with a weed and a notebook’) is 
seen, through the competing demands of self-expression in the writer and explanation in 
the reader. As noted above, in thinking about the distinction between the ‘wound’ itself 
and the flow through the wound of meaning, the generating/sustaining distinction 
remains ambiguous here; Blazer states that poetry ‘becomes the abyss’ (IAO 136) 
through which the writer is seen, but this seems at odds with Graham’s poem (and other 
ideas about language discussed here) wherein the void appears as a consequence or a 
condition of the poem.  
In fact, Blazer uses the final image of the poem without also noting that it is merely one 
of a string of images that touch on the voids inhabiting language; though the final image 
may refer to the poet in particular, others refer to religious or materialist responses to 
the incompleteness of the self (ll.57-62). There is no suggestion in the poem that the 
images are sequential or mutually exclusive. Blazer’s more restricted reading reflects, 
one suspects, the more abstracted vision of poetry and language that his approach 
entails. It is perhaps illuminating that the man is mistakenly described as having a whole 
in his head, rather than his chest (IAO 136) – an unconscious prioritising of the mental 
and symbolic over activity and embodiment. Graham’s list of many varied ‘holes’, by 
contrast, may be making a much simpler (but not simplistic) point about how the 
diverse ways in which the nature of language opens up gaps and undecidables is 
reflected in our practices, one of which is the attempt to see the poet in the poem. 
However, though this simpler reading may assist in escaping the more vertiginous trails 
of trying to capture the idea of the self, or the nature of the writer, this is not the offer of 
a solution or conclusion. If the call to attentiveness about our everyday practices that 
marks Graham’s poetry generally – seen in the child’s play in digging a hole, a walk on 
the beach, studying flowers in bloom – can allow us, for a time, to put aside the 
temptations of speculative philosophy, this is in exchange for giving up on certain ideas 
of certainty and permanence. We must let go of the idea that the self can be 
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exhaustively described as we imagine it might be – or better, we must sometimes come 
to see that, like Stevens’ Blackbird, we are not really imagining what we think we are 
able to imagine. The ‘wound of meaning’ is thus closer to the continuous flow through 
the wound than the rent itself, as we constantly allow ourselves to be immersed in (and 
be given shape by) the world – social and physical – around us. 
This chapter has endeavoured to show how the ineffable endogenous to language is 
interrogated through Jorie Graham’s poetic practice, as inheritor and refresher of the 
Romantic and Modernist streams of Wallace Stevens’ work. The self immersed in and 
generated by language is revealed as much in the stutterings and digressions of language 
as in its smooth flow and in the responsibilities assumed in making meaning. This 
illustrates some of the methodological and stylistic elements of Wittgenstein’s later 
work, also, while a Wittgensteinian reminder of the embodiment of language in our 
practices (and vice versa) serves to domesticate some more speculative accounts of the 
self. In part this relies on pointing out where analogies have come loose of their roots 
and no longer appear as analogies (BT §87). 
The next chapter returns to a consideration of Wittgenstein’s own text of Philosophical 
Investigations, paired with Kei Miller’s collection The Cartographer Tries to Map a 
Way to Zion. Considering Wittgenstein’s systematic use of metaphor in this work and 
others, and the implications of his geographical images, is shown to be important for 
understanding his philosophical ambitions and frustrations. Our modes of discourse in 
part determine what can be expressed and how, and just so poetry can play a role in 
freshening our awareness of our long established grooves of thought (Z §359). 
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Chapter Five: Cartographic metaphor 
in Philosophical Investigations and the 
poetry of Kei Miller.     
    
Introduction 
The later Wittgenstein’s use of recurring metaphors and analogies as a central part of his 
philosophical method has been well documented. Discussions about his choice of style 
and manner of argument are plentiful, including accounts that seek to discover the 
proper philosophical arguments behind the phrasing and those that hold it to be more 
productive to treat the writing as a work of literature, inseparable from its style. 
Philosophical Investigations in particular has attracted rival approaches to reading. 
Among the accounts I have in mind particularly, amongst others cited in this thesis, are 
Stanley Cavell’s ‘The Investigations’ Everyday Aesthetics of Itself’, Marjorie Perloff’s 
Wittgenstein’s Ladder, ‘Wittgenstein and Literary Language’ (Jon Cook and Rupert 
Read), Mark W. Rowe’s ‘Success Through Failure: Wittgenstein and the Romantic 
Preface’, Richard Eldridge’s Leading a Human Life, and Béla Szabados’ Wittgenstein 
as Philosophical Tone-Poet. Some further examples of treatments of Philosophical 
Investigations as poetry or inspiration for it are given in the next chapter. 
This chapter, while avoiding conflating the activities of philosophy and literature, 
attempts to take seriously a number of the key analogies used in Philosophical 
Investigations, to show how by interrogating them we can better understand both 
Wittgenstein’s reason for using them and the implications for his ideas. The focus will 
be on one particular system of analogies within the work – of landscapes, maps, roads 
and journeys – and their effects on our capacity to think about the operations of 
language and philosophy. In a domestication of the inexpressible of the type explored in 
previous chapters, this chapter provides a case study of the possibilities and restrictions 
of a particular mode of thinking; what it is permitted, conceivable or purposeful to say 
(CV 32e) – what Juliet Floyd in her resolute reading of the Tractatus calls the 
Fragestellung within which philosophical enquiry might proceed (‘Wittgenstein and the 
Inexpressible’ 188). Throughout this thesis, it has been argued that Wittgenstein draws 
attention to how what we see and say in the world, particularly philosophical 
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puzzlement, is partly dependent on the words and logical frameworks we use in our 
language and our practices. This chapter explores the linguistic and methodological 
framework that Wittgenstein developed in his later thinking, and what this framework 
does for his philosophy and this text in particular. 
The effort is in many ways literary, and will make some of its arguments on the basis of 
literary examples, chiefly from Kei Miller’s collection The Cartographer Tries to Map 
a Way to Zion. This collection places notions of mapping, landscape and language at the 
centre of its concerns, using them to write about identity, expression and oppression, as 
well as studying the histories and rhythms of cartographical language itself. The poems 
therefore provide a deeper and alternative exploration of the metaphors under scrutiny, 
while also opening up a channel for discussing the ethical concerns implicit in, and 
underpinning Wittgenstein’s imagery. Simultaneously, by considering the ramifications 
of the language Wittgenstein used, an opportunity for further engagement with Miller’s 
poetry is created, in a consciously interdisciplinary way. As many scholars have argued, 
for example Andrea Selleri in ‘Literary Examples in Analytic Aesthetics: The Claim of 
the Empirical’ and Stein Haugom Olsen in ‘The Discipline of Literary Studies’  a 
historical and permeable perspective on literature as a discipline (both subject matter 
and technique) can be materially productive and help us to avoid taking for granted the 
staging devices of our investigations. A further point, though I am only able to touch on 
it briefly in this chapter, is how both Miller and Wittgenstein make use of complexly 
related (not to say disciplining) interlocutors in their writing. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
the interlocutory voices have a number of roles in Philosophical Investigations, as 
warnings, temptations, gut-reactions, straw men and tools of persuasion. Likewise, 
Miller’s Cartographer and Rastaman interact not as good guy/ bad guy, nor as a blunt 
dichotomy. They function as a way of bringing into focus the dissolution of apparent 
opposites or equivalencies; this reflects how dialogue and characterisation can bring us 
to see things not captured by conceptual analysis alone. Stanley Cavell’s remarks on 
metaphor cast a helpful light on how this chapter’s attention to Wittgenstein’s and 
Miller’s language choices bear fruit: ‘metaphor transcends criteria not as if to repudiate 
our mutual attunement but as if to pressure this attunement (under which pressure 
certain of our attunements with others will fail; but with certain others the attunement 
will be intensified and refined)’ (In Quest of the Ordinary 147-8). Both poet and 
philosopher engage in testing our language(s), in ways that break its spells over us, or 
strengthen our bonds with other speakers, intuiting new moments of expression. 
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Maps, Journeys and Landscapes 
In part, this chapter stems from an ongoing aim to categorise Wittgenstein’s network of 
analogies, and thereby provide another way of thinking about his choices of 
presentation. Aspects such as the complex relations between sight and thought, the 
concentration on physical activity, and the interplay of everyday scenes with strange 
fantasy societies, might all be brought into a new light by charting their varied use and 
connections. The analysis is based on the English text of G.E.M. Anscombe’s 
translation of Philosophical Investigations (1986 edition); a bi-lingual analysis might 
have generated more results, though likely not significantly; likewise other editions. I 
mined the text using common terms and phrases associated with journeys, landscapes 
and mapping. Some phrases are well known, such as the remark in the Preface: ‘[t]he 
philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes 
which were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings’ (my emphases) 
(vii) for which key terms I sought out additional instances. Other terms were part of the 
usual network of expressions connected with these practices. A full account of all the 
instances in which relevant phrases or images occur would be, in its current form, 
unwieldy, so in this chapter I will only reference (as footnotes) key phrases as they are 
deployed as part of the ongoing argument. Footnotes beginning ‘cf PI’ indicate where 
the marked term or phrase occurs in Philosophical Investigations. 
One interesting feature of Wittgenstein’s writing is his attention to specific expressions 
and analogies, involving continual revision of his manuscripts. I argue that there are 
distinct phases of metaphor in his writings, including spatial or geometric metaphors in 
the Tractatus, particularly the ladder metaphor and the idea of meaning as a function of 
suitably arranged or connected elements (e.g.: TLP 3.121, 3.4, 4.463, 6.54) The 
following sources provide a deeper treatment of ‘logical space’: Jerry H. Gill 
‘Wittgenstein and Metaphor’ 272-274, Andrew Peach’s ‘Possibility in the Tractatus’ 
and.Hacker’s Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies 23). In On Certainty there is 
a shift towards geological images, of things layered, shifting through natural processes, 
or interdependent parts, such as the bedrocks of streams (§99), systems of ideas (§126), 
grounds and foundations (§204) or hinges on which other beliefs rely and pivot (§§341, 
343, 655). Briefly, I would suggest that the notions of depth indicate an emphasis on the 
‘natural history’ of humans, and the accompanying awareness of how our behaviours 
are temporally and biologically rooted (to continue a similar metaphor). Wittgenstein’s 
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later interest in anthropology and ritual, especially in Remarks on Frazer’s Golden 
Bough, discussed elsewhere in this thesis, reflects this outlook. 
In Philosophical Investigations geographical or movement metaphors dominate, 
perhaps best summed up by §457, ‘meaning something is like going up to someone’. 
Though the focus of this chapter are the geographical and cartographical images, there 
are clear parallels between the activity implied in these metaphors of movement and 
examples of activities (language games etc.) and Wittgenstein’s move towards 
descriptions of diverse human life. The actual word ‘map’ only occurs in one section of 
PI, §653, and it is not used as a direct metaphor for language, but as an example of the 
confusions that can arise in looking for an explicit definition of reading, or 
understanding. In this section, Wittgenstein asks the following: at what point can one be 
said to be ‘following’ a map, if unable to provide any of the normal structures of 
explanation that constitute being able to read it? Ultimately, someone’s behaviour must 
relate to the language game of following a map – the determination of which is a matter 
of agreement or consequences, rather than set criteria (§§654-5). However, 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of our encounters with language – and especially the activity 





 of finding one’s way about,
34





 These are all very grounded and active images in the text, and comprise a 
striking contrast to the idea of lofty contemplation usually associated with 
philosophising. Cavell, whose insistence on embodiment, action, voicing and personal 
involvement emerges from his reading of Wittgenstein as a literary stylist and 
intellectual irritant, likewise rejects the idea of a general philosophical solution. Any 
satisfactory account or telling example such as Wittgenstein seeks, lays open a path that 
others can follow but only for themselves through their engagement, not because a 
universal truth has been revealed: ‘the authority of exemplarity in the articulation of 
response instead of the authority of abstraction’ (Eldridge ‘Criticism and the Risk of the 
                                                             
32 cf PI vii.   
33 cf PI vii, §398, §509, p197, p200, p205. 
34 cf PI §123, §203, §664, p202. 
35 cf PI §85, §139, §203, §525, §534, p213, §653. 
36 cf PI §25, §38, §107, §139, §172, §183, §398, §444, §615, §653, p215, p216. 
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Self’ 94). The question is whether these kinds of activities can provide us with what we 
long for – a way of understanding the world, or orienting ourselves within it – or 
whether they lack the distance needed to obtain a clear view of that world. 
37
 
The idea(l) of a clear view 
A central idea in Wittgenstein’s understanding of language and our language games is 
the desire we have for obtaining a ‘perspicuous representation’ (PI §122) of our 
practices, as has also been mentioned in previous chapters. Translations of the original 
German ‘übersichtlichen Darstellung’ are varied, with different emphases. It is given as 
‘surveyable representation’ by Hacker (Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning), 
which immediately connects with ideas of map-making, as does ‘birds-eye view’ 
(Philosophical Remarks), and to a lesser extent Nicholas Gier’s ‘synoptic 
representation’ (Wittgenstein and Phenomenology 12). Wittgenstein is thought of in 
Hacker’s account as producing a map or table of our philosophical puzzlements caused 
by grammar and our immersion in it, or of aspiring to an unencumbered view of the 
playing fields of our puzzlement. However, despite this apparently helpful link between 
mapping and Wittgenstein’s geographical metaphors, I agree with Beth Savickey’s 
defence of Anscombe’s translation, ‘perspicuous representation’ (‘Wittgenstein and 
Hacker: Übersichtliche Darstellung’). As well as retaining Wittgenstein’s interest in 
clarity, rather than completeness or comprehensiveness, this translation better fits the 
overall composition of Wittgenstein’s metaphor-set, in which he is less a cartographer 
than a traveller, or a guide. He deals in local phenomena rather than standardising maps. 
As I will argue in what follows, we may have the ambition of the cartographer, or aerial 




Since we are always immersed in our language games as they unfold and can only truly 
understand them from within, we lack the clear overview that we would sometimes like 
to attain in being able to explain them from the outside. And this limitation is a 
frustration. Within particular language games, the lack of an overview is partly to do 
with the difference between ‘knowing’ and ‘inhabiting’ a practice (like the difference 
between knowing the words of a language and being a native speaker of it) and partly to 
                                                             
37 cf PI §5, §24, §89, §92, §122, §125, §126, §132, §435, p198, p213, p224. 
38 For further discussion of the distinction between Vorstellung and Darstellung, and the exteriorisation 
that a translation of Darstellung needs to include, for which ‘representation’ is adequate, but perhaps 
not ideal, see Eldridge Leading a Human Life 176-7. 
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do with the different demands that are made of the concepts we want to explain when 
they are ‘in use’ or ‘on display’; sometimes a sharp-edged definition is wanted, 
sometimes a blurred edge, or a series of examples (PI §77). There is also the feeling 
(which may be thought of as characteristic of the philosophical mind-set) that only an 
absolutely outside perspective will do if we are to really explain things, including 
language itself. If we could escape from the particularities of application we would 
better understand the functions and rules of particular words or games. We would, as it 
were, be able to speak about language from outside, if only we could strip away all of 
the ambiguities and qualifications of actual use. Although certainly distinct from the 
ladder metaphor at the end of the Tractatus (6.54), the ascent metaphor implicit in 
attaining this perspicuous representation draws on similar feelings of escape, stillness 
and clarity that would be achieved by getting above the ambiguities and contingencies 
of our existence. 
There are different ways in which Wittgenstein’s use of perspicuous representation can 
be taken, especially given the variably interpretable phrasing of §122: ‘The concept of a 
perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of 
account we give, the way we look at things.’ I will briefly describe two divergent 
applications of this remark to illustrate these possibilities: David Schalkwyk’s analysis 
of earthbound and airborne metaphors of philosophy in ‘Wittgenstein’s “Imperfect 
Garden”’ and John Gibson’s discussion of literature and standards in ‘Reading for 
Life’.
39
 In each case it is instructive to consider the limitations of the idea of a 
perspicuous representation, and to what extent these limitations are themselves part of 
Wittgenstein’s approach. 
A lot hinges on how we understand the words ‘concept’ and ‘we’ to operate in §122. 
Schalkwyk takes the ‘we’ to refer to ‘the philosopher who wishes to get above the 
                                                             
39 Other applications of the concept of perspicuous representation are of course possible, such as a clear 
understanding of our grammar, on the normative account of rules discussed in Chapter 1 and below, as 
an attempt at a value-neutral overview of diverse cultural phenomena (D. Z. Phillips Faith After 
Foundationalism)or as Wittgenstein’s proffered alternative to historical or scientific explanations of 
human activities, as Brian Clack gives in Wittgenstein, Frazer, and Religion (53-4), noting the 
resemblance between PI §122-3 and Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, particularly ‘This perspicuous 
representation is of fundamental importance for us. It denotes the form of our representation, the way 
we see things [...] we “see the connections” (RFGB 133). Clack’s application is certainly productive, and 
has some echoes with Wittgenstein’s seeing himself as representing a ‘spirit’ at odds with the culture of 
his age (see also below), but does oscillate between treating the concept as a methodology and a 
metaphor for language or philosophy; there is a tension between the idea of an overview and the 
assemblage of examples and reminders discussed in Chapter 3, which is in part the reason for adopting 
the view of the concept described in this chapter. 
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hurly-burly of ordinary language-games in order to see and make the necessary 
therapeutic connections that will free us from the bewitchments induced by our usual 
inextricable situatedness in linguistic practice’ (‘Wittgenstein’s “Imperfect Garden”’ 
60). In other words, he equates the desired ascent with the Wittgensteinian project of 
explaining philosophical confusions by obtaining a clearer perspective on what puzzles 
and distracts us. If we do not (currently) command a clear view, it is because we need to 
remove the debris of everyday use or intellectual habits, in order to avoid philosophical 
cul-de-sacs and questions that remain unanswerable.  
Looked at this way Wittgenstein’s philosophical technique can be seen as guiding us in 
this direction, pointing out obstacles, like someone familiar with the territory assisting a 
visitor. Schalkwyk notes the elevated position of the perspicuous representation, and 
contrasts it instructively with the more earthbound activities of criss-crossing 
landscapes mentioned above. How can we both continue our necessarily involved 
language games (at ground level) while also looking for the ‘clear representation from 
above’ (61)? He reads this tension between the metaphors as an unresolved desire for 
the clarity of philosophical abstraction (or the escape of the Tractarian ladder), and one 
which eventually proves a frustration for Wittgenstein. The overview is linked with the 
search for a ‘redeeming word’ (55), the ‘erlösende Wort’ that features repeatedly in 
Wittgenstein’s Notebooks (e.g.: January 20, 1915, June 03, 1915). Wittgenstein frames 
the solution to his work and puzzlement as constituted by the presentation of the single 
word or expression that brings into clarity what is otherwise said only in half-sense or 
muddle. To find it will ‘put an end to intellectual restlessness’ (‘Wittgenstein’s 
“Imperfect Garden”’ 55) according to Schalkwyk, but the search proves unending, and 
brands the philosopher as a perpetual itinerant, never able to settle in or summarise the 
surrounding landscape (62). This is in many ways a more nuanced and productive 
reading than the view that finding the right way of speaking (or not speaking) entirely 
stills the urge to speak the inexpressible, or to resist philosophising, though this may be 
a matter of temperament (James C Klagge, Wittgenstein in Exile 129). 
The trouble with this reading of §122, attentive though it is, is that the frustration 
described is attributed to the Wittgensteinian method in a way that suggests the 
difficulty was not foreseen, or that the eggshells of an earlier philosophy (CV 51e) are 
still found to be clinging to the new approach, and not rejected but treasured. But this 
seems to miss the central difference of Wittgenstein’s method: that the frustration is not 
a surprise, or something eventually to be overcome, but something that has to be faced 
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up to, and worked with, despite the acknowledgement that philosophy will never 
permanently come to an end – the redeeming word is a moment of peace or rest, not an 
epiphany. We not only ‘inhabit’ our language but must ‘sustain and amend [it] in our 
ongoing activities of judgement’ (Luntley Wittgenstein, Meaning and Judgement vii). I 
argue that if we take the words ‘concept’ and ‘we’ in §122 differently, we can attribute 
the ‘we’ not to the small band of Wittgensteinian philosophers, but to ‘us’ more 
generally – the range of humanity that may include philosophers in general in their 
attempts to analyse and understand language, politicians looking for the best means of 
persuasion, Christmas party attendees working out social niceties, and so forth. We have 
a sense that to command our language game is to get a clear view of it, to be able to 
partially stand above it in ways that other players cannot. This might be illustrated by 
the common footballing expressions, that a clever pass shows ‘great vision’ or that 
reliable defending involves being able to expertly ‘read the game’. Within such 
particular language games, an overview is sometimes, and to varying degrees, 
achievable, and we therefore have the concept of a perspicuous representation. 
However, when it comes to the kind of absolutely general overview that philosophers 
tend to seek, we have the concept but no way of making it real, since we have as yet 
provided no context for it, and cannot; our perfectly understandable desire for it is 
doomed to failure. This is, I propose to argue, a key Wittgensteinian insight – not that 
the clear view is needed but difficult (and the objective of much philosophical activity) 
nor that the very idea of a clear view is nonsense. Rather, the desire for such an 
understanding is simultaneously present and understandable, yet unfulfillable. That is 
why the philosopher remains earthbound and restless. This is not a flaw in 
Wittgenstein’s method, but a key part of it; without that realisation, the continuation 
would be not work but torture. The difficulty of this kind of philosophy comes from 
having to accept an element of perpetual frustration, release from which can only be 
momentary.  
The momentariness of release again finds a parallel in Cora Diamond’s ‘The Difficulty 
of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy’, in which empathy with another, born of 
imagination and recognition of a kind of personhood, permits the leap between minds, 
even very different ones (72). We can, partially and briefly, know what it is to be that 
other, see the world in a new way, without any requirement to be able to put this 
knowing into rational or propositional terms. Indeed, any attempt to put this into 
language, at least in terms of statements of facts, might only yield nonsense, since these 
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are not the kinds of sentences required. Many of Wittgenstein’s analogies for coming to 
understand a meaning similarly capture a sudden or startling feeling – (PI §§6, 506, 
p196, p210) – continuous with the mood of activity and movement displayed by the 
whole text of Philosophical Investigations, which can itself be treated as a performance 
or a game (Richard Eldridge Leading a Human Life; G.L. Hagberg Meaning and 
Interpretation: Wittgenstein, Henry James, and Literary Knowledge 14). ‘[T]his 
language-game is played’ (Emphasis in original. PI §654). Here, rather than 
understanding another, however, it is more a case of coming to understand ourselves 
(singular and plural) by bringing into view how our practices shape our expressions, and 
how these can themselves be changed (can change us) in various ways.  
John Gibson has a similarly grounded idea of what a perspicuous representation could 
be, in ‘Reading for Life’. The challenge of our failure to understand is not met by a 
flight away from our language practices, but by the accumulation of helpful examples, 
so that where we are puzzled we are shown how to carry on, but in such a way that 
nothing seems strange, nothing appears to stand in need of explanation. A perspicuous 
representation does not explain anything. It rather demystifies what we once found 
“queer” (118). This does not mean that for each case there is a perfect example, or a 
standpoint from which we can see everything – there simply is no ‘God’s-eye view’ 
(119) that could be attained. Instead, with patience and attention to how we use our 
language, we can provide a series of intermediate cases that serve particular purposes. 
Gibson’s retention of the provisional and ordinary nature of our relief is effective; there 
is no transformative information, only a new view on things and a series of fixes. It is 
important to remember, though, that this sage advice will only satisfy the philosophical 
urge temporarily. We have always to guard against our desire to make our world fully 
comprehensible. How do we continue to resist the temptation of generalisation, without 
giving up the work of philosophy altogether?  
Both Gibson and Schalkwyk go on to describe how literary examples can be made to do 
the kind of therapeutic work that their conception of philosophical restlessness requires, 
which I will briefly say more about later. Meanwhile, I will return to the metaphors of 
maps and landscapes, to show how Wittgenstein’s repeated uses can create the series of 
reminders that are needed to keep us grounded and engaged. We can attempt to be 
continually prepared for the compromises and limitations of our situated worldview, 
and this is part of the effectiveness of Wittgenstein’s choice of imagery: the map, 
symbol of order and overview, can be revealed as a vehicle of compromise. 




In ‘Glimpses of Unsurveyable Maps’ David Wagner has given a many-faceted account 
of Wittgenstein’s use of the map metaphor, alongside examples of imagined or 
impossible maps in literature. It provides a reminder of the specific kind of compromise 
that a map is, without which the notion becomes absurd. A map cannot replicate the 
world it represents in such detail that it becomes a suffocating replica, as happens in 
Jorge Luis Borges’ ‘On Scientific Rigor’ (‘Glimpses of Unsurveyable Maps’ 366). 
Neither, though, can a ‘perfect’ map be one that is impossible to misread because it 
shows nothing at all, as The Bellman’s chart in Lewis Carroll’s ‘Hunting of the Snark’ 
demonstrates. Nor can a map go “all the way down”, like Josiah Royce’s idea of a map 
that is so perfectly, self-reflexively accurate that it contains a scale version of itself, 
which contains a scale version of itself and so on ad infinitum. (‘Glimpses of 
Unsurveyable Maps’ 369). However, despite this necessary distance and difference 
from what it represents, a map must contain some connection with its own context in 
order to be useful, which may be considered a form of self-reflexiveness. This notion is 
pursued by Ben Smith in ‘Beating the Bounds’, in which the physical, experiential form 
of mapping created by the British tradition of beating the bounds affects both the 
landscape and those initiated into it through the ritual, connecting this linkage between 
map and its readers with the poetry of ‘dwelling space’ and its borders in the poetry of 
John Burnside. Movement through the unfamiliared-familiar marks much of Burnside’s 
poetry, as discussed in Chapter 2. A map need not of course be a thing of paper and ink, 
as Smith’s example illustrates. It must, however, be sufficiently like a map to be 
recognised as one, even if it turns out to be a very bad or misleading one: ‘Maps will 
only get us lost if we know how to read them’ (Eric Bulson Novels, Maps, Modernity 
131). 
Wagner claims that ‘in a contextual sense every useful map is a map-within-a-map. For 
what use would a map of Oxfordshire be to someone lost in Lower Austria?’ (‘Glimpses 
of Unsurveyable Maps’ 371). But this ignores the fact that a map could be used for 
navigation outside of its own field of depiction, such as when planning a trip, or using 
its scaling to mark off how far one has travelled, or learning how to read another, more 
useful, map by studying the keys and signs of cartographical orthodoxy, and so on. 
However, the more general point still applies: a map must contain enough that is 
comprehensible to the reader and the context if it is to do more than play to our hunches 
(cf OC §201).   
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The point of the map metaphor is that it combines the method by which Wittgenstein 
sought to progress, while also showing that this method itself only makes sense relative 
to a context. A map is useful because it is limited, and has certain omissions and 
assumptions. When the importance of each map’s particularity of design and application 
are forgotten the map becomes counter-productive or ridiculous. In this sense the 
‘useless maps’ Wagner describes become useful, ‘[i]f only as inspirational material for 
philosophers’ (‘Glimpses of Unsurveyable Maps’ 372-3). More pertinently, perhaps, 
they can act as reminders of the dangers of philosophical ambition, and the over-
application of our productive pictures and metaphors. 
These considerations of mapping, however, tend to come at the image from only one 
side, as it were. We draw or use a map to find our way about in a landscape, one that 
seems to predate and dwarf us as we traverse it. Rowe is right to note that the journey
40
 
through the Wittgensteinian landscape is usually rural or mountainous
41
 – through 
something discovered and to all intents and purposes permanent – rather than the built 
and designed world of a city (‘Success Through Failure: Wittgenstein and the Romantic 
Preface’ 87). Where the city metaphor does come into play in Philosophical 
Investigations, it is usually still an under-populated ‘ancient city’ (§18) and tends to be a 
restrictive or disorientating place, rather than something that can be criss-crossed and 
explored
42
; here we follow paths but do not create them.
43
 Most often, the map 
metaphor suggests a landscape; the journeys are on foot and through countryside. One is 
hard-pressed not to associate the image with Wittgenstein striding across the dramatic 
countryside of Norway or Austria, or taking a riverside walk with a friend, deep in 
conversation, so often recalled in Recollections of Wittgenstein. (This biographical note 
may be irrelevant to how we understand and apply the metaphor itself – that is, its 
signification – though it perhaps explains some of its continuing appeal, both for 
Wittgenstein and for us.) The map is the means by which we navigate the landscape, or 
                                                             
40 cf PI vii. 
41 cf PI p200. 
42 cg PI §89, §206, §243, §308, p185. 
43 Wittgenstein’s association between cities and rules, and the estrangement work that philosophy may 
be tasked with is also illustrated in O. K. Bouwsma’s Wittgenstein Conversations 1949-1951 (35) ‘When 
you leave the city, there are still roads, but no traffic lights. And when you get far off there are no roads, 
no lights, no rules, nothing to guide you. It’s all woods. And when you return to the city you may feel 
that the rules are wrong, that there should be no rules, etc.’ 
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explain it to others; it is a means of following the ‘rules’ laid down by the space we 
want to understand. 
Exactly how rules are ‘laid down’ – and the implications for what it means to then 
follow a rule – remain a point of contention. Most Wittgensteinian accounts posit a 
normative power to the rules of language, so that the ‘roads’ they make offer us the only 
routes of travel; any attempt not to follow an existing road leads into the wilderness of 
nonsense. There is certainly a sense of being thus guided and directed in how we follow 
rules. But it is not clear that this is an essential or operative aspect of the rules 
themselves. Wittgenstein in The Big Typescript also uses the metaphor of a path around 
a garden: ‘A rule compared to a path. Does a path say that one is to walk on it (and not 
on the grass)? Does it state that people usually go that way?’ (BT §240). In 
Wittgenstein: Opening Investigations Luntley responds: ‘Clearly, both questions are to 
be answered in the negative. So, what is a path? It is a regularity, a way we regularly go 
up the garden’ (97). If so, no force makes the path the way it is; it emerges as a factor of 
the regularity of our use – a description, rather than a prescription. Luntley uses this 
more modest notion of rule to question conservative, normative accounts of 
Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar (92). For our purposes here, the diversity of 
ways in which language can direct us – from necessity to instruction, to simple 
regularity – is worth noting, both in connection with the impossibility of a conclusive 
release from philosophy via a clear overview, as in Schalkwyk’s account, and with the 
idea of our view of the world having a living history, as the following discussion will 
make clear. 
One further way of reading the difference between a path partly created by our actions 
and a road laid out ahead of us is that the former can help us to extend Wittgenstein’s 
metaphor into thinking about the implications of mapping for the landscape mapped, as 
well as for the map-holder.  
Cartography is not a neutral science, though it tends to aspire to be so. As J. B. Harley 
warns in The New Nature of Maps, ‘design is fraught with potential ethical 
consequences’ (201). And yet, Harley complains, the discipline itself rarely engages in 
the consequences of the choices made of what to map, what to obscure, the distortions 
of projections, the implications of keys and symbols. Without underestimating the 
achievements of increasingly powerful mapping technologies and the benefits of 
standardised design, if becomes accepted ‘that certain conventions are “natural” or 
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“normal”, the danger is that they acquire a coercive and manipulative authority’ (202). 
“Truth” in mapping cannot only be a question of graphical accuracy and respect for 
copyright; the ways in which cartographical consensus can shut down those voices that 
do not follow its keys may hide the choices of omission or accent in design, and these 
require our attention, too. Since Harley’s ‘Deconstructing the Map’ first appeared in 
1989 (followed by many other articles questioning cartography’s capacity for and 
assumption of objectivity) there have been a number of responses that have deepened 
and refined critical thinking about mapping. Harley’s (largely Foucauldian) 
identification of the ideologies and power structures that come between a map and the 
world it claims to represent has been extended to a more Derridean question of the very 
possibility of talking about a mapped world separate from its ‘creation’ in the map. Not 
only does the ideology of the map-maker disguise the truth of the world, but there is no 
truth of the world accessible to us by deconstructing the ideologies we can discern in the 
maps. Cartography’s ‘foundational ontology [...] that the world can be objectively 
known and faithfully mapped using scientific techniques that capture and display spatial 
information’(Kitchin, Gleeson and Dodge ‘Unfolding Mapping Practices’ 480) has 
increasingly been eroded by questions of dominant discourses, the mapped subject, and 
connections between history, technology and purpose in mapping. Many post-modern 
critiques of cartography are naturally concerned with the development of power 
structures, especially in a (post)colonial discourse, including how maps can ‘inculcate 
us into seeing and representing the world in highly selective (and, for the powerful, 
felicitous) ways’ (Clayton ‘Snapshots of a Moving Target’ 19). A map does not only 
record, but fixes, simplifies and instructs. 
Kei Miller is an eloquent contributor to these debates, particularly on matters of 
literature and Jamaican civil rights, including his essays in Writing Down the Vision. 
His facility with key theoretical texts can also been seen in the employment of 
postcolonial critic Sylvia Wynter’s essay in “xiv” of CWZ: “On How / We Mistook the 
Map for the Territory” (Ll. 9-10). 
It is also worth bearing in mind that the ability or habit to think ‘in maps’ is a relatively 
new one. As has been explored by D. K. Smith in The Cartographical Imagination in 
Early Modern England, the availability of maps and mapping technology that flourished 
in early modern English not only provided tools for commerce and travel, but actually 
reformed how people saw their own world and their place in it, moving from localised 
reference points to universal, quantifiable places and movement. This was reflected 
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simultaneously in the literature of the time, such as in the rise of the travelogue as a 
literary genre (Andrew Hadfield Literature, Travel and Colonial Writing in the English 
Renaissance 1). Just as the scientific world view makes grasping value in the world 
difficult, as seen in Chapter 3, it can be difficult to conceive of our world, now, other 
than in mappable, comparative terms. In a similar vein, to turn to a literary example can 
provide a set of reminders that alert us to how our worldview frames our thinking, and 
how paying close attention to our language and nonsense can pay dividends. In the next 
section a literary example provides a way of speaking about issues while resisting being 
subsumed into the standardising discourse of cartography, operating not as a set of 
examples or morals, but as a reading performance and experience. It simultaneously 
provides an exploration of the map metaphor that has implications for thinking about 
language: the yearning for a clear view, and what it means to orient ourselves in this 
way.  
The Cartographer’s Ideal  
Kei Miller’s The Cartographer Tries to Map a Way to Zion, has received wide-spread 
praise for its humour, musicality and political alertness, winning the Forward Prize, 
amongst others. Much of Miller’s writing – prose, poetry and comment – charts issues 
of globalisation, race, blending cultures, and the powers of literature to reveal and 
preserve specific lived experiences. 
At the heart of the collection is the insistence that the ways in which we talk create and 
constrain how we see the world, what seems possible within it. The words we have 
access to and the status we afford them impact on not only what we see, but how and 
where we look. This may no longer be a startling idea. By its own terms, however, it is 
one that perpetually needs to be fleshed out again through original examples and forms. 
It is one thing to say that language is itself active and world-building, another to keep 
this in mind through renewal and demonstration. As our language-world evolves, so 
does our appreciation of this change. What Miller has achieved is to interlink clashes of 
culture, discourse and outlook in a manner that is involving yet individual, and that 
remains irreducibly poetic.   
The Cartographer Tries to Map a Way to Zion is largely composed of a dialogue of 
poems between the titular Cartographer, who has been charged with mapping the Island 
of Jamaica, and the Rastaman, who is keen to challenge the assumptions and systems 
behind this apparently neutral task. Through the moments that pass between the 
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interlocutors, we are presented with the benefits of mapping – its precision and capacity 
for ordering – but also its contrast to the bright variety of local colour, the dark 
rumblings of history, and the unmappability of people. The turning point of their 
encounter comes in the Cartographer’s sudden resolution to map a way to Zion, about 
which the question that defines his discipline – Where is it? – makes little sense. At 
best, one might ask the related question – How do I get there?  
Initially, the confrontation seems to be one of cultural asymmetry, as the Cartographer 
represents the scientistic, abstract, Western, quantitative discipline of cartography, 
whose objectivity belies a rapacious urge to count and classify; against him is set the 
firmly local, historical, provocative Rastaman. The latter is loquacious, hospitable and 
distrusting, a determinedly human figure, wholly involved in, and protective of, the life 
the Cartographer would like to classify – neutrally and rationally, as if from above.  
In particular one can find the attractions and dangers of a systemising worldview. The 
illusion of neutrality in such an endeavour is a common target in the poems, for instance 





The cartographer says 
 no – 
What I do is science. I show 
the earth as it is, without bias. 
I never fall in love. I never get involved 
with the muddy affairs of land. 
Too much passion unsteadies the hand. 





The rastaman thinks, draw me a map of what you see 
                                                             
44 Several of the poems in the dialogue are untitled except for the Roman numerals; references 
are given to these numerals. 
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then I will draw a map of what you never see 
and guess me whose map will be bigger than whose? 
Guess me whose map will tell the larger truth? 
 
The ambition to ‘draw a map of what you never see’ – but what is nonetheless there, 
available, might well be a motto for Wittgenstein’s approach in Philosophical 
Investigations, with the important proviso that, like the Rastaman, there is no claim that 
this depends on special knowledge or perspective, nor that it is a job to ever be 
concluded. Far from avoiding the ‘muddy affairs of land’ we return to the rough ground 
(PI §107). 
 But the difference between these two methods does not result in a stand-off. The 
characters continue to argue, travel together, pick up each other’s traits, and reveal their 
similarities. The Rastaman plays the host – ‘Come share with I an unsalted stew / an 
exalted stew of gungo peas and callaloo / and let I tell you bout the nearby towns’ (v), 
while the Cartographer, despite his early claims that he would ‘never get involved’ (iii) 
finds himself not recording neutrally the landscape, but learning of the island’s 
sometimes dark history, and wishing he could make some recompense, ‘if on his map 
he made our roads a little / smoother, a little straighter, as if in drawing / he might erase 
a small bit of history’s disgrace’ (xi). 
In each encounter, the consequences of mapping are drawn out – from the large scale 
imposition of borders (ii) to the precise vagueness of navigating according to the advice 
of locals (x); the possibility of seeing the world geometrically or mythically (xii), or of 
the relation between representation and history (xi, xiii). Two recurring themes in the 
collection also complement the dialogue poems: place names and roads. I have 
discussed these images in more detail elsewhere,
45
 so for the moment I want to take one 
image that emerges from the poems and is particularly relevant for the Wittgensteinian 
map metaphor. Miller is at pains to stress the history – and the continued living of it – 
that has shaped the island geographically, culturally and linguistically. In ‘Roads’, ‘xxi’, 
‘v’ and other poems, the different purposes and characters of roads are charted; a route 
on which we travel may also be a scar of slavery, a reminder of pilgrimage, crime or 
                                                             
45 See ‘Cartographic thinking and the poetry of Kei Miller: Of Metaphors and Maps.’.   
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struggle, an opening up of new land, an escape or a conquest. In short, roads
46
 wear 
their histories into their landscape. 
Far from being neutral connectors between places, differentiated on the map only by 
their colour coding, the routes we chose for crossing a landscape have many purposes 
and effects. Just as lines drawn on a map are not merely neutral or representative, but in 
their “unfolding effects and affects [...] are performative” (Gerlach ’Lines, contours and 
legends’ 26), roads are more than markers of travel; they have history, agency, and a 
shaping phenomenology. Miller speaks about the character of movement around the 
Island, including how one might pass along: 
secret roads and slaving roads, 
the dirging roads, marooning roads 
 [...] 
cow roads and cobbled roads 
 the estate roads and backbush roads 
 [...] 
causeway roads and Chinese roads 
 [...] 
press-along, soon-be-done, 
the not-an-easy, the mighty-long.  (‘Roads’ Ll. 1,2,6,7,12, 16,17) 
Beyond the type and task of a road, the route may reflect something very other. Poem 
‘xi’, relates how a road was built curved, to please the ego of a plantation owner’s wife, 
so that Miss Musgrave 
on her carriage ride home 
would not have to see 
a nayga man’s property 
so much bigger than her husband’s.  (Ll.11-15) 
The race-divide that structured the island’s history is not a surface-level phenomenon; it 
is pressed deep into the infrastructure, becoming harder to change with every iteration 
                                                             
46 cf PI §29, §85, §426, §491, §596. 
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of its processes. ‘Some kinds of ghostly line . . . can have very real consequences for 
peoples’ movements’ (Irwin et al. ‘The City of Richgate’ p 62, cited in Gerlach 26). The 
‘serpentine’ flow of Lady Musgrove’s Road now causes pandemonium on the modern 
city’s commuter route, as its needless turns restrict and complicate traffic (L.10). This 
unexpected addendum to the colonial past (interestingly at odds with the Haussmann-ish 
rationalisation of the landscape one might sooner anticipate) acts as a reminder of the 
entrenchment that decisions undergo, and institutions facilitate. The Cartographer notes 
reluctantly the ‘thoughtless’ (L. 26) lay out of the street, wishing he could put right the 
injustices of history with his mapping; straightening and smoothing roads “as if in 
drawing / he might erase a small bit of history’s disgrace” (L. 35-36). But for whom, 
and to whom, would he speak and draw? The map, however superior to reality, cannot 
improve the traffic, or undo its knotty history. The character of the landscape is as much 
a factor of its past as its present topography and culture. Miller depicts Jamaica as a 
place where ‘every road might buck yu toe’, a statement of roughness that is as proud as 
it is imperfect (‘v’ L. 5). The Island carries its past in its roads and people and language. 
The Wittgensteinian figure criss-crossing the landscape of a language (a landscape 
distinctly Northern European in its imagining, one might say, with an apparent 
preference for ‘the woods’ over the ‘city’ (Clack Wittgenstein, Frazer, and Religion 
176) is not, on such a view, a neutral presence; it imposes while it explores by opening 
up one route, closing down another, recording and moving according to a particular 
purpose.
 47
 Perspicuous representation is not created by absenting oneself from the 
landscape, but neither can it be achieved by an exhaustive familiarity with the terrain. 
We make choices based on our priorities and limitations. In this structure of selection 
and incompletion, mapping is an ethically charged choice, much like the responsibility 
of meaning-making in Jorie Graham’s poetry, and likewise the map metaphor must 
consider its ethical implications. Wittgenstein’s choice of metaphor, thus seen, reflects 
his own stance regarding the proper way of approaching the ethical, including the means 
by which one might write on ethics.  
Ethics and Practice 
                                                             
47 Wittgenstein regular asks about the ‘way to go’ or knowing ‘the way about’: cf PI §222, §230, 
§309, §339; §123, §203, §664, p202.  
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It is difficult in any discussion of Wittgenstein’s work that touches on the poetic to 
exclude from the same debate the notion of the ethical. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
linking of the two in Wittgenstein’s notes, even while his publishing on either subject 
was near non-existent, marks something important both about how the later 
Wittgenstein conceived of language and judgement functioning, and the centrality of 
ethics to Wittgenstein’s conception of a human life, including the usages of language.  
The oft-quoted remark that Wittgenstein considered talking about ethics and aesthetics 
to be merely Geschwätz (Letter to Paul Englemann 16
th
 January 1918. Letters from 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 12e) might be taken to indicate a dismissal of the topic as nonsense 
or, at best, an essentially human but ultimately hopeless activity, as a positivist reading 
would take the Lecture on Ethics to be presenting. In the later writings, ethics fall 
almost completely out of the picture, with only one brief aside occurring in the 
Philosophical Investigations (§77). One might then ask whether Wittgenstein had 
simply lost interest in the topic, or felt that his earlier critique had answered all the 
questions, or whether he now thought that philosophy – either his own or the model of 
philosophising he was often attacking – was not the vehicle for such a discussion. 
However, an equally viable and more productive reading of the omission is that he did 
not hold ethics to be unimportant, but perhaps too important – that anything that could 
be said in ethics would always fall short of its target and be a travesty of what it hoped 
to capture. Leaving aside the fact that everything we know about Wittgenstein’s 
personal life insists that he was far from indifferent to the ethical or the aesthetic, there 
is little to suggest in the later writing that the ethical has become irrelevant; this is never 
stated, and its omission may in itself be a comment on the subject – even a key to 
making sense of the project, as Benjamin Tilghman has argued in Wittgenstein, Ethics 
and Aesthetics. The moral and aesthetic dimensions of Philosophical Investigations 
‘remain to be made manifest’ through its techniques, rather than its utterances (ix).  
No matter how we choose to view the transition from his earlier to his later thinking, 
Wittgenstein’s movement beyond the work of ‘the author of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus’ (PI §23) seems in this area to be connected to a dissatisfaction with the 
tools used or how the problem was conceived rather than a rejection of the subject of the 
end of the Tractatus – the ethical and how it might or must not be spoken about. The 
formulation Geschwätz is thus as a complaint against the usual ways in which 
philosophy approaches ethics (Yaniv Ickovitz Wittgenstein’s Ethical Thought). In this 
case, the problem Wittgenstein sees is not with the attention to ethics itself, but with the 
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emptiness of assuming that there is something identifiable as ‘the good’ – a special 
category of thing – and then trying to fit more tangible concepts into this space. Our 
attachment to the shapes in which we think, like our attachments to particular words and 
expressions, are under question here, which can carry a far deeper psychological or 
social or habitual connection than the mere surface meaning (Cavell ‘The 
Wittgensteinian Event’ 12). 
In line with the method of the Philosophical Investigations, we ought rather to find 
multiple examples (both in everyday life and in imagined circumstances) and see what 
each of these tell us about the various ways in which the idea of the ‘good’ is used – 
how these uses connect and differ. Literature seems like a suitable candidate for this sort 
of work, since it provides examples in a way that is bounded and memorable. Both 
Gibson and Schalkwyk, in different ways, want to use the literary example as a 
reiterable moment of life, like an animated gif that we can recall and rerun alongside our 
everyday experience. This will provide a model for judgement or a clear(er) view of our 
practices, respectively. But in either case, what the example is supposed to achieve 
relies on extracting it from the practices in which it is embedded (reading, performing, 
watching) in order to facilitate analysis.  
Gibson proposes (drawing on Wittgenstein’s remarks on measurement and the Standard 
Metre in Paris in Philosophical Investigations §50) that we consider literature to be 
playing a different role in our language games than the representational aspects of non-
fiction, having in a sense been ‘removed’ from the demands and applications of this 
practice. Through certain textual or extra-textual markers that identify it as fiction, the 
text is granted a certain license to be treated as a genuine speech-act, but with the 
consequences of such an act held back. Altieri, following J.L.Austin, describes this as 
‘an illocutionary act without illocutionary consequences’ (‘The Poem as Act’ 105). 
Instead of the contents of the literary text requiring the same kind of immediate 
response as an order or a request, we allow a certain amount of free-play to enter into 
our reception, storing up potential reactions for later consideration or application. We 
‘hold’ literature in place through the surrounding traditions of reading and writing; the 
practice of “being literary” (Lamarque. ‘Wittgenstein, Literature, and the Idea of a 
Practice’ 387). 
This notion of a tradition, both of the practice of reading and of particular canonical 
texts, is important for Gibson’s efforts to explain this educational but not 
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representational aspect of fiction (‘Reading for Life’ 119). By writing and repeating 
stories, he suggests we are building up an ‘archive’ of complex human behaviour. 
Rather than thinking of these stories as being representational of some particular thing 
in the world (since they are not), it would be more productive to think of them as 
‘standards’ against we can measure, or through which we can form possible ways of 
seeing the world. Through their ‘fixed’ form as known texts (Gibson seems primarily to 
have canonical or long-standing literature in mind for his model) these standards operate 
not ‘in’ our language games, but stand alongside them; they have a role, but it is not the 
same role as a factual text demanding our assent or response to its content. However, 
Gould’s model of (canonical) literature as standards against which we measure 
ourselves, while remaining distinct from mere ‘examples’, as if literature had a duty to 
be mimetic, still stands at a remove from actual language and, I suggest, inserts a 
distinction between literary and practical language that is an impoverishment to both, as 
Bernard Harrison argues in Inconvenient Fictions 19-70). Simply put, ‘there is in fact no 
material difference, [...only] the use to which we put language varies so much that 
words and sentences become, as it were, unfamiliar when they reappear in a new 
context’ (Perloff Wittgenstein’s Ladder 19-20). Any attempt to draw a line between 
strictly literary and strictly practical language is doomed to failure, given that real 
language itself is not a series of propositions, but always implanted with jokes, clichés, 
gestures, circumlocutions, flourishes and repetitions, even if these are not “on display” 
as they may be in a poem. The point and richness of poetry is best not found in some set 
purpose or quality, but in an activity as a whole – an expression or multitude of 
expressions of our exhilaration, discontent, confusion, loneliness, wit and desperation – 
which we can no more take out of the context of “being poetry” than we can 
(Wittgenstein suggests) perform useful philosophical analysis on a piece of language 
ripped from its repeated applications. 
This is perhaps the best way of taking Wittgenstein’s notoriously difficult-to-translate 
remark ‘philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten’(CV 28e). ‘Really one should 
write philosophy only as one does poetry’ is one slightly clumsy translation, though 
‘dichten’ as the activity of poetizing has no real equivalent in English. Various 
translations have offered ‘...as a form of poetic composition’ (trans. Anscombe cited in 
Perloff  Wittgenstein’s Ladder., preface) or ‘...as one writes a poem’ (trans. Peter 
Winch, Culture and Value 28, 2006) or ‘as a form of poetry’ (Wittgenstein’s Ladder  
n243). Each of these has complications. One wants to avoid too formal a connection, as 
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though philosophy should be bent into certain pre-existing forms, as a poem might be, 
or equate Wittgenstein’s writing with an attempt at verse, erasing the distinction 
between the two kinds of activity (though it is certainly possible to find in 
Wittgenstein’s writing the poetic, as Perloff does, and many artists have (‘Writing 
Philosophy as Poetry: Literary Form in Wittgenstein’). I am sympathetic to 
Schalkwyk’s interest in preserving the activity at the heart of dichten, though even the 
suggestion that philosophy should be ‘poetised’ (‘Wittgenstein’s “Imperfect Gardens”’ 
56) feels retroactive. My suggestion is rather that a certain spirit is being called upon, 
drawing on Wittgenstein’s remarks in Culture and Value (5-11e, particular the early 
draft of the printed foreword to Philosophical Remarks, 8-9e). This avoids these 
difficulties, but admittedly goes beyond either a direct translation or a definitive 
explanation. The appeal to spirit is also made by James C. Edwards in Ethics without 
Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life, urging the need to adopt a certain spirit if 
seeking to continue Wittgenstein’s philosophical project, but his conception is 
essentially Christian-religious, whereas the reading I have put forward throughout treats 
Wittgenstein as being not a orthodox religious believer but forcefully attracted to that 
worldview (Drury ‘Conversations with Wittgenstein’ 79). The spirit is one of fighting 
against the mechanisation and systemisation of life that Wittgenstein saw as the legacy 
of the twentieth century, in favour of directly encounters, provisionality and ‘work on 
oneself’ (CV 24e). Poetic creativity, reading and writing, provides for Wittgenstein a 
model of this perpetual alertness to exact expression, the complexity of clarity, and the 
attempt to show more than is said. The spirit is digressive in the same way that Wallace 
Stevens’ ‘Notes’ digresses in interwoven stories and modes, each adding to the 
understanding of the others, but shying away from proclamations or finality; the illusion 
of an answer is part of the performance that the poem demands of the reader. As Harold 
Bloom says of the opening lines of ‘Notes’, ‘The peace he celebrates here, though 
momentary, is very much of this life [...] a peace that comes from reading and writing 
poems.’ (The Poems of Our Climate 167-8). In like fashion, Kei Miller deviates from 
simple binaries in favour of the evolving characters of the Cartographer and the 
Rastaman, creating rest, or the promise of it, through deeper involvement in everyday 
life – food, music and dance; Wittgenstein uses and evades the traditions of analytic 
philosophy discourse, creating a conversation of many voices, finding small moments of 
pause rather than definite solutions. As Srikanth Reddy writes of such digressive 
techniques, ‘Their authors assiduously map out unruly detours and deviations from 
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imperatives of readerly expectation that have historically governed the decorum of 
poetic discourse’ (Changing Subjects 20).  
Accordingly, I use ‘showing’ above advisedly, and not as a stand-in for what is 
absolutely beyond expression, but as something that makes active demands on the 
reader, in a way beyond the transfer of information; to say “Here, come and see what I 
see” can sometimes be the best and only description on offer (cf. PI §§66, 217, 335, 
p183). And this is essentially the technique of both Kei Miller’s poems and the 
character of the Rastaman within them; there is very little direct argument in the 
collection, though the Rastaman, who holds a PhD ‘(from Glasgow / no less)’ (xiv) 
would be perfectly capable of arguing within the Academy, if this is what would be 
effective. Instead, we are given meaningful details and their connections that might 
otherwise be lost: ‘plenty things that poor people cyaa do without – like board / houses, 
and the corner shop from which Miss Katie sell / her famous peanut porridge’ (ii). The 
Cartographer cannot just be told about them, either, he has to eat the food, dance to the 
music of the place, the ‘DUP-DUP-dudududu-DUP-DUP’ of a nyabinghi beat; this ‘is 
no riddim the mapmaker’s heart is / familiar with. No. Ain’t nutt’n iambic bout dis’ 
(xvii). And in the same way the reader is not just told, but brought into the imaginative 
space of another voice, through Miller’s use of patois, powerful rhythms, and the 
demonstration that things can be seen differently – a kind of persuasion, an invitation to 
compromise. Miller’s sketches of a landscape, his itinerant Cartographer, may never 
reach Zion, (just as Miller’s Church Women find spiritual ascent comforting, 
demanding and elusive) though it is the search, not a discovery that will get him there. 
Likewise, the Wittgensteinian figure in the landscape must continue to travel, seeking 
out new viewpoints, drawing new sketches.
 48
  
In the following chapter, I discuss how my research and poetic practice, and those of 
other writers, have taken up aspects of this Wittgensteinian challenge – to re-write or 
un-write the familiar, and let the activity of language have its full play. This partly 
underwrites the repeated emphasis on practice (as a whole as well as on a conceptual 
level) in this thesis but also agrees with one of Stanley Cavell’s complaints about the 
conventional reception of Wittgenstein as ‘concentrating more on our capacity to 
construct language games than on our desire to break free from our disappointment with 
our constructions’ (‘The Wittgensteinian Event’ 22). The interrogation of the 
                                                             
48 cf PI vii, §232, §673. 
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inexpressible in its very many forms takes the shape of acknowledging these 
frustrations, not as short-comings but as part of our natural condition – our continual 
and always partial efforts to lose and find ourselves in our words. 
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Chapter Six: Poetry Practice 
Introduction 
In its various attempts to bring the inexpressible back into the circulation of ordinary 
use, back from its holiday (PI §38), this thesis has pitched the understanding of 
Wittgenstein’s method at the level of practice. In this way, it avoids the illusions and 
deflections of replacing theory with further theory but also provides an alternative to the 
potentially problematic notions of therapy, or the chimera of being able to give up 
philosophy for good. 
As the chapters have progressed, different faces of the inexpressible have each in turn 
been shown to exist in, or as, practices, with their own histories and points of deflection 
from expression. I have attempted to structure the chapters so that a number of lines of 
thought conjoin, moving from the early Wittgenstein to the later, from more 
philosophical to more literary discussion, and from the contours of logic to specific 
choices of words and modes of discourse. 
In this final chapter, I briefly discuss the poetry-projects that I undertook alongside the 
critical research presented here, providing a further step away from theory towards 
practice. Although not all of these link directly into the content of the thesis – certainly 
not as further arguments – many were inspired by the materials studied and illustrate 
similar kinds of intellectual and artistic engagement. In keeping with the emphasis on 
wider practices, many of these projects were collaborative, inter-disciplinary or 
refashioned for specific purposes. To close this study I have included as appendices 
poems from two of the collections produced, The Wittgenstein Vector and Still Life with 
Promises. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Wittgenstein has proven a rich inspiration for 
artists and poets. Marjorie Perloff has discussed the formal attractions of the Tractatus 
and the interrogative mode of Philosophical Investigations as marking contemporary 
American poetry (‘Towards a Wittgensteinian Poetics’ and the final chapter of 
Wittgenstein’s Ladder). There is considerably more work to be done, both in identifying 
Wittgenstein’s direct influence on poets and artists such as Jan Zwicky, Johanna 
Drucker, David Clark, John Hall, Robert Creeley, Tony Lopez, David Markson, Garret 
Caples, David Connearn, Emmanuel Hocquard, Alan Halsey, and John Cage, as well as 
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using Wittgenstein’s understanding of language and form in assessing artworks 
generally. This is a project I would hope to take up in future, particularly since the 
questions that Wittgenstein raises about the in completeness of language and the attitude 
of aesthetic appreciation apply so readily to the burgeoning possibilities of digital 
literature as a performative genre.  
Here I want to give two brief examples of existing work. Jan Zwicky’s collection 
‘Wittgenstein Elegies’ includes poems written from the philosopher’s perspective, and 
incorporates numerous quotations and allusions to his work. Zwicky also incorporates a 
number of Wittgenstein’s stylistic markers, such as the use of multiple voices 
(Wittgenstein’s public personae, the poet Trakl (whose career Wittgenstein supported 
with a donation when he gave away his inheritance) Wittgenstein’s inner monologue, 
and a narrator’s voice) indicated with a mixture of speech marks, italics and 
indentations. Broken and unfinished lines, though considerably less baroque than Jorie 
Graham’s typography, mimic both Wittgenstein’s constant need for revision, and the 
skittish activity of thought, as distinct from the supposed clarity of philosophy. 
Sometimes the stark declarations prohibit a narrative reading of the poems, making 
them more like the proposition-objects of the Tractatus. Zwicky’s collection creates a 
frustrated Wittgenstein character, closed in by his inability to express what seems to 
need expressing, both by the logical form of language and by his inability to write 
poetry. Despite his remark discussed previously about doing philosophy in the manner 
of writing a poem (CV 28e), Wittgenstein was convinced of his own lack of ability as a 
poet: ‘Just as I cannot write verse, so too I can write prose only up to a certain point, & 
no further. There is a quite definite limit to my prose, & I can no more overstep it, than I 
would be able to write a poem’ (CV 67e). The poem included as an appendix in the 
1998 edition of Culture and Value (100) shows that he maintained an interest in poetry, 
both as art and as practice, though he always felt that his writing was limited to 
expressions of good taste, or ‘good manners’ (Emphasis in original. CV 29e). In ways 
similar to the frustrations explored in Chapter 5, Zwicky presents Wittgenstein as 
returning again and again to questions or problems that are to be dissolved rather than 
solved, and temptations to be resisted. Ultimately, it is a recognition that the 
Fragestellung must be shifted away from the empty concepts of philosophy towards 
ordinary speaking and living: 
The idea 
Now absorbs us that the ideal 
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
241 
 
is concrete. One vast analysis, a single form/ 
At each expression’s root. 
[...] 
We think already that we see it there. 
A thing that we had always known 
But never spoken. 
This was our mistake.  (47) 
 
Zwicky, also a philosopher by profession, uses both Wittgenstein and Heraclitus 
throughout her oeuvre, such as in the shifting music and lost landscapes of Forge, 
asking ‘Who can name the absence / music is, who draw that space, / the cold breath, 
sudden and empty / that will own you the rest of your life?’ (‘Music and Silence: Seven 
Variations’ ll. 1-4). 
The second example I want to use to prime my discussion of Wittgensteinian reading 
and ways of writing is the much less direct case of Jo Shapcott’s Of Mutability, which I 
read as a text bearing a number of Wittgensteinian markers. Though the collection as a 
whole is an exploration of cancer (co-incidentally also the cause of Wittgenstein’s 
death) the poem ‘Hairless’, for example, not only foregrounds the bodiliness of 
communication – our appearances and expressions shaped by our faces, illnesses, 
movements – but contains a number of phrases that could have been taken directly from 
Philosophical Investigations (§250, 261, 614-6; p229), The Blue and Brown Books (7), 
Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology II (40) and elsewhere. 
Can the bald lie? The nature of skin says not: 
it’s newborn-pale, erection-tender stuff, 
every thought visible – pure knowledge 
mind in action – shining through the skull. 
I saw a woman, hairless absolute, cleaning. 
[...] 
It was clear just from the texture of her head, 
she was about to raise her arms to the sky; 
I covered my ears as she prepared to sing, to roar. 
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Shapcott dramatises the loss not only of hair but of a hinge of life; cancer has robbed the 
woman of her expressions, her place in the form of life; something so simple and 
apparently innocuous can weird our language games. Like Kei Miller’s Church Woman 
in ‘Off-Key 1’, the note of wordless song, the roar, may be the most articulate 
expression. 
The Wittgenstein Vector 
In the projects connected with this thesis, the poetic motivation is often a similar 
pressing on the hinges of propositions: metaphors disguised as literal statements, 
displaced contexts, and moments when our usual expressions fail. As Avram Stroll 
notes, with a Wittgensteinian eye on language we may think about the different ways in 
which language games lean on the foundations of our practices, and how poetry can 
play with them, through ambiguity, shifts of tone or meaning, formal innovations, and 
the building or disappointing of expectations (‘Wittgenstein’s Foundational Metaphors’ 
15-16; PI §§574-7). In The Wittgenstein Vector, a collaborative project with SMSteele 
and Jaime Robles, the contexts of sense and production of the Tractatus were 
pressurised to produce an art installation, which subsequently spawned a short film and 
a conference presentation, and has been re-exhibited in San Francisco for ‘Sisters of 
Invention’. Publication of the collection as a book is currently being considered, which 
carries its own ironies, since the project was conceived as an explosion of 
Wittgenstein’s original text and the logical dependence of the numbered propositions.  
As I have discussed in more detail in ‘The Wittgenstein Vector: essay and poems’,  in 
later life Wittgenstein observed that the austere chain of propositions that made up the 
Tractatus might actually function as something more like chapter headings for a full 
work of philosophy. The Wittgenstein Vector fills in these imagined spaces, but with 
poetry rather than philosophy. The installation was constructed on a Victorian brick 
wall on the University of Exeter Streatham campus. Iron eyes are embedded in the wall, 
where fruit trees were once espaliered. The laminated poem-cards, with the Tractatus 
proposition on one side and the text on the other, stood at right-angles to the wall, 
interspersed with art pieces by Jaime Robles, based on Wittgensteinian images and 
themes. The reader followed the poems using a map provided – according to the 
numbering system, the poems’ themes, individual poets – or at random. The cards bent 
to the touch and rattled in the wind, adding tactile and auditory elements to the 
exploration. 





Figure 2 The Wittgenstein Vector, 2012. Portrait of Wittgenstein. Photo Credit Jaime 
Robles. 
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Figure 3 The Wittgenstein Vector, 2012. Proposition 7. Photo Credit Jaime Robles 
 
By dismantling Wittgenstein’s book, and allowing new texts and applications to emerge 
through these fractures, we in part enacted the philosopher’s own later philosophy, with 
its insistence on the importance of context and use to meaning-making. We also address 
his discomfort with the idea of publishing a book of philosophy – he worried that an 
authoritative text might become stale and stop readers from having to do too much 
thinking for themselves – by questioning the finality of any such text.  
Our explicitly poetic engagement with the Tractatus has drawn out connections between 
different elements of Wittgenstein’s thought, and also the human and literary contexts 
of its production. Crucial to all this is the range of possible responses to Proposition 7, 
the famous closing remark of the book, which this thesis has argued was, in its various 
forms and methods, a continual prompt to Wittgenstein’s philosophy: ‘Whereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’. In our re-reading and re-writing of his words, 
we have interrogated this call – for restraint? for despair? – through unexpected modes 
of speaking and creating. 
Three writers’ voices pull a putatively linear text in many directions. Some of the poems 
play out the philosophical thought, or use the constraints of Wittgenstein’s system as a 
springboard; others probe the terse expressions and logical rigour for a more human 
moment – possible openings on to comfort, confusion, love or sorrow. Many threads 
hold its pieces together, but none is the single connecting line (PI §67). My 
contributions enjoy the interplay of the philosophical and the personal, attempting to tie 
together the human and the philosopher – the passion and ridiculousness of both. The 
silences between propositions came to stand for Wittgenstein’s deeply felt incapacity to 
do justice to the ethical and the sacred in a fractured world, one shadowed by isolation 
and conflict. How can words do justice to our situation; how can we do justice to our 
words? 
A selection of my contributions to the collection are reprinted in Appendix A. ‘1.11 The 
world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts’, for example, 
imagines Wittgenstein’s desire to be ‘absolutely safe’ in the Lecture on Ethics (8). 
Wittgenstein’s examples of ethical statements in the lecture are striking in their 
adherence to everyday language and desires, even while they are placed as exceeding 
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meaningful speech. In the collection as a whole, the poem sits between texts by Jaime 
Robles that play with the intricate numbering and ontological underpinnings that open 
the Tractatus, and is designed to offer a momentary return to the familiar, while 
remaining equally unobtainable. A similar playing with the propositional numbering 
system can be seen in ‘2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition 
had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true’, in which further 
propositions are imagined inserted between 2.0211 and 2.0212, much as Wittgenstein’s 
later writing style seems to invite continual digression or deferment through the 
insertion of examples or interlocutors. Other poems play with our habits of reading: 
‘6.1265 Logic can always be conceived to be such that every proposition is its own 
proof’ and ‘6.22 The logic of the world which the propositions of logic show in 
tautologies, mathematics shows in equations’, for example, disrupt the usual flow of 
understanding with breaks, gaps, formulae and blanks. The former puts into view an 
example of language operating not as information-giving but as ritual (Z §160; RFGB 
133). The latter, mimicking Jorie Graham’s _____________s described in Chapter 4, 
uses omission and repetition to emulate the kind of deflection that Cora Diamond 
discusses in ‘The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy’: what 
information do we hide from ourselves in our relations with, and systematic 
consumption of, animals bred for meat? 
One question we faced was how to respond to the final proposition of the Tractatus, ‘7 
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’. In the original installation, we 
left the card obverse of the proposition blank, and in performances have also ended on a 
sustained silence, allowing Wittgenstein’s drawing of the limit the final, withdrawing 
word. However, for the published collection, and partly in view of the process of this 
thesis, I replaced the blank page with a series of unpunctuated questions, pressing the 
reader with a mixture of abstract, personal or rhetorical enquiries, to which the poem 
admits no response. The varieties of the inexpressible intermingle, as the reader’s lack 
of response may be practical or logical, and may be felt as a discomfort, a taboo or a 
frustration. 
The installation was reconfigured as a hanging mobile for indoor installation, allowing 
readers to spin the cards and create new patterns along which to read the poems. This 
formed part of the Wor(l)ds in Collision exhibition (Exeter 2015), which I curated with 
Jaime Robles, showcasing how a number of text and visual artists had responded to 
Wittgenstein’s work, in particular the notion of games and play.  
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Wor(l)ds in Collision 
Opened to coincide with the annual conference of the British Wittgenstein Society, this 
semi-permanent exhibition featured works by Johanna Drucker, Tony Lopez, David 
Connearn, Alan Halsey, Dan Wood, Richard Carter, Sas Colby, John Hall and the 
Exegesis collective. Each piece placed under playful inquisition our received ideas of 
language and representation. Johanna Drucker’s Wittgenstein’s Gallery and Stochastic 
Poetry, for example, use visual representation – of objects as well as hand-set type – to 
ask questions about how our grammar works; verbs treated as nouns, nouns as verbs; 
pictures with different iterations raise questions about identity and ‘meaning the same’; 
overlaid type in chaotic but nearly comprehensible patterns represent natural 
conversation at the expense of our conventions of type. David Connearn's pieces, by 
contrast, meditate on Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Colour and the ideas of fine shades of 
difference or blurred concepts in Philosophical Investigations (§50, 71; p200-4), in 
which incredibly fine variations of colour are placed side by side, and hand-drawn lines, 
each with its own tiny variations are placed together, creating the suggestion of patterns 
or signatures, raising questions about how we use our words to describe, and how we 
might hunt for the specific conditions of an experience. Alan Halsey’s In White Writing 
again commented on our methods of production and interpretation, with prints created 
by collages of scrap paper and discarded drafts, photocopied and annotated to create 
intricate and inviting doodles that promised and withheld decipherment – a promise that 
was later fulfilled, or confounded, by Alan reading the pages in performance, complete 
with stutters and omissions, lists of phone numbers, and animal howls. As Alan Munton 
described it, in his Shearsman review of the exhibition, ‘[t]here is structured mental 
activity that breaks out disrespectfully into the world; the language-relation between the 
given and the imagined; and the creative subject surrounded by inanimate but 
provocative objects: this exhibition embodies such relationships.’ 
Still Life with Promises 
The second collection relating to this chapter takes similar inspiration from 
Wittgenstein’s remarks, using several as titles or epigraphs. The poems are included as 
Appendix B. Some respond directly to the concerns in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, or his 
interest in conceptions of madness and therapy, the functions of names, or the grip a 
particular image has on us, our bewitchment by language. Others are a continuation of 
Wittgenstein’s interlocutors in Philosophical Investigations, following supposed 
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answers into cul-de-sacs or literalising metaphors. Relating situations where words 
seem inadequate, we find ourselves retelling stories, wondering when we might 
discover the ‘redeeming word’, or the movements to bridge divides between us. I find, 
in retrospect, that the poems are heavily populated with birds, cats and other animals, 
mostly domestic; although this was not a theme I set out to develop, I connect their 
presences with my own fascination with the temptations of anthropomorphism – the 
simultaneous blankness and recognition of an animal gaze; the way our lives are filled 
with animal voices not ours to understand; the awareness of one’s own human outlook 
and the difficulty (or seductive ease) of empathising with an other. The animal – 
sometimes specific animals – represent the slippages between intelligibility and 
unintelligibility that parts of this thesis have addressed; how do we speak to, or for, an 
other form of life? When Wittgenstein says ‘If a lion could speak, we could not 
understand him’ (PI p223) this is not just a remark about the difficulty of speaking 
across language-games or forms of life; it is not as simple as not sharing a language or 
simply putting animals outside what we include in our human world (Cary Wolfe and 
W.J.T Mitchell ‘Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and 
Posthumanist Theory’). It points towards the framework that lies behind such ideas as 
speaking, understanding, co-habiting, and what it means to individuate. There are fine 
gradations of understanding, that at times will be relevant, at others not. There is no one 
line, crossing which grants access into a human community, but many and overlapping 
practices, in which speaking and behaving is granted meaning. A re-enchantment of the 
world is also an enchantment by it – its pleasures, tempi and contradictions – and the 
extent to which we control this enchantment, or can determine its inclusiveness, is a 
matter of experimentation, context and agreement. In poetry those lines can be redrawn 
as pictures, challenges and fables, encouraging us to reassess the grooves of thought we 
run in. 
Several of the poems in this collection have been works of collaboration, which I find 
another tool for refreshing my language, putting poems into new light through 
comparisons; much like the perspicuous representation of Remarks on Frazer’s Golden 
Bough (133) and Philosophical Investigations §122; we ‘sharpen our eye’ by placing 
telling examples together, or in constellation. ‘Bangor, Maine from 30,000ft’ was 
commissioned for Exewhirr, a public engagement event exploring technology and 
embodiment. With poets Wei Hsien Wan and Isabel Galleymore I produced a pamphlet 
called Paraphernalium that pondered issues of climate change, digital romance, and our 
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society’s inscriptions of itself. ‘Memory Box’ was part of a collection called Drawing 
Over is Drawing Under in which the same three poets wrote poems after paintings by 
Michael Broughton. Recalling Wittgenstein’s ‘beetle in a box’ (PI §293), how is a 
memory something we ‘have’, how is it ‘owned’? The way our language treats our 
“inner life” of thoughts and feelings as objects has lead to some of our most enduring 
philosophical confusions, and some of my favourite over-readings of metaphor for 
poetic effect. 
Translations and Technologies 
Finally, I have become increasingly interested in process of translation and technologies 
for writing or publishing. As well as a recent collection of translations of Golden Age 
Dutch poetry with early modernist Esther van Raamsdonk, I have collaborated with poet 
David Sergeant to produce utopian and dystopian ‘translations’ of an imagined source 
text. By running Nigel Farage’s infamous victory speech on the morning after the UK’s 
referendum vote to leave the EU (‘without a shot fired’) through Google-translate for 
each EU national language, we produced texts full of suggested meanings that also 
made plain Farage’s rhetorical strategies. The overall effect or our translation was 
darkly humorous, pastiche-ing over-worn phrases and euphemistic language, with, we 
hoped, an echo of Karl Kraus’ truthful satire. In these times of rising nationalism and 
the threat to the European project, Wittgenstein’s experiencing of the world as exile 
from a disappearing world, and his feting in a culture and language not his own, as 
Perloff elucidates in Wittgenstein’s Ladder, is increasingly powerful. His life in 
combination with his philosophy can keep us alert to easy and divisive myths, their 
forms and apparent natural reality. 
In 2014, I organised an interdisciplinary seminar that encouraged collaborations 
between philosophers, scientists, artists and digital humanists, under the title ‘Wiring 
Wittgenstein’. The meeting showcased digital literature research and projects, including 
my digital humanities ‘twitterture’ project, in which a modern-English version of the 
Roman de la Rose is transmitted in daily tweets, in collaboration with the Johns 
Hopkins Digital Manuscript Library, under the hashtag #roserom. The poem-snippets 
were coupled with images from the database, essays about the project, and a 
commentary by Professor Steven Nichols. In making the translation I considered how 
the Twitter medium transmitted ideas of the tweeting self – both diced up into pre-sized 
snippets of speech (140 characters), and retained indefinitely in the account’s history of 
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activity. By using the poems to begin conversations with other impersonations of 
historical or literary figures, such as Geoffrey Chaucer, John Lydgate and King Cnut, 
we raised more serious questions about translation as creation, responsibilities to source 
texts, and the democratisation of information through digital storage and dissemination.  
Envoy 
As this thesis has attempted to bring into view the many different ways that we seem to 
meet the limits of expression, and show that these are rooted in particular practices, 
none of which can coherently lay claim to either define or dismiss what we find 
inexpressible, it ought to be shy of offering firm conclusions. ‘Beware’, as David 
Sergeant says in ‘The Cornish Cough’, ‘the one / who’d take a definition like a pill // or 
nail the breeding wind against your tongue’ (ll. 56-58). The operation of finding how 
our practices shape us and vice versa is in a sense a philosophy of ‘what attacks false 
necessities’ (Cavell In Quest of the Ordinary 184). These necessities include the 
postures our pictures seem to force us into adopting, without pretending that we can 
simply ignore them or treat them as arbitrary. This philosophical activity, as Cavell 
insists, cannot if it is true to itself, stand separate from the rest of life (Berry ‘Stanley 
Cavell’s Modernism’ 54).  
Using Cavell’s writing as an instructive comparison, and pulling together several of the 
strands followed in this thesis, I argue that Wittgenstein’s engagement with philosophy, 
framed as questions of it from within, similarly seeks to understand what might still the 
urge to philosophise. However, Cavell’s insistence on finding a space for voice – his 
own – and ways in which he is able to take responsibility for the language and culture 
he is part of, is a speaking against the worry of finding himself blank. Philosophy is 
regarded as a violence done to ordinary language, attempting to stem the flow of 
interruptions of the self that constitute language use (Eldridge ‘Criticism and the risk of 
the self’ 96). Wittgenstein seems by contrast already to inhabit, even be weighed down 
by, his own voice. It threatens to reveal too much about himself, as much of the 
correspondence in Monk’s Duty of Genius shows. Often Wittgenstein is trying to 
understand and resist the urge to escape himself into philosophy and the respite 
(absolution or rest) this offers, which must paradoxically be both justifiable to himself 
and beyond justification. Wittgenstein seems to feel the pull of philosophy as a spell 
cast by language and culture as a whole, a deeply felt urge, where Cavell’s search for 
attunement remains more everyday (though not necessarily in conflict with 
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Wittgenstein’s own concerns), characterised by the individual utterances, or claims on 
us, made by others in our language (Timothy Gold ‘The Literal Truth’ 163). Perhaps 
what marks the starkest difference between these two writers, whose parallels are often 
very valuable, is Wittgenstein’s powerful sense of ‘decency’ – a recurring theme in 
Culture and Value (e.g.: 11e, 35e, 51e, 58e, 85e) and his correspondence. This is a 
notion was arguably more pressing for someone of Wittgenstein’s cultural background, 
standing in contrast to concerns of authenticity that predominate Cavell’s more 
individualistic thinking, and indeed much contemporary and confessional poetry. While 
there is not the space here to adequately analyse the difference between these drives, I 
would note that Wittgenstein’s decency, while on the surface a more conservative 
attitude, incorporates a sense of obligation to one’s society, ethics and practices (or the 
failing in this) that is extremely powerful. Wittgenstein’s inability or refusal to escape 
himself, to think other than through his own person, even in philosophy (Badiou 
Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy 88 – though here conceived more socially and 
historically than Badiou allows) provides strong parallels with the conflicted self of 
Jorie Graham’s poetry, as well as the cultural and religious concerns of John Burnside 
and Kei Miller.  
In my own practice I find the idioms of my ordinary expression inescapable without risk 
to my ‘decency’, which is one reason for the language used: conversational and 
conventional, but with moments of misformation as the pictures of everyday English 
become unserviceable, or a translation from another language better strikes the required 
note (PI §6). I have tried to skirt the boundaries between an imagined ekstasis of verbal 
excess and the risk of becoming leaden (though this often where poetry is most 
revealing – ‘Laurence Goldstein ‘What Does “Experiencing Meaning” Mean?’ 119). 
The point of the poems, though frequently personal or philosophical, is also a 
confirmation of my own joy in finding expressions that refresh but still fit the language 
available to me. As John Mole admits, sometimes it is as simple as feeling at home and 
‘most adventurous when making patterns out of language, surprising myself with its 
possibilities as the writing takes shape or risking a radical change of gear if it doesn’t’ 
(‘Poetry, Jazz and the Sound of Surprise’ 210). This admission is a kind of decency, I 
think, and one that makes the writing of Wallace Stevens, in his world of orderliness 
and imagination, fantastical language and ordinary pleasures, so attractive, and such a 
useful parallel for Wittgenstein’s work. Similarly, Kei Miller’s use of multiple linguistic 
registers in not only an extension of his poetic toolkit, but the recognition of an 
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obligation, or the creation of hybrid literature that aspires to be both specific and 
accessible. Both writers create new frames of song or strange syntax, through which 
something else about the world is revealed. In the end, this is what prevents poetry from 
merely talking to itself - ‘What poetry mustn’t do’ (Bernard O’Donoghue ‘Poetry’s 
Concern’ 222) – but also from spoiling itself by moralising or overstating intellectual 
points (CV 62e). Instead this is poetry talking through itself – its heritage, practice and 
potential.  
Through the different aspects of the inexpressible encountered in this thesis, the 
importance of seeing each as a practice, or providing reminders of the patterns and 
forms of life that scaffold our meaning or failure to mean, I have attempted to show the 
advantages of this reading of Wittgenstein, avoiding the extremes of both theory and 
therapy, and emphasising the sensuousness and flexibility of language that poetry 
thrives on. This has also shown how important poetry and the arts are for a truly 
integrated understanding of Wittgenstein, that aesthetics are ‘interwoven into the fabric 
of his main body of philosophical work to the extent of undercutting its purported 
subdisciplinary demarcation’ (Eran Gunter ‘Critical Study: An Inadvertent Nemesis – 
Wittgenstein and Contemporary Aesthetics’ 299). Further, Wittgenstein’s thinking can 
open new readings of poetry of his own time and today, providing inspiration for and 
critiques of form, metaphor and creativity.  
In pursuit of this, the thesis has paid attention to a variety of approaches and contexts, in 
a way that reflects Perloff’s notion of a Wittgensteinian text as ‘alternately anecdotal 
and aphoristic, repetitive and disjunctive, didactic and jokey, self-assertive and self-
cancelling’ (Wittgenstein’s Ladder 66). Ultimately, the perfect expression of the 
inexpressible would say nothing at all about it, only reveal, to the attentive reader, the 
unsayable within the practice: ‘if only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then 
nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be – unutterably – contained in what has been 
uttered’ (Wittgenstein, Letter to Paul Engelmann 09/04/1917).  
Finally, perhaps, a practice or a poem must be left to speak for itself. 
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Appendix A:The Wittgenstein Vector 
Preface 
 
Imagine yourself a landscape 
clothed in soil crossed by paths 
asking to be judged to be followed 
 
not a word a map 
understood like bird-flight 
except heard before or a portrait 
of the unobserved framed 
 
what resides in nonsense 
in more glory its jingles numbered 
than saying nothing   
 
and yet what is unsaid 
you speak when you cease 
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1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. 
 
I should very much like to feel absolutely safe 
as though the world were wrapped in a duvet 
muffling the noise of traffic, impossible to disturb. 
An infinity of being between fresh sheets. 
 
I would need to be assured that no part, not even 
a toe, would protrude from cover into daylight, 
that bird noises exist only within 
the perimeter of my perception. I could sleep 
 
as cleanly as an algorithm, replicating days, 
everything proven true. I would know 
that I know the precision of breathing, this world 
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1.2 The world divides into facts. 
 
The conductor’s nod barely disturbs  
the brim of his hat – worn to a shine 
by years of thumbing down, 
donned only for closed rehearsals –  
sends a swoop 
more ready than the sea 
through the coop of woodwinds, 
pearling their hooms and hums  
into the new-drummed wave, 
until the rushed choir rises,  
translated between knife lips 
into a flourish of seabirds, 
rising   
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2.014 Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs.  
 
I would pick up an orange 
if it would bring you home 
if it amended the world 
embanked its rivers 
I would dot it with cloves 
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2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense 
would depend on whether another proposition was true.  
 
(2.02111    This, once known could cast  
                  a reassuring shadow, a sundial by which to carry out 
                  measurements. 
2.02112     Though the truth of this  
                  depended on the position on of the sun  
                  which depends on the time of day. 
2.021121   The sun moves in accordance with the mechanism 
                  of my wristwatch. 
2.02113     The adulation of the dawn chorus remains  
                  independent of my waking to witness it. 
2.021131    I am locked in a room with thick curtains.  
                  The arguments of birds do not disturb me. 
2.02114     I should like to move  
                  out of the sun 
    proposition to proposition.  
2.02115     It would be possible to make sense  
                  in the light of my attention  
   which is the sun. 
2.02116     In dreams I could not picture myself  
                  though I am confident of my presence.) 
2.0212       It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world  
                  (true or false). 
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2.1 We make to ourselves pictures of facts.  
 
Your life opening like a court-case, 
speeches and wigs, the indentation 
of gavel on wood. Cars and horses move 
like cardboard cut-outs over maps 
under your serious hands. “This is approximate.” 
There will be judgement. If you call  
upon a witness they will reconstruct  
events, bricks in the piers of a bridge. 
At the back of the room, an artist 
perches, laying down your likeness 
for the next case. You offer 
your profile, and she does the same, 
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3.26 The name cannot be analysed further by any definition.  









          the rope catches 
    
                 muscles of plaster  
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3.324. Thus there easily arise the most fundamental confusions (of which 
the whole of philosophy is full).  
 
What it would be like to walk 
the firmness and the roots 
of a lengthening forest 
between the thighs of mountains 
prickling the very tendrils 
of a twilight sky, each foot  
pressed into the give and tension 
of a red soil, one hand slipping 
over the trunks of still-warm trees  
the other holding up a picture 
of bricked city traffic, just high 
and steady enough to sheet  
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4 The thought is the significant proposition.  
 
A trough of bottles after Christmas 
cackles into recycling. 
This t-shirt is a harvest of cat hair. 
 
Quietly, gambling happens among pennies 
and cigar smoke, its memory, 
brown and sofa-solid. 
 
A breathe has the shape 
of the tide in a harbour, 
coddling a jangle of boats. 
 
It is a study of heat. 
Pull a cracker, find the joke 
in the fleet scattering of soot. 
 
A live fish boxed between disgusted palms 
tells futures quick 
as a flick of the tongue. 
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4.2 The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with the 
possibilities of the existence and non-existence of the atomic facts. 
 
You have opened a book 
onto an unread page, a crocodile  
playing peek-a-boo with a child 
 
 
There is a kind of angel, slim and webbed 
  that carries you while you are driving, 
  knife-hands gentle on your shoulders. 
 
 
In 1918, Italy. P.O.W.  
                       P or –P? 
Perhaps written ― 
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5. Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. 
     (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.) 
 
In which truth tries on the white coat and arranges itself 
(according to the atomic weights of words.) 
 
 
The mind collides propositions and writes down the patterns. 
(The energy of a proposition is its cultural velocity.) 
 
 
The world takes the form of an answered riddle. 
(I have seen the high cliffs around Thebes.) 
 
 
Mr Wittgenstein writes folk-music, of cherries with no stones. 
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5.1361 The events of the future cannot be inferred from those of the present. 
Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus.  
 
Feynman’s electron, a loose zipper  
 in the continuum. I was. 
  You remember, you’re there, too. 
 
So I will be nothing else  
 but everything – the condition of movement: 
  fluid white, struck black 
 
a fumbled hanging sky 
 a still exploding ocean. 
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5.254 Operations can vanish (e.g. denial in “~~p”, ~~p = p).  
 
A postcard with pictures on both sides 
is shot into the pillar-box, with a slight 
application of spin  
from the middle and index fingers.  
Alcibiades writes his mash-notes from Persia, 
to long-dead Socrates: wish you 
were here. A wish to eat itself.  
Something  
about the weather, the trousers, dust that cakes eyes, mouths,  
the necks of amphora. He misremembers  
the mountain snows  
of Sparta and his speech  
to the snub-nosed ghost, the love 
half-requited, of the man on the ladder. 
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5.47321   Occam’s razor is, of course, not an arbitrary rule nor one justified 
by its practical success. It simply says that unnecessary elements in a 
symbolism mean nothing. Signs that serve one purpose are logically 
equivalent, and signs that serve none are logically meaningless.  
 
One could imagine a tribe  
(let’s call them ‘us’) whose everyday games  
had no place for notions of forgiving.  
How would this show 
in their baking bread, rose beds,  
shaking hands, and so forth? 
They might instead keep  
tallies of Wrongs, carved 
on civic columns, or clench  
their jaws for a certain length of time 
appropriate to forgetting  
(by some untroubled mechanism)  
Or do we quietly carry  
around our necks these things 
accumulating 
until we no longer sleep 
on our stomachs, for fear  
of suffocating? 
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5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.  
 
A favourite childhood game was always 
to trek to the very edge of the universe  
– a pure curve, somehow blue in all directions –  
to poke an arm (the right one) out. The play  
was to wiggle your fingers, coins in a purse, 
feel them dissolve into protons and neutrons. 
 
In all the times we went I never 
thought to expose my head: too scared 
to look into a world where distance 
never started, ran forever. I wonder 
now, if I had dared to lick the void,  
filled my senses with its ancient trace 
 
would the taste have burned  
my tongue right out 
or it would have been nothing  
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6.1265 Logic can always be conceived to be such that every  
proposition is its own proof. 
 
You say: “tell me   you love me, 
say I love you,”    like a creed 
ladled out    into the ribs 
of a church so    the truth drips 
in, delving    the Onduline heart 
for poor flashing   darts 
into crevices   and pools: 
a thick red    liquid, a cartoon 
of blood.    This is convincing 
(someone    of something) 
a little self-propelling   ceremony 
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6.22 The logic of the world which the propositions of logic show in 
tautologies, mathematics shows in equations. 
 
To calculate how much meat you’ll receive, use this equation: 
 
 
Live weight x dressing percentage x carcass cutting yield = pounds of meat. 
 
For example,  
a 280-pound hog  
butchered to bone-in chops and roasts 
well trimmed, and regular ground pork or ____________ will yield  
 
 280 x (0.72 x 0.74) = 280 x 53% = 148 pounds of meat. 
 
A _____________ hog  
___________ to boneless chops and roasts,  
closely trimmed, and lean __________ pork or sausage will yield 
 
 _____ x (0.72 x 0.65) = ________ x 47% = 132 pounds of meat. 
 
A 280-pound ________  
butchered to boneless _________ and ____________,  
closely trimmed, and lean ground pork or sausage will __________ 
 
 280 x (0.72 x 0.65) = 280 x 47% = _____________ m___. 
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6.36111 The Kantian problem of the right and left hand which cannot be 
made to cover one another already exists in the plane, and even in one -
dimensional space; where the two congruent figures a and b cannot be made 
to cover one another without moving them out of this  space. 
The right and left hand are in fact completely congruent. And the fact that 
they cannot be made to cover one another has nothing to do with it.  
 
----o                         x--x                        o---- 
                 a               b 
 




Butting on moonrock, shaping craters with the hammer-ball 
   the cappuccino froth of breeze blocks 
      puffs away gritting windows and glasses 
         in a windless chill wet socket of daytime 
            all torque and swing and outbreath hoofing 
               a ringing cracking blue sure imprint into dust 
                  caught twice, three, four faces broken free 
                    leaning off meekly, slowly into crumbed turf 
                       soundless and helpless solid stone  
                          gone 
the way of it, frozen at the elbow 
   a pile, then, a sacked city claiming at least 
      there were blisters on the left palm of it 
         turned at the wrist’s parabola; absent, dirty 
            a slice rucked back to obsecrate disorder  
               done, space lit up with itself, an unnecked bottle 
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                  and then knowing, not knowing, 
                     when to stop. 
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7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.  
        
Where have you been  Are you  alone 
 How did you  imagine it  
 How did you   manage  
How do you   feel now It  is me 
Is it painful   still When was  the last time 
Is it the   same ache Are  you an expert 
Do you remember  
  Will you be  coming home 
Will you hold   me tonight Would you like to lose yourself 
Does this change anything  
Are these your   hands A big  joke, huh 
  Did any of  this make sense to you 
Did you like   the pictures 
How do you   think I feel Is this the first time 
Do you want   to be punished Are you a kind person 
Do you like   that Where were  you last night 
Do you trust   me Is it  true 
Was it an   accident Why can’t  you sleep 
How often  Are your dreams your own 
Do you know   the situation Does  it show 
 Do you object Why you 
Is it correctly  spiced Is there  enough nutmeg 
Is that a  line you’d cross Do you always react like that 
Have you ever   wondered what you’d  do with all that freedom 
  Is that red or blue 
Was it ever  love What else  is there 
 Who else is  there  
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
274 
 
Since when have   you believed any  of this nonsense 
Are you happy  Why don’t you  stop 
Why can’t you   look at me Is it tactical 
Wouldn’t you like    to know 
 Did you say  something 
Don’t you care  Have you never  worried yourself insane 
Isn’t it inevitable  Are you sure  it’s safe 
What if it’s   never enough What  if it’s a boy 
Have you been  good Is it  the rice pudding 
Are you stressed Are you scared Are you satisfied  
  Are you happy 
Are you free What did you  decide 
Is it delicious  Is it over 
Are these my  hands Did you  eat the plums from the icebox 
Can you hear  me 
What did I   tell you 
Haven’t we done  this before Are  you happy 
Do you miss  me Was it  cancer 
Are you talking  to me Could  one compose a sentence  
whose meaning was  perfectly determined  without reference to 
its context Would  you like to  stay for coffee 
What’s the next   move Are you  happy 
Do you think  I am complicated Do you think 
  Are you listening  
  




Appendix B: Still Life with 
Promises 
In what sense does an order anticipate its execution?    




Is it unwillingness to move your feet 
through the tall fescue that keeps you standing 
a little further off, your chat a beat 
behind an easy laugh, your responding 
kept becalmed, your profile like a plate. 
Or does something spring-like and incomplete 
in my gestures – which always come too late  
or too early for my words – only meet 
you at a glancing angle,  flick your cheek 
like a bluebottle? I’d lay arguments  
out beneath the trees,  and let reason speak 
unhampered by a heart, or just invent 
jagged animal noises. But you lay 
unmoved as a blue jar of mayonnaise, 
beyond persuasion – or I might say 
a stranger swaying in the summer haze.   
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   “I know” and “You can rely on it”. But one cannot always 
substitute the latter for the former. 
(On Certainty §561) 
How is it you    resist 
being clutched    through your words 
through your gestures   that own you 
more than you    own them 
 
Your simple movements   express 
holding     something or too much 
honesty and I know    all I am likely to know 
everything    as if that were everything 
 
I have the feeling you are   yet to break the rules  
to speak     nonsense  
 
The curious thing    is the blame  
I can’t help place on you   for my helplessness 
like a bag     full of done necessities 
that should spill   in the right hands 
 
Or is it    even a question that  
the fault     is not  
the length     of my arms but 
the brightness     of my reflection  
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The thing I would most dread… that you could take it for granted that I was deluded. 
(Conversations with Wittgenstein, Drury. p 166) 
 
It is as formal as showing  
a snow-goose around the house: 
up and down encumbering stairs 
hissy of cat-plucked splinters in the spindles 
fluffing up against the bathroom-cold. 
 
Afterwards, I sit. 
A medieval devil’s head 
carved in wood 
tilts between my hands. 
I cover his eyes to keep him calm, 
his stumpy tongue pressing against my palm. 
 
You are upstairs 
still in dressing-gown and bed-socks 
beneath the quilt beneath the quilt, 
steaming exhaustion into baggy sheets. 
I hammer tea into bone-china cups 
and touch the damp feathers on the carpet, 
spooked by the tightness of the sound, the rattle of teeth. 
  





Your hands clamp on it tight 
closed off like a tooth 
  Is this what entitles you  
  to call it your own 
  as though the sight 
  of it were theft 
A code understood unseen 
a deathwatch  
beetle knocking  
its way through the beams of a house 
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Our motto might be: “Let us not be bewitched”.  
(Zettel §690) 
   
Arion vulgaris 
A slug clings  
to the kitchen floor 
tight as glaze on a pot. 
 
The slug is not of the kitchen floor, 
nor part of it, nor a late sophistication 
of the kitchen floor. It has erupted into your morning. 
 
A realisation yet to take  
its first breath pecks  
above your left eye (a precise and necessary hole). 
 
It would be impossible to imagine 
the slug toppling onto its side. 
 It resides and glistens. 
 
Could you interrupt this strange, undulating, honest thing –   
 catch it between finger and thumb  
like a mother bird tending her hatchlings? 
 
Could you stamp it flat – feet 
barely feeling the give and the suck – 
and flick it into the mosses under the fridge? 




It would be easier to imagine the end 
of capitalism,  or taking tea with that god 
 you saw once, hanging his umbrella on the back of your door. 
  





It is raining, and I say it is raining. 
I believe myself. 
My descriptions are clear, my delivery perfect. 
So believable am I 
that the window is cut with droplets 
and the grass outside lays itself flat. 
If I were to go outside, 
I would even get wet. 
 
 
It has been written, and I have read it. 
I make it believable 
with my best belief. 
The butterfly is pinned so precisely 
to the board, that you could not be mistaken. 
Its colours are dignified with names. 
If I were to breathe on it 
I would expect it to fly away. 
 
 
There is a curtain and I have drawn it. 
I have built a fence  
with nothing on the other side. 
Here is a hand    my own hand   
that built it.  Certainly,  
with this hand 
I shrink the world;   
I possess it, like a coin.  
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      Suppose someone were to say: “Imagine this 
butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful”?! 
   (Zettel §199) 
 
Is it a matter of well-buffed lenses, or tight-fitting silhouettes? 
Work hard, do the work required  
comb up storm-clouds and burry skies  
pin-boards for your specimen. 
 
Focus on the wing smeared in walnut juice; 
dropped crystals and stitches, the 
rot-steeped edges, a browning cancer. 
The apical vantage point or perfect map  
 
would surely show you the surface 
(the slip in detail, the tightening of light). 
Make this your quarter of interpretation. 
You might imagine reading circuit diagrams  
 
from an unknown science. You might enjoy 
the myth of a mental process  
purring, the way cash machines rattle  
counting out money.  
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Need one imagine it in order to mimic it?   
(Philosophical Investigations §450) 
 
If one could only repeat oneself 
by some sound or symbol 
into believing in a pain 
imagined in a curtained room; 
 
If one could only repeat oneself 
like a paper-chain of dancers, each  
stepping from the outline 
of a possible first page; 
 
If one could only repeat 
the bluff, crumbed sounds 
of wind catching the backs 
of one’s ears, like this 
 
could one repeat 
oneself into a faith, 
an authorised self-possession, 
the expression of an unwavering eye? 
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Eulogy with omissions 
 
Interestingly, you’re alive as I write this, still ____________ even  
      still in colour, but it seems 
      I need  
      to write out 
your ghostliness, solidity, pipe-smoker’s tarred top pocket 
      the reek of nostalgia.  
      I can  
      hardly be a ___________ 
of a certain type without that hard-to-remember figure,  
      (a radio 
      rambling in the  
      kitchen.)  
Am I too ______________? 
      Are you  
      not yet set,  
      tree-glass  
patient for the burr of memory? I could see you  
      object,  
      if I showed you  
      this  now 
and see the motion of it: the head a fraction back, furrows  
      stacking above eyebrows,  
      mouth 
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gently open (about half an inch), page at three-quarter arm’s ______________ 
      two fingers 
      a thumb.  
Your nails need cutting.  
      You might read  
      this aloud –  
      a barked ‘cello 
before handing it back with a barely imitable widening of the eyes. 
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And how will he know again in the future what remembering feels like?   
(Philosophical Investigations §231) 
 
 
Something new to learn 
my name grazed. 
She gazed up into his wild eyebrows, a forest of intellect, 
wishing to burrow her way in, shelter like a hedgehog. 
My writing scattering 
strung metal, a harp imploding. 
“Joe,” she whispered, “My sweet cockroach, Joe…” 
Writing: this ethics of moderation. 
He held her close against his rock-like chest.  
“For you, I will bend time to my will, the will of the 
people.” 
A puffball of marginalia. 
Joe slowly turned to her, until her whole vision  
was filled by his muscular moustache. 
To say nothing 
should come as easily, 
shouldn’t it?  
How much she longed to serve him, like a sick dog, her 
Ryaboi! 
Photo album full 








His hand, that state-crafting hand, rested  
Locked  on her cabbage-white shoulder. The power ran through 
her, like liquid steel. 
in a library 
“One star-crossed love affair,” he whispered with pale-blue passion, “is a tragedy. One 
million, a statistic.”49 
 
  
                                                             
49 Text in Italics taken from “In the Heat of Proletarian Revolutionary Literature”, Josef Besoshvili, M&B: 
1953. 





: a prayer for the replication of the self 
bunkered a millimetre beneath original skin, 
fallen out of air into fat and the roots 
of tiny hairs. A perfect tattoo  
might re-inscribe itself, line drawing over  
line, tunnelling towards marrow, each layer  
relayed in rising tinnitus of needles.  
Look here, he grins, rolling up a sleeve and slapping  
an bicep with two sure fingers. And I see a man  
with one sleeve up, grinning, two fingers on unyielding  
muscle, and by him my inked double  
staring at the picture of another exposed arm.  
My sketched stance dangles between  
art’s finitude and the blue-smoke smell  
of the reservoir beneath, this craft 
as personal as sweat 
 writes depth into this parchment. 
I feel giddy in its closeness, as if placing  
my thumb over this Peeping Tom 
would blur me out  
of this bar, this table, these shoes, 
tight, into a new, unreadable skin. 
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Bangor, Maine from 36,000 feet 
 
A hare, a stag, a bat, a bear 
 risen drunkenly to its hind legs –  
  I invert the old game  
   of spotting dragons in the clouds. 
 
   Snow lakes in the shapes 
     of deer and rushing fire 
     freeze every hollow into motion. 
     This landscape runs  
   corrected of its permanence. 
    
   My carrier drops  
  its hurrying shadow 
 over country that dreams  
the return of ice. 
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6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when he has used the, - as 
steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he 
has climbed up it.) 




Here I am speaking 
like the spring in a clock 
running down. 




to quell, to dominate or eliminate. 
Each its own movement of the tongue 
its courtroom. 
Wigs and gowns. 
Do I know how to go on? 
Doors open 
the room rises. 
  
Wittgenstein and Poetry: Negotiations of the Inexpressible.        M. D. Rose-Steel 
292 
 
We have our conversations 
 
between the words,  
 
with stuttering gestures that pass  
 
through         targets or clutch for 
 
an arm already fallen, 
 
it isn’t  the same, it’s nothing like it 
 
nothing like a mistake. or a headache 
 
snatched into bone. can’t you fix 
 
that damn light?  you ask, pointing at 
 
my chest, then     the steam from the 
kettle as 
 
I have crossed to the fridge;              
tea? 
 
which of these words will rattle in my 
throat 
 





along Cambridge streets, 
Wittgenstein jumping 
 
from one topic of logic to the next 
 
as if his thoughts are string arrows 
 
and coil themselves about, 
suffocating  
 
 any                 resolution. you don’t 
see it 
 
at all. I couldn’t say it, nor      its 
denial. it’s  
 
 not a contradiction: a syllable of 
nonsense,  
 
 your co-ordinates within a  gesture 
towards 
 
a witless outer boundary.        the 
tightness of 
 
how one might feel; a world 
 
I express in gears and switches 
 
which can break, not unlock, a 
silence 
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